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On - June , a Conference under the heading “Central Banks in the 21st Century” was organised in Madrid to commemorate the 150th anniver-
sary of the adoption of the name Banco de España by the Spanish Central Bank. 
The Conference was held under the term of office of my predecessor, Jaime Caru-
ana, who provided firm backing for the event and followed the preparation of the 
programme and all related organisational work very closely. 
The Conference enabled participants to discuss in depth and with a long-term 
perspective the main issues surrounding central banking today in the areas of mon-
etary policy, payment systems and financial stability. A discussion on current mac-
roeconomic imbalances and their impact on world economic trends, with particu-
lar focus on central banks’ tasks, added an appropriate shorter-term perspective of 
present economic policy challenges to the programme. 
This volume presents the Conference proceedings which, I believe, will contrib-
ute to promoting discussion and understanding of the main challenges currently 
facing central banks and, hopefully, to inspiring possible policy-making improve-
ments. We appreciate the outstanding contributions of all those who participated 
in the symposium, helping shed light on very complex and relevant topics. Finally, 
let me convey my special thanks to all the staff involved in the design and organisa-
tion of the conference. 
Foreword
Miguel Fernández Ordóñez
Governor of the Banco de España

This book contains papers and proceedings from the Conference organ-ised on 8-9 June 2006 to celebrate the 150th anniversary of the adoption of 
the name Banco de España by the Spanish Central Bank. On this occasion, dis-
tinguished public officials, central bankers, academics and financial market par-
ticipants met in Madrid to exchange views on the changes in the role played by 
central banks in the recent past and the challenges ahead in the new century. The 
Conference permitted participants to discuss in depth the main issues currently 
shaping the monetary policy debate, along with other matters of great relevance to 
central bankers. In particular, the programme included sessions on Payment and 
Security Settlement Systems and Financial Stability. Moreover, there was a panel 
discussion on how current macroeconomic imbalances affected the economic out-
look and the extent to which this was relevant for central banks. In what follows 
we summarise the papers presented and the discussions held at the Conference. 
Monetary Policy
In the session on monetary policy, chaired by Governor Jaime Caruana, Alan 
Blinder presented an issues note dealing with up to sixteen relevant questions. The 
paper contained what proved to be relatively uncontroversial arguments in favour 
of collegial monetary policy decision-making committees, the involvement of central 
banks in banking supervision, the gradualist approach for interest rate decisions, the 
need to lead rather than follow markets and other issues. The commentators, however, 
focused their remarks on a few questions on which they presented their own nuances 
or sometimes contradictory views. These mainly related to the objective function of 
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central banks, the selection of core versus headline inflation as a target variable, the 
limits to central bank transparency and the extent to which monetary policy should 
take into account relevant financial developments, such as asset price bubbles. 
Regarding the loss function for central banks, Blinder made a case for central 
banks becoming more transparent about their policy objectives. In that respect he 
set out different practical and theoretical arguments which, in his view, would ad-
vise central banks to adopt something close to a quadratic loss function in which 
both inflation and unemployment (or output) deviations from target would ap-
pear as arguments. He would however accept that, in a systemic crisis scenario, 
central banks should depart from the regular objective function and give priority 
to financial stability considerations.
Governor Vítor Constâncio expressed reservations on the proposal to ask cen-
tral banks to make explicit their own loss functions. First, using results by Michael 
Woodford, he highlighted several theoretical points. In particular, he reminded 
the audience that a loss function between inflation and the output gap was only a 
good approximation to consumers’ welfare under specific assumptions, such as the 
absence of frictions other than sticky prices and the presence of cost-push shocks. 
Moreover, he recalled the practical difficulties of deriving robust estimates of the 
output gap. As a consequence, he preferred central banks not to be committed to 
a specific loss function or to a concrete instrument rule. ECB Vicepresident Lucas 
Papademos considered that the quadratic loss function proposed by Alan Blinder 
did not permit a realistic description of central bankers’ behaviour and introduced 
unnecessary constraints. In particular, he stressed that the ECB did use a hierarchical 
ordering of objectives – in which price stability had an overriding importance – and 
recalled the underlying proposition that, in general, price stability contributed 
to reducing output volatility.
A second issue, related to some extent to the previous one, was the use of either 
headline or core inflation in the definition of central bank objectives. Blinder pre-
sented three arguments in favour of using a core inflation measure: lack of control-
lability of non-core components of CPI (such as oil or unprocessed food), better 
predictability of the core (less volatile) components and a better contribution by core 
inflation targets to sensible monetary policy in the face of supply shocks. The latter 
point stemmed from the relatively uncontroversial fact that central banks should not 
react to the direct effect of adverse oil shocks on headline CPI but only to second-
round effects, the sole effects that would be captured by the core measure.
Constâncio voiced some sympathy for Alan Blinder’s conceptual arguments. He 
added that from a welfare standpoint it made sense to ask monetary authorities 
to attach greater importance to developments in the more rigid components of 
CPI, such as services, than to components whose prices change more flexibly, such 
as energy, and which were typically outside standard measures of core inflation. 
He nevertheless contended that the use of core inflation targets entailed practi-
Introduction: conference summary 13
Santiago Fernández de Lis and Fernando R
estoy
cal and communication difficulties outweighing the potential advantages. These 
difficulties were spelled out by Papademos, who mentioned that there were two 
major requirements for the choice of the policy-relevant measure of inflation: 
first, relevance; and second, lack of arbitrariness in its definition. He argued that 
core inflation measures fell short in both aspects. Moreover, he recalled that core 
inflation was sometimes a poor leading indicator of the relevant headline (CPI) 
inflation. As for policy, he considered that a medium-term orientation of central 
bank’s actions sufficed to avoid excessive reaction to transitory supply shocks of 
the type described by Alan Blinder.
A third aspect that aroused much debate was the issue of transparency. 
Blinder’s issues note presented the very powerful arguments in favour of central 
banks’ transparency, which support the current general consensus on this matter. 
He saw transparency as required to guarantee both the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, which clearly depended on the ability of central banks to steer expecta-
tions, and the democratic accountability of independent monetary authorities. 
Moreover, he paraphrased Einstein to state that “Every central bank should be as 
transparent as possible, but no more so”. He saw only limitedly effective bounds to 
transparency and stressed that, although most central banks had considerably in-
creased transparency in the recent past, most of them still revealed too little infor-
mation on their own forecasts. In particular, he criticised the practice by most cen-
tral banks of making their published forecasts conditional upon exogenous interest 
rate assumptions. In his view, this approach might be subject to inconsistency, lack 
of transparency and potential instability problems. As an alternative, he proposed 
formulating conditional monetary policy plans running over the regular forecast-
ing horizon (as did the central banks of Norway and New Zealand), and publish-
ing those plans as part of a fully consistent set of macroeconomic projections.
This latter idea was criticised by commentators who otherwise agreed with the 
general principles in favour of transparency. In particular, both Constâncio and 
Papademos remarked that projections based on market interest rates were both 
internally consistent and transparent. The latter speaker also mentioned that the 
uncertainty surrounding any prospective path for future policy rates was so great 
that conveying such information to the public would hardly enhance clarity. 
Moreover, he noted the difficulties for a collegiate policy body to agree on a con-
crete policy path and to convey the relevant uncertainty to the public. More im-
portantly, he considered it would be very problematic to prevent the public from 
perceiving the published path as a sort of pre-commitment device and warned of 
the risks this perception could pose for the credibility of the central bank.
Finally, all speakers devoted a significant part of their presentations to express-
ing views on the implications of financial stability considerations for monetary 
policy actions. Blinder argued that central banks should have a relevant role in 
safeguarding financial stability. He nonetheless saw no compelling reason for 
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monetary authorities to include asset prices (or deviation of assets prices from fun-
damentals) in their objective functions and argued that the central bank was not 
responsible for misguided investment decisions. He also mentioned that asset bub-
bles could not be identified ex-ante and that even if they were, the central bank 
had no instruments to correct them. In these conditions, an attempt by a central 
bank to contain what it thought was a speculative bubble would most likely be in-
effective and lead to suboptimal outcomes in terms of output and inflation. As an 
alternative, he defended the mop-up strategy under which central banks should only 
be ready to react as aggressively as needed – by loosening policy – if and when the 
bubble bursts. The approach followed by the Fed in the recent 1998-2000 stock 
market episode was, in his view, a successful example of how the ex-post mop-up 
strategy could suffice to avoid a serious economic downturn after a bubble burst.
Papademos argued that a mop-up strategy, though it might have worked well in 
specific episodes, was not always enough to prevent sharp reversals that potentially 
entailed very high costs in terms of macroeconomic stability. This provided a jus-
tification for central banks to adopt a prudent policy approach of leaning against 
the wind in certain exceptional episodes. While he would agree that bubbles were 
normally difficult to predict, it was relevant that episodes of abnormal asset price 
behaviour should tend to be associated with excessive money creation. In that con-
nection, he stressed that although the ECB did not target asset prices, it carefully 
monitored capital markets and money and credit developments. That improved its 
ability to assess longer-term risks for price stability stemming from financial devel-
opments. Constâncio was also less sceptical than Blinder on the ability of monetary 
policy to respond, in specific circumstances, to exceptional financial developments. 
He mentioned in that regard the available evidence showing that price stability did 
not guarantee financial stability and emphasised that an environment with low rates 
and anchored inflation expectations could actually lead to excessive asset demand.
In that connection, Raghuram Rajan described a number of channels through 
which institutional investors’ appetite for risk tended to be high in a low interest rate 
environment. He commented that, when riskless returns were not high enough, fund 
managers’ remuneration schemes tended to make them more willing to obtain high-
er returns by taking up risky assets and to increase leverage. Moreover, those manag-
ers had incentives to make the extra returns look like the result of their professional 
ability (alpha) rather than the consequence of normal market remuneration of the 
extra (beta) risk undertaken. Investment in instruments (such as credit derivatives or 
emerging market debt) facing tail risk could help in that respect. Finally, he stressed 
that this type of behaviour spread very easily from one professional investor to an-
other as they were typically subject to a sort of herd behaviour. All those remarks 
pointed, at the very least, to a potentially relevant new transmission channel of mon-
etary policy impulses that, unlike the credit channel, did not operate through banks 
but through financial markets. This author also called for a careful reflection on all 
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possible effects of a prolonged period of low interest rates on agents’ behaviour and 
the extent to which they could be relevant for monetary policy decision-making.
In his lecture entitled “Activism and alertness in monetary policy”, ECB Presi-
dent Jean-Claude Trichet dealt with core issues regarding actions and communi-
cation by monetary authorities against the background of the ECB experience. 
He first criticised standard measures of policy activism based on the volatility of 
policy-relevant interest rates. In particular, he contended that the word activism 
was a strategic concept and should be assigned to the policy approach followed 
by central banks that were “constantly endeavouring to be faithful to [their] ob-
jective”. Moreover, he stressed that an activist policy could be consistent with dif-
ferent policy paths as the concrete policy actions undertaken by an activist central 
bank depended very much on a number of structural and conjunctural factors, 
such as the size and nature of the shocks impacting the economy, the degree of 
price and wage rigidities, and the credibility of the price-stability objective. On 
that basis, he argued that the ECB’s policy was not less activist than the FED 
in response to the economic slowdown initiated in early 2001. The smaller re-
duction of interest rates performed by the ECB was a logical consequence of the 
clearer predominance of supply shocks in Europe and the greater rigidity of the 
economy. In those conditions sharp policy adjustments were more likely to gen-
erate excessive output volatility. Furthermore, he recalled that the monetary ac-
commodation went far beyond what could have been expected judging by past 
experiences in Europe, as the ECB was able to reduce interest rates to levels prac-
tically unprecedented in the last 50 years. This could only be accomplished in a 
context in which inflation expectations remained anchored at levels compatible 
with price stability. In this connection, Trichet attributed much of the success 
in keeping inflation expectations under control to the reputation gained by the 
ECB of following a “recurrent pattern of behaviour”. Communication had played 
an important role in that respect as it helped to convey the clear message that the 
ECB was never pre-committed to unconditional moves but adhered to a steady 
alertness strategy which permitted policy to be permanently at the correct level to 
attain the price stability goal.
Payment and Securities Settlement Systems
The session on payment and securities settlement systems, chaired by ECB 
Executive Board Member Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, focused largely on aspects 
related to the prospects for financial integration in Europe framed in the ongoing 
developments in the global financial system.
The presentation by Anthony Santomero offered a comparative overview of 
the evolution of both retail and wholesale payment systems on both sides of the 
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Atlantic. Santomero compared first the extensive use of Giro systems and the rela-
tively limited use of paper cheques in Europe with the opposite situation in the 
US, where the paper cheque was the vehicle used in half of all non-cash transac-
tions. He explained that the discrepancy was a consequence of a number of eco-
nomic and institutional factors, including the different way the banking indus-
try was organised: while very fragmented in the US, it was dominated by a small 
number of large banks in most European countries. He also stressed the different 
role of central banks. In Europe, central banks had played a role in promoting 
electronic giro systems and had acted as the regulator of payment systems. In the 
case of the Fed, these types of functions had been combined with an active role as 
service provider in a context in which there had historically been restrictions on 
banks cooperating with each other on developing common infrastructures.
Concerning wholesale payment systems, Santomero indicated that the discrepan-
cies were much smaller, as the ESCB was operating a real-time gross settlement sys-
tem (TARGET) not dissimilar to FEDWIRE, created soon after the foundation of 
the US Federal Reserve in 1913. However, he identified a few discrepancies between 
infrastructures. In particular, he mentioned the different solutions given to meeting 
the liquidity needs of these systems. While Fedwire allowed for non-collateralised 
daylight overdrafts that were limited essentially by caps and self-regulation, Eurosys-
tem central banks did not impose any quantitative restrictions but required over-
drafts to be fully collateralised. In his view, however, the trend was clearly towards 
convergence. In the US, market forces were prompting more electronic clearing and 
fewer paper-based transactions. Moreover, it was very likely that Fedwire would rely 
more heavily on collateral – thereby resembling TARGET – in the future.
Tumpel-Gugerell gave an overview of the current situation of and challenges 
for the integration of payment and securities settlement systems in Europe. She 
summarised the steps undertaken for the integration of large-value and retail pay-
ments. The creation of TARGET initiated a process of consolidation of RTGS 
systems that would be further enhanced by TARGET 2, as it would provide the 
potential for further cost reductions. For retail payments, the Single European 
Payment Area (SEPA) initiative, although initiated by the private sector, had been 
actively supported by the Eurosystem. That project would imply the creation of 
standardised European payment schemes that would promote efficiency gains for 
end-users through a combination of better and cheaper services. She nevertheless 
considered that, in order to take full advantage of technological innovation, fur-
ther standardisation was necessary. Moreover, what was required in her view was 
the enlargement of the market for payment services through more cashless transac-
tions and the supply of value-added services to customers.
Those issues were also covered by Governor Christian Noyer in his interven-
tion. Regarding wholesale payments he added a reflection on the interaction be-
tween TARGET 2 and Securities Settlement Systems. He raised the question of 
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whether TARGET 2 should support a wide range of interaction models to foster 
competition between systems or should instead limit the interaction models to 
only one in the long run. He stressed that in the latter case the Eurosystem could 
only select the most efficient interaction model. As regarded retail payments, he 
highlighted the uncertainty surrounding the future structure of the retail payment 
industry, which ranged from a single infrastructure operating as a natural monop-
oly to competition between several systems. He also found it important to strike 
the right balance between encouraging the adaptation of payment systems to tech-
nological innovation and ensuring the safety of payments. Moreover, Noyer con-
sidered it necessary to strengthen business continuity requirements, and identified 
two challenges in that regard: to respect cost-efficiency and to seek consistency 
between different relevant regulations. He finally dealt with the role of the Eu-
rosystem in this field. He recalled that the European central banks were payment 
service providers, facilitators of market and regulatory developments, and overse-
ers, and stated that there was scope for further involvement in all three aspects.
In the field of securities settlement, Tumpel-Gugerell referred in her intro-
ductory remarks to the need for an integrated infrastructure. At the same time, 
she considered that the process in that direction was slow but continuous. She 
highlighted in that regard the arrangements for cross-border use of collateral in 
the Eurosystem and the reduction in the number of central counterparties and 
central securities depositaries. Furthermore, she argued against a single model for 
achieving integration. Rather, she embraced the concept of interoperability that 
encompassed the concept of vertical and horizontal integration and required the 
cooperation of all private and public interested players. Finally, Tumpel-Gugerell 
considered that although the integration process should be market-driven, au-
thorities had a role to play. She said that this role was on one hand to correct 
market failures and on the other to remove legal and fiscal barriers to integration.
Alberto Giovannini expanded on this set of issues. He remarked that an EU 
financial system was not currently in place. Although there was no prohibition 
on trading between EU Member States, there were significant impediments and 
costs to cross-border financial transactions. The latter were reflected in different 
technical standards, market conventions, rules and regulations that were country-
specific. The impediments were particularly severe in security clearing and settle-
ment, where national monopoly structures remained. He considered that in that 
area maximum consolidation was justified as a means of taking full advantage of 
economies of scale. Moreover, in his view consolidation also helped mitigate sys-
temic risks, since the impact of the failure of a single entity within an infrastruc-
ture would be smaller as the volume operated through that system increased.
Giovannini agreed with Tumpel-Gugerell that the reform strategy should in-
volve both the public and the private sectors. However, he underlined that this 
approach involved a complex strategic interaction between both. Although he ac-
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knowledged that there had been relevant practical initiatives to remove obstacles 
to integration, he criticised the lack of boldness by public authorities in providing 
the appropriate legal and regulatory framework for European post-trading. Gio-
vannini warned that this might have also slowed down the reform of standards 
and conventions to be undertaken by the private sector. Moreover, he noted that 
the focus had so far been the development of a framework to eliminate barriers to 
cross-border clearing and settlement. Little attention had however been devoted so 
far, in his view, to the structure of the industry (arquitecture). In particular, he saw 
a risk that the consolidation process might ultimately generate a socially-subopti-
mal pan-European natural private monopoly and called, therefore, for regulators 
to monitor the process carefully.
The regulatory issues attracted much attention in the general discussion:
–  Governor Erkki Liikanen enquired about the possibility of using regula-
tion to contain the natural tendency of monopolistic competitors to inflate 
the price of essential services by bundling them with other services more 
open to competition. Giovannini argued that bundling practices might not 
necessarily run against the interest of consumers, since the joint production 
and distribution of several services could yield synergies too. He noted that 
a pricing system conducive to more transparency could be achieved by re-
quiring firms to offer the bundled services separately, as well. Under such 
an arrangement consumers could readily verify whether the price of the 
bundle reflected any underlying synergy or, on the contrary, a distortional 
monopolistic premium. He reasoned, however, that the centrepiece of the 
debate should first be the existing obstacles to stronger integration of clear-
ing and settlement systems in the EU, an issue which, in his view, merited 
more interest than that so far received. 
–  There were also questions on whether there should be a role for the pub-
lic sector in providing some services within an efficient EU-wide payment 
and settlement system. Giovannini argued that those core functions, which 
were necessary for the general sound functioning of the system but were 
not subject to strong technological innovation, might be performed by pub-
lic agencies. As for other activities with larger scope for innovation, he rec-
ommended a stronger role for private participation. In order to avoid a so-
cially suboptimal industrial structure, he proposed implementing a system 
of managerial incentives that placed special emphasis on cost minimisation 
rather than profit maximisation. This proposal could be put into practice by 
giving room to users in the system’s governance boards. 
–  Reflecting on Giovannini’s proposal for a distinction between functions 
with low and high technological content, Santomero voiced his scepticism 
about the precise criteria to be followed in practice, and he argued that vir-
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tually every single structure in the sector was subject to the dynamics of 
technological change. From that perspective, he maintained that it might 
not be possible to draw a line separating those functions within the sys-
tem that should be undertaken by public entities and others that should 
be kept open to competitive forces. Noyer agreed with Santomero and of-
fered the example of the French large-payments system as a real instance in 
which two different structures, one public and another private, coexisted. 
He also emphasised that the worst possible scenario for the general interest 
would be one in which a single profit-maximising entity prevailed.
Global Imbalances
The session on global imbalances was chaired by the ECB Executive Board 
member José Manuel Gonzalez-Páramo. Participants in the round table agreed 
that the size of these imbalances was unprecedented and exchanged views on the 
explanatory factors, the likely sustainability and persistence of the disequilibria, 
the need for a policy adjustment – and the types of policies needed in different 
regions – and the possible role of central banks in that regard.
A number of factors were mentioned as contributing to explain current account 
imbalances among the major economies: low saving in the US, both public and 
private, the latter possibly linked to high asset prices (a point emphasised in partic-
ular by David Folkerts-Landau) and/or excessive saving in China plus insufficient 
investment in other emerging countries in Asia (Gonzalez-Páramo). Vincent Rein-
hart observed that in some circumstances strong productivity gains might be relat-
ed to substantial current account deficits, a point also mentioned by Governor Axel 
Weber. Most speakers referred to the role exchange rate policies in Asian countries 
(in particular China) were playing in maintaining and amplifying external imbal-
ances, by preventing the adjustment of real exchange rates. It was also mentioned in 
this regard, however, that in the Chinese case the question of exchange rate flexibil-
ity could not be analysed in isolation, and that it was especially important to look 
at these issues in the context of the sequence of capital account liberalisation and 
the need to strengthen the soundness of the banking system.
Most participants agreed that current global imbalances were hardly sustain-
able. Only Folkerts-Landau expressed the view that the present configuration of 
imbalances was certainly unstable, but perhaps sustainable, to the extent that it 
reflected a certain equilibrium among key global players in the so-called Bretton-
Woods II system. In that regard, present imbalances were a result of profound 
changes in the global economy over recent years (especially the integration of 
China), and did not reflect in his view an over-reaction of financial markets, and 
nor did they necessarily point to inappropriate economic policies in key coun-
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tries. In particular, excessive emphasis on the need for an exchange rate apprecia-
tion in China might be risky insofar as such an adjustment might have negative 
repercussions on the domestic financial system, which was not yet robust enough 
to absorb such an adjustment. Weber stressed, however, that there were inherent 
risks and costs of reserve accumulation that needed to be taken into account when 
evaluating the functioning of the Bretton Woods II paradigm.
Governor Vittorio Corbo said there were two scenarios of correction, namely a 
hard landing and a soft landing scenario. Although the probability of the latter was 
higher than that of the former, the risks attached to the low-probability, high-risk 
scenario merited careful monitoring by the authorities.
Although there was considerable consensus around the idea that present imbal-
ances were unsustainable, Weber expressed the view that they could persist longer 
than commonly thought, a view that gathered considerable support around the 
table. Among the reasons for this persistence, that most widely mentioned was 
the possibility of a reduction in home bias (the trend to accumulate domestic as-
sets in excess of what would have been rational from an efficient portfolio alloca-
tion viewpoint), as a result of the globalisation process. Several speakers referred 
to the increasing empirical evidence of such a decrease in home bias. Gonzalez-
Páramo mentioned that, according to ongoing empirical research at the ECB, 
this decrease was particularly strong for euro area member countries, whose level 
of home bias was also lower (around 65%) than in the US. Reinhart also stressed 
that the relevant variable was relative home bias as compared to other countries 
or regions rather than its absolute value. He also mentioned that valuation effects 
might offset the impact of exchange rate changes and that the impact of the latter, 
in the case of the US, might be more than offset by changes in the opposite direc-
tion of real growth in the rest of the world and therefore of net external demand 
for US products.
There was also considerable consensus on the need for policy adjustments to 
provide for a gradual correction of global imbalances, an objective that all speakers 
saw as desirable. In the view of Corbo, the solution would involve many players 
that would need coordinating, but national policies would in any case have to be 
strengthened to face a world of growing uncertainty.  
In the area of policy adjustments, most speakers mentioned the need for an in-
crease in public and private saving in the US, together with structural reforms to 
enhance the flexibility of the European and Japanese economies. Other elements 
of a package of policies to address global imbalances mentioned in the round table 
were: an increase in investment in East Asia (other than China), which remained 
at abnormally low levels since the Asian crisis in the mid-nineties; an improvement 
in the absorption capacity of oil-exporting countries, to increase the re-spending of 
their extra revenue as a result of recent increases in oil prices; and increased exchange 
rate flexibility and financial sector reforms in most emerging Asian economies.
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Corbo addressed the particular case of Latin American countries, which in his 
view were playing a negligible role in financing the external US current account. 
He acknowledged that Latin American countries had made in general consider-
able progress in reducing their vulnerability over recent years, by improving their 
fiscal and monetary policy frameworks, reducing their debt levels and improv-
ing the structure of their debt and their current account positions, as well as the 
soundness of their financial systems. Despite this progress, countries with closer 
ties to the US and/or with a relatively high level of debt were in his view still vul-
nerable to a hard landing scenario.
What is the role of central banks in addressing global imbalances? As con-
cerns monetary policy, Gonzalez-Páramo and Folkerts-Landau stressed that the 
best contribution central banks could make was to maintain low and stable in-
flation rates. Beyond this, Folkerts-Landau saw a role for central banks to use 
moral suasion for a gradual adjustment of real exchange rate levels where need-
ed. Several speakers addressed the issue of whether central banks should have a 
role in addressing asset market bubbles or misalignments (some of which were 
apparently playing a role in global imbalances), a topic previously discussed in 
the session on monetary policy. The consensus view was that it was extremely 
difficult to envisage a situation in which monetary policy needed to react to 
movements in asset prices over and above their impact on traditional measures 
of inflation. Folkerts-Landau emphasised in this regard that sectoral imbalances 
were very difficult to address through monetary policy measures. In the same 
vein, Reinhart stressed that monetary policy should not pay attention to relative 
prices, or to asset prices per se.
There was also considerable consensus on the importance of the role central 
banks should play in maintaining financial stability and a soundly functioning 
infrastructure of financial markets, in particular in a situation in which global 
imbalances – and their correction – posed certain risks of stress for particular seg-
ments of global financial markets.
The general discussion and the subsequent replies by roundtable participants 
raised a number of interesting issues, including most notably the following:
–  Whereas an increase in US savings seemed to be an ingredient in any pol-
icy adjustment scenario, it was less clear which component (public or pri-
vate) should make the main contribution to the adjustment. Steve Cec-
chetti argued that it was extremely unlikely that private savings would 
adjust unless there were a dramatic change in the US housing market, 
whose strength explained the weakness of private saving, via wealth effects. 
According to this view, only fiscal policy could increase US saving. Vincent 
Reinhart agreed that private saving rates would increase only to the extent 
that there were an adjustment in asset prices.
22   Central banks in the 21st century
–  The question of the link between global imbalances and the low level of real 
interest rates was mentioned by Alberto Giovannini. There was consensus 
that we knew relatively little on the link between both features of the recent 
economic performance, and that further analysis was needed.
–  The attractiveness of US capital markets as a magnet for the savings of the 
rest of the world was mentioned by Alan Blinder. Insofar as global imbal-
ances were a two-sided phenomenon, policy prescriptions should not ne-
glect the capital account side, a corollary of which was that Europe and Ja-
pan, in particular, should do more to attract capital from abroad.
–  China’s exchange rate policy was seen by some participants as part of a strat-
egy to foster growth and exit from an underdevelopment situation, a strat-
egy that required some understanding on the part of industrial countries. 
Other participants mentioned however that the strategy harmed most other 
developing countries competing with Chinese products in third markets 
and whose exchange rate was flexible and market-determined. 
Financial Stability
In the session on financial stability – chaired by Governor Erkki Liikanen – Fre-
deric Mishkin presented an issues note focused basically of how emerging econo-
mies could best harness the benefits of globalisation while avoiding its risks. In his 
presentation he highlighted the crucial role played by developing appropriate in-
stitutions, in particular the need for (i) strong property rights and legal system, (ii) 
fighting corruption, (iii) improving transparency and corporate governance and 
(iv) avoiding government participation in direct credit.
Mishkin described how globalisation promoted financial development, by fos-
tering liberalisation and opening up to foreign financial institutions, which in-
creased competition, improved the financial system infrastructure, introduced best 
practices, increased the efficiency of the financial sector and reduced the cost of 
capital. In Malcolm Knight’s words, globalisation was “a vital catalyst for imple-
menting domestic structural reforms”.
Nevertheless, Mishkin also acknowledged that there was a “dark side” to finan-
cial globalisation, as highlighted by the fact that the source of a number of recent 
banking and currency crises had been earlier process of liberalisation which, via a 
lending boom and surging capital inflows – and in the presence of typically weak 
supervisory frameworks – had led to financial instability. Governor Erkki Likkanen 
and Governor Guillermo Ortiz confirmed that most of the elements described in 
that part of the issues note were present in their respective experiences of banking 
crises in Finland and Mexico. The question therefore was which policies were most 
likely to ensure that countries fully exploited the benefits of globalisation while 
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minimising the risk of crisis. Mishkin presented a comprehensive list of pruden-
tial regulation and supervisory measures and policies aimed at that objective.
The measures included limiting currency mismatches in the balance sheet of 
financial intermediaries; avoiding deposit insurance in the absence of proper in-
stitutions to limit moral hazard; restricting connected lending and the ownership 
of banks by commercial enterprises; ensuring that banks had sufficient capital; 
focusing on risk management and encouraging disclosure and market-based dis-
cipline. Other speakers generally agreed with this list of policy objectives, but 
qualified certain aspects. Likkanen warned that the absence of explicit deposit in-
surance could be equivalent in some emerging market economies to an implicit 
blanket guarantee of deposits which might be even worse from a moral hazard 
point of view. Ortiz agreed on the emphasis on disclosure and expressed his view 
that the listing on domestic stock exchanges of systemically important subsidiar-
ies of global banks would help ensure appropriate market-based discipline.
One recommendation that triggered a substantial debate among participants 
was to facilitate the entry of foreign banks into the domestic banking system. 
Mishkin mentioned a series of advantages related to foreign banks’ participation: 
a greater diversification of portfolios, more access to resources, less vulnerability 
to domestic shocks (and, as a corollary, a smaller incidence of crises, as shown by 
empirical evidence), better management and risk control mechanisms, and less 
probability and expectation of a bail-out in the event of a crisis. There was con-
sensus among speakers on the advantages of foreign banks’ participation, but a 
few questions were asked in that regard. Likkanen raised issues related to cross-
border responsibility in supervisory policies and crisis management in the Eu-
ropean context. The EU setting relied on two features – the principle of home-
country control and the distinction between branches and subsidiaries –  which, 
in his view, were increasingly difficult to implement due to the rapid increase in 
cross-border activity and the trend towards a relative growth of branches as opposed 
to subsidiaries. The problem, in his view, affected particularly the case of foreign 
banks systemically relevant in the host country, especially in the case of branches. 
He noted that Europe was increasing supervisory co-ordination to address these 
issues, without for the time being considering a change in the model, although 
alternative models might be considered in the medium to long term.
Ortiz remarked that banking efficiency improved notably in Mexico after the 
entry of foreign banks. To ensure, however, the benefits of globalisation, it was in 
his view necessary to improve competition. He mentioned that subsidiaries were 
managed by global banks like branches, a trend that posed problems for host 
country regulators and supervisors. He also expressed doubts on how consolidat-
ed supervision was treated in Basel II, in particular as concerned risk in domestic 
currency vis-à-vis the sovereign issuer in the host country, which should be based 
on external or internal ratings, implying an increase in the financing costs of host 
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countries’ sovereign debtors. To improve market discipline he also suggested that 
minority shareholders should have a seat on subsidiaries’ boards.
There arose from Mishkin’s paper a series of questions as a result of the princi-
pal-agent problem inherent to financial regulation and supervision. In his view, to 
make prudential supervision work it was necessary (i) to ensure prompt corrective 
action when problems arose; (ii) to limit the perception of a policy of “too-big-to-
fail”, by means of which institutions of a certain size were expected to be bailed 
out by the government in the event of problems; and (iii) to provide resources, 
authority and a sufficient degree of independence (and the corresponding account-
ability) to regulators and supervisors.
A question which aroused considerable debate was the appropriate degree of 
discretion in supervisory policies in emerging market economies. Mishkin warned 
that an excessive degree of discretion might backfire against supervisors in the ab-
sence of a strong institutional and legal framework. He expressed in this regard some 
concern on the application of Basel II (in particular its second pillar) in these coun-
tries, which might not be appropriate at that particular point, since in his view it was 
better with a weak institutional environment to encourage market discipline rather 
than the discretionary power of the supervisors. Other participants regarded this 
question as a matter of proper sequencing. Malcolm Knight agreed that emerging 
market economies should adopt Basel II “only when ready”, whereas Likkanen re-
marked that they could move gradually to a more flexible and risk-based approach.
One question that gave rise to much debate was the right sequencing between 
financial liberalisation and the creation of an appropriate institutional structure of 
the financial system. In the issues note Mishkin argued that the latter should be 
in place before financial liberalisation, but acknowledged that the incentives for 
reform mostly arose after liberalisation which, according to Knight, raised a dilem-
ma which could not be answered with a single formula, the solution being coun-
try-specific.  
Mishkin outlined in his presentation a series of recommendations concerning 
macro and structural policies. In his view a prudent fiscal policy, a monetary policy 
oriented towards the objective of price stability and implemented by an independ-
ent central bank, a floating exchange rate regime and openness to international 
trade were all ingredients that facilitated the task of fully exploiting the benefits 
of financial globalisation while reducing the risks. Concerning monetary policy, 
Knight emphasised the need to look further than the relatively short horizons of 
most inflation target frameworks and to pay attention to longer-term trends in li-
quidity and asset prices, which in the present environment of low inflation would 
imply avoiding complacency.
Likkanen stressed that the choice of the exchange rate regime depended on 
many factors, but that we should not exclude a priori that certain exchange rate 
pegs might prove to be an appropriate monetary strategy in some countries. He 
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also raised the issue of the different nature of crises and the likelihood that the fol-
lowing one would contain new elements: market instability, the existence of sys-
temic non-bank financial institutions, the increasing importance of liquidity and 
contagion in market transmission and the internationalisation of institutions and 
markets were mentioned as elements that might shape financial crises in the future.
In the final part of his issues note, Mishkin considered what industrial coun-
tries could do to ease emerging market economies’ integration into the global 
economy. He concluded that opening up their markets to goods and services 
from emerging market economies was the main contribution advanced countries 
could make in that connection.
In the general discussion and the subsequent replies by speakers, a number of 
interesting issues were raised:
–  Vittorio Corbo emphasised the need for parallel progress in trade and fi-
nancial liberalisation, a view that was shared by other participants.
–  Jaime Caruana expressed the view that Basel II was superior to Basel I even 
for emerging market economies, as it was more risk-sensitive. On the issue 
of whether it would require a more stringent treatment of sovereign debt 
issued in foreign currency for some emerging markets, he stressed that this 
treatment would in principle be more correct than the present one. He also 
mentioned that it was normal that global institutions should have a global 
view of risks, and that that should be compatible with adaptation to the 
local market. He also expressed a view in favour of transparency rules for 
subsidiaries, but only insofar as they did not run against property rights.
–  Richard Portes raised the question of who would bear the costs in the 
event of an insolvency in a global institution and expressed the view that 
Memoranda of Understanding between supervisors did not normally ad-
dress this issue with sufficient clarity, an opinion that was shared by other 
speakers. President Trichet referred to the specific case of the Eurozone 
and mentioned that its case was not so different than at the national level, 
where in general there were no strict, codified rules for crisis resolution. 
In his view similar arrangements were perfectly feasible in the euro area, 
without any need for further clarification. 
Conclusions
Vicepresident Pedro Solbes focused his concluding remarks on two of the 
main topics of the Conference: financial stability and global imbalances. He first 
reflected on how the interest of supervisors had somewhat shifted focus from the 
analysis of individual institutions to a more broad macro-based approach. He 
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linked this to the identification of potential risks for the financial system arising 
from the combination of expansive macroeconomic developments and herd be-
haviour by market participants.
At the same time, Solbes warned against simplistic analysis linking asset price in-
creases and debt accumulation to imbalances that could merit economic policy action. 
He mentioned the example of the European monetary union which was, for countries 
like Spain, a structural shock justifying higher values for productive assets and a higher 
propensity to borrow as a consequence of rational behaviour by economic agents. He 
nonetheless stressed the importance of containing the influence of amplifying factors 
such as unduly expansionary fiscal policy or malfunctioning labour markets. Those 
factors could actually dampen the economy’s ability to absorb smoothly the expan-
sionary impact of shocks such as those generated by the monetary union.
As for global imbalances, Solbes dealt first with the origin of current account 
disequilibria. He saw that while surpluses generated in oil-exporting countries were 
a rational intertemporal response, that might not always be the case in developing 
countries with a net saving position. As the latter were now foregoing consump-
tion to finance that of richer countries, the reasonableness of those imbalances was 
at least debatable, as were the current exchange rate policies of surplus countries 
and the fiscal policies in the US.
He recalled the risk of imbalances leading to the disorderly correction of ex-
change rates. At the same time, he considered as heartening the emerging con-
sensus that currency stability was a public good whose preservation required joint 
action under a cooperative approach.
He finally remarked on the limits of standard policy tools. In particular, he saw 
a risk of focusing the debate excessively on exchange rates, as this could encour-
age protectionism and act as a distraction on other policy fronts. Moreover, stand-
ard demand policies were of little effect when imbalances were linked to structural 
problems that inhibited consumption or investment in surplus countries.
In his concluding intervention, Governor Jaime Caruana commented on the 
changes observed in the global financial system and on how these had affected 
the role played by central banks. In his view the process of financial development 
and liberalisation worldwide had increased the possibilities of risk-sharing among 
agents and enhanced the ability of private agents to make efficient intertemporal 
decisions, thereby increasing social welfare. At the same time, those developments 
had meant new challenges for monetary and supervisory authorities. For central 
banks, after years of broad success in delivering low inflation, the process of finan-
cial deepening had increased the complexity of the relationship between prices and 
financial stability. For Caruana, a long period of monetary stability coupled with 
low interest rates could arguably be conducive to certain types of financial imbal-
ances, sometimes generated by excessive risk-taking by economic agents, which 
could eventually threaten the stability of the whole system.
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Caruana agreed that the ex-ante identification of episodes of systemic finan-
cial distress was not an easy task and that, in advanced economies, they oc-
curred typically with low probability. Still, if the likely consequences of those ex-
treme episodes were sufficiently adverse, in his view the central bank could in 
very specific circumstances depart from its regular reaction function to consider 
actions aimed at reducing the risks entailed. He also contended that prudential 
policies could do much to promote the resilience of the financial system. That 
involved the design of regulatory and supervisory frameworks aimed at promot-
ing appropriate risk assessment by providing the right incentives to individual in-
stitutions. Arguably, that included a better understanding of how risks evolved 
along the business cycle. He mentioned in that connection the New Capital Ac-
cord (Basel II), and underlined how this framework provided more risk-sensitive 
capital requirements and promoted transparency. The latter would help minimise 
the problems of information asymmetry between lenders, borrowers and authori-
ties that had been at the root of recent financial crises.
Caruana also referred to the specific challenges faced by central banks within 
the EMU. He stressed, specifically, those related to the heterogeneity of the single 
currency area in terms of shock exposure, domestic policies and allocation mech-
anisms. In addition, he mentioned the steps that still had to be taken to build a 
fully integrated market for financial services and emphasised its relationship to 
the effective functioning of monetary policy. The Eurosystem had responded to 
the analytical challenges posed by cross-country diversity by paying due attention 
to the analysis of national economies when assessing the economic situation and 
the prospects for price stability for the euro zone as a whole. Moreover, it had 
been an active player in promoting higher financial integration – e.g. with the 
creation of TARGET – and had supported public or private initiatives aimed at 
removing barriers to cross-border financial transactions. He expected the Eurosys-
tem to further strengthen its current policy approach in both areas in the future.
Caruana concluded his intervention stating that recent developments on the 
financial landscape and the closer interaction between financial and macroeco-





There have been three great inventions since the beginning of time: fire, 
the wheel, and central banking, 
  –  Will Rogers 
Victorians heard with grave attention that the Bank Rate had been raised. 
They did not know what it meant. But they knew that it was an act of ex-
treme wisdom.
  –  John Kenneth Galbraith 
My assignment is to survey the main questions swirling around monetary policy today. I emphasize three words in this sentence, each for a different 
reason. “Main” is because one person’s side issue is another’s main issue. So I had 
to be both selective and judgmental in compiling my list, else this paper would 
have been even longer than it is. “Policy” indicates that I have restricted myself 
to issues that are truly relevant to real-world policymakers, thus omitting many 
interesting but purely academic issues. “Today” means that I focus on current is-
sues, thus passing over some illustrious past issues. All these omissions still leave a 
rather long list; so I will have to treat some issues quite briefly. 
I have compiled a list like this once before. In December 1999, at what I be-
lieve was the first conference ever organized by the brand-new European Central 
Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt, I offered (over dinner, no less!) a list of 15 questions 
that would have to be answered by anyone starting a central bank from scratch 
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at the time (Blinder, 2000). In this paper, I will declare two of my 15 Frankfurt 
issues largely resolved, and note that two others have dropped off the radar screen 
without being resolved. However, I will add five new issues. Thus the list of is-
sues has grown longer, not shorter, since 1999. But do not mistake that for lack of 
progress. Both the art and science of monetary policy have advanced considerably 
since then. 
Before proceeding further, let me mention some issues that I will not take 
up, for their omission is, in some sense, a measure of that progress. My Frank-
furt list included the old debate over the choice between interest-rate targets 
and monetary-aggregate targets, which seems to have been resolved every-
where except in the ECB’s rhetoric. It also included the issue of whether elec-
tronic money poses a threat to central banks, which was a hot issue then but 
seems to have faded from view.2 Earlier discussions of central banking issues 
devoted a great deal of attention to the need for central bank independence.3 
But that debate is all but over, and I will simply assume that the central bank 
is independent.4 Similarly, some earlier authors thought it necessary to defend 
the proposition that low inflation is a central goal of monetary policy, a prop-
osition that no longer needs defense.5 In addition, a huge amount of ink has 
been spilled on the time consistency debate and the so-called inflation bias6 
– another debate that I consider to be over, although others may disagree.
What, then, will I discuss? Part I, the longest part of the paper, takes up five criti-
cal questions regarding the institutional design of the monetary policy authority: 
1 What is the proper objective function for monetary policy? 
2 How transparent should the central bank be? 
3  Should the central bank be an inflation targeter, as that term is commonly 
used nowadays? 
4  Should monetary policy decisions be made by a single individual or by a 
committee – and, if the latter, what type of committee? 
5 Should the central bank also regulate and/or supervise banks? 
After that, I turn in Part II to operating principles for monetary policy, dis-
cussing six issues: 
2 See, for example, the papers by Charles Goodhart, Charles Friedman, and Michael Woodford in the 
July 2000 special issue of the journal International Finance. 
3 See, for example, Fischer (1994). 
4 However, there are those who worry about fiscal dominance and/or budgetary independence of the 
central bank.
5 Again, see Fischer (1994). However, the issue of whether monetary policy should target the inflation 
rate or the price level remains a live one. See Issue 15 below. 
6 The original sources were Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). 
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 6  Is the observed proclivity of central bankers to avoid policy reversals jus-
tifiable? 
 7  Does the revealed preference of central bankers for gradualism make 
sense? 
 8  Is “fine tuning” possible after all? And if so, should central bankers at-
tempt to fine tune their economies? 
 9 Should central banks lead or follow the financial markets? 
10  Should central banks in floating exchange rate regimes intervene in the 
foreign-exchange market? 
11 Should central banks use derivatives in the conduct of monetary policy? 
Finally, I briefly discuss five issues pertaining to the transmission mechanism 
for monetary policy in Part III: 
12 Transmission through the term structure of interest rates 
13 Transmission through the exchange rate 
14 How should the central bank deal with asset-market bubbles? 
15  How should the central bank deal with the zero lower bound on nominal 
interest rates? 
16 Do the world’s giant central banks have global responsibilities? 
I The design and structure of the central bank
The first set of five issues pertains to how central banks should be designed 
and organized – to their “constitutions,” so to speak.
 Issue 1: What is the proper objective function
for monetary policy? 
My jumping-off point for this discussion is the loss function that has become 
ubiquitous in academic writings on monetary policy: 
L = (π – π*)2 + λ(y – y*)2 or (1a)
L = (π – π*)2 + λ(u – u*)2, (1b)
where L is the period loss, π is the inflation rate and π* its target value, y is real 
output and y* its “natural” or “equilibrium” or “potential” value, and u is the un-
employment rate and u* is the NAIRU. Two variants are given because some au-
thors prefer to represent the central bank’s real economic activity objective by the 
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output gap while others prefer the unemployment gap. I will return to this choice 
briefly below; but, for the most part, it is immaterial. 
Nowadays, the live argument is over the size of λ, with some authors fretting that 
it not be set too large. It thus seems almost quaint to recall that Fischer (1994) went 
to great lengths to argue that (π – π*)2 should figure prominently in the loss func-
tions of central banks – that is, that λ < ∞. No one needs to make that argument 
today. 
 Making (1) operational, even in a metaphorical sense, requires that the central 
bank choose three parameters: λ, π*, and either y* or u*. Each raises important 
practical issues. 
Let us start with π*, where two main issues arise. The first is obvious and has been 
so extensively discussed that I will treat it briefly: What’s the number? A consensus of 
sorts seems to have developed around an inflation target of 2% or so for advanced, 
industrial countries. Berg (2005) surveyed practices at 20 inflation-targeting central 
banks, eight of which are from rich countries, and every one of the eight uses either 
2% or 2.5% as the midpoint of its target range. The ECB, of course, targets infla-
tion “below, but close to, 2%,” and the Federal Reserve’s all-but-announced target 
is similar.7 At 2% inflation, the price level doubles every 35 years. Why not set the 
target lower? The two main arguments are (a) that price indexes are biased upward 
and (b) that π* should be set high enough to provide a reasonable cushion against 
deflation (see Issue 15 below). Neither seems controversial nowadays, so I move on 
to a question that is: What measure of inflation should be used? 
One important choice is whether inflation should be measured by a “headline” or 
“core” concept,8 that is, should it include or exclude energy prices?9 I am firmly in 
the “core” camp for three related reasons. First, monetary policy is unlikely to have 
much leverage over energy (or food) prices; so it makes sense to focus the central 
bank’s attention on the inflation it can actually do something about. Second, even 
if the bank’s true concern is headline inflation – which is, after all, the inflation that 
consumers actually experience – it can probably forecast future headline inflation 
better by using current and lagged values of core inflation. Ricardo Reis and I (2005) 
7 The Fed’s preferred index of consumer prices is not the CPI, but rather the deflator for core personal 
consumption expenditures in the national income and product accounts, which normally runs below the core 
CPI measure. In its February 2006 monetary policy report, the FOMC implicitly set its target for core PCE 
inflation at 1.75-2%. 
8 This is not the only issue. For example, Mankiw and Reis (2003) argue for using wage increases rather 
than price increases. Strum (2006) argues for a PPI measure rather than a CPI measure. Reis (2005) explores 
the role of asset prices in the price index. Yet another issue is whether monetary policy should target inflation 
(the usual choice) or the price level. This last question is dealt with briefly under Issue 15 below. 
9 In most countries, “core” inflation also excludes food prices. (In Japan, the core consumer price index 
excludes fresh food but includes energy products.) However, food prices have not been an issue for more than 
30 years, so I concentrate on energy. 
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demonstrate this conclusion statistically for the United States, and I suspect it holds 
in many countries. Third, I believe that concentrating on core inflation is likely to 
produce more sensible monetary policy in the face of oil shocks (see below). 
Despite these powerful arguments, virtually all central banks and governments 
have opted for headline over core. The ECB, of course, is the most prominent 
example in this part of the world. But Berg’s (2005) list shows that 18 of the 20 
inflation-targeting central banks use a headline concept of inflation. 
If the choice is controversial, it must be because of the third reason given ear-
lier: the response to supply shocks. So let me briefly defend my position.10 Con-
sider, first, the case that is dominant in the data: a supply shock that raises the 
relative price of oil temporarily. In that case, oil prices are a source of inflation 
as they rise, but subsequently become a source of deflation as they fall – which 
happens automatically, with no need for central bank action. Given the long lags 
from monetary policy to inflation, there is essentially nothing the central bank 
can do to remove this bit of inflation volatility. 
The other empirically relevant case is when oil prices rise to permanently high-
er levels. Then oil prices are an engine of inflation, but one that naturally peters 
out unless “second-round effects” on core inflation are large. The recent evidence 
suggests only minor second-round effects, perhaps due to central banks’ greater 
determination to stop inflation in the 1990s and in this decade as compared to 
the 1970s (Hooker, 2002). Why? The presumed answer is better anchoring of 
inflationary expectations (Bernanke, 2006). In any case, returning to the main 
question, there is little that monetary policy can or should do to limit the “first-
round effects” of an oil shock. For example, targeting headline inflation during a 
period of rising (falling) oil prices might make monetary policy excessively tight 
(loose). Hence my conclusion: Stick to core inflation. 
The choice of a full-employment target (y* or u*) also merits some discussion. 
Let me first assume that the target is y*, and then consider whether u* might be 
the better choice. 
The empirical literature contains at least three distinct ways to estimate y*. 
The oldest is potential GDP, which can be defined as: 
y* = AF(L*(1–u*), K), (2)
where F(.) is the aggregate production function, A is the Solow residual (in lev-
els), L* is the full-employment labor force (so L*(1-u*) is the “natural” level of 
employment), and K is the capital stock. A second concept – which is closely 
related in principle, but is estimated very differently in practice – is the natural 
rate of output, defined as the level of production (= aggregate demand) at which 
10 I have dealt with this topic in more detail in Blinder and Reis (2005), especially pages 41-45. 
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the price level is neither accelerating nor decelerating. It is often “backed out” of 
an estimated Phillips curve using Okun’s law, thereby making no direct use of 
time series data on either K or L (not to mention A). A third approach is to de-
fine y* as the “trend,” which is then estimated in some mechanical way (e.g., by a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter). 
In the context of an objective function like (1), which trades off output volatil-
ity against inflation volatility, the natural rate of output derived from a Phillips-
curve framework (the second of the three concepts above) seems to be a sensible 
working definition of y*. Often, the empirical procedure begins with an esti-
mate of u* from a statistical Phillips curve. Needless to say, that number cannot 
be known with precision. Most European countries, in fact, never had a widely-
accepted estimate of the NAIRU; and the days when a 6% NAIRU was a consen-
sus choice in the United States are long gone. So, at a minimum, estimates of u* 
must be treated as time-varying and having large standard errors (Staiger, Stock, 
and Watson, 2001). 
Notice that, while academics seem to have a revealed preference for output 
gaps over unemployment gaps, a second empirical step is needed to move from 
the latter to the former – which adds an additional element of statistical uncer-
tainty. That element is productivity, which translates labor input into output. At 
times when projecting (or even estimating) productivity is difficult, estimating 
the path of y* becomes extremely hazardous.11 For this very practical reason, I 
have a mild preference for using an unemployment-gap concept rather than an 
output-gap concept. But I do not want to exaggerate the strength of this prefer-
ence. As Blinder and Yellen (2001) and others have noted, an unrecognized accel-
eration (deceleration) of productivity growth can temporarily depress (raise) the 
NAIRU. 
The next issue is the choice of the weight λ in (1). A higher value of λ connotes 
more concern with output or unemployment gaps, relative to inflation gaps, and 
vice-versa. It is tempting to identify λ with the coefficients α and β in a Taylor 
rule: 
i = r* + π + α(π – π*) + β(u* – u), (3)
where i is the nominal interest rate and r* is the equilibrium real interest. But 
Svensson (1997) has shown that the mapping from λ to α and β is by no means 
straightforward. A higher λ need not even lead to a higher ratio β/α, for example. 
Nonetheless, Blinder and Reis (2005) estimate that Alan Greenspan had a much 
higher β/α than either Paul Volcker or the Bundesbank prior to the advent of the 
euro – a reflection, I believe, of his much higher λ. Furthermore, Rudebusch’s 
11 Orphanides (2003) emphasizes this point. 
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(2001) calculations of optimal α and β for a simple linear model of the U.S. 
economy under different choices of λ show substantial sensitivity of the ratio β/α 
to λ, and in the intuitive direction.12
Theoretical discussions of the loss function generally end about here. But 
central bankers should ponder two more issues. The first is the functional form. 
The quadratic, of course, is motivated solely by mathematical convenience and 
gives rise, among other things, to certainty equivalence. Never mind the specific 
quadratic shape; that’s a quibble I do not want to raise. The more fundamental 
question is why low unemployment should be penalized as much as high unem-
ployment – or, indeed, should be penalized at all (Cukierman, 2004). The main 
reason why central bankers worry about low unemployment is that tight markets 
produce rising inflation. But that should be taken care of by the first term in (1). 
If, speaking hypothetically, monetary policy could push u down further without 
pushing  π up, why shouldn’t it? The late 1990s in the United States is an histori-
cal case in point. Did America suffer some loss because the unemployment rate 
dropped as low at 3.9%?
One obvious answer is the standard micro-inefficiency argument: Deviations 
from the real competitive equilibrium in either direction impose welfare losses. 
But this argument is not terribly compelling if the real world is not perfectly 
competitive. For example, monopolistic competition models suggest that output 
is systematically too low, in which case raising it should yield efficiency gains, not 
losses. Furthermore, some of us believe that low unemployment yields notable 
social benefits that are at least partially non-economic in nature. Another possible 
answer, suggested by Cuckierman (2004), is that the inflation bias discussed by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) returns if low unemployment is not penalized sym-
metrically. This may be the best rationale for doing so. 
The other oft-forgotten issue in specifying the loss function is that every central 
bank has either statutory or tacit responsibility for maintaining financial stability. 
At certain critical times, this objective takes precedence over everything else. So fi-
nancial stability seems far too important to be left out of the loss function. Re-
searchers commonly model this third objective by adding a term like γ(rt – rt–1)
2 
to (1), on the theory that interest-rate volatility and financial-market instability 
are highly correlated. Such a crude proxy surely misses many important aspects 
of financial instability, however, especially during a banking or financial crisis, 
when financial stability may dominate the central bank’s other concerns. So some 
other approach seems warranted. One posibility is a quasi-lexicographic order-
ing under wich the central bank minimizes (1) unless serious financial instability 
arises, in which case it turns its attention to the latter. 
12 Specifically, when λ=1 (his base case), β/α=.58; if λ=4, β/α rises to .95; and if λ=0.25, β/α falls to 
.41. See Rudebusch (2001, Table 1, p. 206). 
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Issue 2: How transparent should the central bank be? 
Much has been written on why central banks should be transparent, some of it 
by me.13 In fact, there is by now a sizable scholarly literature on this topic, which 
I will not summarize here.14 Instead, let me just remind readers that there are two 
main reasons to favor transparency. The one on which economists always focus 
is that greater openness should make monetary policy more effective by tighten-
ing the gears between central bank actions and market expectations. But there is 
another reason, one which real-world central bankers should never forget: demo-
cratic accountability. 
One or both of these arguments appear to have persuaded most of the world’s 
central bankers (and/or their governments), because there is an unmistakable trend 
in the direction of greater openness virtually all over the world. In a quotation 
from the 1980s of which I have long been fond, Karl Brunner (1981) wrote that: 
Central Banking [has been] traditionally surrounded by a peculiar mys-
tique... The possession of wisdom, perception and relevant knowledge is nat-
urally attributed to the management of Central Banks... The relevant knowl-
edge seems automatically obtained with the appointment and could only be 
manifested to holders of the appropriate position. The mystique thrives on 
a pervasive impression that Central Banking is an esoteric art. Access to this 
art and its proper execution is confined to the initiated elite. The esoteric na-
ture of the art is moreover revealed by an inherent impossibility to articulate 
its insights in explicit and intelligible words and sentences.
This was a caricature, of course, but it captured the underlying reality of the 
time. The received wisdom in central banking circles then was: Say as little as pos-
sible, and say it cryptically. But attitudes toward transparency have changed dra-
matically since then, and central banks around the world have opened up.
Although it is still more of a laggard than a leader in terms of transparency, the 
Federal Reserve is a case in point. Prior to February 1994, the FOMC did not 
even announce its interest rate decisions as it made them, preferring to let money 
market professionals figure them out by observing the Fed’s open market opera-
tions. Highly stylized minutes of FOMC meetings were published at the time, but 
only after the following meeting. Contemporaneous statements after FOMC meet-
ings, however, were rare (and extremely terse) until May 1999. 
That is when the Fed made several major changes in its disclosure policies, 
changes that amounted to a quantum leap in the volume of useful information it 
13 See, for example, Blinder et al. (2001) and Blinder (2004).
14 For two recent overviews, see Geraats (2002) and Woodford (2005). 
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provided. First, the FOMC started announcing its “bias” (later changed to “bal-
ance of risks”) immediately. Second, it began issuing statements after every meet-
ing (whether or not there was a change in interest rates). And third, its statements 
became longer and more substantive. Here is one simple quantitative measure. In 
the three years 1996-1998 inclusive, the FOMC issued a total of five post-meet-
ing statements, with an average of 58 substantive words per statement – thus un-
der 100 words per year!15 And the Fed said nothing at all after its first two meet-
ings in 1999 (in February and March). But then it issued a statement after each 
of the remaining six FOMC meetings in 1999, averaging 135 words per state-
ment – thus raising the annual rate to over 1,000 words. This pattern has pre-
vailed (approximately) ever since. 
The FOMC took another step toward greater transparency early in 2002, 
when it began announcing its vote immediately after each meeting, naming 
names. And finally, starting at the beginning of 2005, the Fed began releasing 
the minutes of each meeting with approximately a three-week delay – thus before 
the next meeting. None of these changes can be said to constitute a great leap 
forward. But together they add up to a huge increase in the amount of informa-
tion released by the formerly-mum Fed – as I once called it, a quiet revolution 
(Blinder, 2004). And in my view and, much more important, in Chairman Ben 
Bernanke’s view (Bernanke, 2004b), there is more to come. 
People often ask if there are limits to (optimal) transparency.16 My answer is to 
paraphrase Einstein: Every central bank should be as transparent as possible, but 
not more so.17 By this I mean that the default option should be disclosure; a cen-
tral bank should keep things secrets only when there are good reasons for doing 
so.18 And good reasons do exist. For example, the central bank must preserve the 
confidentiality of proprietary information given to it by private banks – for ex-
ample, in its role as bank supervisor. (See Issue 5 below.) Similarly, the central bank 
must maintain the confidentiality of certain information provided to it by govern-
ments, both domestic and foreign. I would also not want to open monetary policy 
meetings to the press, because that would likely destroy the deliberative process. Fi-
nally, the central bank cannot disclose information it doesn’t have. This last “limit” 
to transparency may sound silly, but I will offer some concrete examples below. But 
15 I include in this count only words pertaining either to the economic situation or to the policy deci-
sion, excluding standard boilerplate such as the opening sentence, which simply states what the FOMC did 
(“The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to…”), and the closing paragraphs that announce 
the vote and the discount rate recommendations of the district banks. 
16 See, for example, Mishkin (2004) and Cukierman (2006).
17 Einstein said: “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.”
18 In contrast, Mishkin (2004, p. 50), suggests that transparency is a good thing only to the extent that 
it “help(s) the central bank do its job.” But, in private conversation, Mishkin has told me that he basically 
agrees with my position. 
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apart from such minor exceptions, all of which are non-controversial, I see few ef-
fective limits to transparency. More important, I know of no central banks that have 
bumped up against the constraint of maximal transparency, with the possible excep-
tions of the Bank of Norway and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ). 
If central banks are not yet near their transparency constraints, what remains 
to be done? The answer, of course, varies by country. For example, the Federal 
Reserve will, I believe, soon begin announcing its inflation target, π*, for the first 
time –  something that many central banks have been doing for years. But I think 
it is a fair generalization to say that, with some notable exceptions, most central 
banks around the world still reveal rather little about their forecasts. This may be 
the next transparency frontier. 
Of course, nothing in life is simple. Whenever a central bank forecasts more 
than, say, six months ahead, future monetary policy is among the crucial assump-
tions that must be built into the forecast. So what future monetary policy should 
be assumed? The debate to date seems to revolve around three main options: 
1 unchanged monetary policy throughout the forecast period 
2  the monetary policy path expected by the markets (and therefore embedded 
in, e.g., futures prices) 
3 the central bank’s (conditional) forecast of its own future behavior.
The current controversy is focused on option 3, which requires the central bank 
to reveal sensitive information. Until recently, the RBNZ was the only one brave 
enough to do this, but lately it has been joined by the Bank of Norway. In neither 
New Zealand nor Norway did revelation of this sensitive information provoke tur-
moil in the markets.19 Some would argue that things might be different if the Fed 
or the ECB were to start projecting their own policy decisions, given the huge 
volumes of trading in dollar- and euro-denominated securities. But it is by no 
means obvious how better information on the central bank’s intentions can do the 
markets any harm. My guess is that, after a short period of adjustment, releasing 
conditional forecasts of future monetary policy would reduce, not increase, market 
volatility. But many central bankers may disagree with my guess, for they are loath 
to take this step. 
There is, however, another intensely practical issue that should not be ig-
nored: Most central banks, certainly including the Fed, do not even agree upon 
long-term (conditional) forecasts of the path of their policy rate. In such cases, 
the failure to announce such a path cannot be viewed as a violation of trans-
parency. Rather, it falls under the seemingly-obvious rubric mentioned earlier: 
You cannot reveal information you do not have. The broader question, then, is 
19 For the case of New Zealand, see Archer (2005). 
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whether central banks should (a) formulate (conditional) monetary policy plans 
running one or two years into the future and then (b) announce those plans as 
part of their forecasts. My own answers are yes and yes. But doing so clearly 
represents a major change in the way most central banks do business. Indeed, 
formulating such plans may be a much bigger change in the current modus op-
erandi than announcing them once formulated. So option 3 above will probably 
remain on the “to do” list, and therefore on the list of current issues for central 
bankers, for quite a while. 
What can be done in the interim? Many academics have been intensely criti-
cal of option 1 – making forecasts based on constant (policy) interest rates.20 They 
point to three main problems: (a) it is logically inconsistent (because, e.g., actual 
market rates are not based on this assumption); (b) it is non-transparent (because, 
e.g., the central bank probably does not believe this assumption); and (c) it leads to 
dynamic instability for the reason first pointed out by Friedman (1968): Holding 
the nominal rate fixed in the face of changes in inflation moves the real rate in the 
wrong direction.21 
I am less critical of the constant interest rate assumption that some of my col-
leagues – for two main reasons. First, dynamic instability is unlikely to be quanti-
tatively important in forecasts that extend only a year or two into the future. Sec-
ond, showing that constant interest rates lead to unsatisfactory outcomes serves a 
useful purpose by providing the predicate for changing monetary policy. Still, the 
critics’ points are valid. 
Option 2 above (using market expectations of future central bank policy) 
eliminates the inconsistency problem and reduces the non-transparency prob-
lem. But the instability problem remains because, in dynamic simulations, 
forecasts taken from current market prices will be exogenous rather than en-
dogenous. Using such market-based forecasts also raises the “dog chasing its 
tail” danger that I mentioned in Blinder (1998) and that Bernanke and Wood-
ford (1997) modeled theoretically.22
There is, however, a workable approach that can eliminate all three problems 
and yet does not require that MPC members agree now on an entire path of future 
policy decisions. The central bank staff can simply use an empirically-estimated re-
action function to project the MPC’s future behavior mechanically – without attrib-
uting those forecasts to the MPC itself. This approach should be roughly consist-
ent with market prices because market participants would probably use something 
similar to forecast the central bank’s behavior. It is also totally transparent, as long 
20 For recent comprehensive treatments, see Svensson (2006) and Woodford (2006).
21 Purely forward-looking models with rational expectations telescope this dynamic instability back 
into the present, leading to the failure of such models to converge to any equilibrium. 
22 Woodford (1994) was an important precursor.
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as the bank reveals the forecasting equation. And finally, it does not lead to dynamic 
instability as long as the inflation coefficient in the reaction function exceeds one.23 I 
would therefore recommend this option to central banks for use right now. 
Issue 3: Should a central bank adopt formal
inflation targeting? 
Recent years have witnessed a notable trend toward a style of monetary policy-
making that originated in New Zealand in 1990: inflation targeting. As noted ear-
lier, Berg (2005) counted 20 inflation targeters, and other observers would add a 
few more central banks to his list. In addition, the ECB can be considered a closet 
inflation targeter, and both the Fed and the BOJ are actively considering whether 
to join the ranks. 
While much has been written about inflation targeting, I can be brief given 
what I have already written about transparency (Issue 2) and the central bank’s ob-
jective function (Issue 1) – because the essence of inflation targeting is announcing 
a numerical value for π* and being transparent about it. 
Svensson (2005) has argued that transparency should extend to the announce-
ment of the numerical value of λ, the relative weight on the output (or unem-
ployment) gap. But that is another one of those pieces of information that central 
banks cannot reveal because they do not have it. Most of us, I believe, would have 
trouble pinning down our own individual λ’s.24 For a monetary policy committee, 
the problem is compounded by having to reach a group decision on λ – especially 
when membership in the committee changes over time.25 
This discussion does, however, raise an interesting transparency point. All infla-
tion targeting central banks are “flexible” inflation targeters – meaning that they 
have λ>0. Why, then, should their policy be called as “inflation targeting” as op-
posed to, say, “unemployment targeting”? Equation (1) looks pretty symmetric to 
me. One possible answer is deliberate obfuscation, which Mishkin (2004) argues is 
quite prevalent. A second possible answer is that π* is a choice variable whereas u* 
(or y*) is a datum that is given to the central bank (Svensson (1999), page 626). To 
me, that answer is unsatisfactory, however, because proper division of labor dictates 
that the government should select π* (perhaps in consultation with the bank) and 
then hand it to the MPC as a datum.26 The fact that π* is given by law whereas u* 
is given by “nature” should be irrelevant to the central bank, which should simply 
23 For this reason, the Bank of England staff fomerly used a Taylor rule in long-run simulations.
24 In fairness to Svensson, this would probably be done by examining alternative optimal paths generat-
ed by the bank staff for different choices of λ. It is not impossible. 
25 Svensson has suggested voting, with the median voter’s preferences prevailing. 
26 One important caveat: π* should not be chosen so frequently that it becomes a political variable. I like 
to think of it as being chosen at the “constitutional” stage.
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take both targets as given and set about minimizing (1) like a bunch of good 
Keynesian dentists. 
Thus, when we translate equations (which only the experts understand) into 
words, objective functions like (1) seem more consistent with the Federal Re-
serve’s dual mandate than with, say, the ECB’s hierarchical goal or the rhetoric of 
many inflation targeting banks, as Meyer (2006) points out. Calling the minimi-
zation of (1) “inflation targeting” therefore seems to be a step away from trans-
parency. 
Transparent or not, central banks (or their governments) still need to decide 
whether to join the ranks of the inflation targeters.27 Historically, most (but not 
all) nations that have adopted inflation targeting did so under duress. Either their 
monetary policy had failed, leaving inflation too high (e.g., New Zealand), or 
they were forced to change their monetary policy regime owing to, say, the col-
lapse of a fixed exchange rate (e.g., the UK, Brazil). 
But the past need not be prologue. Recent converts to inflation targeting, such 
as Norway (and, one might say, the United States), have moved in that direction 
voluntarily – presumably because they were persuaded that the benefits outweigh 
the costs. What are the benefits? The most obvious answer is lower inflation, 
though here the reverse causation problem is severe. (Countries that want to re-
duce inflation are more likely to adopt IT.28) Successful inflation targeting should 
also make inflation less volatile, as Vega and Winkelried (2005) find, and should 
anchor expectations at or very close to π*. That nominal anchor, in turn, can give 
the central bank greater flexibility to respond to short-run exigencies such as high 
unemployment or oil shocks.
Issue 4: Should monetary policy be made by an individual
or a committee? 
In yet another “quiet revolution,” more and more central banks have begun 
making monetary policy decisions by committee. Fry et al.’s (2000) survey of 
practices at 88 central banks (about half the total) found that 79 made monetary 
policy decisions by committee while only nine left those decisions to a single in-
dividual. Thus governments around the world have revealed a clear preference for 
decisionmaking by committee. This phenomenon raises two questions: Why have 
nations switched from individuals to committees? And is this trend desirable? 
The “why” question can be approached in two ways. First, as an empirical 
or historical matter, I believe that the main factor underlying the worldwide 
27 As my colleague Lars Svensson likes to point out, no central bank that has made this choice has subse-
quently abandoned inflation targeting. That is certainly suggestive. 
28 See Ball and Sheridan (2005) and Willard (2006). 
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trend toward monetary policy committees (MPCs) was the perceived success 
of the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank, both of which had long made de-
cisions (at least putatively) by committee. Imitation is, after all, the sincerest 
form of flattery. In addition, there is no reason to have a monetary policy com-
mittee when the central bank is simply taking orders from its government. So 
the trend toward central bank independence opened the door to committee de-
cisionmaking. 
Second, what are some of the conceptual or theoretical reasons why a central 
bank might prefer a committee to an individual? Since I have treated this subject 
at length elsewhere, and because it was recently the topic of an excellent sympo-
sium at another European central bank,29 I can again be brief. In Blinder (2004, 
Chapter 2), I summarized the main arguments for preferring committee to indi-
vidual decisionmaking under the following four rubrics: 
1  Pooling: A committee pools the disparate knowledge of its individual members. 
2  Diversity: Members of a committee bring different decisionmaking heuris-
tics to a complex problem.
3  Checks and balances: Committees are less likely to adopt extreme or idiosyn-
cratic positions. 
4  Reduced volatility: Owing to “averaging” (which need not be interpreted lit-
erally), the decisions of a group are likely to be less volatile. 
Perusing these four virtues, only the last might conceivably be turned around 
and viewed as a vice instead – because one person’s low volatility is another’s exces-
sive inertia. But Sibert (2005) has pointed to another possible downside of group 
decisionmaking: that it might devolve into “groupthink,” which is really a polite 
word for not thinking at all, but merely following the crowd.30
Empirical evidence – much of it from psychology – points modestly toward 
the superiority of group over individual decisionmaking, though the evidence 
is certainly not dispositive and, of course, does not come from studies of mon-
etary policy.31 This last point is one of the considerations that led John Mor-
gan and me (2005) to design and carry out a laboratory experiment in which 
students made synthetic monetary policy decisions both as individuals and as 
29 De Nederlandsche Bank held a workshop entitled “Central Banking by Committee” in Amsterdam 
on November 28, 2005. 
30 Sibert (2005) also devotes a great deal of attention to evidence for free riding and/or social loafing in 
committees. But I cannot believe this is important on MPCs, where (unlike faculty committees, say) the 
group decision is the most important task each committee member has.
31 Kerr et al. (1996) is a metastudy of the experimental literature in psychology; they concluded that 
there is no general answer to the question. See Blinder (2004) for a summary of the economic literature, much 
of it theoretical. Sibert (2005) offers evidence that questions the superiority of group decisionmaking.
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part of five-person groups.32 It was not surprising, given the literature, that 
we found that groups outperformed individuals by a modest margin. It was, 
however, surprising that we found that groups were not more inertial – in 
sharp contrast to 4 above. 
Morgan and I are currently working on a sequel to our original experiment, 
designed to shed light on two further issues. First, do large groups (for us, n=8) 
outperform small groups (n=4), or vice-versa? This issue is germane to the design 
of monetary policy committees which, in the real world, range in size from three 
to 19 members. Second, do groups with designated leaders outperform groups 
without leaders? This issue is particularly important because all real-world MPCs 
– indeed, I am tempted to say all real committees – have leaders. 
In designing an MPC, size is not the only consideration. Blinder et al. (2001) 
first introduced the following typology, which was further developed in Blinder 
(2004). Committees can either be individualistic, meaning that they make deci-
sions by true majority rule with each member voting for his or her own preferred 
policy – as at the Bank of England, for example; or they can be collegial, meaning 
that they agree in advance to submerge individual differences in order to reach a 
group consensus – as at the Fed or the ECB. Collegial committees can be further 
divided into those that are genuinely collegial, meaning that the chairman seeks 
the committee’s consensus and then persuades recalcitrant members to go along 
(e.g., the ECB Governing Council), or autocratically collegial, meaning that the 
chairman more or less dictates the “consensus” to the other members (e.g., the 
FOMC under Alan Greenspan). 
I argued in Blinder (2004) that autocratically-collegial committees are liable to 
behave too much like individual decisionmakers, thereby leaving most of the ben-
efits of group decisionmaking on the table. This logic seems to point toward ei-
ther genuinely collegial or individualistic monetary policy committees. I argued in 
Blinder (2005), incidentally, that the most appropriate communication strategy for 
a central bank hinges sensitively on the type of MPC that it selects, which links Is-
sues 2 and 4. But, I have neither the time nor the space to go into that linkage here.
Issue 5: Should central banks also be bank supervisors? 
One noteworthy recent departure from traditional central banking practice 
is the trend toward taking central banks out of the business of bank supervision 
and regulation. This new division of labor has occurred in varying degrees (in 
some places completely) in the UK, Germany, and Japan, to name just a few 
32 This work was subsequently replicated by researchers at the Bank of England. See Lombardelli et al. 
(2005). Our choice of five-person groups was made long before we heard Sibert’s (2005) claim that five is 
the optimal group size! 
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major countries.33 And it is highly controversial, with reasonable arguments on 
both sides.34 While there are other aspects, the essence of the debate, it seems to 
me, boils down to whether economies of scope or conflicts of interest are the domi-
nant effects when monetary policy (sometimes called “macro prudential” policy) 
and bank supervision (“micro prudential” policy) are consolidated in the same 
authority.35
The (tacit) traditional view emphasizes economies of scope, which imply that 
the two functions are best performed by the same institution. Why might that be 
so? Unlike the case with private businesses, the economies-of-scope issue does not 
turn on cost savings; central banks do not save money by using the same staff for 
bank supervision and monetary policy. Rather, the main issue is whether there are 
quantitatively meaningful complementarities between the central bank’s macro-pru-
dential and micro-prudential responsibilities. The Federal Reserve’s former Vice 
Chairman Roger Ferguson (2000, p. 301), believes there are: “I think the Fed’s 
monetary policy is better because of its supervisory responsibilities, and its super-
vision and regulation are better because of its stabilization responsibilities.” 
For example, having supervisory authority over commercial banks gives the 
central bank unique access to timely information on the health and operation of 
the banking system – information that might be relevant, for example, to making 
judgments about the credit channel of monetary transmission.36 Such information 
becomes obviously important at certain critical junctures; the global financial cri-
sis in the summer and fall of 1998 was one dramatic case in point. More gener-
ally, there is at least some evidence that supervisory information enhances the Fed’s 
ability to forecast the economy (Peek et al., 1999). 
Looking for complementarities in the other direction, having responsibility for 
monetary policy might force the bank supervisor to internalize the potential mac-
roeconomic consequences of its actions. To cite a prominent U.S. example, bank 
supervisors were heavily criticized in the early 1990s for exacerbating the “credit 
crunch,” which in turn hampered recovery from the 1990-1991 recession.37 More 
generally, it has been suggested that micro-prudential policies can exacerbate busi-
ness cycles by, for example, forcing banks to rebuild capital during a cyclical down-
turn.38 Recently, bank supervisors have been taking this long-neglected issue seri-
ously (White, 2006). 
33 See Freytag and Masciandaro (2005, p. 2) for a more complete list.
34 For a comprehensive look at the arguments pro and con, see Goodhart (2000). 
35 Among the other aspects is the question of whether assigning supervisory power to the central bank 
concentrates too much power in one agency.
36 The Federal Reserve has made this argument many times. See, for example, Meyer (1999) or Fer-
guson (2000).
37 Among many sources that could be cited, see Bernanke and Lown (1991). 
38 See Kashyap and Stein (2004) and several of the references cited there. 
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But there are also arguments on the other side. The very things I just cited 
as potential economies of scope can be viewed as potential sources of conflict of 
interest instead. For example, should a supervisor allow sick banks to continue to 
operate just because macroeconomic conditions are weak? I have just suggested 
why the answer might be yes. But there is a legitimate worry that a central bank’s 
concern with macroeconomic management might cloud its supervisory judg-
ment, thereby imperiling safety and soundness. 
Another set of issues arises from the increasing complexity of financial institu-
tions. A modern universal bank is also an investment bank, a stock brokerage, a 
funds manager, and an insurance company, to name just a few. The lines that 
separate one type of financial activity from another are getting blurrier and blurrier 
all the time, and the activities themselves are growing more complex. For a central 
bank to monitor all these disparate activities, it needs staff with expertise in securi-
ties and insurance (and other things) as well as in banking. It may also find itself 
bumping heads with the nation’s securities and insurance regulators, thereby creat-
ing either overlapping jurisdictions or, what is worse, gaps in supervision. Bringing 
some order to this potential jumble makes it difficult to apply the otherwise-appeal-
ing principle of “functional regulation,” whereby the banking supervisor watches 
over banking activities (even if done at Wal-Mart or Merrill Lynch), the securities 
supervisor polices securities activities (even if done at the Bank of America), and so 
on. A potentially cleaner approach is to create one financial “super regulator” that 
can watch over all financial activities at a given institution at once. 
 Where do I come out on this debate? A bit wishy-washy, I’m afraid, and about 
where I was when I compiled my 1999 Frankfurt list. There I wrote (Blinder, 
2000, p. 69): 
Proprietary information that the central bank receives in bank examina-
tions is of some, limited use in formulating monetary policy – and is on 
rare occasions very important. So, on balance, it is probably better to have 
it than not. On the other hand, a bank supervisor may sometimes have to 
be a protector of banks and sometimes a stern disciplinarian – and either 
stance may conflict with monetary policy.
I am persuaded that nations should leave at least some supervisory responsibil-
ity with the central bank. It alone has the broad macroeconomic and even inter-
national perspective that is crucial from time to time. It alone has the ultimate 
responsibility for both macroeconomic and financial stability. And it alone has 
the resources to serve as lender of last resort should the need arise. Given all that, 
it seems unwise to deprive the central bank of supervisory information that might 
be relevant to performing its job. And I do not believe that getting that informa-
tion secondhand is quite as good as getting it firsthand. 
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But that does not imply that the central bank must be the sole or even the 
dominant bank supervisor, especially in countries with hundreds or thousands of 
non-universal banks. Central bank involvement in bank supervision needs to be 
thought of as lying along a continuum, not as a “zero-one” variable. The U.S., 
with four different federal bank regulatory agencies (and 50 more in the states), 
is a clear example.39 The Fed should be able to access all the information it needs 
for monetary policy purposes by serving as the “umbrella supervisor” of all large 
bank holding companies. And it should be in a good position to monitor systemic 
risk as long as it has a window into every large financial institution. Neither role 
requires the Fed to be the primary supervisor of hundreds of small banks – as it is 
today. In this regard, it is striking that, for example, the Bank of England, which 
has been entirely excluded from the supervisory arena, has not protested that this 
exclusion has damaged its ability to conduct monetary policy. 
In any case, regardless of my own views, this is surely a live issue that must be 
addressed by central banks and governments all over the world. 
II Operating principles for monetary policy
I turn next to a set of six questions related to how central banks should conduct 
monetary policy
Issue 6: Should central banks be so averse to policy reversals? 
As a broad generalization, the practice of monetary policy seems to be grow-
ing closer and closer to the way macroeconomists conceptualize it. Increasingly, 
central bankers utilize staff analyses, even quite complicated analyses, and think 
about policy options in the way that technical economists do (e.g., via expecta-
tional effects, output gaps, Phillips curves, and the like). In fact, and in contrast 
to past practice, many central bankers these days even are economists. The cur-
rent heads of the Federal Reserve System, the Bank of England, and the Bank of 
Israel, for example, are all former academic stars. Yet economic analysis and cen-
tral banking practice appear to diverge sharply in at least one prominent respect. 
The matter is what I call reversal aversion – the unwillingness of central bankers to 
reverse direction.
Consider the problem of minimizing the expected discounted present value of 
a loss function like (1) subject to a dynamic, stochastic model of the economy. 
Various aspects of the model, including both the shocks and the coefficients, are 
liable to be changing all the time, which means that the optimal path of the policy 
39 Not that I would recommend this crazy-quilt structure to any other country! 
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instrument is also changing all the time. Suppose the central bank’s policy rate 
has been rising for several meetings, in an attempt to restrain aggregate demand. 
Now suppose an external shock reduces aggregate demand sharply. There is then 
a reasonable chance that the central bank’s optimal policy rate would decline even 
though it has recently been rising.
Although the basic logic of optimization suggests that such policy reversals 
should not be uncommon, central bankers seem to avoid them like the plague. 
For example, suppose we use the arbitrary but reasonable definition that a policy 
reversal is a change in direction within three months. Then the allegedly activist 
British MPC has had only one policy reversal out of 32 interest rate changes in 
its brief history (which began only in mid 1997).40 The Swedish Riskbank began 
using the repo rate as its central policy tool in mid 1994, and since then it has 
changed the rate 66 times.41 Only two of these were policy reversals, one coming 
just after the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. The history 
of the Greenspan Fed was longer (18½ years) but similar: It shows just three re-
versals out of 98 policy moves, two of which were associated with the 1987 stock 
market crash. So reversals are rare. The question is why. And the further question 
is: Are central banks right to avoid them so assiduously? 
As just noted, simple versions of optimization theory say no. There is nothing par-
ticularly strange about a sequence of optimal choices that, say, first rises and then falls. 
Remember Keynes’s classic retort to being chided for changing his mind: “When I 
learn new facts, sir, I change my opinion. What do you do?” So, if it is rational to 
avoid reversals, what factors might standard optimization theory be missing? 
One is the dual problem of simultaneous optimization and (re)estimation in 
a world of pervasive uncertainty. Statistical devices such as Kalman filters (which 
are just an example) will give rise, e.g., to forecasts and parameter estimates that 
evolve slowly as new information is received. Policy based on such forecasts and 
estimates would also evolve slowly. 
Another factor is surely central bankers’ concern with their credibility. If citizens, 
and perhaps even markets, do not understand the underlying model, do not ob-
serve the shocks very well, or do not understand the logic of optimization in the 
face of “news,” they might misinterpret a sequence in which interest rates first rise 
and then fall as prima facie evidence that the bank had erred.42 That belief, in turn, 
might undermine the bank’s credibility or, in an extreme case, even threaten its in-
dependence. At minimum, a quick policy reversal poses a major communication 
problem. Central banks worry about the loss of credibility a great deal. To cite just 
40 Widening the window to four months would add two more reversals. The count in this paragraph 
were all current through the end of March 2006.
41 This count is a bit skewed by 25 changes in 1996, mostly of them small. 
42 This point is emphasized by Goodhart (2004).
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one example, Alan Greenspan told the FOMC in July 1996 that, “If we are per-
ceived to have tightened and then have been compelled by market forces to quickly 
reverse, our reputation for professionalism will suffer a severe blow.”43 Hundreds of 
similar statements must have been made by central bankers all over the world. 
A second factor leading to reversal aversion may be concern with financial 
market stability. Frequent policy reversals by the central bank might induce un-
wanted volatility in financial markets as traders felt they were being whipsawed. 
And a third factor, of course, is the natural unwillingness to be seen as admitting 
error. So, on balance, the observed aversion to policy reversals is understandable 
– whether or not it is optimal. 
There is, however, a downside to refusing to reverse course. Remember that a cen-
tral bank that will not change its policy stance even though it is optimal to do so will 
from time to time find itself falling “behind the curve” – and will subsequently have 
to play catch-up. That in itself can cause turbulence in financial markets. More im-
portant, falling “behind the curve” presumably means either that the inflationary cat 
gets out of the bag or that the economy suffers a longer slump than is necessary. 
Thus reversal aversion is of a different character from the other issues on my 
list. In the main, I have chosen matters that are currently controversial. This one 
apparently is not; virtually all central banks seem to exhibit strong aversion to pol-
icy reversals. The operational question here is: Should the advisability of reversal 
aversion be a subject of active debate? And my answer is yes.
Issue 7: Is the preference for gradualism rational? 
To a greater or lesser degree, central banks around the world also seem to exhib-
it a strong revealed preference for gradualism, that is, for tightening or easing in a 
series of small steps rather than making fewer, larger rate changes. Econometrically, 
this means, for example, that when Taylor rules like (3) are estimated on real data 
they always need to include the lagged dependent variable, viz: 
i = r* + π + a(π – π*) + b(u* – u) + θi–1 + ε. (4)
This equation is typically derived by appending a partial adjustment mechanism, 
i = θi–1 + (1–θ)i* , (5)
to the specification of the desired funds rate, i*, given by (3). Since a typical esti-
mate of θ is 0.8 or more in quarterly data (Rudebusch, 2005), the implied adjust-
ment is very slow. 
43 Quoted by Meyer (2004), p. 56. 
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Table 1 displays the observed distributions of the interest rate changes actu-
ally promulgated by the three central banks mentioned in the previous section: 
the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Swedish Riksbank. The strong 
preference for small changes is evident at all three banks: The fraction of all rates 
changes that is 25 basis points or less is 79% for the Fed, 88% for the BoE, and 
89% for the Riksbank. To put some perspective on this, remember that Willem 
Buiter, a member of the Bank of England’s original MPC, once famously derided 
a 25 basis point rate change as “chicken feed,” presumably because it is unlikely 
that 25 basis points would ever be enough to push “actual” to “desired” anything. 
What the table does not show is the huge amount of serial correlation in the 
data. The Fed is a nice example. It cut rates 24 times between June 1989 and Sep-
tember 1992, and then raised rates seven times between February 1994 and Febru-
ary 1995. Later, it raised rates six times between June 1999 and May 2000, and 
subsequently cut rates 13 times between January 2001 and June 2003. From June 
2004 through June 2006, it raised rates by 25 basis points at 17 consecutive FOMC 
meetings. None of these episodes was interrupted by even a single move in the op-
posite direction. If Newton had observed such data, he might have concluded that a 
central bank in motion tends to stay in motion in the same direction. Why is that? 
One reason is option value. In a world of constant change, pervasive uncer-
tainty, and a strong aversion to policy reversals, a central bank may assign a high 
value to “keeping its options open” – literally. One way to accomplish that is to 
move interest rates more gradually than suggested by simple optimization theory 
(without learning or adjustment costs) – so that you can always stop without hav-
ing to reverse direction. Notice the crucial role of reversal aversion in this argu-
ment. Changing policy now, rather than waiting for later, forecloses options only 
if you have reversal aversion – for otherwise, you can quickly undo whatever you 
have just done. (Analogously, a stock option, once exercised, is gone.) So central 
Rate change Federal Reserve (a) Bank of England (b) Sveriges Riskbank (c) 
Below 25 bps 17 0 32
Exactly 25 bps 61 28 27
26-49 bps 3 0 2
Exactly 50 bps 17 4 5
Above 50 bps 1 0 0
TOTAL    99 32 66
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF POLICY RATE CHANGES TABLE 1 
a. August 1987 through March 2006. 
b. May 1997 through March 2006. 
c. June 1994 through March 2006. 
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bankers’ intense aversion to policy reversals is probably one significant factor con-
tributing to monetary policy gradualism. 
Whether the gradualism induced by reversal aversion should be decried or ap-
plauded is, of course, a matter of debate. Standard optimization theory is often 
interpreted as saying that the policy instrument should follow something close to a 
random walk because the central bank should move its policy rate only in response 
to new information. For example, William Poole (2003, pp. 5-6), a current mem-
ber of the FOMC who was formerly an academic economist, wrote:44 
In my view of the world, future policy actions are almost entirely contingent on 
the arrival of new information… Given information available at the time of a 
meeting, I believe that the standing assumption should be that the policy action 
at the meeting is expected to position the stance of policy appropriately. 
But the Greenspan Fed often did not behave this way, and one major reason, I be-
lieve, was Greenspan’s devotion to keeping his options open. He always wanted to 
maintain the flexibility to stop at any moment without having to reverse course (Blinder 
and Reis, 2005). One way to accomplish that is to move cautiously when you move. 
A second plausible reason for gradualism is serially-correlated shocks and/or 
gradual updating of forecasts and parameter estimates, which would keep the 
central bank moving in the same direction over a series of meetings. Rudebusch 
(2005) points out that econometricians cannot readily distinguish between partial 
adjustment and serially-correlated errors. So, rather than observing what appears 
to be central bank inertia, we might just be observing non-inertial responses to se-
rially-correlated shocks and changing information. Indeed, Goodhart (2004) sug-
gests that serially-correlated forecast errors explain what appears to be gradualism 
at the British MPC, and Sack (2000) found that serially-correlated shocks help 
explain the FOMC’s observed (and seemingly inertial) reaction function. 
A third possible explanation of gradualism derives from what I have labeled 
“Brainard conservatism” (Blinder, 1998). In a seminal paper, William Brainard 
(1967) suggested that, unlike additive uncertainty, multiplicative uncertainty 
should induce a policymaker to move his instrument less than he would under 
certainty equivalence. Even in Brainard’s original paper, this was not a tight de-
duction, but rather a result that held for certain (plausible?) parameter values 
– basically that covariances were not too large. Subsequent research has verified 
the fragility of Brainard’s result in a variety of more complex settings. There is 
no Brainard conservatism theorem.45 Yet I still believe what I wrote in Blinder 
44 I have a hard time squaring this quotation with moving the Federal funds rate by 25 basis points at 16 
consecutive meetings. I suspect Poole does, too. 
45 This was clear already in Chow (1975), Chapter 10. See also Rudebusch (2001) and many other sources. 
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(1998, p.12): “My intuition tells me that this finding is more general – or at 
least more wise – in the real world than the mathematics will support.”46 No-
tice that if a wise central banker is conservative in the Brainard sense, he will 
normally move the policy rate too little to put it where he thinks it should be. 
He will therefore have to move rates again and again – presumably in the same 
direction. 
A fourth motive for gradualism is the desire to smooth interest rates. As I 
noted earlier, central bankers often associate interest-rate volatility with financial-
market instability, perhaps because rate changes lead to asset revaluations. Hence 
a concern with financial stability can rationalize adding a term like γ(it – it–1)
2 to 
the central bank’s loss function. If that is done, the lagged interest rate is carried 
naturally into the monetary policy reaction function, without any need to posit 
the existence of adjustment costs. In fact, Rudebusch (2001) finds that positing a 
substantial value of γ helps explain the Fed’s observed – and quite inertial – reac-
tion function. 
Woodford (2003) has constructed a rather different explanation for gradualism 
based on the importance of pre-commitment. He uses a specific forward-looking 
model based on Calvo (1983) pricing, in which only some prices are free to ad-
just each period. In that setting, he argues that, if the central bank can precommit 
to a future path of interest rates, then firms that are free to set prices now will ex-
pect rates to keep moving in the same direction. They will therefore adjust their 
prices by more, thereby compensating for those who cannot adjust their prices at 
all. This is beneficial in Woodford’s model because faster price adjustment keeps 
the economy closer to its full-information equilibrium. While Woodford’s paper 
is frequently cited by academics, I am skeptical that this specific mechanism in-
fluences real-world central bank thinking very much. Nonetheless, the basic idea 
that expected gradual adjustment of short rates can lead to strong reactions of long 
rates is probably quite general (Bernanke, 2004a). 
In short, we have a plethora of explanations for why gradualism might be ra-
tional. I have mentioned five: option value, serially-correlated shocks, Brainard 
conservatism, the desire to smooth (market) interest rates, and expectational ef-
fects on long-term rates. Any one of them will do. The question is: Which are the 
operative reasons? 
Issue 8: Is monetary fine tuning possible? Desirable? 
Were it not for the success of Alan Greenspan as Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, the next issue would not be on my list at all. “Fine tuning” sounds like 
an archaic phrase left over from the 1960s. Ever since the 1970s, it has been 
46  Simulations by Onatski and Williams (2003) suggest this as well. 
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used more often in a pejorative sense than in a prescriptive one, as when my col-
league Lars Svensson (2001, p.1) warned that “the complex transmission mecha-
nism of monetary policy, the varying lags and strength of the effects through 
different channels, unpredictable shocks and inherent uncertainty combine to 
prevent the use of monetary policy for fine-tuning.” In other words: Do not at-
tempt this at home. 
But Alan Greenspan did, and he succeeded. It is worth asking how. More ger-
mane to this paper, it is worth asking whether other central bankers should try to 
fine tune their own economies. But what, precisely, does that mean? Blinder and 
Reis (2005), who focus on this question, suggest two aspects: 
(a)  pursuing an activist stabilization policy that strives to keep inflation 
and unemployment close to their targets. With a reaction function 
like a Taylor rule, that would mean utilizing relatively high values of 
α and β. 
(b)  adjusting the central bank’s policy instrument(s) frequently in pursuit 
of that goal. Note that, as just argued, frequent adjustment presumably 
means that the typical interest rate change will be small. 
But fine tuning certainly does not mean: 
(c) achieving or expecting to achieve perfection. 
We have already noted that most central banks practice (b). What about (a)? 
I am tempted to answer with Bobby Kennedy’s famous rhetorical question: Why 
not? Consistent with (c), no basketball player expects to hit 100% of his shots – 
and none does. Nonetheless, the objective is always the same: to toss the ball in 
the center of the basket, in line with (a). Archers behave similarly when they aim 
their arrows. Indeed, what else should they do? The real fine-tuning issue, it seems 
to me, is how hard to try. 
If there is an argument against trying too hard, that is, against reacting strongly 
to output and inflation gaps, it must revolve around the dangers of oversteer-
ing and, therefore, of accidentally destabilizing the economy. How realistic is that 
danger? Rudebusch’s (2001) analysis of optimal versus actual policy in a simple 
linear model of the U.S. economy points strongly toward the opposite conclu-
sion: that the Fed’s α and β are too small. On the other hand, some of the simula-
tion findings in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Levin, Wieland, and Williams 
(1999), and Orphanides and Williams (2005) suggest that the Greenspan Fed re-
acted too strongly to unemployment or output gaps (but not to inflation gaps). 
The issue seems open. It also strikes me as an important practical issue for central 
bankers to resolve.
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Issue 9: Central banks and financial markets:
Who leads and who follows? 
In Blinder (1998, pp. 59-62), I argued that central banks should guard their 
independence from financial markets as zealously as they guard their independ-
ence from politics,47 an argument I picked up in much greater detail in Blinder 
(2004, Chapter 3). But other than the theoretical paper by Bernanke and Wood-
ford (1997), I have seen almost no scholarly attention to this matter. To frame 
the issue, consider two stereotypes: 
–  Old-Fashioned Central Bank sees itself as a sometimes-stern disciplinar-
ian that lords it over the unruly, and sometimes downright foolish, finan-
cial markets. It sees itself both as the adult at the party and as the boss. It 
therefore expects the markets to follow its lead, even though it knows they 
will not always oblige. 
–  New-Fangled Central Bank, by contrast, is deeply respectful of markets. It 
sees itself as more of a student of the financial markets than as a teacher, 
and it respects the markets for their power and wisdom. It routinely uses 
asset prices to “read” what the markets expect it to do, and it is loath to 
deviate much from that expectation. 
As a broad generalization, my claim is that Old-Fashioned Central Bank is giv-
ing way to New-Fangled Central Bank in the real world. In part, such a move-
ment is inevitable and appropriate – after all, Old-Fashioned Central Bank is a 
bit of a throwback. But I worry a bit that the shift may be going too far. 
Why might this be of concern? One reason is the dog-chasing-its-tail problem 
mentioned by Blinder (1998) and modeled formally by Bernanke and Woodford 
(1997). When central banks follow market forecasts, which are in turn based on 
forecasts of the central bank’s own behavior, the result can be either dynamic in-
stability or a failure of equilibrium to exist, depending on whether the model is 
backward or forward looking. In the real world, this problem would likely mani-
fest itself in a monetary policy that tends to overshoot in both directions, just as 
speculative markets do. 
Finally, there is the related matter of time horizons. Economic models nor-
mally pretend that financial markets are populated by coolly-rational, farsight-
ed investors with long (if not infinite) time horizons. But this benign view of 
markets contrasts sharply with what people in the trenches see every day on 
trading floors. As Fischer Black slyly put it, financial markets look much more 
efficient from the banks of the Charles than from the banks of the Hudson. On 
47 A version of these lectures was first given in 1995, while I was Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. 
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the banks of the Hudson and in other financial centers where prices are actually 
made, you find hordes of young traders who are susceptible to fads, herding, and 
occasional hysteria. These people tend to have incredibly short time horizons, 
extending at most to the end of the current pay period and maybe only to the 
end of the trading day. 
Notice the great irony here. One of the main reasons why central banks should 
be independent of politics is that politicians have notoriously short time horizons, 
extending at most to the next election. Well, the next election is usually much fur-
ther away than the close of the trading day. Wouldn’t it be a shame if central bank-
ers, in an effort to be “modern”, escaped from the control of shortsighted politi-
cians only to put themselves under the thumb of even more shortsighted traders? 
To be sure, central banks cannot cut themselves off from the markets – and should 
not try. Markets are not only the main transmission mechanism for monetary policy 
but also invaluable sources of information. They need to be respected, though per-
haps more for their power than for their wisdom.48 One way to conceptualize my ba-
sic point is to contrast the two different meanings of the English verb to listen. Should 
central bankers listen to the markets? Yes, in the sense that we should all listen to news 
broadcasts; but not in the sense that children should listen to their mothers. 
Issue 10: Should central banks intervene in foreign
exchange markets? 
One arena in which the preeminence of market judgments over central bank 
judgments clearly holds sway is the prevailing attitude toward foreign exchange 
intervention. Let me break this issue into two closely-linked questions: 
1  Do central banks have the power to move exchange rates with sterilized in-
tervention?49 
2 If so, should they use that power? 
Question 2, of course, comes straight from the previous issue. If markets always 
get the exchange rate right, there is certainly no reason for central banks to inter-
vene. So let’s at least entertain the possibility that markets sometimes get exchange 
rates badly wrong. If you reject this possibility, you can skip straight to the next 
section. But you must also explain the value of the dollar in early 1985 – and per-
haps today as well.
Current thinking in academic and, even more so, in central banking circles runs 
strongly against foreign exchange intervention – mostly answering “no” to both ques-
48 On this, see Issues 12 and 13 below. 
49 The power of unsterilized intervention is not at issue. This section pertains only to sterilized intervention. 
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tions. Regarding Question 1, the empirical evidence has long been read to say that 
central banks have little ability to move exchange rates, except perhaps fleetingly, with-
out changing their monetary policies. But more recent academic studies, using better 
data, suggest a bit more scope for unsterilized intervention (Sarno and Taylor, 2001). 
The negative consensus always struck me as a bit peculiar, anyway. Why are 
central banks unable to move currency rates when shifts in private-sector supply 
and demand move them all the time, and by large amounts? No one thinks that 
private currency traders are powerless to move exchange rates. Why do they lose 
this power if they go to work for the public sector? I believe the answer must be 
quantitative rather than qualitative: Private sector traders regularly buy and sell 
currencies in far greater volume than central banks do. So, to me, the real ques-
tion is more normative than positive: Should a central bank buy or sell the (pos-
sibly large) amount of foreign currency required to move its exchange rate? 
A negative answer is certainly tenable. Especially in the case of a major, ac-
tively-traded currency like the dollar, euro, or yen, the requisite volume of trans-
actions might be gigantic – which would put the central bank at risk of large 
capital losses if it is wrong. In such cases, the central bank had better be very 
sure (a) that it is right and (b) that the exchange rate goal is important enough 
to justify taking the risk. (And if the exchange rate goal is that important, maybe 
it should use unsterilized intervention anyway.) Such massive foreign exchange 
interventions may also have to be asymmetric. While a central bank can always 
supply as much domestic currency as needed to hold its exchange rate down,50 it 
may not have enough foreign exchange reserves to prop its exchange rate up. 
For the most part, I accept this consensus: Outguessing markets is a hazard-
ous business. But, in my view, we must allow for some exceptions.51 For exam-
ple, there are times when currency misalignments are glaringly obvious, even if 
the “right” exchange rate is not. The dollar in early 1985 (far too high), the dol-
lar again in the spring of 1995 (too low), and the euro in the spring of 2001 
(too low) are cases that quickly spring to mind. While neither the timing nor the 
amount of the market’s eventual correction could have been known in advance, it 
was not hard to recognize that exchange rates were misaligned; and the eventual 
direction of change was obvious. In cases like that, chances are good that many 
market participants are aware of the same facts as the central banks, and so are 
holding their positions nervously. That should make it possible for a large (and 
hopefully concerted) intervention by central banks to push the forex market in 
the direction in which it was destined to go anyway. 
50 Assuming it can sterilize the foreign currency inflows. 
51 Below, under Issue 14, I outline the conditions necessary to make it sensible for a central bank to try 
to “burst” an asset-market bubble. Here I am, in essence, claiming that these conditions are occasionally met 
in the case of exchange rates. 
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But Question 2 remains. Is the exchange rate a sufficiently important relative 
price that the central bank should (a) temporarily take its eye off its true targets 
(inflation and unemployment) and (b) accept the risk inherent in large-scale 
currency speculation? My own answer is: normally no, but sometimes yes. For 
example, there are rare times when exchange rates are so misaligned that they 
distort trade patterns so much, or interfere so much with demand management, 
that it becomes rational for the central bank to intervene in large volume. An-
other possibility, which is exemplified by China today and perhaps by Japan in 
2003-2004, is that a nation might believe that its vital interests are best served 
by a lower exchange rate than the free market would deliver – and be willing to 
pay the price to achieve it. 
I realize that I am delivering this paper in a euro-zone country with no ex-
change rate to worry about. But the ECB may have to deal with the exchange 
rate issue once again when the markets not only correct the current overval-
uation of the dollar but probably overshoot. And, of course, the belief that 
recent months have constituted one of those rare moments when concerted 
intervention makes sense is what underlies recent suggestions for a “new Pla-
za accord” (Cline, 2005). So I would like to resurrect the intervention issue, 
which has been dead and buried for too long, and commend it to the attention 
of central bankers.
Issue 11: Should monetary policy use the derivatives markets? 
I noted earlier that financial markets are big, powerful, and innovative. 
Nothing illustrates these traits more dramatically than the explosive growth of 
the markets for derivatives. Derivatives pose many interesting and difficult is-
sues for supervisors and regulators but, in keeping with my assignment, I con-
fine myself to their potential role in monetary policymaking,52 which comes in 
three parts: 
1 as a source of market information 
2 as part of the monetary transmission mechanism 
3 as possible assets for open-market operation. 
The first two are uncontroversial. Given the liquidity and volume of trading in, 
say, interest rate swaps, central banks would be foolish to ignore the signals ema-
nating from those markets – and they don’t. Similarly, the most dramatic early in-
fluences of a central bank’s policy moves, or even of expectations of policy moves, 
may well be registered in the markets for derivatives such as interest rate futures. 
52 For this reason, I restrict myself to fixed-income derivatives, such as swaps. 
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Since these markets, in turn, are linked to the interest rates that matter for real 
economic decisions, such as those on home mortgages and business loans, they 
are a key component of the monetary transmission mechanism. I don’t think an-
yone doubts either of these propositions. 
But the third potential role for derivatives is highly speculative at this point; 
I do not know of a single central bank that conducts open-market operations in 
derivatives.53 I raise the possibility as an issue for the future. Why? 
One reason is the sheer size and growing importance of some of these markets, 
which means they are terrifically deep and liquid. It has often been said that the 
Federal Reserve conducts open market operations in the U.S. Treasury bill market 
because that is the deepest, most liquid market in the world; and similar state-
ments are made about other central banks. Well, that may no longer be true. And 
even if it is true today, it may not be true tomorrow, given the rapid expansion of 
the derivatives markets. Central banks of the future may discover that they can 
get faster, more reliable execution in the swaps market, for example. 
Another reason stems from the juxtaposition of rapid growth of the derivatives 
markets against slow growth of central bank balance sheets. Some observers feel 
that the markets are already so large and innovative that central banks have a hard 
time moving even short-term interest rates via conventional open-market opera-
tions.54 One obvious answer, of course, is to conduct ever-larger open market op-
erations – which is where the size of central bank balance sheets comes in. If, 
for example, currency shrinks relative to GDP while fixed-income markets grow, 
central banks may find their portfolios of T-bills shrinking relative to the size of 
the open-market operations needed to move markets.55 If and when this hap-
pens, leverage may be the answer; and that, of course, is where derivatives come 
in. Market participants routinely use derivatives to create huge amounts of lever-
age, and thus effectively to control large volumes of securities with relatively little 
capital. Why can’t central banks, who are certainly higher-rated counterparties, 
do the same? It’s something to think about. 
Of course, central banks will want to move into this domain cautiously, if at 
all. They are stodgy to begin with, appropriately so in my view; and derivatives 
have a vaguely disreputable public image. But most of the “accidents” in the de-
53 I ignore the Bank of Thailand’s use of foreign exchange derivatives in 1997 because that seems to 
have been motivated by a desire to conceal its true reserve position, not as a way to conduct monetary policy. 
The Bank of Mexico deals in options on the peso to influence (not peg) its exchange rate – though transpar-
ently. Finally, as part of its efforts to guard against financial disruption at the end of the millennium, the 
Federal Reserve sold call options on repos in October-December 1999. (See Drossos and Hilton (2000).) I 
am grateful to Steve Cecchetti for calling these last two cases to my attention. 
54 I am, personally, rather skeptical of this argument. But one hears it all the time.
55 Note the parallelism to the previous issue about exchange rate intervention. 
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rivatives markets, not to mention the frauds, have taken place in “exotics,” not in 
plain-vanilla interest rate swaps, which are simple, transparent, and either are or 
can be traded on organized exchanges. And it is, of course, in plain vanillas that 
any sensible central bank would operate. For this reason, I believe that conducting 
open-market operations in swaps would confer a side benefit by steering markets 
away from exotics toward more plain vanilla swaps. Indeed, were I of a mind to 
predict the future of central banking, as opposed to just analyzing the present, I’d 
be tempted to forecast appearances by central banks in the swaps markets. But for 
now, it is just something to think about. 
III  The transmission mechanism for monetary policy
I turn, finally and more briefly, to five controversial and/or poorly understood 
aspects of the transmission mechanism for monetary policy.
Issue 12: Transmission via the term structure of interest rates 
The simplest version of the monetary transmission mechanism traces the central 
bank’s influence from overnight rates (which it controls) to longer-term interest 
rates and thereby on to aggregate demand. The link from short rates to long rates 
is normally based on the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates, 
which states that intermediate- and long-term rates are the appropriate weighted 
averages of expected future short rates. 
There is a catch, however. It has been known for years that the expectations 
theory fails virtually every empirical test miserably, at least when expectations are 
rational.56 A one-sentence synopsis of this literature is that long rates are terrible 
(and biased) predictors of future short rates. To show just one example, I repro-
duce below a graph from Blinder (2004, p. 78). It shows, on the horizontal axis, 
the one-year U.S. Treasury bond rate expected to hold nine years ahead according 
to the yield curve and, on the vertical axis, the actual one-year rate nine years later. 
There is hardly any correlation between the two.57 
Just why this is so remains a major intellectual puzzle. To blame the puz-
zle on time-varying term premia is just to give it a name – like blaming ma-
56 Among the many references that could be cited, see Campbell (1995). Chow (1989) suggests that the 
theory fares better under the assumption of adaptive expectations. 
57 The straight line drawn in the graph is not the best-fitting regression line. It is a line with a freely-esti-
mated intercept (to allow for a constant risk premium) and a slope of 1.0, which is the slope implied by theo-
ry. The slope of the actual regression line (not shown) is only 0.27. The underlying data are for U.S. zero-cou-
pon bonds, monthly from December 1949 through February 1991. 
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chine malfunctions on “gremlins.” In Blinder (2004, Chapter 3), I suggested 
(but certainly did not prove) that the expectations theory fails because long 
rates are far more sensitive to short rates than “rational” pricing models pre-
dict. This hypothesis may or may not be correct. My main purpose in calling 
attention to the term structure puzzle here is not to resolve it, but rather to 
urge central bank research departments to give it high priority. It may be the 
piece of the monetary transmission mechanism about which we are most in 
the dark. 
This issue relates, by the way, to Issue 9. If markets are so bad at forecasting 
future short-term interest rates, why should we give so much deference to their 
forecasts of anything else – including future central bank policy?
Issue 13: Transmission via exchange rates:
uncovered interest-rate parity 
The mention of unresolved puzzles and terrible forecasts leads naturally to 
the next issue: the equally-embarrassing failure of uncovered interest-rate parity. 
If one-year interest rates are 5% in the United States and 3% in Germany, the 
market is implicitly forecasting a 2% depreciation of the dollar against the euro 
over the coming year. And a similar forecast is implied by every other pair of 
international interest rates over any horizon. Thought of in terms of monetary 
policy, when divergent central bank policies engineer international interest rate 
differentials, those differentials are supposed to first forecast and then become ex-
change rate movements. Unfortunately, on average they do not. Not only are 
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uncovered interest-rate parity relationships terrible forecasters of future exchange 
rate movements, they often get the sign wrong.58
This is a serious matter. In the usual story of the role of exchange rates in mon-
etary transmission, a country that raises its interest rates experiences a currency 
appreciation. The theory of uncovered interest parity explains that this happens 
in order to induce (rational) expectations that the currency will subsequently de-
preciate back to its original (real) exchange rate. Thus a tightening of monetary 
policy is supposed to lead to a quick appreciation followed by a depreciation. 
Nice and logical. But, empirically, it does not happen. How, then, does monetary 
policy influence exchange rates? A good question. And until it gets a good answer, 
central bankers are operating in a dense fog. So this issue also ranks high on the 
research agenda – and high on the list of reasons not to place excessive trust in 
market forecasts. 
Issue 14: How should central banks react
to asset-price bubbles? 
Asset prices are an important part of the monetary policy transmission mech-
anism. Other things equal, when stock or home prices rise, a central bank that 
is targeting, say, a weighted average of the inflation and output gaps will raise 
interest rates because wealth effects might otherwise drive aggregate demand up 
too fast. This is old hat, uncontroversial, and a standard part of monetary policy 
practice. 
But should central banks react to asset-market bubbles per se, meaning over 
and above the amount implied by the link from asset prices to wealth to aggregate 
demand? In the loss function context, that would mean adding some asset prices 
(e.g., stock prices) as a third argument of the loss function. In the Taylor rule con-
text, it would mean adding those prices as another term in the equation, as Cec-
chetti et al. (2000) explicitly recommend, so that the central bank would then raise 
interest rates as stock prices go up even if y and π were both on target.59 Both the 
current and previous chairmen of the Federal Reserve are on record as opposing 
this idea (Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Greenspan (2002)), as am I (Blinder and 
Reis, 2005, pages 64-70). Since so much ink has been spilled on this issue, I can 
be very terse in outlining the pros and cons. 
Proponents of bubble bursting argue that: 
58 Among the many sources that could be cited, see Wadhwani (1999) and Meredith and Chinn (2004).
59 Cecchetti et al. (2000) explicitly state that the central bank should not have a target price for the stock 
market, but should just “lean against the wind.” Thus stock prices enter the Taylor rule with a positive coeffi-
cient, but there is no target level for stock prices.
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–  the central bank has a clear responsibility to preserve financial stability, 
which is threatened by asset bubbles. 
–  sizable bubbles can, in fact, be detected by applying U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Potter Stewart’s famous test for pornography: “You know it when 
you see it.” Furthermore, they can be recognized early enough to do some-
thing about them. 
–  bubbles lead to misallocations of resources (e.g., the Internet craze) and 
also damage conventional macroeconomic stability (e.g., when a slump 
follows a stock market crash). 
–  the central bank has instruments at its disposal that can deflate bubbles with-
out doing undue harm to its primary goals, inflation and unemployment. 
This last argument is usually tacit, not explicit, but it is essential. Without it, 
bubble-bursting may do more harm than good, even if all the rest is right. 
Opponents of bubble-bursting concede that bubbles do happen, do cause re-
source misallocations, and are sometimes recognizable. But they argue that: 
–  financial stability can be maintained by what Reis and I (2005) called the 
“mop up after” strategy. 
–  bubbles generally become “obvious” only after they have inflated quite far, 
and attempts to identify them earlier would likely produce many false pos-
itives. 
–  the central bank is not responsible bad private investment decisions, and 
the macroeconomy is best managed by focusing monetary policy on infla-
tion and unemployment. 
–  the central bank has no instruments suitable for targeting specifically at 
bubbles. Raising interest rates enough to burst a bubble would likely burst 
the economy as well. 
I find the second set of arguments far more compelling and, in support, I offer 
the following quick reflections on the greatest bubble in history: the U.S. stock 
market bubble of 1998-2000.60 The idea is that, if the case for bursting bubbles 
didn’t apply then, it may never apply. 
First, the stock market bubble was recognizable, but only rather late in the 
game; and acting too early could have been disastrous. For example, even dur-
ing its worst months after the crash, the market never returned to where it was 
on the day in December 1996 that Alan Greenspan declared it to be “irrationally 
exuberant.” Should the Fed have tightened in 1996 and squelched the ensuing 
60 Similar facts apply to Europe and Japan. The tech-stock bubble was a worldwide phenomenon. 
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boom? My answer is no. Second, the “mop up after” strategy worked extraordinar-
ily well even in this extreme stress test; not a single sizable bank or brokerage firm 
went bankrupt. Third, despite the fact that a staggering $8 trillion in wealth was 
vaporized, the post-bubble recession was so small that it disappears in annual data. 
Finally, if the specific concern was tech stocks, what instrument could (or should) 
the Fed have used to target this idiosyncratic sector? 
While my personal opinion is clear, the main point is that real-world central 
bankers need to make a decision on this issue.
Issue 15: Dealing with the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates 
While central banks control the (very) short-term nominal interest rate, most 
economists believe that it is real interest rates that influence economic activity.61 In 
a deep slump, the central bank would like to make real short rates negative. But this 
is impossible if the inflation rate is zero or negative, because nominal interest rates 
cannot fall below zero. For decades, most economists viewed this issue as a theoreti-
cal curiosum of no practical importance. But Japan has taught us otherwise.62
What to do? First, prevention is clearly better than cure. Bernanke, Reinhart 
and Sack (2004) creatively examined various unconventional monetary policies 
– things that a central bank confronted by the zero lower bound might try – and 
I would add exchange-rate intervention to their list. I think it is fair to say that 
such a central bank would not be powerless. That’s the good news. However, the 
unconventional policies are likely to be far weaker than conventional interest-rate 
policy. That’s the bad news. So it is certainly better not to flirt with zero. 
Inflation targeting, or rather successful inflation targeting, should help. By post-
ing a target, π*, that is safely above zero, and then achieving it, a central bank can 
avoid confronting the zero lower bound. At worst, it can always push the short-
term real interest rate down to –π*, which is why π* should be bounded away from 
zero. Of course, with shocks and control errors, even an inflation targeting central 
bank might find itself below π*, or even below zero. However, should this happen, 
a credible commitment to the positive inflation target should keep the current ex-
pected inflation rate above the current actual inflation rate, leaving re = i – πe well 
below r = i – π. 
61 The truth is not as one-sided as economists often pretend. For example, the front-loading of real 
mortgage payments in a conventional (nominal) fixed rate mortgage makes the nominal rate matter quite a lot 
to capital-constrained home buyers.
62 When the core CPI inflation rate in the United States dipped to 1.3% in August 2001, the Fed voiced 
concerns about deflation and the zero lower bound. See Bernanke (2003). All the time of this conference, with 
core HICP inflation at 1.4%, the ECB should have been just as concerned. 
Monetary policy today: sixteen questions and about twelve answers 65
Alan S. Blinder
Targeting the price level, rather than the inflation rate, provides even greater 
protection against getting trapped by the zero lower bound. Credible inflation 
targeting should engender expectations that π, which could go negative for a 
time, will converge upward to π*. But credible price level targeting should engen-
der expectations that π will actually overshoot π* for a while in order to get the 
price level, pt, back to its target path – thereby pushing π
e higher sooner. For this 
reason, the earlier verdict that inflation targeting is superior to price level target-
ing (Fischer, 1994) may need to be revisited for a world of very low inflation. 
Note, by the way, that adopting a price level target does not imply that the aver-
age inflation rate must be zero. The desired price level path can be defined to rise 
over time at some pre-determined inflation rate: pt* = p0(1+π*)
t.
Issue 16: Do the giant central banks have
global responsibilities? 
There is one last question that most central banks can answer quickly (and 
in the negative) but that giants like the Federal Reserve and the ECB (and per-
haps the Bank of Japan and, one day, the People’s Bank of China) must wrestle 
with: Should a central bank consider the welfare of other countries in making its 
domestic monetary policy decisions? Or, put slightly differently, do the Fed and 
ECB bear some responsibility for the health of the world economy? 
Before addressing this question, let me make an important conceptual dis-
tinction analogous to the one made under Issue 14 (bubbles). In an interrelated 
world, what happens in Country B will reverberate somewhat on Country A. 
For that reason, the central bank of Country A must and will take events in 
Country B into account in formulating its own domestic monetary policy. To 
cite just one obvious example, forecasts of foreign economies are needed to gen-
erate a forecast of your own net exports. The question for this section is a dif-
ferent one: Should the central bank’s objective function have some foreign (or 
world) variables in it? Or, put more concretely, might there be times when the 
Fed or the ECB should tighten or ease even though their own domestic econo-
mies are not calling for such action? 
The case of the “25 basis points that saved the world” – the Fed’s rate cut in 
September 1998, at a time when the U.S. economy was booming – brought this 
issue into bold relief. While Alan Greenspan was careful to justify the cut by fret-
ting about possible infection from abroad, many observers at the time thought 
the Fed was doing its part to “save the world.” 
The question is a vexing one, and one major reason is legal. The Fed was cre-
ated and derives its mandate from acts of the U.S. Congress; the ECB derives 
its authority and mandate from the Maastricht Treaty. In both of these cases, 
and in all others of which I know, the central bank’s legal mandate pertains 
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exclusively to the domestic economy. Other than worrying about possible rever-
berations from various Country B’s, what right, then, does either the Fed or the 
ECB have to take actions designed to help other countries? And if such actions 
run counter to domestic needs, has the central bank actually violated the law? 
These are serious issues. 
But, on the other hand, an elephant walking through the jungle must take care 
where it steps. The European and American (and perhaps also the Japanese) econ-
omies are so large, and so important to both real and financial activity throughout 
the world, that it can be argued that good international citizenship gives them spe-
cial responsibilities. That is why I raise the question, but do not answer it. 
IV Monetary policy in the 21st century
With 16 different issues, it would be foolish to try to summarize all the argu-
ments. Instead, let me use this concluding section to provoke discussion by offer-
ing overly-crisp and excessively definitive answers to the 16 questions posed in this 
paper – leaving out the nuances and counter-arguments. 
Organizational structure 
1  Monetary policy should target a core, not headline, measure of inflation and 
set the inflation target well above zero – say, at 2%. 
2  Most central banks need to become more transparent in several dimensions. 
One is their forecasts, including conditional forecasts of their own behavior. 
However, a mechanical reaction function might do as an interim solution. 
3  Inflation targeters should be more transparent about having an output or 
unemployment stabilization objective. 
4  Monetary policy is best made by committees, but autocratically-collegial com-
mittees may not exploit the advantages of group decisionmaking sufficiently. 
5  Nations should not exclude their central banks from bank supervision. 
Operating principles 
6  Central banks need to question their reasons for such extreme aversion to 
policy reversals. 
7  On the other hand, we have, if anything, too many good explanations for 
the preference for gradualism. 
8  Instead of scoffing at “fine tuning,” perhaps some central banks should raise 
their aspiration levels. 
 9  Central banks should lead the markets rather than follow them. 
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10  There may be more scope for unsterilized foreign exchange intervention 
than current central bank rhetoric and practice admit. 
11  Some central banks should begin thinking about conducting at least 
some of their open-market operations in derivatives. 
Monetary transmission 
12  Figuring out why the expectations theory of the term structure fails so 
badly is an urgent research priority for central banks. 
13  So is the abject failure of uncovered interest parity. 
14  Central banks should not use monetary policy to burst asset market bubbles. 
15  Central banks should have contingency plans for dealing with the zero 
lower bound on nominal interest rates. 
16  As the world continues to integrate economically, the ECB and the Fed 
(and eventually also the PBoC) may implicitly have to assume more glo-
bal responsibilities. 
Finally, I confidently predict that, five or ten years from now, some other 
scholar will have no trouble at all in formulating a list of 16 or more unresolved 
monetary policy issues. I just hope some of them are different from mine. 
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It is indeed a pleasure to comment on such a challenging and thought-provoking paper. Unfortunately, I will not have time to go through all the 
very pertinent questions raised in the paper, so my remarks will be selective. 
The combination of theoretical and practical aspects in the paper reflects the 
remarkable progress of the dialogue between the academic and Central Bank 
worlds in the past 15 years or so. Changes on both sides have contributed 
to that development. The emergence of a new benchmark macro model that 
eliminates the LM curve and clearly establishes the interest rate as the mon-
etary policy instrument, as it had usually been the practice of Central Banks, 
helped the connection with the practical side of things. In its dynamic ver-
sion the new benchmark combines the methodology of Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium models that came from the Real Business Cycles school 
with the new Keynesian nominal rigidities and gives sense to the effects of 
money on the real economy through a more realistic transmission mechanism. 
Monetary policy affects prices indirectly through its effect on optimising con-
sumption, investment and labour market decisions in the context of real and 
nominal rigidities. The output gap, representing the degree of slack in the 
economy, plays an important role in the model as an important channel on 
inflation and as a policy target. This avoids the assumption of a direct effect 
of money through a pure liquidity effect and corresponds better to the stylized 
fact that policy influences first the real side of the economy and then prices. 
The new approach also assumes the possibility of optimal Central Banks be-
haviour when policy is determined by a rule that comes from an optimization 
exercise and responds to inflation and a theoretically consistent output gap. 
All this helped the dialogue to which Central Banks contributed by begin-
ning to commit to a more precise policy framework that includes the need to 
focus on the importance of expectations and to attempt to influence them by 
becoming more credible and transparent through appropriate communication. 
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This led to what the author in his latest book calls the “quiet revolution” in 
central banking.1
At the same time, we have observed a remarkable convergence of Central Bank 
practices in conducting monetary policy. Even when they profess different strate-
gies, one can identify a common denominator, a set of general principles that seem 
to have universal acceptance. I group these under five headings: 
1  First, the main goal of monetary policy has been more clearly defined as be-
ing price stability, meaning a low medium term objective for the inflation 
rate. Other objectives may be added, explicitly or implicitly, with different 
or equal weights in the objective function, but there is now no ambiguity 
about the main concern of policy.
2  Second, to form a view about the economic situation and the risks for inflation, 
a full information approach is adopted, and this means analysing the complete 
set of information variables. As Wim Duisenberg (2000)2 expressed it once: 
“Monetary policy-making in the euro area has to reflect the complexities and 
uncertainties which surround the transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
… These uncertainties imply that no single approach is likely to be entirely reli-
able. … Reliance on a single indicator or forecast, or a single model of the econ-
omy or view of the world, would, in these circumstances, be extremely unwise. 
The strategy needs to incorporate the full range of relevant indicators and assess 
them in the context of a variety of different models”. Even if the assessment is 
organized around two types of analysis, as it is the case in the Eurosystem, the 
aim is “the cross-checking of information in coming to its unified overall judge-
ment on the risks to price stability”3. This is the way the issue is expressed in 
our May 2003 communiqué that clarified our basic policy framework. It also 
added that “the monetary analysis mainly serves as a means of cross-checking, 
from a medium to long-term perspective, the short to medium-term indica-
tions coming from economic analysis”. It also stated: “Monetary analysis will 
take into account developments in a wide range of monetary indicators includ-
ing M3, its components and counterparts, notably credit, and various measures 
of excess liquidity”. This reference to many aggregates, including credit, is im-
portant, especially in view of the instability since 2003 of traditional money de-
mand functions for M3, an instability that impairs monetary analysis4. From 
the point of view of the convergence of policy practices that I mentioned, it 
1 Blinder, Alan S. (2004) The quiet revolution: Central Banking goes modern, Yale University Press.
2 Duisenberg, Wim (2000) “From the EMI to the ECB”, Speech delivered at the Banque de France’s Bi-
centennial Symposium, Paris, 30 May 2000. 
3 “The ECB’s monetary policy strategy”, Communiqué of 8 May 2003.
4 See Avouyi-Dovi et al (2006) “La function de demande de monnaie pour la zone euro: un réexamen”, 
Notes d’Études et de Recherche de la Banque de France.  
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is interesting to confront this with one of the criteria used by the Norges 
Bank, that epitome of inflation targeting, in “assessing whether a future 
interest rate path appears reasonable compared with the monetary policy 
objective”. In fact, the 5th criterion asserts that “Interest rate setting must 
also be assessed in the light of developments in property prices and credit. 
Wide fluctuations in these variables may constitute a source of instability 
in demand and output in the somewhat longer run.”5
3  Third, it is well established that the short-term monetary interest rate is an 
instrument of monetary policy and not any quantitative monetary variable. 
In addition, the strategy of using intermediate targets for monetary policy has 
been abandoned and the instrument is related with the final targets as Ben-
jamin Friedman (1990)6 recommended many years ago as a more efficient use 
of information. Here, we should note that the notion of an inflation forecast 
as an intermediate target put forward by Svensson does not contradict this 
because the forecast variable is directly related with the final target of policy. 
4  Fourth, according to the new benchmark model, the transmission mech-
anism goes first through the real economic decisions of households and 
firms and only with a longer lag on prices. Also, the model gives great im-
portance to expectations of future values for the relevant variables. With 
forward-looking rational agents, expectations of future policy influence 
present decisions and so problems of credibility become relevant for mon-
etary policy. This implies that policy must adopt a forward-looking ap-
proach and that a focus on expectations is required. However, it should 
be clear that this does not imply that policy should follow market expecta-
tions, since this could entail serious dynamic instability and indeterminacy 
problems. Quite the contrary in order to influence expectations, monetary 
authorities must embark on effective communication with other econom-
ic agents and become more transparent about their own decision-making 
process in order to establish credibility. 
5  Fifth, in spite of granting more importance to a rules-based orientation 
of policy no central banker will deny the need for some discretion in con-
ducting policy in the face of real life uncertainties. As Alan Blinder put it 
in his previous book on central banking: “Rarely does society solve a time 
inconsistency problem by rigid precommitement or by creating incentive-
compatible compensation schemes for decision makers. Enlightened dis-
cretion is the rule”.7
5 Norges Bank (2005) “Inflation Report” no. 1/2005, March.
6 Friedman, Benjamin (1990) “Targets and instruments of monetary policy” in B. Friedman and Frank 
Hahn (ed.) “Handbook of Monetary Economics”, Vol. II, North-Holand.
7 Blinder, Alan (1998) Central banking in theory and practice, The MIT Press, page 49.
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When mention is made of rule-based policy, we should not forget that there is 
a lot of confusion surrounding the word “rule”. Theory talks about commitment 
to rules but that notion seemingly includes mere respect for a precise procedure 
in conducting monetary policy. Ben Bernanke and Frederic Mishkin (1997)8 say, 
for instance, about inflation targeting that it “…does not represent an ironclad 
policy rule… Instead, inflation targeting is better understood as a policy frame-
work”. Even when Lars Svensson defines, for instance, “general or specific target 
rules” we see that he does not mean any sort of mechanical rule, but commit-
ment to a framework that has been made more precise in some aspects but still 
allows room for exercising judgment.9 In some circumstances, the “specific tar-
get rules” alluded to by Svensson may nevertheless be too rigid. The expression 
“constrained discretion” was coined to designate the current practice and at least 
for monetary authorities of big countries or big economic areas that is the name 
of the game. 
The five points I have just described are not sufficient to characterize a policy 
framework and the missing details are the ones that are important to differentiate 
the various regimes in existence. I find that the questions raised by Alan Blinder in 
his paper concerning the “institutional design” and the “operating principles” as 
particularly apt to help us complete that task. As I will not comment on all those 
questions, I hope that my answers, plus the five points above help to convey my 
overall view on the way to conduct monetary policy. 
Let me start then with the question about the specification of the objective func-
tion for monetary policy (Question 1). The formula presented in the paper is gen-
erally accepted and widely used and I have no qualms with it. Going further to 
a full specification of all the parameters is of course another mater. Fully speci-
fying the objective function has been one of the recurrent recommendations of 
Lars Svensson in the context of the inflation target regime10. The only pragmatic 
version of that regime is the so-called “flexible inflation targeting” that takes into 
consideration the stabilization of the output gap. Consequently, the demand for 
a full specification is a way of defending the inflation targeting framework from 
the accusation of being misleading as, in spite of its name, it includes other targets 
after all. That is alluded to by Alan Blinder in the paper when he suggests the re-
gime could as well be called “unemployment targeting” (see page 18) but has been 
used to justify a harsher criticism of inflation targeting by Jon Faust, Dale Henderson 
8 Bernanke, Ben and Frederic Mishkin (1997) “Inflation targeting. A new framework for monetary poli-
cy?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, pp. 97-116. 
9 Svensson, Lars (2003) “What’s wrong with Taylor rules? Using judgment in monetary policy through 
targeting rules” in Journal of Economic Literature 41: 426-77. 
10 See the previous note and Svensson, Lars (2003) “The Inflation Forecast and the Loss Function,” in 
Paul Mizen, ed. (2003), Central Banking, Monetary Theory and Practice: Essays in Honour of Charles Goodhart, 
Volume I, Edward Elgar, 135-152. Also available in http://www.princeton.edu/svensson/.
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and Benjamin Friedman11. It is true that Svensson formally demonstrated quite a 
while ago (Lars Svensson, 1997)12 that, when you have a model that makes the 
output gap a major determinant of future inflation, to define a longer period to 
achieve a pure inflation target in a gradual way is the same as putting the output 
gap in the objective function. In addition, many inflation targeters have made it 
explicit that they have a “flexible” framework, meaning that they do consider an 
objective of stabilization of the output gap. One can even go as far as recognizing 
that any monetary policy strategy that accepts that an indicator of the slack in 
the economy, like the output gap, has a major role in the transmission channels 
of monetary policy, implicitly includes the stabilization of that gap as part of its 
intermediate goals. In effect, from a long term perspective, stabilizing the out-
put gap is a way of ensuring the elimination of both inflationary and deflation-
ary forces. Nevertheless, in the short-term a trade-off may exist between the two 
gaps, inflation from its target and output from its potential. That trade-off may 
be related with the desired speed at which the economy converges to its long-
term equilibrium or may result from considering that it is welfare-enhancing to 
avoid too much volatility of output (see Laurence Meyer, 2001)13. If the possibil-
ity of a short-term trade-off is accepted then a specification of λ would be useful. 
I do not believe that it is possible or desirable to announce a full specification 
of the objective function. First, I think that it would be impossible or misleading 
to get a value for λ from a collective decision-making body. More fundamen-
tal though, I think it would not be advisable for the reasons that stem from the 
relationship established by Michael Woodford in his book14 between consumer 
welfare and the form of the loss function to be adopted for monetary policy pur-
poses. A major conclusion of his analysis is that the form of the loss function 
depends on the structure the economy considered in the model and on defining 
the transmission mechanism. Specifically, regarding the loss function in Blinder’s 
paper, Michael Woodford shows that it is a reasonable approximation to the indi-
rect consumer utility function if the following conditions are met: 
a)  There are no “welfare consequences of transaction frictions that account 
for the demand for the monetary base”, which means the results apply to 
11 Faust, Jon and Dale Henderson (2004) “Is inflation-targeting best-practice monetary policy?”. And 
Friedman, Benjamin (2004) Comment on Faust and Henderson in Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 
Volume 86, Number 4, July/August 2004, pages 117-149.
12 Svensson, Lars (1997) “Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets,” 
European Economic Review, 41 (1997) 1111-1146. Also available on http://www.princeton.edu/svensson/.
13 Meyer, Laurence H. (2001) “Inflation Targets and Inflation Targeting”, Speech made at the Univer-
sity of California at San Diego Economics Roundtable, in http://www.federalreserve.gov/.
14 Woodford, Michael (2003) “Inflation stabilization and welfare”, Chapter 6 of Interest and Prices, 
Princeton University Press.  
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a “cashless limit” economy. Otherwise a term with an interest rate differen-
tial would have to be added to the objective function. 
b)  The only nominal distortion stems from sticky prices. 
c)  There are cost-push shocks. 
d)  Only monetary policy is considered. There is no consideration of cyclical 
fiscal policy. 
Changes in this set-up may alter the form of the objective function. For in-
stance, if there were no cost-push shocks, then there would be no trade-off be-
tween inflation and the output gap and the objective of the central bank would 
be just to eliminate the inflation deviation from its target. In the set-up under re-
view, wages are considered flexible and prices follow the Calvo model of sticky 
prices, which implies that inflation variation results in distortions of relative prices 
and the welfare losses are proportional to the expected discounted sum of squared 
deviations of the inflation rate from zero. Nevertheless, as Woodford (2006) re-
marks, if different price adjustment schemes are assumed, the form of the func-
tion varies: “For example, if the probability of adjustment of an individual price 
is increasing in the time since that price was last reviewed – a specification that 
is both intuitively plausible and more consistent than the simple Calvo speci-
fication with empirical models of inflation dynamics – then welfare losses are 
proportional to a discounted sum of squared deviations of the current inflation 
rate from a moving average of recent past inflation rates, rather than deviations 
from zero. The goal of policy then should be to keep inflation from differing too 
greatly from the current ‘inertial’ rate of inflation, which implies that inflation 
should not be reduced too abruptly if it has been allowed to exceed its optimal 
long-run level”.15
In addition, many empirical analyses have shown that wage stickiness is very 
important for the inflation process. If this is recognized, again the trade-off be-
tween the two gaps will be different. As Olivier Blanchard and Jordi Gali (2005)16 
showed recently, when real wage rigidities are introduced what they call “the divine 
coincidence” of stabilizing together the two gaps disappears. In that case and “in 
contrast with the baseline NKPC model, the divine coincidence no longer holds, 
since stabilizing the output gap (γ – γ2) is no longer desirable. This is because 
what matters for welfare is the distance of output not from its second-best level, 
but from its first-best level. In contrast to the baseline model, the distance between 
the first- and the second-best levels of output is no longer constant”. 
15 Woodford, Michael (2006) “Rules for Monetary Policy” in NBER Reporter: Research Summary 
Spring 2006, on http://www.nber.org/reporter/spring06/woodford.html.
16 Blanchard, Olivier and Jordi Gali (2005) “Real wage rigidities and the New Keynesian Model”, 
NBER Working Paper no. 11806, November 2005. 
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As Woodford (2006) points out “If [prices and] wages are staggered in ac-
cordance with the Calvo specification, then the welfare-theoretic loss function 
includes a term proportional to the squared rate of goods price inflation and an-
other term proportional to the squared rate of wage inflation each period. In this 
case, optimal policy involves a trade-off between inflation stabilization, nominal 
wage growth stabilization, and output-gap stabilization”.17 
Finally, there are two important issues related to the measurement and inter-
pretation of the output gap. First, it is well-known that any output gap variable 
is very imprecisely estimated, particularly in real-time. Second, the theoretically 
consistent output gap that plays a central role in the New Keynesian literature 
bears little resemblance to the three empirical measures presented in the paper. 
The theoretical output gap is defined as the deviation of output from its equilib-
rium level in the absence of nominal rigidities. Given that the theoretically con-
sistent output gap is model-dependant, this adds to the difficulty of defining a 
reliable and applicable objective function. 
All this indicates that, as no Central Bank should be committed to a pure in-
strument-rule, in the same way it should not commit to and make public a pre-
cise objective function. In effect, if information changed about the transmission 
mechanism, the Central Bank should then have the opportunity of changing the 
parameters without facing the very difficult communication task of explaining 
that change. 
Regarding the price index to use in the definition of the target for inflation I 
tend to sympathize with the author’s position. To the arguments mentioned in 
the paper one could add that the same analysis by Woodford about the relation-
ship between welfare and the loss function for monetary policy demonstrates 
that “If prices are adjusted more frequently in some sectors of the economy than 
in others, then the welfare-theoretic loss function puts more weight on variations in 
prices in the sectors where prices are stickier… This provides a theoretical basis for 
seeking to stabilize an appropriately defined measure of ‘core’ inflation rather 
than an equally weighted price index”.18
There are nevertheless important practical obstacles to the use of a sort of 
core inflation index. First, the communication difficulties would be very signifi-
cant and the principle of accountability to public opinion would be compro-
mised as the general population is used to headline inflation, which is the gener-
al index that appears as relevant for daily life expenditures. Second, it would be 
difficult to assess the relative degree of price rigidity of all the goods composing 
17 See note 15.
18 See note 15. As Woodford notes, this result was first proven by Erceg, Henderson and Levin 
(2000) “Optimal monetary policy with staggered wage and price contracts”, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 46(2), pp. 281-313. 
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the HICP, in order to compute the “core” inflation aggregate. Actually, this core 
aggregate would only be theoretically adequate if price stickiness was the main 
nominal rigidity in the economy. Finally, I agree that a practical important im-
plication of the choice of index is the degree of policy reaction to supply shocks 
that may affect the more volatile components that are normally excluded from a 
core index. In the Eurosystem we have dealt with the problem by allowing head-
line inflation to go temporarily above our definition of price stability without a 
monetary policy reaction when the increase in prices resulted from a recognized 
supply shock and second-round effects were not present. I think this is the appro-
priate way to deal with the question, and this puts me in the camp of those that 
Faust and Henderson (2004)19 designate as LETers (Limited exploitable trade-
off ) instead of a NETer (Non exploitable trade-off ) or, in the more colourful ex-
pression of Mervyn King, an “inflation nutter” aiming at reaching its target in 
every period. A strategy that is forward-looking and has a medium-term horizon 
for the achievement of its objective should be able to deal with this problem of 
supply shocks. 
A final point about the objective function regards the consideration of other 
possible objectives of policy in the field of financial stability. The author’s solution is 
to adopt a quasi-lexicographic approach: “The central bank minimizes (the objective 
function) unless serious financial instability arises, in which case it turns its attention 
to the latter” (page 11). This is coherent with the idea, defended in the paper in rela-
tion to asset price bubbles, that monetary policy should adopt a pure “mop up after” 
strategy when dealing with financial stability issues. I have doubts that this strategy 
is sufficient and I think that monetary policy should not forget completely about 
those issues in its regular functioning or at special turning points. 
There is some ambiguity about the definition of financial stability but two 
main meanings stand out. One, more fundamental, follows Mishkin (1991)20 and 
defines financial stability as a situation where the financial system is able to ensure 
in a lasting way, and without major disruptions, an efficient allocation of savings 
for investment opportunities. In another sense, financial stability refers to absence 
of a major misalignment of asset prices that can threaten future disruption of mar-
kets and the real economy. Both meanings are of course connected as they point to 
the same notion of smooth financial institution and market functioning. Conse-
quently, I also deal with Question 14 in this point. 
Traditionally, the dominant view was that asset price booms were associated 
with a general inflationary climate that fostered speculation against a background 
of expansionary policies. However, since the late eighties we have witnessed various 
episodes that contradict that old notion. Two types of analysis of structural devel-
19 See note 11.
20 Mishkin, Frederic S. (1991) “Anatomy of financial crises”, NBER Working Paper no. 3934.
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opments in the financial system provide some understanding of recent events and 
question the conduct of monetary policy.21 
The first approach has been developed in the BIS research, in particular by 
Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe (2002) and William White (2006).22 The main 
idea is that under present circumstances, monetary stability is not enough by 
itself to ensure financial stability and may even contribute to unstable prices of 
financial assets. This contradiction seems to stem from the very success of mone-
tary authorities in guaranteeing price stability in a credible way. The coexistence 
of an environment of low interest rates with future inflation expectations, well-
anchored in the low levels defined by central banks objectives, would allow cred-
it expansion that would fuel asset prices increases. If valid, this view would be 
very disquieting to central bankers because the traditional view has been exactly 
the opposite, i.e., that stability of prices of goods and services would stimulate 
market participants to concentrate on the real factors that affect the fundamen-
tals of valuation of financial assets, thus contributing to low volatility in their 
respective markets. This view, which is certainly basically valid from a long-term 
perspective, is nevertheless not incompatible with the possibility that a short-
term trade-off may exist between monetary and financial stability. That may be 
the case in particular in periods of transition after a long period of disinflation 
or when monetary policy starts to change the interest rate cycle after a long pe-
riod of low rates. 
The second view providing a broad explanation for the recent instability of as-
set prices has been put forward by Raghuram Rajan (2005),23 in a recent noted 
paper. What came to be known as the “Rajan risk” is linked with the structure of 
incentives of managers and institutions in the new financial environment. The 
gain in importance of market-based non-regulated institutions and the reduced 
weight of traditional banking give prominence to compensation schemes more 
linked to returns which induces managers to enter into riskier transactions. Sec-
ond, performances in these growing sectors of “investment institutions” tend to 
be measured essentially against peers and this fosters the herd behaviour already 
present in financial markets. 
Both types of behaviour increase the probability of episodes of asset price mis-
alignments. The system tends to assume more risks, including the so-called tail 
21 In the following paragraphs, I use of parts of the text I delivered in another recent occasion. See “Fi-
nance and Regulation” a speech delivered on May 26th, on the occasion of the meeting of the European As-
sociation for Banking and Financial History (in http://www.bportugal.pt).
22 Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe (2002) “Asset prices, financial and monetary stability, exploring 
the nexus” BIS working paper no. 114. White, William (2006) “Is price stability enough?” BIS Working 
Paper no. 205. 
23 Rajan, Raghuram G. (2005) “Has financial development made the world riskier?” NBER Working 
Paper no. 11728, November 2005.
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risk where probabilities are low but losses can be high. Who would have thought 
some years ago that pensions funds and insurance companies would become par-
ticipants in the market for risk of default of other firms? On the other hand, hedge 
funds manage nowadays many more assets than in 1998 and are involved in less 
liquid markets. Additionally, their returns have become more correlated across 
supposedly different types of funds and this seems to indicate that they could be 
subject to the same type of risks in a period of tighter credit and stressful equity 
markets. 
This points precisely to accrued risks in periods of monetary policy transition. 
Central Banks should not ignore this possibility and in fact they usually take into 
consideration financial stability issues for which they are mandated. This is one of 
the reasons that explains why they embark into gradualism, interest rate smoothing 
and manage turning points of policy at a measured pace. More generally, financial 
stability concerns should not be ignored in the decision-making process even in 
more normal periods. As I mentioned a few years ago “…even without defining 
precise targets, interest rate policy, in certain circumstances, should ‘lean against 
the wind’ when it blows too strongly in asset markets” (Constancio, 2002)24. I 
do not recommend an aggressive approach to start bursting bubbles or to include 
a term with asset prices in the objective function, but we should not ignore the 
problem altogether when is starts to emerge, without having the illusion that mon-
etary policy could provide the whole solution. The problem will have to be ad-
dressed by other instruments, like regulation and supervision. As far as monetary 
policy is concerned the full-information approach that I described as one of the 
five main principles in the conduct of monetary policy may be particularly useful 
here. In particular, looking to developments in credit aggregates may be informa-
tive, precisely because, as suggested by research done in the BIS, buoyant credit 
expansion is normally – albeit not always25 – associated with asset prices booms. 
The existence of the sort of short-term trade-off that we are considering may 
create significant problems for the inflation targeting monetary policy regime. 
This framework is by definition very much attached to targets and forecasts for 
inflation as an almost exclusive basis for decisions, and therefore has difficulty in-
corporating other considerations into the decision-making process without losing 
some credibility. The notion that this can be overcome by extending the horizon 
of the inflation forecast by a number of years does not look realistic and has not 
been attempted. Very interesting, however, is the addition made by the Central 
Bank of Norway to the list of criteria to assess future interest rate policy that I 
24 Constancio, Vítor (2002) “Policies and institutions for global financial stability” in 8th International 
Financial and Economic Forum, Vienna, November 2002.
25 For instance, in the case of Portugal we had high credit growth in the second half of the 90’s but there 
were no asset price bubbles either in the stock market or in housing.
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mentioned earlier. The addition refers to the need of considering asset prices in-
creases and aggregate credit growth. Of course, this criterion, although subordi-
nate, only adds to the difficulty of the framework to fend off the accusation of 
having multiple objectives hidden behind a single denomination of “inflation tar-
geting” without the transparency of disclosing the exact criteria that may justify a 
temporary deviation from the main target. A disclosure, let me add, that I would 
consider virtually impossible or unwise to make. 
An important argument that Alan Blinder uses to defend his view on asset 
price bubbles is that the “mop up after” strategy “worked extraordinarily well” in 
the context of the stock market bubble of the late 90’s. It should be remembered 
though that it worked well for the economy because of the very expansionary fis-
cal policy and the wealth effects on other asset markets (bonds and real estate) in-
duced by the very aggressive monetary policy. The final result is that the so-called 
global imbalances are still with us and no one knows how their winding down 
will play out. 
This discussion highlights the importance I attach to financial stability as one 
of the core mandates of any Central Bank. In this context, I agree with Blinder’s 
conclusion that important supervisory responsibilities should remain with Cen-
tral Banks (Question 5). This conclusion stems directly from the strong com-
plementarities that exist between the macroeconomic prudential surveillance 
framework and microeconomic supervisory responsibilities. On the subject of the 
counterarguments based on the idea of a conflict of interest with monetary policy 
let me add just two comments. The first, that it is illusory to think that this pos-
sible conflict would disappear just by separating and giving the two functions of 
supervision and monetary policy to different institutions. The second, to under-
line the fact that the possibility of that conflict does not exist in the euro area be-
cause National Central Banks that are responsible for supervision do not decide 
alone the single monetary policy and are not in full control of money creation. 
On transparency (Question 2), I agree that the trend is irreversible in the direc-
tion of wider disclosure by Central Banks of their procedures. Transparency about 
goals and about methods can be beneficial to monetary policy because expecta-
tions are such an important channel of transmission. Expectations about future 
policy and future inflation affect today’s decisions on wages and prices and those 
expectations depend on the economic agents’ view of future monetary policy. So, 
I agree with the author on most of the points he makes about these issues. Re-
garding the methods of published inflation forecasts and the treatment to be giv-
en to the future path of interest rates, I think that taking into account the path 
indicated by the financial markets is an adequate solution. It is logically consist-
ent, it is transparent and in the case of the Eurosystem cannot lead to any sort of 
dynamic inconsistency as in our framework the staff forecast is just one element, 
albeit an important one, in the whole information set that we consider in our de-
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liberations. Contrary to the inflation-targeting regime, there is no commitment to 
a direct link between the projections and our decisions on interest rates. 
On transparency regarding the decisions and the decision-making process, I 
share the arguments that justify in our case the non-publication of minutes with 
the indication of individual votes. The young age of our project and its supra-na-
tional nature would create risks of great pressure from national public opinions on 
the vote of national Governors. With time and the consolidation of our institu-
tions, I am open to reconsider my opinion on this issue. 
I have already expressed a number of opinions on the inflation targeting regime that 
should be enough to reach the conclusion that I do not favour the adoption of a fully-
fledged version of that framework in big economic areas (Question 3). In relation to 
small countries and in particular emergent ones, I accept that the regime may be useful 
because it provides a level of commitment that fosters the required credibility for Cen-
tral Banks. In the case of big developed areas without significant credibility prob-
lems, the regime, the way I see it, has some costs and unnecessary rigidity. This 
opinion is very much dependent on my definition of an Inflation Targeting Frame-
work (ITF). Alan Blinder in his paper states that the “essence of inflation targeting 
is announcing a numerical value for π* and being transparent about it”. There are 
some definitions of an ITF that add very little to this requirement to character-
ize the regime, appending only aspects of transparency and communication regard-
ing methods and decisions. If that would be enough for a definition then the Eu-
rosystem could be included as an inflation targeter, which would come as a surprise 
to many insiders. In fact, that definition is too broad to be useful. Lars Svensson, 
the author that best theorized the regime, distinguishes between “general targeting 
rules” that specify “the objectives to be achieved, for instance, by listing the target 
variables, the target levels for those variables, and the (explicit or implicit) loss func-
tion to be minimized”, and “specific targeting rules” that specify “operational con-
ditions for the target variables (or forecasts of the target variables)”.26 
These specific rules are essential to characterize a “flexible” inflation target re-
gime and they may consist either in a principle, announced by several Central 
Banks, that the interest rate should be adjusted such that the resulting inflation 
forecast at an appropriate horizon (usually about two-years ahead) is on target, or 
they may specify operational Euler conditions for monetary policy. “In particular, 
an optimal targeting rule expresses the equality of the marginal rates of transfor-
mation and the marginal rates of substitution between the target variables in an 
operational way” (Svensson, 2003). 
It is the important role attached to inflation forecasts and the commitment to 
move rates in reaction to them that really differentiates the ITF from other mone-
tary strategies. My general assessment is that even if, as Svensson underlines, judg-
26 See Svensson, Lars (2003) in note 12.
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ment exercised by the Central Bank enters into the elaboration of those forecasts, 
the scheme is not as totally clear as it proclaims to be and may be too rigid at 
certain moments. 
As I have already mentioned, there is a difficult coexistence between the name 
“inflation targeting” and the multiple goals (real and/or financial stability) that 
are alluded to and with the claim of total transparency and credibility. The prob-
lem gains practical importance when we ask: how far and how long a deviation 
from the inflation target will be allowed to accommodate other objectives? There is 
no criterion (transparent or otherwise) to answer this question. Other regimes also 
leave a margin of ambiguity but do not claim that their credibility depends on their 
transparency and the precision of the rule they follow. Could it be that the ITF falls 
into the category of those who apply the sort of “folk wisdom” that maintains that 
Central Banks should “do what they do, but only talk about inflation”.27
On the other hand, the strict link between forecasts and decisions can create 
credibility problems either when rates are moved beyond what the forecasts indi-
cated as appropriate or when rates are moved only because of the forecasts even if 
other obvious aspects of the situation would justify a delay. Both situations have 
occurred in practical experience and may constitute a source of problems, espe-
cially if the interest rates considered for the forecast are the conditional indication 
of the decision-making body about its own future policy. 
The operational problems related to gradualism and fine tuning (Questions 
7 and 8) are very well dealt with in the paper. I agree that there are many and 
good arguments that make gradualism in moving interest rates the rational at-
titude to have. Keeping an option value in the face of a continuous flow of data 
and the objective of smoothing rates seem to me the most cogent ones. Regard-
ing “fine tuning” I do not follow the paper in trying to keep open the possibility 
of Central Banks becoming somewhat bolder in pursuing it. In general, the argu-
ments to be usually prudent in rate decisions rest on the pervasive uncertainty 
that constitutes the background of monetary policy. We have data uncertainty, 
parameter uncertainty and model uncertainty. There are methods to help us to 
overcome the consequences of these sources of uncertainty but they have great 
limitations and, in general, they lead to caution. The possibility of destabilising 
markets or the economy by taking quick and strong action is just too big to be 
risked. Naturally, extraordinary circumstances may well justify decisive action in 
a short period of time. Let me add another word of caution regarding methodol-
ogy. It is not easy to decide if a Central Bank is being too cautious or not. Using 
Taylor-type estimated interest rate rules to assess and compare the behaviour of 
Central Banks in this regard can be misleading. The coefficients obtained are a 
mixture of structural parameters of the economy and an expression of the au-
27 See Faust, Jon and Dale Henderson (2004) in note 11.
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thorities’ preferences. For instance, if prices are more sticky (as they are in Europe) 
interest rate moves have a bigger effect on the real economy. On the other hand, 
in that case fluctuations of inflation will more easily distort relative prices and lead 
to more welfare losses. These aspects may lead to an estimate of a Taylor rule with 
a somewhat low output gap coefficient that would not be solely the reflection of 
the authorities’ preferences but the consequence of how the economy reacts. This 
means that we should be very cautious in accepting conclusions from this type of 
analysis, which is very common in trying to determine if some Central Banks are 
being more or less gradualist than others. 
As for the problem of deciding if Central Banks should lead or follow the fi-
nancial markets (Question 9) I totally agree with position expressed in the paper. 
Alan Blinder has written extensively on this question, stressing the risk of dynam-
ic instability and the need for Central Banks to be independent from markets. I 
just want to add the remark that the alternative is not for Central Banks to be 
too ready to disappoint or surprise markets. Central Banks should be predictable. 
The point then is to be able to permanently explain the framework used to decide 
on monetary policy and influence market expectations. Good communication is 
therefore essential and can produce the desired results, as happened last April when 
our communication was able to change market expectations that were being car-
ried away by rumours. As Blinder says at the end of his latest book: “Going mod-
ern need not and should not mean relinquishing the role of leader to the financial 
markets. Monetary policy decisions are, in the end, public policy decisions and, as 
such, are not suitable candidates for privatisation”28. In paying tribute to the good 
work Alan Blinder has done in his writing about central banking I think that this 
is a very appropriate quotation to end my comments.
28 See note 1.
I Introduction 
Let me start by saying a few words of thanks and extending my best wish-es to this great institution, which is celebrating 150 years of bearing the 
prestigious name of Banco de España. I would like to thank Governor Caruana 
and the Banco de España for organising this excellent conference and for invit-
ing me to participate in this panel. 
To kick off this conference, Alan Blinder has prepared an impressive survey 
which presents and assesses the main critical issues that are currently truly rele-
vant for monetary policy-makers. He has demonstrated again an admirable ability 
to blend top academic research with good central banking practice and common 
sense to produce this insightful and stimulating review. Alan’s list of 16 questions 
regarding monetary policy is fairly long and, indeed, somewhat longer than the 
list he presented in 1999 at the first ECB conference. This may seem discour-
aging and might suggest that not much progress has been made over the past 
six years. However, the two lists are not identical: some of the original questions 
have been resolved, and new ones have arisen. Therefore, there are still plenty of 
critical issues concerning the science and art of central banking that need to be 
addressed, and Alan himself provides answers to most of them. 
Given the wide range of questions raised by Alan, I will inevitably have to be 
selective and do some cherry-picking, by focusing on issues that are more con-
troversial or more interesting from my perspective, and that can also be discussed 
adequately in the limited time available. I will discuss a number of issues regard-
ing the objectives and strategy of monetary policy, aspects of policy implemen-
tation including central bank communication and transparency, the relationship 
between monetary policy and financial markets, and the implications of globali-
sation for monetary policy. 
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II  Monetary policy objectives: some fundamental, 
strategic and analytical issues 
I would like to begin by addressing some critical questions concerning the in-
stitutional design of monetary policy, in particular issues relating to monetary pol-
icy objectives. These include fundamental issues regarding the choice and ranking 
of policy goals, as well as other important subjects pertaining to the strategy and 
analysis employed in pursuing these goals.
A fundamental development in monetary policy-making over the past two dec-
ades has been the emergence of a strong consensus – or at least a general accept-
ance of the view – that the overriding aim of monetary policy should be the attain-
ment and preservation of price stability. This view is shared by an overwhelming 
majority of central banks and academic economists. It is presumably also shared 
by the political authorities, as manifested by the legislation that has been enacted 
in many countries to enable central banks to pursue this objective. The roots of 
this consensus are: 
1  The greater appreciation of the benefits of price stability for durable eco-
nomic growth and social welfare; 
2  The recognition that monetary policy can effectively determine price de-
velopments over the medium and longer run, but cannot permanently and 
systematically influence economic activity; 
3  Growing evidence that independent central banks can pursue price stability 
effectively while minimising output volatility.
Despite the general agreement on the primacy of price stability as a monetary 
policy objective, there are differences of opinion on several related issues: 
1  How this goal is linked and ranked relative to other policy objectives; 
2  What is the appropriate strategy for policy formulation; 
3  Whether and how the concept of price stability should be defined in quan-
titative terms;
4  How to operationally specify a final policy target and in particular the 
measures of inflation and economic activity that central banks should aim 
to control. These differences are not inconsequential for the formulation 
and conduct of monetary policy. 
The central bank’s objective function 
In examining these issues, Alan uses, for part of his analysis and assessment, 
an objective function for monetary policy that is often employed in academic 
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work: a quadratic loss function that penalises a weighted average of the devia-
tions of the inflation rate (π) from its target value (π*) and the deviation of 
real output (y) or the unemployment rate (u) from their “equilibrium” or “nat-
ural” values (y*, u*). Although, as Alan acknowledges, this particular specifica-
tion of policy-makers’ objectives is motivated (if not dictated) by “mathemati-
cal convenience” (in the theoretical analysis of monetary policy, given that it 
facilitates the derivation of results, especially under conditions of uncertainty, 
the fact is that it imposes unrealistic constraints on policy-makers’ preferences 
and does not appropriately describe the objectives of many central banks, in-
cluding the ECB.  
In the case of the ECB, the Treaty establishing the European Community 
states that “the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stabil-
ity” and that, “without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall 
support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contrib-
uting to the achievement of the objectives of the Community”, which include a 
high level of employment and sustainable and non-inflationary growth. In the 
euro area, monetary policy goals are therefore not stated, and cannot be expressed 
in terms of their relative importance (which, in principle, cannot be captured by 
choosing the size of the parameter λ defining the relative weight), but are clearly 
specified in a hierarchical (or lexicographic) manner, which emphasises the over-
riding importance of price stability and also implies that policy should not be 
formulated in terms of an objective function which trades off inflation volatility 
against output volatility. The underlying proposition is that, in general, price sta-
bility contributes to reducing output volatility. 
I should also briefly mention that the selected loss function does not seem to 
be able to capture the points raised by some economists concerning the poten-
tially asymmetric costs of high and low unemployment, relative to its natural or 
NAIRU level. It is also unclear as to whether it can provide an appropriate rep-
resentation of policy preferences for those central banks that have opted for an 
inflation-targeting strategy and at the same time aim to support a high level of 
economic activity. This observation partly relates to the specific functional form 
and partly to the results of Svensson (1997), who has shown that the parameters 
of a Taylor rule are not related in a straightforward way to the relative weight λ of 
inflation and output deviations from their target values. 
Monetary policy strategy and the operational target for price 
stability 
Given the choice and ranking of objectives, a key aspect of the policy frame-
work is the strategy adopted for pursuing them, which involves decisions con-
cerning the method of analysis and the quantitative definition and operational 
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target for price stability. The approaches chosen by central banks differ, but they 
are converging. Many central banks have opted for an inflation-targeting strat-
egy based on a single analytic model and aimed at an inflation rate of 2% or 
2.5% as the midpoint of the target range. The ECB has adopted a more general 
and eclectic strategy that includes both economic analysis and monetary analy-
sis. It has also adopted a quantitative definition of price stability – an increase in 
the price level that does not exceed 2% – and, given this definition, it aims to 
maintain inflation at “below but close to 2%”. The Federal Reserve has not yet 
formally adopted a precise, operational price stability or inflation target (though 
implicitly a target for core inflation at 1.75% – 2% has recently been used). We 
have found the selection and announcement of a quantitative definition of price 
stability extremely important for policy formulation as well as for guiding and 
anchoring inflation expectations to price stability. Moreover, it provides a yard-
stick for the assessment of the effectiveness of monetary policy and for demo-
cratic accountability. 
However, despite the adoption of a quantitative definition of price stability to 
orient our policy, the ECB does not use the term “inflation targeting” to describe 
its own strategy – even if Alan tends to put us in the same camp. Presumably, 
there must be some real differences warranting this position, and indeed there are. 
First, for the Governing Council of the ECB, inflation projections based on a sin-
gle model are not the only all-encompassing tool on the basis of which decisions 
and communication are organised; our projections are seen as important input to 
our economic analysis, but are strictly staff projections and one element of our 
economic analysis. A second major difference is that we assign an important role 
to monetary analysis in assessing the medium to long-term inflation trends and 
risks. A final point is that our policy framework has a medium-term orientation 
but we have eschewed specifying a fixed time horizon for our assessment of the 
outlook for price stability. 
At the same time, there are no major differences in the practical implementa-
tion of monetary policy strategies among price stability-oriented central banks and, 
with regard to at least some aspects of the policy framework, remaining differences 
are diminishing. In recent years, for example, we have observed a greater focus by 
some inflation-targeting central banks on the medium and long-term horizon and 
on the role of money and credit growth in determining medium to long-term in-
flation trends and in influencing asset price dynamics. 
Core versus headline inflation 
Despite the convergence of many aspects of the monetary policy strategies, 
there are still important differences. One such difference is whether the operational 
target for inflation should be the headline or a core measure of inflation. Alan has 
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declared that he is firmly in the “core” camp for several reasons. He argues that a 
central bank should aim at core inflation because: 
1  It cannot effectively control headline inflation given its inability to offset 
supply shocks; 
2  It can better forecast future headline inflation on the basis of past core-in-
flation dynamics, and 
3  Targeting core inflation is likely to result in more sensible monetary policy 
in the presence of supply (energy price) shocks. 
In this debate, I am firmly in the “headline inflation” camp. Let me explain. 
To begin with, our responsibility as central bankers is to preserve the stability of 
the overall, general price level which determines the public’s purchasing power 
and social welfare. The inability to offset immediately supply-side shocks does not 
change this responsibility, while the medium-term orientation of our monetary 
policy clearly indicates that we do not aim to offset such unanticipated shocks 
over the short run. I believe it is important to differentiate the role of a core infla-
tion measure in the definition of the central bank’s objective from its relevance 
and potential usefulness in the assessment of the outlook for price stability and 
the formulation of policy. With regard to the monetary policy strategy, the price 
index used to define the medium-term objective should be a comprehensive and 
credible measure of citizens’ purchasing power which cannot be criticised for be-
ing defined in an arbitrary manner. Core inflation measures fall short of this re-
quirement because of the exclusion of important items relevant for the public and 
because of the degree of arbitrariness in the definition of core inflation. 
Another issue concerns the use of an appropriate measure of core inflation as an 
information variable in the formulation of monetary policy. There are two pertinent 
questions: first, which measure of core inflation provides reliable information about 
domestic underlying inflationary pressures by removing short-term noise from 
headline inflation due to transitory shocks, and second, whether different measures 
of underlying inflation can better forecast developments in headline inflation. 
Many concepts of core inflation have been proposed, such as HICP inflation 
excluding energy and food components, trimmed means of the HICP sub-index-
es and model-based measures. While the proposed different core measures can be 
helpful in removing transient noise from trend inflation, there is no strong evi-
dence in the euro area that a specific core inflation measure is a reliable tool for 
forecasting headline inflation at relevant horizons. Our experience and analysis 
leads to different conclusions than those derived from the US experience cited 
by Alan (see Blinder and Reis, 2005). In the euro area, the gap observed between 
headline and core inflation often closes with core inflation increasing and con-
verging towards higher headline inflation. 
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For example, in the euro area in the period 1999-2002, a considerable positive 
gap opened up between the headline inflation and the underlying measure which 
excludes food and energy prices. However, following a period of strong demand 
growth, this gap was closed not by a significant drop in headline inflation, but 
by a delayed upward movement in this “core” measure. Following the indication 
of the core measure on this occasion would have been a costly policy mistake (see 
ECB, 2005). 
This episode shows that the usefulness of core measures might be generally 
limited, and that medium-term inflationary pressures are very much related to 
various underlying causes and processes as well as to the nature and dynamics of 
the shocks affecting the economy. Consequently, the optimal monetary policy re-
sponse cannot be determined on the basis of a simple rule relying on a measure of 
core inflation; it depends on the size, nature and persistence of shocks affecting the 
economy. And such shocks cannot, in general, be identified and their effects can-
not be adequately assessed only by using a measure of core inflation. 
A point that should be emphasised with regard to the appropriate response 
of monetary policy to supply shocks is that their ultimate effects on inflation and 
output dynamics will obviously and crucially depend on the reaction of economic 
agents, especially of the participants in product and labour markets, which is in-
fluenced by their expectations about the response of the central bank to such dis-
turbances. The fact that no significant second-round effects have been observed in 
the recent past does not imply that they will not emerge in the future, if an accom-
modative monetary policy is maintained, especially as the economic recovery gains 
momentum. If a central bank adjusts the monetary policy stance only when sec-
ond-round effects have become clearly visible, by relying on some measure of core 
inflation, its response will come too late and it is likely that a larger dose of monetary 
tightening would be required than would have been the case if it had adjusted earlier 
on the basis of its assessment of all pertinent risks to future headline inflation. 
The strategy of the ECB, therefore, relies on a comprehensive analysis of the 
shocks affecting headline inflation as well as on a wide variety of economic indica-
tors and methods of analysis in order to assess the outlook for price stability over 
the medium term. And, importantly, the medium-term orientation of the ECB’s 
monetary policy strategy ensures that in our assessment we appropriately discount 
short-term volatility due to transitory supply shocks.
III  Central bank transparency and communication 
of future policy rates 
The second big theme I want to address is central bank transparency and, in 
particular, Alan’s suggestion that central banks should announce their conditional 
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monetary policy plans, at least as part of their forecasts. When discussing the is-
sues of transparency and communication, it is important to distinguish between 
general aims and principles, on the one hand, and practical and effective means 
of fulfilling them, on the other. 
I fully agree with Alan on the importance of, and the reasons for, (maximum) 
central bank transparency and I partly share his view on the limits to (optimal) 
transparency. But I draw different conclusions about the usefulness of pre-an-
nouncing an explicit path for future policy rates over a period of one to two years. 
This is because of my different assessment of the nature and extent of the uncer-
tainty we face, the quality of available information and the limitations to our ana-
lytical methods, which have implications for the effectiveness of Alan’s proposed 
communication strategy. 
A high degree of transparency is an essential element of the democratic ac-
countability of central banks. Transparency also enhances the effectiveness of 
monetary policy by helping to guide the expectations of economic agents and 
bring them into line with policy objectives and actions. It is particularly im-
portant that markets and the public at large have a good understanding of the 
systematic and conditional conduct of monetary policy by the central bank, so 
that expectations about future price developments and the path of policy rates 
are in line with the central bank’s mandate. For all these reasons, the ECB has 
always striven to be as transparent as possible and has tried to communicate 
clearly, and by a variety of means, its policy objective, its strategy, its assessment 
of the economic situation, as well as the outlook for price stability and the as-
sociated risks.
The limits of central bank transparency 
Are there limits to the transparency of central banks? Alan’s view on this is-
sue is nicely presented by paraphrasing Einstein: “Every central bank has to be as 
transparent as possible, but not more so.” The crucial issue is the meaning or in-
terpretation of “but not more so”. Alan argues that the meaning of this proposi-
tion is that the default option should be disclosure, unless there are good reasons 
for the central bank to maintain the confidentiality of certain information in its 
role of supervisor or fiscal agent.
In my view, there is another interpretation of the meaning “but not more than 
possible”, which takes into account the limitations of our analytical tools and the 
uncertainty surrounding the medium to longer-term outlook. This interpretation 
also relates to the second objective of transparency, which is to provide economic 
agents with useful information so as to enhance clarity and understanding about 
policy actions and to reduce pertinent uncertainty. If future policy actions over a 
fairly long time horizon depend on projections about the future paths of many 
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exogenous variables that are inevitably characterised by uncertainty, as well as on 
various shocks that by definition cannot be anticipated, and, more importantly, 
when there is considerable uncertainty about certain structural or behavioural pa-
rameters of the economy, then providing explicit guidance on the future policy 
rates, conditional on the underlying projections and assumptions, generally in-
volves risks that can undermine the usefulness of providing more information on 
the central bank’s policy intentions. 
Let me elaborate on some of the risks. First, the general public may fail to 
fully understand that a pre-announced path of future policy rates is conditional 
and that changes in the state of the economy will require changes to this policy 
path. Eventual deviations from the previously projected policy path may there-
fore be viewed, at least by many who are not experts in monetary economics, 
as a failure of the central bank to follow its announced intentions. This could 
damage its credibility, even if it is conducting policy in an optimal manner. 
Second, the central bank is often faced with a high degree of uncertainty, in-
cluding “Knightian” uncertainty, about the functioning of the economy and the 
response of economic agents to shocks and policy actions. Under such circum-
stances, it is difficult to determine an optimal or appropriate path of policy 
rates over a long time horizon and to agree about such a policy path in a poli-
cy-making committee, and to properly convey to the public all the conditions 
underlying such a path. Finally, I do not think that publishing a path of future 
policy rates, which is mechanically derived from an empirically estimated re-
action function, would be helpful. On the contrary, it would be difficult to 
explain the difference between this path and the one decided by the decision-
making body in the context of a forward-looking strategy with a medium-term 
orientation. Confusion rather than greater clarity may be the outcome of im-
plementing such an approach. 
For this reason, I suggest that a central bank should be as transparent as pos-
sible, but no more so than is realistically useful for enhancing the clarity and un-
derstanding of the future monetary policy stance.1 This does not mean that central 
banks cannot give qualitative guidance about the future policy stance by means of 
official statements, particularly in special circumstances when the size and balance 
of risks to the outlook for price stability dictates the provision of such guidance or 
when the central bank believes that market expectations about future monetary 
policy are deviating significantly from its policy intentions as determined by its 
own assessment. 
However, I share some of Alan’s considerations on the limits and drawbacks of 
macroeconomic projections based on a constant interest rate assumption. As you 
know, in order to improve the overall consistency and forecast quality of the Eu-
1 This view is closer, though not identical, to that suggested by Mishkin (2004), p. 50.
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rosystem staff macroeconomic projections, we recently decided to change the as-
sumption about the future path of short-term interest rates that is incorporated 
in the staff projections. With the projections released today, we have started to 
produce macroeconomic projections that are conditional on the path of future 
interest rates expected by the markets, as embedded in the yield curve and in fu-
tures prices. This approach corresponds to the second option in Alan’s paper and 
addresses the concerns expressed by eliminating an internal inconsistency and im-
proving transparency. It will not solve all of his concerns, but it should mitigate 
some of them.
IV Monetary policy and asset prices 
 I will turn now to the questions in Alan’s list that concern the relationship 
between monetary policy and financial markets. In Question 14, Alan asks: how 
should central banks react to asset price bubbles? To answer this properly, I would 
need at least another 20 minutes. Unfortunately, I do not have that much time, 
but let me make two remarks. 
First, I agree with Alan that asset price bubbles are difficult to identify in 
real time and are thus often only identified ex post. This notwithstanding, 
it appears to me that there are a number of tools that can help identify the 
emergence of bubbles. The ECB does not target asset prices, but pays close 
attention to asset price movements with a view to preserving the stability of 
consumer prices over longer horizons. In this regard, the role of money and 
monetary analysis in the ECB’s strategy helps us to assess developments in as-
set prices and the degree to which they pose a risk to price stability over the 
longer term. 
Second, excessive appreciations and subsequent rapid reversals in asset prices 
could have very high costs for price stability and for the real economy. Therefore, 
a policy of only “mopping up after” – to use Alan’s terminology – could have 
worked on some specific occasions, but this may not always be the case while, at 
the same time, it might create moral hazard problems. In light of this, a central 
bank may want to consider a policy of carefully “leaning against the wind” un-
der certain, clearly exceptional, circumstances. It would then adopt a somewhat 
tighter policy stance in the face of an inflating asset market than would otherwise 
be the case if confronted with a similar macroeconomic outlook under more nor-
mal market conditions. Given the uncertainty surrounding the appropriate mon-
etary policy stance under such circumstances, it could consider to err on the side 
of caution by trying to avoid feeding the bubble with an overly accommodative 
policy. These issues, which have been extensively discussed, deserve further analy-
sis and consideration. 
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V  The implications of globalisation for monetary 
policy and the global responsibilities of central 
banks
My final remarks relate to the last, very challenging and open question raised by 
Alan on the global responsibilities of the main central banks. This is an important 
question that cannot be answered in a simple, straightforward manner and in a 
limited period of time. And Alan does not provide an answer, either. I would like 
to pose, however, a set of related questions on the implications of globalisation 
for monetary policy. In a globalised economy, should the role and orientation of 
monetary policy be changed? Should the framework for analysis and policy for-
mulation be amended? Is the required analysis for setting policy becoming more 
demanding? The direct and brief answers I recently gave to these questions are: no, 
no and yes to some extent. 
It is sometimes argued that the monetary policy of a major central bank should 
help guide the domestic economy’s adjustment to the evolving global economic 
environment and the competitive pressures associated with globalisation; and that 
it should foster the adjustment of global imbalances and even assume responsibili-
ty for the smooth functioning of the global economy. In my opinion, globalisation 
does not affect the central role and overriding responsibility of central banks to 
preserve price stability “at home”. On the contrary, maintaining price stability in 
a rapidly evolving, globalised economy that may influence the dynamics of infla-
tion in various ways becomes more essential and challenging, particularly in situ-
ations where adverse inflation shocks or inflationary pressures in some economies 
are now more easily transmitted to others.
Consequently, if the primary objectives of monetary policy are unaffected by 
globalisation, the appropriate strategic framework for analysis and policy formu-
lation should remain the same. However, the analysis required for policy formu-
lation will have to carefully take into account the various effects of globalisation 
on the dynamics of inflation, economic growth and asset prices. For example: in 
the a globalised economy, traditional measures of core inflation are even more 
difficult to interpret and use as indicators of underlying domestic inflationary 
pressures; the estimates of potential output are more difficult to calculate in a ro-
bust manner; and the measurement and usefulness of output gaps are subject to 
greater uncertainty than is usually the case. Consequently, our role and responsi-
bilities as central bankers are fundamentally the same in the globalised economy, 
but the performance of our tasks may be becoming more challenging. Having 
said that, I would agree that other pertinent issues raised by Alan deserve careful 
consideration. 
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VI Concluding remarks 
Clearly, there are many questions still to be answered, and challenges to be ad-
dressed. We should, however, also not forget that during the last two decades, in-
dustrialised countries have experienced a marked reduction in the average level of 
inflation and in the volatility of both output and inflation. I have no doubt that 
improved economic policies, and better monetary policy in particular, have con-
tributed, perhaps largely, to this development, and despite the room for potential 
further improvements, as suggested by Alan. On this optimistic note, which be-
fits such a celebratory conference, I should like to conclude.
Thank you for your attention.  
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In recent days, we have seen a retrenchment of investors from a broad range of risky assets, especially emerging market debt and equity. While there are ex-post fac-
to explanations for each country as to why investors were on a selling spree, a graph of 
the stock market index run up from January 2004 to the peak in 2006 against the fall 
since that peak to date is a pretty significant straight line – the more markets went up, 
the more they fell. The most widely accepted explanation seems to be changing “risk 
aversion”.  Investors were risk tolerant while pushing up markets, and suddenly became 
risk averse. Like most facile explanations in the markets, this one illuminates little. Why 
were investors so foolhardy then, and so scared now? What made them change? 
I will argue in this talk that much of what is termed changes in “risk aversion” 
is likely to be changes in the structure of incentives and resulting behavior of 
investment managers – by “investment manager” I mean managers of financial 
assets ranging from those running insurance companies to those running venture 
capital and hedge funds. A primary driver of these changes is likely to be a change 
in the stance of monetary policy. Monetary policy thus might have effects outside 
the traditional channels, though the behavioral channel will amplify traditional 
effects. I will discuss what all this might imply for policy making.
Examples of greater risk taking in a low interest 
environment 
Let me start by offering two examples of why institutions may take more risk 
when interest rates are very low and reverse that when interest rates are high. The 
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1 The following reflects my views only and are not meant to represent the views of the International 
Monetary Fund, its management, and its board. I thank Charles Collyns, Graham Hacche, and Laura Ko-
dres for useful comments. 
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first, traditionally known as “risk shifting”, is well known. When an insurance com-
pany has promised premium holders returns of 6 percent, while the typical match-
ing long-term bond rate is 4 percent, it has no option if it thinks low interest rates 
are likely to persist, or if it worries about quarterly earnings, but to take on risk, ei-
ther directly or through investments in alternative assets like hedge funds. All man-
ner of risk premia are driven down by this search for yield and thus risk.
A second example is that of hedge funds themselves where a form of induced “risk 
shifting” can be seen. The typical compensation contract for a hedge fund manager 
is 2 percent of assets under management plus 20 percent of annual returns in excess 
of a minimum nominal return (often zero). When risk free returns are high, com-
pensation is high even if the fund takes on little risk, while when risk free returns are 
low the fund may not even exceed the minimum return if it takes little risk. Thus 
low rates will increase fund manager incentives to take on risk. Furthermore, since 
the cost of borrowing can also be low at such times, fund managers can goose up re-
turns by adding leverage. In doing so, they further add to risk 
Alpha and Illiquidity Seeking 
The two examples are a little different. In the first case,  procyclicality of risk 
taking behavior is induced by the level of interest rates because of the nature of 
pre-contracted liabilities. In the second, procyclicality is induced by the nature of 
compensation. I want to explore the incentives induced by compensation more 
generally. To do this, I will first describe the very practical theory behind how in-
vestment managers are compensated.
The typical manager of financial assets generates returns based on the systematic risk 
he takes – the so called beta risk – and the value his abilities contribute to the investment 
process – his so called alpha. Shareholders in any asset management firm are unlikely to 
pay the manager much for returns from beta risk – for example, if the shareholder wants 
exposure to large traded U.S. stocks, she can get the returns associated with that risk 
simply by investing in the Vanguard S&P 500 index fund, for which she pays a fraction 
of a percent in fees. What the shareholder will really pay for is if the manager beats the 
S&P 500 index regularly, that is, generates excess returns while not taking more risk. 
Indeed, hedge fund managers often claim to produce returns that are uncorrelated with 
the traditional market (the so-called market neutral strategies) so that all the returns they 
generate are excess returns or alpha, which deserve to be fully compensated.
In reality, there are only a few sources of alpha for investment managers. One 
comes from having truly special abilities in identifying undervalued financial as-
sets – Warren Buffet certainly has these, but study after academic study shows that 
very few investment managers do, and certainly not in a way that can be predicted 
before the fact by ordinary investors.






A second source of alpha is from what one might call activism. This means 
using financial resources to create, or obtain control over, real assets and to use 
that control to change the payout obtained on the financial investment. A ven-
ture capitalist who converts an inventor, a garage, and an idea into a full fledged 
profitable and professionally managed corporation is creating alpha. A private eq-
uity fund that undertakes a hostile corporate takeover, cuts inefficiency, and im-
proves profits is also creating alpha. So is a vulture investor who buys up default-
ed emerging market debt and presses authorities through various legal devices to 
press the country to pay more. 
A third source of alpha is financial entrepreneurship or engineering – investing 
in exotic financial securities that are not easily available to the ordinary investor, 
or creating securities or cash flow streams that appeal to particular investors or 
tastes. Of course, if enough of these securities or streams are created, they cease 
to have scarcity or diversification value, and are valued like everything else. Thus 
this source of alpha depends on the manager constantly innovating and staying 
ahead of the competition.
Finally, alpha can also stem from liquidity provision. For instance, investment 
managers, having relatively easy access to finance, can hold illiquid or arbitrage 
positions to maturity: if a closed end fund is trading at a significant premium to 
the underlying market, they can short the fund, buy the underlying market, and 
hold the position till the premium eventually dissipates. What is important here 
is that the investment managers have the liquidity to hold till the arbitrage closes.
This discussion should suggest that alpha is quite hard to generate since most 
ways of doing so depend on the investment manager possessing unique abilities 
– to pick stock, identify weaknesses in management and remedy them, or un-
dertake financial innovation. Unique ability is rare. How then do the masses of 
investment managers justify the faith reposed in them by masses of ordinary in-
vestors? The answer is probably liquidity provision, which is the activity that de-
pends least on special managerial ability and could be termed the poor manager’s 
source of alpha. But when the supply of liquidity is plentiful, many investment 
managers enter the business of liquidity provision. Even as they take ever more 
illiquid positions, they compete away the returns from doing so. The point is that 
extremely accommodative monetary policy, as well as a sense that policy will stay 
accommodative, engenders “illiquidity seeking” behavior, which has close paral-
lels to risk seeking I spoke about earlier. 
When Alpha is Hard to Generate
Alpha is hard to generate, but ordinary investors seem to value managers who 
seem to have the ability to generate it. New investors are attracted by the high 
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excess returns generated by a manager, and the promise (invariably disappointed, 
I should note) that it holds for future excess returns. And current investors, if dis-
satisfied, do take their money elsewhere although they often suffer from inertia in 
doing so. As an example from one class of investment managers, if you plot the 
flows into an average U.S. mutual fund as a function of the excess returns it gener-
ates, you will see, positive excess returns generate substantial inflows while nega-
tive returns generate much milder outflows. Investors thus think that managers 
who perform well this period will do so in the future. Since managerial compensa-
tion also varies with assets under management, overall, investment managers face 
a compensation structure that moves up very strongly with good performance or 
apparent alpha, and falls, albeit more mildly, with poor performance. In the jargon 
of economists, the compensation structure is convex in alpha. 
So what is the manager with relatively limited ability to do when central banks 
flood the market with liquidity and the competition to generate alpha from li-
quidity provision makes it ever harder to generate more alpha? Put another way, as 
market inefficiencies are narrowed by the flood of money, what can managers do 
to earn their keep? As Grossman and Stiglitz have argued, the paradox of efficient 
markets is that they do not pay those who keep them efficient. Indeed, as I will 
argue, even while micro-inefficiencies are arbitraged away, the market may develop 
macro-inefficiencies – large movements of asset prices away from fundamentals 
– that are really hard to arbitrage away, as a result of agency problems.
What kind of behavior may be engendered when liquidity reduces most mi-
cro-inefficiencies? One option is to hide risk – that is, pass off returns generated 
through taking on beta risk as alpha by hiding the extent of beta risk. Since ad-
ditional risks will generally imply higher returns, managers may take risks that are 
typically not in their comparison benchmark (and hidden from investors) so as to 
generate the higher returns to distinguish themselves. 
For example, a number of insurance companies and pension funds have entered 
the credit derivative market to sell guarantees against a company defaulting. Es-
sentially, these investment managers collect premia in ordinary times from people 
buying the guarantees. With very small probability, however, the company will de-
fault, forcing the guarantor to pay out a large amount. The investment managers 
are thus selling disaster insurance or, equivalently, taking on “peso” or “tail” risks, 
which produce a positive return most of the time as compensation for a rare very 
negative return.2 These strategies have the appearance of producing very high al-
2 Peso risk is named after the strategy of investing in Mexican pesos while shorting the U.S. dollar. 
This produces a steady return amounting to the interest differential between the two countries, although 
shadowed by the constant catastrophic risk of a devaluation. Another example of a strategy producing 
such a pattern of returns is to short deep out-of-the money S&P 500 put options [see Chan, Getmansky, 
Haas, and Lo (2005)]. 






phas (high returns for low risk), so managers have an incentive to load up on 
them, especially when times are good and disaster looks remote.3 Every once in a 
while, however, they will blow up. Since true performance can only be estimated 
over a long period, far exceeding the horizon set by the average manager’s incen-
tives, managers will take these risks if they can.
One example of this behavior was observed in 1994, when a number of money 
market mutual funds in the United States came close to “breaking the buck” (go-
ing below a net asset value of $1 per share, which is virtually unthinkable for an 
ostensibly riskless fund). Some money market funds had to be bailed out by their 
parent companies. The reason they came so close to disaster was because they had 
been employing risky derivatives strategies in order to goose up returns, and these 
strategies came unstuck in the tail event caused by the Federal Reserve raising inter-
est rates quickly. 
While managers may load up on hidden “tail risk” to look as if they are gen-
erating alpha, they are also likely to recognize that true alpha is hard to generate. 
Therefore, for the more observable investments or strategies for their portfolio, 
they are likely to be wary of being too different from their peers, because they in-
sure themselves against relative underperformance (that is, generating a negative 
alpha) when they herd – after all, there is safety in numbers for who can be fired 
when everybody underperforms? In other words, even if they suspect financial 
assets are overvalued, they know their likely underperformance will be excused if 
everyone else is in the same boat. 
Both the phenomenon of taking on tail risk and that of herding can reinforce 
each other during an asset price boom, when investment managers are willing to 
bear the low probability “tail” risk that asset prices will revert to fundamentals 
abruptly, and the knowledge that many of their peers are herding on this risk 
gives them comfort that they will not under perform significantly if boom turns 
to bust. 
Monetary Policy and Incentives 
Thus far, I have highlighted four types of behavior – risk shifting, illiquid-
ity seeking, tail risk seeking, and herding among investment managers. My con-
jecture, which needs to be tested econometrically, is that all these behaviors are 
amplified when interest rates are low (especially following a period of high rates), 
3 Certainly, the pattern of returns of hedge funds following fixed income arbitrage strategies sug-
gested they were selling disaster insurance. The worst average monthly return between 1990 and 1997 
was a loss of 2.58 percent, but losses were 6.45 percent in September 1998 and 6.09 percent in Octo-
ber 1998. 
104   Central banks in the 21st century
liquidity supply is plentiful, and both conditions are expected to prevail for some 
time. In reduced form, this behavior will look like an increase in risk tolerance. 
Conversely, if monetary conditions are expected to tighten substantially, we should 
see a reversal in this behavior, which would be attributed to increased risk aversion. 
Of course, part of this behavior would be accentuated by the genuine uncertainty 
surrounding any turn in monetary policy. Preliminary analysis suggests simple 
proxies for the risk aversion of financial markets in the United States, such as the 
VIX index, do seem to be positively correlated with the level of short-term interest 
rates, as with broad measures for liquidity.4 Moreover, the VIX explains a signifi-
cant portion of the variation in emerging market debt spreads [see Kashiwase and 
Kodres (forthcoming)].
If verified empirically, however, this would suggest an additional “behavioral” 
channel for the transmission of monetary policy than the ones we are familiar 
with, the traditional money channel, the borrower balance sheet channel (Bern-
anke and Gertler (1995)), the bank lending channel (see, for example, Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988, 1992) or Kashyap and Stein (1997)), and the liquidity channel 
(Diamond and Rajan (2006)). I admit though that clever work would be needed 
to tell its effects apart from these other channels. 
Nevertheless, from a policy perspective, this “behavioral” channel introduces 
new dimensions to thinking about monetary policy. For one, it could work entire-
ly through institutions outside the banking system – through finance companies, 
insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds, and venture capitalists. Equally 
important, it could have wider effects than through credit. In particular, it will 
affect asset prices, and could thus also amplify existing channels like the balance 
sheet channel, with the riskiest and most illiquid financial assets or borrowers af-
fected the most. Finally, because emerging markets and developing countries of-
fer risky and illiquid assets, there will be substantial spillover of industrial country 
policies to these markets.
Let me conclude. If indeed there is a strong behavioral channel we need to 
think more about the following questions:
1  Do the anticipated dynamics of monetary policy matter? For instance, a pe-
riod of prolonged low rates following a period of high rates may create par-
ticularly perverse incentives. On the other hand, rapid and sudden tighten-
ing following a prolonged period of accommodation may leave a number of 
participants stranded on a limb of illiquidity. How should this knowledge 
affect the conduct of policy and the molding of expectations?5
4 A GARCH model with ARMA terms in the mean equation (thereby correcting for auto-correlation 
and heteroskedasticity) finds a positive and statistically significant correlation between the first differenced 3-
month U.S. T-Bill yield and the implied volatility of the CBOE S&P 500 Index options contract. 






2  Should industrial country policymakers take into account the substan-
tial spillovers their policies may have on emerging markets and develop-
ing countries? What should emerging market policymakers do when faced 
with potentially volatile funds that are being “pushed” in because of inves-
tor risk tolerance?
3  Should the net for prudential supervision be expanded? What elements 
need to be brought to bear, if any, to curb immoderate behavior? Do we 
have tools to affect managerial incentives more directly? What do we have 
to learn to be able to use them effectively?
4  What happens if there is a crisis? Should liquidity be infused? How? And 
how does one limit future moral hazard stemming from the infusion?
None of what I have said should be taken as a condemnation of the financial 
sector, which has contributed immensely to economic growth. But we also do 
need to work to answer the questions I have raised. It may well be that monetary 
policy is best focused on maintaining domestic price stability narrowly defined 
over a medium term horizon, and not on anything else. It is important that we 
take into account the many changes that have affected the financial world in ar-
riving at this conclusion and not simply leave it to theology. 
Thank you. 
5 In many ways, my argument dovetails well with work at the BIS, which suggests that quiescent goods 
price inflation may have created a fertile new environment for asset price booms and consequent busts. Per-
haps oversimplifying the well-argued ideas of Borio (2003), Borio and Lowe (2002), and Crockett (2003), 
in this new environment, credit expansions are less likely to be accompanied by goods price inflation. Mone-
tary policy that is focused on controlling short-run goods price inflation is likely to exert fewer checks on 
credit expansion and asset price inflation. The increase in the number of booms and busts in recent years is 
thus attributed, in part, to the death of inflation. My own view is that the change in the institutions domi-
nating the financial landscape, as well as their incentives, should also be part of the story. 
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Since  january , the day on which it officially became the monetary authority of the euro area, the ECB has changed its policy rate, the rate on its 
main refinancing operations, 18 times. Over the same period, the Federal Reserve 
System has made 35 changes. The easing cycle that started on both sides of the 
Atlantic – and of the Channel – in 2001 saw a cumulative reduction in the poli-
cy rate of 275 basis points in the euro area, accomplished in a sequence of seven 
moves. The ECB started to reverse that cycle in December last year and has since 
changed its policy in a sequence of three steps. In the United States, the same eas-
ing phase saw 13 reductions, with a total loosening of 550 basis points, and was 
first reversed in June 2004. Since then, the Federal Reserve has hiked its target 
rate 16 times in continuous steps.
I thought I would take advantage of the opportunity afforded by this im-
pressive programme to revisit a theme on which I have reflected in the past: 
“activism” in monetary policy. Is there a univocal definition of this notion? Can “activ-
ism” be quantified by simple statistics such as the frequency and size of policy 
moves? Can a central bank be “active” while moving its policy rate in a meas-
ured and observationally cautious way? Was the ECB active enough in respond-
ing to the evolving state of the euro area economy? The few facts that I have re-
counted seem to suggest otherwise. I will try to convince you that the contrary 
is true.
I will offer some provisional answers on the basis of what I believe I have 
learned thus far. I suspect, though, that the passing of time and further analysis of 
the euro area economy will be needed to deepen our understanding of this issue.
My definition of activism in monetary policy is, I believe, conventional: activism is 
the strategic attitude of a central bank that is constantly endeavouring to be faithful 
to its objective. In the case of the ECB, it is the constant striving to keep inflation 
close to its arithmetic objective, and to take all the steps needed to check nas-
cent inflationary pressures while at the same time trying to minimise unnecessary 
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macroeconomic disruptions in the process. “Activist” is an attribute that applies to 
a strategy, not to a policy path.
My answer to the question of whether or not activism can be measured by 
simple statistics is negative. Strategic activism in monetary policy cannot be 
quantified in simple terms, not in abstraction from knowledge of the key struc-
tural forces and economic relationships that govern the functioning of our sys-
tems at any point in time. When evaluating the appropriateness of their action, 
central banks do not have the luxury of linking policy to a handful of summa-
ry statistics. They engage in a complicated process of signal extraction from a 
wealth of diffuse data and events. They calibrate decisions to the key structural 
parameters of the economy in which monetary policy has to function, to the na-
ture of the shocks to which the economy is typically prone. The path of policy is 
adjusted accordingly.
The ECB’s strategy is as active as it needs to be to fulfil our mandate. I would 
claim that clarity about the objective of our policy afforded considerable latitude 
for action in the early years of the decade, and a remarkable leverage over market 
conditions more recently. This has happened despite repeated unfavourable shocks 
in the former period and apparent policy inaction in the latter. Always, our strat-
egy and the information coming from the real economy, as well as from the sphere 
of monetary aggregates, much more than our words, have shaped market expecta-
tions beyond the very near term, a sign that the complex analysis required to pre-
TRANSATLANTIC ASYMMETRY: POLICY RATES SINCE 1999
(PERCENTAGE POINTS; DAILY DATA)
FIGURE 1
SOURCES: ECB and FED. 
Note: Last observation refers to 8 June 2006. For the euro area the policy rate refers to the rate on 
the main refinancing operations until 28 June 2000 and to the minimum bid rate thereafter. For the 
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dict our judgement has not materially impeded market participants in respond-
ing meaningfully to incoming data.
Policy activism and economic dynamism
To frame the issue, let us consider a stereotypical monetary policy reaction 
function that has a short-term interest rate on the left and a number of observ-
able reaction variables on the right. Think, for example, of any kind of reaction 
functions that econometricians and expert observers often use – and sometimes 
abuse – to compare monetary policy strategies. In essence, they all encapsulate a 
simple rule of thumb: raise the policy rate if anticipated inflation is higher than 
the objective and there are signs that the economy is operating above capacity. An 
additional condition for ensuring macroeconomic stability that applies to these 
rules is that the reaction in the nominal rate must be strong enough for the real 
rate to be varied pro-cyclically: when inflation expectations rise, and the economy 
expands above potential, real monetary conditions have to be tightened.
I choose this way of framing the issue primarily because it is widely used by our 
observers, and because it is sufficiently concise to be easily understood. But, before 
launching into the analysis, I should add that, precisely because it is simple and 
pedagogical, this framework is also a very incomplete description of our policy be-
haviour. Overall, because it does not capture the very essence of the two-pillar strat-
egy, based on an economic assessment of medium-term risks to price stability, on 
the one hand, and a cross-checking based on medium to longer-term risks assessed 
though our monetary analysis, on the other. Also, because such representations of 
our policy are not sufficiently state-contingent, whereas my colleagues and I are far 
from being exclusively guided by mechanical configurations of indicators, but are 
very interested in the contingencies, and finally take our decisions on the basis of 
synthetic judgement enlightened by multiple experiences. As I often say, collegial 
wisdom is of the essence in central banking. This underscores the tension between 
describing policy simply and implementing policy simply: simple descriptions of pol-
icy need not – and indeed never do – mean simple policy behaviour.
Assuming that the parameters attached to the various indicator variables in 
the reaction function indeed capture the deep strategic preferences of the cen-
tral bank, empirical estimates of these coefficients are often used to quantify the 
strength with which the central bank intends to respond to the state of the econ-
omy. In other words, these estimated parameters are sometimes viewed as objec-
tive measures of strategic “activism” in monetary policy. 
A central bank would qualify as strategically more passive – or less active – than 
another central bank if the estimated coefficient attached to inflation expecta-
tions in deviation from the central bank’s objective, and the estimated coefficient 
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penalising the indicator of macroeconomic slack, turned out to be smaller. Why 
would this central bank qualify as more “passive”? Because, for given variances of 
inflation and real activity, this central bank would indeed be inclined to take more 
moderate action in response to changes in the outlook. It would move its policy 
rate by narrower margins – and perhaps more infrequently – than its more “activ-
ist” counterpart. Moreover, as analysts typically append a partial adjustment mech-
anism to the representation of how the central bank interest rate responds to the 
economic state, there is an additional source of “activism” – or “passivity” – that 
would emerge from these simple empirics. This is the inertia coefficient attached 
to the lagged interest rate dependent variable, which in these rules moderates the 
pace of reaction of the policy rate to its fundamental determinants.
In any case, in the naive theory of this world, plain comparison of the frequen-
cies of policy moves and the size of interest rate adjustments would suffice to tell 
the strategies of these two central banks apart. A smoother policy path would sig-
nal a “more passive” strategy.
But of course the world is not that simple, and in fact there are serious pitfalls 
lurking behind strategic inferences drawn on the basis of comparisons of variances 
in policy rates. It is not too difficult to portray situations in which such inferences 
could be highly misleading. I will give three examples, all relaxing one important 
qualification upon which my earlier example was predicated: the assumption that 
our two central banks are confronted with the same economic environment.
First, imagine two central banks which are equally responsive to economic 
conditions: in the reaction-rule jargon that I am using here, these are two central 
banks that share exactly the same reaction parameters. But one central bank now 
faces a less dynamic economy than its counterpart. By “less dynamic” I mean an 
economy that – as a matter of regularity – is hit by shocks of smaller magnitude 
which tend to fade away more gradually. Here, reaction parameters are the same 
– by hypothesis – but the reaction variables fluctuate at different speeds. All other 
things being equal, the patterns of adjustment of the policy rate that the same rule 
would induce in the two economies would be likely to look very different. The 
central bank operating in the less dynamic economy would in all likelihood be ob-
served to adjust interest rates along a more moderate path. The other central bank 
would appear more reactive. But any strategic implications drawn from the vari-
ance in the two policy paths would be purely illusionary. The smoother course of 
policy would not reveal any deep-seated strategic inertia: it would only reflect the 
same response to shocks with quite different dynamic properties. Monetary policy 
would appear “passive” because the economy itself was evolving slowly.1
1 A similar interpretation of “interest rate inertia” – the tendency of central banks to adjust rates in the 
same direction and in small steps – can be found in G. Rudebusch, “Term structure evidence on interest rate 
smoothing and monetary policy inertia”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 49 (pp. 1161-1187), 2002.
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A second example again considers two identical central banks, now facing shocks 
of a different nature. One central bank predominantly faces demand shocks, which 
result in persistent departures from trend growth. This statistical pattern has sym-
metric and durable effects on output and inflation and thus presents a relatively 
straightforward monetary policy problem under the rule that I am postulating here 
for simplicity. As both reaction variables – forecasted inflation and output – would 
frequently move in tandem, the policy rate of this central bank would have to 
be changed frequently and forcefully in the same direction to offset the shock. 
But what would happen in the other economy, if it – unlike the first – were 
more prone to supply shocks? Experience suggests that supply shocks yield sharp 
transitory increases in inflation, possibly followed by smaller, more permanent 
“second-round” effects, though the longer-run impact on inflation is obviously 
significantly determined by the response of monetary policy. Given the transi-
tory nature of the initial inflation bursts, the simple hypothetical rule – which 
incorporates the reaction to expected inflation – would advise the central bank to 
“look through” the immediate isturbance and change policy only to the extent 
needed to offset the anticipated more permanent effects of the shock on inflation 
in subsequent quarters. Its policy rate, again, would be observed to be less vari-
able. What is important to note is that the same rule – equally active strategies 
– would support two different patterns of observed policy behaviour in different 
economic environments.
The third case is perhaps the most interesting of all. Here exogenous shocks are 
identical, but economic structures differ. Different transmission mechanisms there-
fore propagate the same shocks with lags that vary between the two economies. The 
first economy has more rigid adjustment mechanisms: pricesetters and wage-nego-
tiators are more sluggish than those in the other economy in processing economic 
news – including changes in the stance of monetary policy – and bringing them to 
bear on their decisions. What is the source of those rigidities in the first economy? 
There can be many reasons for rigidity. Perhaps labour practices and contractual in-
stitutions – dating from the early post-war decades when the economy was heavily 
regulated – induce distortions in large segments of the labour market. This stands 
in the way of an efficient matching of skills and productive capabilities. Perhaps 
tight regulatory restraint on business and statutory inhibitions discourage innova-
tion and impede a faster response to new shocks and new opportunities. Whatever 
the source of rigidity, the observational result is that prices and wages in the first 
economy reflect changes in fundamentals with considerable lags.
How should monetary policy respond to shocks in these conditions? Note that 
I am moving away from the naive world of simple policy rules and am taking a 
step further into the – admittedly no less conjectural – realm of optimal policy 
design. The answer to my question depends critically on the inflation process 
that we postulate. We know that when inflation expectations are well-anchored 
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around the inflation objective of the central bank, the evolution of inflation over 
time is influenced by the numerical objective of policy more than by the histo-
ry of inflation itself. We can state this differently, saying that when the economy 
internalises the central bank’s objective firmly, the inflation process becomes less 
persistent and more forward-looking. If inflation expectations are well-anchored, a 
shock to inflation in the recent past is likely to have a lesser impact on inflation in 
the future. One reason for this is that the shock will not encourage workers to bar-
gain for commensurate rises in nominal wages to protect the real value of earnings. 
Equally, firms would certainly resist such potential bargaining. All such parties and 
other price-setters will anticipate that the central bank will ultimately drive infla-
tion back to its pre-shock level. Hence, they will tend to treat past inflationary 
shocks as transitory and inconsequential for the future outlook.
In the first economy in this example, where prices are sticky and inflation ex-
pectations are well-anchored, monetary policy can be more patient and focused on 
the medium term when confronting a cost-push shock. Again, as in the other two 
examples, it is likely to be observed to change policy less aggressively in the face 
of an unexpected shock to headline inflation. But this seeming “patience”, once 
again, does not signal inertia, “passivity” or neglect for macroeconomic conditions. 
It reflects a careful calibration of the policy course to the structural peculiarities of 
the underlying economy. First and foremost, the policy response to the inflation-
ary shock will be less persistent because the inflationary consequences of the shock 
will be more promptly reabsorbed in the first place. Second, with stickier prices, a 
change in the nominal policy rate of a given size will have a stronger impact on the 
real rate, which is all that matters when it comes to measuring the stance of policy. 
In these conditions, a more moderate policy path is not a cause of instability. In 
fact, it is the very precondition for avoiding the dangers of over-steering, of acci-
dentally destabilising the economy.
Of course, the thought experiments that I have been sharing with you so far 
are only as useful as the rules or the optimality benchmarks with which real-world 
behaviour has been compared. And I am certainly not the only one here who be-
lieves that simple reaction rules – or monetary policy optimality exercises, for that 
matter – cannot serve as the ultimate test for actual policy behaviour. But I hope I 
have conveyed one notion. Even in the over-simplified world of my canonical ex-
amples, where the macroeconomic state can be adequately described by a handful 
of facts, where these facts are reliably condensed in summary indicators – which, 
too, are immune from sampling errors and statistical revisions2 – and where policy 
2 Of course, in the actual practice of monetary policy, uncertainty about the data is extremely pervasive.
We are even uncertain about the current economic situation as economic data are received with a lag, are typi-
cally subject to multiple revisions, and in any case can only roughly and partially depict the underlying eco-
nomic reality. 
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algorithms are an acceptable description of policy choices, even in that conjectur-
al world the variability of the policy instrument would not be a sufficient statistic 
with which to judge monetary policy strategies.
In particular, even in that world, a slower-moving, structurally more rigid econo-
my would support an observationally more moderate policy course.
In the real world, as I will try to explain next, that observationally moderate 
path for policy receives an even stronger justification.
Facts and policy in the euro area
My emphasis on a structurally more rigid and less dynamic economy periodi-
cally facing adverse supply shocks is, of course, deliberate. That laboratory case 
resembles the euro area that I know. I will organise my interpretation of stylised 
facts about the euro area in the recent past into three broad categories: shocks, 
structures and monetary policy.
 Shocks
One reason the euro area resembles my third example is that, compared with 
the United States, it seems to be subject to demand shocks of smaller magnitude 
but to be more frequently hit by supply shocks.3 In the last ten years this shock 
pattern seems to have grown even more pronounced, despite globalisation and a 
generalised shift towards closer international economic integration.4 This is no-
where more evident than in the anatomy of the boom-bust cycle that spanned 
the decade starting in 1995 in the two economies. In the United States, the run-
up phase was significantly propelled – as we know with hindsight – by overly 
optimistic views about long-run earnings growth and, notably, exaggerated be-
liefs in the profitability of emerging technologies. But the strength in business in-
vestment that the boom brought with it also had important implications for the 
supply side of the US economy, through its influence on the rate of increase in 
labour productivity and thus the economy’s sustainable level of potential output. 
ECB staff calculations estimate that the contribution to the growth of output 
per hour worked coming from capital deepening doubled in the United States 
in the course of the 1990s. Subsequently – and despite the sharp reappraisal of 
3 See, for example, the structural comparative analysis in F. Smets and R. Wouters, “Comparing shocks 
and frictions in US and euro area business cycles: a Bayesian DSGE approach”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 
20(1), January 2005.
4 This is a well-known, if certainly surprising, fact. See, for example, J. Stock and M. Watson, “Has the 
business cycle changed? Evidence and explanations”, paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City Symposium “Monetary Policy and Uncertainty,” Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 28-30 2003.
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those expectations and the unprecedented drop in business investment that fol-
lowed the market collapse in 2000 – it stabilised at the elevated levels that it had 
reached at the turn of the millennium. Since then, remarkably, capital deepening 
has been replaced, as the main engine of output per hour growth, by extraordinary 
advancements in total factor productivity (TFP). Arguably, US firms have been 
able to meet expanding demand with a more efficient organisation of the produc-
tion processes.
The same ten-year episode had a distinctly different face in the euro area. The 
stock market appreciation – comparable in size to that seen in the United States 
– went hand in hand with a decline, not a rise, in the contribution of capital to 
measured productivity. And a contemporaneous steady decline in TFP through-
out the decade has reinforced, rather than offset, the diminishing contribution of 
capital.5 The euro area seems to have had its fair share of stock market turbulence, 
without enjoying the side benefit of improved supply conditions.
The slowdown in trend productivity has been a primary determinant of the 
weak economic performance of the euro area. By depressing income growth pros-
pects and by reducing the prospective return on capital, it has held back consump-
tion spending and business investment, which has been further curtailed to some 
extent by the ongoing demographic shift towards a more elderly population.6 Rap-
idly decelerating productivity was one force behind the counter-cyclical rebound 
in unit labour costs that we observed during the early part of the new millennium. 
(See figure 2) 
This surge in unit labour costs was atypical, if contrasted with the way in 
which unit labour costs in the United States elastically responded to the down-
turn with a sharp decline, and it represented an ongoing source of inflationary 
pressures. Adverse underlying developments in productivity have made it more 
difficult for our firms to smooth through the volatility of the many non-wage 
5 See G. Gomez-Salvador, A. Musso, M. Stocker and J. Turunen, “Labour productivity developments in 
the euro area”, forthcoming as an ECB Occasional Paper. They report that the average contribution of capital 
to measured productivity growth in the United States was 0.6 percentage point in the first half of the 1990s, 
increasing to 1.1 percentage points in the second half of the decade and stabilising at 1.0 percentage point on 
average between 2000 and 2004. In the euro area, the trend was reversed: a contribution of 1 percentage point 
in the first half of the 1990s became 0.4 percentage point and 0.6 percentage point, respectively, in the second 
half of the 1990s and in the first five years of this century. The TFP contribution, calculated on the basis of 
the Solow residual, tripled in the United States from the early 1990s to 1.6 percent on average in 2000-2004, 
but halved in the euro area from 1.3 to 0.6 percent in the same period. Correcting the euro area TFP measures 
mentioned above for variable capital utilisation does not change the picture. In fact, such correction would 
shift the start of the slowdown in productivity to the mid-1990s. 
6 As the share of the population that is of working age declines, the rise in the capital stock needed to 
equip the labour force decreases. Lower rates of investment in some member countries may also reflect some 
relocation of production to China and other newly industrialised countries (where investment rates have been 
quite high in recent years).
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cost disturbances that they have encountered since 1999. This lesser degree of 
resilience has kept the evolution of inflation – and real activity as well – con-
stantly vulnerable to unexpected shocks, such as the increases in the prices of 
energy and beef – to name only two – which have been brought about by ad-
verse changes in supply conditions.7 Note that inflation (see figure 3) edged 
higher in the downturn phase and remained at elevated levels thereafter, at a 
time when the accumulating margin of slack in labour and product markets 
could in fact have been expected to reduce price pressures. Again, compare 
these developments with the sharp disinflation which occurred, during the 
same period, in the United States.
Of course, we cannot directly observe full capacity of either labour or other 
production factors. Consequently, we can never be certain about the level of ac-
tivity that would represent the full utilisation of available resources, and even less 
so about the strength of the relationship that links utilisation and inflation. How-
ever, I hope that I have demonstrated that this connection is seemingly weak in 
the euro area, probably weaker than across the Atlantic.
ANNUAL CHANGES IN UNIT LABOUR COSTS IN THE EURO AREA AND THE U
(PERCENTAGE POINTS; QUARTERLY DATA; SEASONALLY ADJUSTED)
SFIGURE 2
SOURCES: Eurostat and BIS. 





















































7 The cluster of large unanticipated supply shocks that have implications for the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices that is the focus of the ECB’s inflation analysis includes a strong and persistent increase in 
the price of oil and natural gas in 2000 and again after 2004; increases in unprocessed food prices associated 
with the outbreak of BSE and foot-and-mouth disease in 2001; and rises in administered prices and tobacco 
taxes announced in late 2004.
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Structures
This structural feature brings me to the second category of my remarks: the 
structure of the economy on this side of the Atlantic. I will concentrate on two 
factors that critically affect the relationship between inflation and the fundamental 
shocks that drive the economy and determine its state: price flexibility and the an-
choring of price-setting.
Extensive empirical research on price flexibility and inflation persistence in 
the euro area has recently been produced in a concerted effort that has occupied 
staff of the ECB and of the entire European System of Central Banks.8 It comes 
to two main conclusions. First, in the euro area, prices are distinctly less flexible 
than, say, in the United States. Prices change infrequently: the average duration of 
a consumer price spell – a measure of the time that it takes for retailers to reprice 
8 See E. Dhyne, L. Alvarez, H. Le Bihan, G. Veronese, D. Dias, J. Hoffmann, N. Jonker, P. Lünne-
mann, F. Rumler and J. Vilmunen, “Price-setting in the euro area: some stylised facts from individual con-
sumer price data”, ECB Working Paper No 524, 2005. The paper reports that the average duration of CPI 
price spells in the euro area is 4.3 quarters. By comparison, M. Bils and P. Klenow, in “Some evidence on 
the importance of sticky prices”, Journal of Political Economy 112, 2005, calculate that the average duration 
of CPI prices in the United States is 2.2 quarters. Other Phillips curve-based analyses broadly confirm these 
results. For the euro area, see J. Gali, M. Gertler and D. Lopez-Salido, “European inflation dynamics”, Eu-
ropean Economic Review 45(7), 2001, and J. Gali, M. Gertler and D. Lopez-Salido, “Erratum”, European 
Economic Review 47(4), 2003.
CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION IN THE EURO AREA AND THE US
(YEAR-ON-YEAR PERCENTAGE CHANGE; MONTHLY DATA; SEASONALLY ADJUSTED)
FIGURE 3
SOURCES: Eurostat and BIS. 
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their products – is 13 months (see table 1). According to surveys, it is 11 months 
for producers. In the United States, comparable figures indicate durations of less 
than 7 months and slightly more than 8 months respectively.9
More infrequent price revisions make the setting of prices less responsive to 
economic news, including, as I already pointed out, changes in monetary condi-
tions. In general, sticky price revision processes reduce the odds that the imbal-
ances created by economic shocks can be rectified by adjustments in prices. Con-
versely, they make the burden of adjustment to a shock fall disproportionately 
on changes in output, incomes and employment. Also, stickier prices tend – all 
other things being equal – to increase the persistence of inflation. This is because 
the impact of a shock that today modifies firms’ real cost conditions tends to be 
spread out over an extended future, as staggered price adjustments catch up only 
slowly with the changed underlying circumstances.
Despite sluggish price-setting mechanisms, however, inflation persistence in 
the euro area is low by international standards. This is the second important find-
ing of the new body of evidence that I mentioned: an inflationary shock dissi-
9 Abstracting from methodological differences in price-collecting procedures across statistical institutes, 
differences in the frequency of price adjustments can be due to various causes. Differences in the degree of 
competition, especially in the services sector, may be a factor, particularly given evidence that the divergence 
of such frequencies is most pronounced in that sector. Another factor that is often cited is the fact that small 
corner shops, which change their prices less frequently than supermarkets, have a higher market share in euro 
area countries than in the United States.
STATISTICS EURO AREA US
CPI Frequency 15.1 24.8
Average duration (months) 13.0 6.7
Median duration (months) 10.6 4.6
PPI Frequency 20.0 n.a.
Surveys Frequency 15.9 20.8
Average duration (months) 10.8 8.3
New Keynesian Phillips Curve Average duration (months) 13.5 - 19.2 7.2 - 8.4
MEASURES OF PRICE STICKINESS FOR THE EURO AREA AND THE USTABLE 1
SOURCES: For the CPI in the euro area, Dhyne et al. (2005), Bils and Klenow (2004) in the US. For the PPI, 
Vermeulen et al. (2005). Surveys: Fabiani et al. (2005) for the euro area, Blinder et al. (1998) for the US. 
New Keynesian Phillips Curve: Estimates in Galí et al. (2001, 2003) refer to the GDP deflator and are converted 
from original quarterly figures. 
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pates quickly in the euro area despite rigidities, and inflation has a tendency to re-
turn to its long-run norm reasonably quickly. The half-life of the effect of a shock 
to inflation is considerably less than one year, which is close to the figure that one 
obtains, for example, for the United States, again notwithstanding vastly different 
patterns of price-updating practices across the two areas.
What explains this apparently inconsistent evidence? Another ECB study, esti-
mating a structural model on euro area and US data, goes some way towards rec-
onciling empirical stickiness in prices and low persistence in inflation on the basis 
of a model of inflation determination that features real costs and expectations.10 As 
I said before, even if price sluggishness introduces persistence into the inflation 
process – which in itself tends to perpetuate past inflation pressures into the future 
– some of that persistence can be undone if the expectations of price and wage-
setters are focused on the objective of the central bank. Indeed, this study finds 
that the influence of the ECB’s inflation objective on the evolution over time of 
inflation outweighs the influence of past shocks, and thus at least partly compen-
sates for the added inertia resulting from a more rigid economic structure. We are 
pleased to observe that analysis of survey-based  measures of inflation expectations 
suggests that central bank leverage on expectations has become much stronger 
since the establishment of the euro.11 
Monetary policy
Having reviewed structures and shocks, I now move on to the third aspect of 
my discussion of the euro area: monetary policy. Did considerations pertaining to 
the nature of the shocks that occurred in the recent past and to the structural pe-
culiarities of the euro area play any role in positioning the stance of monetary pol-
icy? Can they go some way towards explaining the observationally moderate path 
that the policy rate has followed in the euro area? Did the smoother path of our 
policy rate impede a smooth adjustment of the euro area to the shocks that have 
hit the global economy in the recent past? Finally, does low inflation persistence 
provide reason for complacency? 
10 See L. Christiano, R. Motto and M. Rostagno, “Financial factors in business cycles”, presented at the 
IMF-IRF Conference on DSGE Modelling at Policymaking Institutions: Progress and Prospects hosted by the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Washington, 2-3 December 2005).
11 The consumer survey on inflation expectations compiled by the European Commission is a good ba-
rometer of the sensitivity of short-term inflation expectations to recent inflation dynamics. Results are pre-
sented in terms of the difference between the percentage of respondents who believe prices will increase and 
the percentage of respondents who believe that they will decrease or stabilise. Prior to the euro cash changeo-
ver there was a tight relationship between this qualitative indicator and actual inflation developments, with a 
correlation coefficient close to 1. However, since the cash changeover, the correlation between the two series 
has dropped to 0.4. 
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When the ECB in early 2001 initiated the easing cycle that we started to 
reverse in December last year, this was done on the heels of significant adverse 
supply shocks, relatively strong wage dynamics, and headline inflation rates at 
levels unseen in Europe since the late phases of convergence to the new curren-
cy. Yet the Governing Council judged that our commitment to attaining price 
stability, in line with our official definition, through our monetary policy strat-
egy was sufficiently credible for us to take that easing decision without running 
the risk of destabilising inflation expectations. That conviction was reinforced 
by a rapidly deteriorating outlook and by reassuring signs that inflation ex-
pectations discounted a scenario in which inflation would settle in the zone of 
price stability in the medium term. The rapid softening of activity that we saw 
coming and the increasing odds that the recovery would not materialise soon 
– we believed – would validate ex post the inflation expectations and make the 
threat of renewed inflation considerably weaker. Information extracted from 
monetary trends supported our prediction of subdued inflation looking into 
the more distant future.
Monetary accommodation was quicker and, in retrospect, far more persistent 
than could have been predicted on the basis of the policy regularities on record. 
In the end, monetary action amounted to an interest rate reduction of 275 basis 
points, bringing the policy rate to a level which was below the lowest interven-
tion rate of the central banks of an overwhelming majority of member countries, 
including Germany, during the last 50 years. It is all the more remarkable that we 
were able to follow such a historically unseen trajectory for our vast continental 
economy, the euro area, given that the individual countries had very diverse and 
mixed legacies as regards past monetary credibility.
It is difficult to work out a convincing counterfactual: what would have hap-
pened if the reaction of the ECB had been more in line with the patterns of poli-
cy behaviour established in the past, rather than the more forceful action we took. 
However, structural – if model-specific – analysis of the mix of the macroeconomic 
shocks that have hit the euro area since 2001 reveals with hindsight that the ex-
tra monetary policy stimulus that we introduced has been critical in avoiding a 
deeper and more enduring recession here and on a global scale.
I judge that the policy course was carefully calibrated to the structural char-
acteristics of the euro area transmission mechanism, some features of which 
I tried to outline earlier. We were guided, in particular, by the understand-
ing that a central bank operating in a relatively rigid economy is able to de-
liver the same quantum of monetary accommodation by adjusting its policy 
instrument in more moderate steps than in a relatively more flexible economy. 
Under the structural conditions that prevail in our economy, a more aggres-
sive easing would have introduced unwelcome volatility in both inflation and 
output that would have necessitated corrective, countervailing action further 
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down the road.12 Certainly, as I will argue shortly, the ECB would not have 
maintained the nominal and real policy rate at the low levels at which they were 
held for more than two years without consistent signs that expectations were 
well-anchored and inflationary shocks were being quickly reabsorbed.
Alertness and active communication
No central bank represented in this room, or elsewhere, can reasonably spell 
out in advance its reaction to every conceivable contingency. This means that 
surprises in our behaviour can never be ruled out, notably in the face of potent 
shocks. In particular, we might be confronted with new occurrences of risks which 
could force us to take bold steps that our observers could not have predicted by 
extrapolating from our past history of policy conduct. To some extent, this is what 
occurred over the earlier phase of the international economic downturn: we took 
sizeable risks in the direction of “activism”.
What were those risks? First, in an economy as rigid as the euro area, it might 
well be true that temporary imbalances between demand and potential supply are 
slow to show through convincingly to inflation. But if and when they finally do, 
they would be more costly to correct.13 So, monetary policy should be sufficiently 
alert to any threats to the outlook for price stability, so that it does not find itself 
reacting belatedly – and with less chance of success – to trends that have long been 
underway.
Second, it is true that the expectation that inflation will not come loose from 
its anchor affords some short-term flexibility to respond to economic disturbances 
– with a view to ensuring more balanced macroeconomic conditions in the long-
er term. But that flexibility only lasts as long as economic agents and the public 
are confident that the opportunity will not be misused. And we just do not know 
enough about the way policy actions influence expectations and how sensitive cen-
tral banks’ credibility is to short-run departures from low inflation to warrant ex-
12 Counterfactual simulations based on a large-scale estimated dynamic general equilibrium model of 
the euro area have quantified the implications of alternative policy scenarios. This analysis reaches two conclu-
sions. First, the loss in GDP that would have been associated with a situation in which the ECB did not devi-
ate from the estimated reaction rule embedded in the model – and thus monetary policy in the euro area fol-
lowed a tighter course – would have come close to 1% per annum on average since 2001. Second, had the 
ECB followed a more aggressive policy easing, one resembling the sharp rate reduction engineered by the Fed-
eral Reserve in the United States, the standard deviation of inflation would have tripled and the standard devi-
ation of output doubled since 2001. The model used is documented in Christiano et al cited above. 
13 Another way to state this notion is that in an economy such as the euro area, where prices and wages 
are as rigid as they prove to be, the “sacrifice ratio” is probably large. This means that the action required to 
counter inflation – when inflationary pressures actually emerge – would be more forceful.
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perimenting. Occasional monetary policy activism, as circumstances require, is 
not the same as fine-tuning. Fine-tuning – if I may twist a phrase borrowed from 
Alan Blinder and Ricardo Reis – cannot be resurrected.14 Building and maintain-
ing a reputation for prudent policy involves commitment to a systematic strategy: 
that is, following a recurrent pattern of behaviour, so that stable expectations are 
consistently validated ex post.
During the extended period of policy accommodation, we were able to steer ex-
pectations effectively without explicit action, proof that markets accept as true the 
ultimate motives of policy that we profess. In those instances in which expecta-
tions displayed signs of overreaction to current events – such as surging oil prices 
– our renewed emphasis in communication on our objective, on the vigilance and 
determination that we would apply to enforce it, on our steady alertness, provided 
effective resistance to inordinate developments. Importantly, signalling vigilance 
proved instrumental in reaching a common understanding with the markets: the 
ECB, though observationally inactive, was at any time ready to start action. Our 
policy course was rightly seen as always contingent on the arrival of new informa-
tion. Given the information available each time the Governing Council meets, 
the standing assumption in the markets should always be that the policy deci-
sion is aimed at positioning the stance of policy appropriately. No history of 
past monetary policy decisions could ever be taken as an indication of a com-
mitment, on our side, to enact a sequence of interest rate moves in the future. 
Unconditional – or “quasi-unconditional” – talk about future policy would have 
impaired the difficult balance that we maintained between supportive credit 
conditions and persistently anchored inflation expectations. Active emphasis in 
communication upon “alertness” required keeping all options open to a – pos-
sibly quick – change in policy. Pre-commitment to a policy path would certainly 
have made that reversal of policy difficult to execute and/or to justify, and there-
fore non-credible.
The markets seem to have internalised these strategic principles with an in-
creasing degree of precision. Incoming data which, since the autumn of 2005, 
have indicated more persuasive signs of a recovery in an environment of abun-
dant liquidity and elevated commodity prices were correctly mapped into expec-
tations that the stance then prevailing would not be consistent with controlling 
inflation over the medium term. Markets anticipated in good time that the ECB 
would soon begin reversing the extra easing that had been put in place.
In retrospect, market expectations have aligned well with our intentions. Since 
December, consistent with our remit to be alert and pre-emptive, the monetary 
14 See A. Blinder and R. Reis, “Understanding the Greenspan Standard”, paper presented at the Feder-
al Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium “The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future”, Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming, August 25-27 2005. 
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policy of the ECB has been perceived to be in a mode of progressive withdrawal of 
monetary accommodation. Indeed, this withdrawal has been and remains condi-
tional on the evolution of our analysis with respect to our objective of price stabil-
ity, but it has not been predicated on any single shortterm indicator of the mac-
roeconomic state. In the last few months, the ECB has not measured the state 
of the economy by the strength or weakness of any particular piece of incoming 
news. It has continued to extract the macroeconomic trend from the wealth of 
cumulative evidence accruing – from month to month – from the economic and 
the monetary side. In both cases, the medium-term orientation of its monitoring 
activity has been preserved. Two examples: as regards our economic analysis, when 
looking at the underlying trend of growth of the European economy, we judged 
in the second half of last year that we were experiencing a recovery with the trend 
progressively approaching potential. We judged that the short-term volatility ob-
served in important indicators, including the quarterly growth figure for the fourth 
quarter of 2005, did not call into question the medium-term growth prospects and 
therefore the associated gradual increase of risks to price stability. Another exam-
ple can be extracted from our monetary analysis: consistent indications that broad 
money growth was increasingly due to its most liquid components has contributed 
in recent months to a gradual tilt of the balance of risks perceived to be signalled 
by our monetary analysis. It was not the behaviour of aggregate M3 per se which 
altered the outlook for price stability. It was the realisation that the structural force 
at work behind persistently abundant liquidity was becoming increasingly con-
nected with final spending and pricing decisions.
As I said at the start, the complexity of the analysis required to predict our 
moves has not materially impeded market participants in responding meaning-
fully to incoming data. The understanding of our strategy and the information 
coming from the real economy, as well as from the sphere of monetary aggregates, 
have shaped market expectations beyond the very near term. I attribute this sat-
isfactory result to our policy framework, which features a primary, sharplydefined 
objective and a systematic reaction to events whenever the objective is perceived 
to be at risk.
Concluding remarks
I am sometimes asked the following question: “You are in the process of in-
creasing rates. Is your judgement that your rates today are significantly lower than 
they should be? What then is the level of the “neutral rate” that you would judge it 
appropriate to reach (as rapidly as possible)?”
My response to such questions would be the following. First, we are not in a 
position that we would judge “abnormal”, in the sense that we would have to in-
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crease as rapidly as possible our interest rates up to the “normal” level. We are in 
a process of progressively withdrawing the present degree of monetary accom-
modation commensurate with the risks to price stability that we perceive, associ-
ated in particular with the present development of the economic recovery. To the 
extent that we never previously pre-committed to unconditional moves and we 
have always adhered to the posture of steady alertness which is at the heart of our 
strategy, our monetary policy stance should and does – to the best of our own 
comprehensive, deep and candid assessment of the situation – at any time makes 
it possible to cope with the risks we see for price stability in a medium-term per-
spective. Then, in a dynamic perspective, our refusal of unconditional pre-com-
mitments, our position of permanent, steady alertness and our strategy help focus 
our policy upon being permanently at the “correct level” in terms of attaining our 
primary goal in a medium-term perspective. 
Second, from a central bank’s perspective, the Wicksellian concept of a “neu-
tral rate” is more particularly useful in the event that the central bank has – for 
whatever reason – moved its rates far away from the policy stance that it would 
judge appropriate ici et maintenant, here and now. As you can see, in my view, 
this cannot be the case for the Governing Council of the ECB. 
Third, one can be sure that we will continue to analyse the situation very care-
fully on an ongoing basis. It is clear that if our main scenario is confirmed over 
time, a further withdrawal of monetary accommodation will be appropriate. We 
do not specify ex ante a sequence of policy actions, as I have said clearly since last 
December. The appropriate policy stance will always depend on information on 
the economic and monetary side and on the source and dynamic properties of 
the underlying shocks that will hit the economy and we will always remain alert. 
It is the combination of events and data, some expected, others unexpected, that 
will be analysed and will permit us to define our future trajectory.






It is both an honour and a pleasure for me to be here and to celebrate with you the 150th anniversary of the adoption of the name “Banco de España” by 
the Spanish central bank. I am very grateful for the opportunity to comment on 
issues relating to payment and securities settlement systems, which I regard as vital 
for the central banking community. 
I am also delighted to have three distinguished speakers participating in this 
session: Mr Giovannini, who will discuss the challenges of integration in the 
European securities settlement systems, Mr Noyer, who will comment on European 
payment systems, and Mr Santomero, who will provide us with a US perspective 
on the changing pattern of payments. 
I will introduce this session with some remarks on the drivers of current and fu-
ture institutional developments in payment and securities settlement systems. En-
hancing economic productivity depends to a considerable extent on the efficiency 
of the payment and securities settlement market. In fact, it has been argued that 
a significant part of the backlog of productivity growth in Europe vis-à-vis the 
United States results from inefficiencies in banking and securities settlement. I 
believe that progress has been made to eliminate these inefficiencies, but more 
work needs to be done by the financial industry, regulators and politicians to 
speed up the process. 
1 Payments 
To meet the challenges in the field of payments, I would like to discuss three 
areas of action. 
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1.1 Integration of the large-value and retail payments market
In my discussion of the integration of the payments market, I will focus primarily 
on Europe. The United States is more advanced in this respect as the integration 
process has already taken place there. 
For large-value payments, the creation of TARGET2 will conclude the consolidation 
process of RTGS systems in the euro area that was initiated with TARGET1. 
TARGET2 will provide the potential for further efficiency gains and cost reductions 
to its users. Additionally, it will incorporate features that allow for more flexibility 
in the risk-cost trade-off, for example liquidity saving features.
What does this mean in practice? In my view the launch of TARGET2 will create the 
possibility for pan-European banks to centralise their payments back offices and liquidity 
management. Economies of scale and scope will lead to sizeable cost reductions.
TARGET2 is not the only driver for integration, consolidation and consequently 
for potential efficiency gains for banks and society. The creation of the Single Euro 
Payments Area (SEPA) will boost the development of Europe’s single market. For 
retail payments, the creation of the SEPA is the topic driving the integration of 
the payments market in the euro area. The Eurosystem has allocated considerable 
resources to support this process, encourage banks to work towards the SEPA goals 
and involve all stakeholders. The SEPA project is far-reaching and involves the 
creation of standardised pan-European payment schemes, such as credit transfer 
and direct debit. In addition, it includes a framework for the pan-European use of 
cards. From 1 January 2008, the SEPA will promote choice. 
Choice for corporations, merchants and consumers: thanks to the SEPA, corporations, 
merchants and consumers will no longer be bound to their “national” commercial 
banks or card schemes. Furthermore, merchants will be able to choose to accept 
debit card schemes in their shops other than the current national ones. 
Choice for the commercial banks: banks can choose to enter new geographical 
markets by offering their payment services to potential new clients in other European 
countries. The SEPA also offers banks a choice for processing their payments. 
Owing to standardisation, infrastructures will become fully interoperable within 
the SEPA. Consequently, geographical location will no longer be an issue. Moreover, 
I expect that the number of automated clearing houses in the euro area will fall 
considerably in the coming years, a prediction which has also been publicly 
acknowledged by them. 
Ultimately, I anticipate that the SEPA will create a competitive pan-European 
payments market. The SEPA will enable banks and infrastructures to reduce their 
costs and exploit economies of scale. In the end, the SEPA will allow the end-user 
to benefit from these efficiency gains through a combination of better products, 
better services, and better prices. TARGET2 and the SEPA will therefore transform 
the payments market in the euro area, making it more dynamic and cost efficient.





1.2  Technological innovation will be one of the additional
effects of these dynamics 
Exploiting technological innovation can be an important means of saving costs, 
which is a pressing need in the payments business in order to avoid further erosion 
of profitability. For instance, if customers move away from paper to electronic 
payments, the consequent use of straight-through processing would become a 
reality, even for retail payments. Considerable cost savings would become possible. 
In order to fully exploit the technological possibilities, standardisation is required. 
If the market cannot agree on standardisation, regulatory steps may be necessary.
1.3 Enlarging the market for payment services  
An additional effect of the dynamics in the market for payment services will 
be the enlarging of the market, e.g. by promoting cashless payments and offering 
value-added services to customers. This will lead to cost-savings, but will also 
generate further revenue sources. Although it falls to the banks to develop their 
business proposals, central banks can assist by offering their expertise. 
2 Securities 
Moving on from payments to securities settlement issues, the issues at stake 
are hardly less challenging. The need for action at European Union (EU) level 
to improve clearing and settlement processes in the EU has been highlighted 
recently in two communications by the European Commission on financial 
markets and competition. The current cross-border arrangements in the EU are 
complex and fragmented and impose excessive costs, risks and inefficiencies on 
investors, institutions and issuers. The documents published by the Commission 
show the variations in cost structure among different EU markets and how a 
more (integrated and) efficient post-trading infrastructure could lead to a reduction 
in transaction costs of up to 18%. This, in turn, could increase GDP by around 
0.6% in subsequent years. 
This confirms that we need an integrated infrastructure, but it is easier said 
than done! How can we achieve this in practice? I would like to stimulate reflection 
on three main aspects.
 
2.1 Integration is a slow but continuous process 
First, Rome was not built in a day. Nor was, for instance, the integrated 
securities infrastructure in the United States. It may be worth recalling that the 
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process of integration in the United States started in 1975 and was completed 
in 1999 with the creation of the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation 
(DTCC). The process of integration took just under 25 years in a country with 
a single currency, a single system of central banks, a single regulator, a single legal 
framework, and, last but not necessarily least, a single language. In the European 
Union, we have 14 currencies, one system of central banks and 13 non-participating 
central banks, more than 50 regulators, 25 legal systems and about 20 languages. 
In the euro area things are a little better, since we at least have a single currency and 
a single system of central banks. It is clear that we cannot expect a rapid solution, 
but it is important to have a clear vision of what we would like to achieve or at 
least of what we do not want to achieve.
The process of integration is already under way: it started six years ago following 
the introduction of the euro. Since then, some progress has been made moving 
on from a situation in which cross-border securities settlement was just “possible” 
towards a truly European domestic infrastructure. One example is the increase 
in the use of cross-border collateral for Eurosystem credit operations from 16% 
in 2001 to 45% in 2005. Progress has also been made on the consolidation 
of central counterparties (CCPs) and central securities depositaries (CSDs): the 
number of CCPs fell from 14 in 1999 to 7 in 2005, while the number of CSDs 
fell from 22 to 9 over the same period. In some cases, consolidation is leading 
to lower transactions fees. For instance, this has been the case for Euronext, 
and is foreseen to be the case for the Nordic CSDs alliance. Nevertheless, the 
market is still fragmented, further integration is required, and Rome is still a 
long way off. 
2.2 There is no single recipe for integration 
Second, all roads lead to Rome, i.e. there is not necessarily an optimal recipe/
model for achieving integration. The US model (two CSDs and one CCP for 
securities) is not necessarily the benchmark for Europe. The different starting point 
may justify a different path. Now, necessity is the mother of invention and, here, 
the invention is called “interoperability”. What interoperability actually means in 
practical terms in the field of post-trading infrastructure remains to be defined. 
One peculiar aspect of the European infrastructure seems to be that interoperability 
encompasses the concept of vertical and horizontal integration and can only be 
achieved as a joint effort by all interested players: not only stock exchanges, central 
counterparties, central securities depositories, but also central banks, as providers 
of payment and collateral management services. Cooperation is helpful because 
many hands make light work, but it is also necessary because a chain is no stronger 
than its weakest link.





2.3 The role of authorities 
Third, there is no doubt that the process of integration should be marketdriven. 
However, this does not mean that authorities should just stand back and wait and 
see. Action by authorities is warranted in the event of market failures. Some markets 
can be reluctant to change (the first step is always the hardest and old habits die 
hard) and the different time horizon of costs (today) and revenues (tomorrow) re-
lating to the necessary investments may increase this reluctance. Moreover, market 
forces may not be able to take all the necessary steps to ensure effective competition 
as well as the stability of the infrastructure. It is not a coincidence that, to date, 
the most successful example of integrated infrastructure has been the establishment 
of the TARGET system for settlement of large-value payments. It should be noted 
that TARGET was created not by the market, but by the central banks. 
Moreover, action is required to remove legal and fiscal barriers to integration. In 
this respect, the Eurosystem welcomes the initiatives specified in the communication 
by the European Commission and, in particular, supports the adoption of a 
framework directive on clearing and settlement. A directive could complement 
the market-led removal of barriers to integration and contribute to ensuring fair 
and open access and price transparency. This is, in turn, a necessary condition to 
ensure effective competition. The Eurosystem also deems it important that the 
EU securities infrastructure is adequately protected from financial and operational 
risks and that no regulatory arbitrage is introduced by the adoption of inconsistent or 
diverging regulatory standards in Europe. The Eurosystem therefore takes the view 
that the finalisation and implementation of the ESCBCESR standards for clearing 
and settlement are essential to ensure the sound and smooth functioning of the 
EU financial infrastructure.
Conclusion 
I hope I have succeeded in touching on the main drivers of change in payment 
and securities settlement systems and I am now looking forward to the presentations 
of the three panellists who will provide more detail on these issues. As none of 
them needs to be really introduced to you, let me just say that I am very proud to 
chair such a distinguished panel:
Alberto Giovannini fights on a day-to-day basis for a comprehensive programme 
of fostering integration in the field of securities settlement. It is a bit unfair to him 
that we speak about “Giovannini barriers” as if he had some responsibility himself for 
the persistence of these obstacles. Instead, we should speak about the “Giovannini 
vision” that his report so convincingly put forward. 
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Christian Noyer is in the driving seat of building a dynamic and competitive 
European economy and represents an important financial sector. With his leadership 
and clear-sightedness, he helps the industry to seize the large opportunities that an 
integrated Europe offers. 
Anthony M. Santomero combines in an impressive manner the world of academia 
and central banking. The US financial sector provides to some extent a blueprint for 
an integrated financial sector in Europe. Therefore, it is particularly interesting to 
listen to the assessment by someone who has helped so much – through practical 
as well as well academic contributions – to shape the financial sector.
1 Introduction
In Europe, the financial system plays a central role in economic develop-ment. The essential functions of the financial system are the allocation of re-
sources towards the most productive uses, and the allocation and optimal dis-
tribution of economic risk. Through these functions, the financial systems 
contributes to reward the most productive sectors of the economy, and to phase 
out the less productive sectors. It also helps re-cycle capital and labour employed 
in less productive sectors. It is apparent that the evolution of EU societies and 
economies from regimes characterized by state intervention to market economies 
(an evolution that is, arguably, incomplete) requires an efficient financial system 
to take up roles that in the past were carried out by governments, often with dis-
appointing results.
Yet, the current structure of the financial system in the EU is faulty. The EU 
financial system does not really exist as a single, integrated entity. It is rather the 
sum of national financial systems. Of course, national financial systems are not 
isolated from each other, in the sense that there is almost complete free trade in 
financial assets and financial services across the different member states. How-
ever, it is important to make a distinction between the absence of prohibition to 
trade with other EU member states, and the presence of hindrances and costs to 
cross border trade. These hindrances are very often unintended, as they represent 
an inheritance from a not-so-distant past: they originate from the largely national 
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Unifortune Asset Management
1 This article draws on my work as an advisor to the EU Commission in the area of post-trading.  Many 
of the ideas in this article were developed previously and appear in Giovannini, Berrigan and Russo (2006). I 
am very grateful to Sean Berrigan, Godfried de Vidts, Mario Nava, Daniela Russo and David Wright for hav-
ing clarified my ideas on these issues over many years of work together.
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nature of financial intermediation in European countries which were until recently 
isolated from each other by the prohibition to cross-border trade in assets and fi-
nancial services. Nationality is reflected, well beyond the use of different languages 
(an issue that is of second-order importance in finance), in the use of different 
technical standards, market conventions, rules and regulations that are country-
specific.
The EU Commission and the European Central Banks are the most powerful 
sponsors of an integrated, efficient EU financial system. Their sponsorship origi-
nates from different, though related, incentives that drive the two institutions. In 
the case of the EU Commission, the desire to build an integrated and efficient 
financial system stems from the desire to support economic development by elimi-
nating all barriers to trade, explicit or implicit. In the case of the European Central 
Bank, an efficient and integrated financial system represents an essential pillar for 
macroeconomic stability in the region where its mandate extends; in addition, a 
well-working financial system is a key enhancer of its own monetary policy tools 
aimed at controlling liquidity in the region and, indirectly, affecting inflation and 
inflationary expectations.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the process of construction of the EU fi-
nancial system from the perspective of its foundations: the functions of clearing and 
settlement of securities. Because the status quo is characterized by inconsistent stand-
ards, conventions and rules, the process of reform is necessarily one of liberalization, 
through the elimination of these inconsistencies, which represent barriers to cross-
border securities trade. There are a number of complicated, and interesting, aspects 
of this process. First, it has to operate across two different dimensions: the various 
member states and the different institutions. Second, it has to involve both private 
agents and authorities. Third, it has to tackle effectively the conundrum of national 
monopolies. Suppose that certain market infrastructures are monopolies. In a fully 
integrated EU market national monopolies make no sense, since they prevent the 
full exploitation of economies of scale, which is achieved by EU-wide consolidation. 
The question is therefore how to manage the transition from national monopolies to 
the EU-wide institutions2. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the problem of 
post-trading (clearing and settlement, C&S) in the EU. Section 3 illustrates the 
underpinnings of C&S market reform. Section 4 describes the reform strategy. 
Section 5 discusses some of the key questions around the reform process. Section 6 
contains a few concluding remarks.
2 The relevance of this question hinges on the realism of the starting hypothesis, that economies of scale 
in the industry provide a powerful momentum towards monopolistic provision of infra-structural services. 
Several of the propositions put forward in this paper would apply even if instead of a single supplier, the mar-
ket was characterized by the coexistence of few large suppliers.
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2 A system faulty at the core
C&S represent the core of the financial system. They are the physical and vir-
tual arrangements that ensure that each buyer receives what he or she has paid 
for, and each seller receives the value of what he or she has sold. Financial inter-
mediation is based on financial trades which are overwhelmingly trades in securi-
ties or derivative contracts. C&S of securities and derivatives are thus the core 
of the financial system. By setting the rules and procedures that make financial 
transactions possible, C&S arrangements define a financial market. Once the 
rules and procedures to effect securities transactions are set, the rules determin-
ing how buyers and sellers meet and how prices are specified can be easily chosen. 
Recent experience has demonstrated that C&S are deeper and heavier than trad-
ing structures: for any given C&S infrastructure, trading venues can be more eas-
ily created and modified, often in competition with each other3. 
Over the years C&S infrastructures have developed in a way to maximize efficien-
cy and safety of securities transaction. A clear pattern is observed in every country: 
there is maximum consolidation of central counterparties and of central securities 
depositories. Such consolidation is most frequently supported by regulations grant-
ing monopoly powers to central counterparties and central securities depositories.
What justifies maximum consolidation of C&S infrastructures? It is helpful to 
think about the technology underlying these functions. C&S rely on technologies 
3 Indeed, there are a number of cases, in the US and in Europe, of trading venues that have used vertical 
integration as a device to protect themselves from competition.
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that are well approximated by zero-marginal cost curves: there is an investment in 
information infrastructures that when are in place can be scaled up almost cost-
lessly. For this reason it is in the best interest of the market that C&S infrastruc-
tures achieve the maximum consolidation possible: only in this case would the cost 
of these infrastructures be minimized. In addition, there is also a risk argument for 
maximizing consolidation. The larger the number of counterparties in the C&S 
infrastructures the more efficiently the risk of a default of a single entity can be 
shared in the market, and the spreading of a single entity’s default is contained. 
The larger the number of counterparties and transactions going through the C&S 
infrastructure, the larger the possibilities of collateral netting and therefore the 
lower capital requirements to effect securities transactions.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the size and potential of an integrated EU securities 
market. Figure 1 reports the value of the assets under custody in the EU, the Euro-
area and, for comparison, in the US. Figure 2 reports a measure of transactions 
volume in the same three markets. Interestingly, the figure shows that the number 
of instructions handled by the sum of all securities settlement systems of the EU 
significantly exceeds that handled by US securities settlement systems. This differ-
ence does not necessarily indicate that the EU securities market is larger than the 
US, since in the case of the latter country integration is such that netting of trans-
actions is much more significant, and therefore the instructions making their way 
to the settlement system are comparatively fewer.
It is apparent that when we consider EU securities markets a s a whole, a structure 
of national monopolies is inconsistent with a liquid and efficient EU-wide securities 
market, because it does not permit the achievement of the potential cost savings aris-
INSTRUCTIONS HANDLED BY SELECTED SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS
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ing from consolidation. Furthermore, national C&S infrastructures have developed 
together with a long list of technical standards, market conventions, rules regulations 
and laws that reflect every individual national financial market, and that are not co-
herent with each other. National monopolies and incoherent standards, conventions, 
rules and laws are the faults at the core of the EU financial system.
The fragmentation is significant, as well as the complexity of governance struc-
tures of market infrastructures. Figure 3 illustrates the structure and governance of 
trading and post-trading in the case of cash equities. The figure shows a number of 
facts. First, the sheer fragmentation of equity trading and post-trading when one 
looks at the EU as a whole. There are very few structures that service more than 
one national market. Second, the presence of both horizontally (LCH Clearnet, 
CRESTCo, Euroclear) and vertically (Deutsche Borse, Borsa Italiana, Latvia, Esto-
nia) integrated structures. 
Figure 4 illustrates the effects of fragmentation, by comparing the costs of do-
mestic transactions and cross border transactions in the EU. For the sake of com-
parison, the figure reports also the cost of a domestic transaction in the US. The 
figure shows that the cost of domestic transactions are comparable in the EU and 
in the US. By contrast, the cost of a cross-border transaction in the EU is many 
times the cost of the same transaction within borders. This fact was first illustrated 
in Giovannini Group (2001). The prime suspect for such huge differences in cost 
are the faults I have mentioned above: national monopolistic structures, largely 
isolated from each other, incoherent standards, conventions, rules and laws.
One of the most relevant facts in today’s environment is that despite the still 
significant inconsistencies across the various national post-trading infrastructures 
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there exist a momentum to consolidate. This is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6, 
which focus on Euro-area countries. Figure 5 shows the number of securities set-
tlement systems in the Euro-area before 1999 (the year of the introduction of the 
Euro) and in 2004. Figure 6 shows the number of central counterparties in the 
same dates. Both figures show that there has been a decrease in the number of 
providers. Yet, when comparing the Euro-area with the United States, it is appar-
ent that there is much more room for further consolidation.
Where does the pressure to consolidate come from? The most plausible hy-
pothesis is that, despite the fragmentation of the market, there exist gains to be 
made by consolidating infrastructure platforms. Indeed, the recently announced 
deal between the New York Stock Exchange and Euronext is an illustration that 
consolidation gains are available even in the case of two markets that are charac-
terized by different standards and regulations, even though issuers and investors 
are by and large free to access them both. In addition, the opportunities from 
consolidation would much increase if inconsistent standards, conventions and 
rules across the EU are eliminated. It is plausible that many providers are moving 
towards consolidation in the expectation that this will indeed happen. In the next 
section I discuss reform initiatives.
3 Market reform
The need to reform post-trading in Europe has been felt only relatively recently. 
The Financial Services Action Plan, a comprehensive reform process designed by 
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the European Commission to create a single financial services market in the EU did 
not mention post-trading in its initial drafts. It could be argued that several EU pol-
icymakers had been of the view that, once the Euro was introduced and prohibition 
to trade securities and financial services cross border were lifted, market infrastruc-
tures would somehow adapt themselves. This view could certainly be shared, but 
leaves open the question of whether market evolution would be too slow to deliver 
the efficiency gains that a truly integrated post-trading infrastructure could offer.
The two so-called Giovannini Reports (Giovannini Group, 2001 and 2003) put 
together existing wisdom4 on the causes and effects of fragmentation in EU post-
trading infrastructures. The contribution of the two reports has been to explain 
that the present infrastructure is not just the effect of differing regulations but is 
also determined by differing technical standards and differing market conventions. 
These all developed together and work together. The whole post-trading environ-
ment is thus the result of the complex interaction of rules issued by national au-
thorities and rules of the game in markets.
The Giovannini Reports identified 15 barriers to efficient post-trading in the EU. 
The barriers are caused by inconsistencies due to technical standards and market prac-
tices, to the requirements of tax compliance in different countries, and to differing 
legal definitions of securities ownership. They are listed in Table 1. The analysis of 
barriers is a device that highlights the extent to which the post-trading market is frag-
mented and helps to focus on practical initiatives aimed at eliminating the barriers.
4 The Group of Thirty in particular has devoted significant resources in studying and explaining the im-
portance of efficient post-trading in global financial markets.
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The second report (Giovannini Group, 2003) produced a structured set of initi-
atives aimed at eliminating all of the 15 barriers. The structure was built as follows:
–  For every barrier, one or more entities directly responsible for coordinating 
actions aimed at its elimination were identified;
–  A temporal sequencing of these initiative was established, based on the 
functional relations existing among the different standards, conventions 
and rules;
–  A set of deadlines were offered, representing a minimal time frame esti-
mated as necessary to complete the initiatives described.
The two reports have been widely publicized and have been discussed through-
out the industry. Nobody has challenged either the analysis of the reports, in par-
ticular the finding on the exorbitant relative costs of cross-border post-trading 
services versus the same services for transactions within the same country, or the 
method of reform.
Technical requirements/market practices
Diversity of IT platforms/interfaces
Need to maintain multiple membership of settlement systems
National differences in rules governing corporate actions
Differences in the availability/timing of intra-day settlement finality
Impediments to remote access
National differences in settlement periods
National differences in operating hours/settlement deadlines
National differences in securities issuance practice
Restrictions on the location of securities
Restrictions on the activity of primary dealers and market-makers
Taxation
Withholding tax procedures disadvantaging foreign intermediaries; and
Tax collection functionality integrated into settlement system
Legal certainty
National differences in the legal treatment of securities
National differences in the legal treatment of bilateral netting; and
Uneven application of conflict of law rules
THE 15 BARRIERS TO EFFICIENT CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT IN THE EUTABLE 1
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In particular there have been significant endorsements from public authorities. 
The European Commission published a Communication (Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities, 2004) fully supporting the reform process described in the 
second Giovannini Report. The European Parliament has declared that C&S re-
form is essential for EU prosperity (Contribution of the European Parliament to 
the Commission’s Legislative and Work Programme, 2006), and, finally, the Com-
mission has included C&S among the highest priorities for efficiency-inducing re-
forms (the so-called Lisbon Agenda).  All of these statements are to be welcome, 
considering that a few years ago among EU policymakers awareness on the impor-
tance of market infrastructure was at best limited!
4 The reform strategy
When discussing reform of market infrastructures the first option that is nor-
mally considered is the so-called top-down option, that is the option of creating 
new EU-wide providers through a government initiative. The precedents of suc-
cessful top-down initiatives are important. In the United States, as recently as in 
1999, the Depository Trust Company, or DTC, and National Securities Clear-
ing Corporation, or NSCC, which clears and settles trades in equities, corporate 
bonds, municipal bonds, unit investment trusts and exchange-traded funds, were 
consolidated into a new group whose holding company was named Depositary 
Trust and Clearing Corporation, or DTCC. This was the most significant and 
most recent step in a long process of consolidation of post-trading infrastructures, 
driven mainly by users, which occurred through progressive dismantling of verti-
cally-integrated structures of exchanges and post-trading platforms, and horizontal 
consolidation5. So, while the US experience is normally hailed as a successful top-
down, one-shot, consolidation coup, in reality it is, as Considine (2006) explains, 
a process of progressive adaptation of structures and market rules (including rules 
granting remote access) which facilitated consolidation. Such consolidation was 
arguably driven by the users community, but at the same time consistently sup-
ported by authorities.
Another successful experience that is often recalled is that of the creation, in 
Europe, of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the overnight transition from 
many distinct currencies and legally independent monetary policies into a sin-
gle currency managed by a single institution. The ECB is the entity responsible, 
among other things, to manage the system of cash payments in the Euro Area. 
Would it not make sense to create an entity that manages the systems of securities 
payments?
5 See, in particular, Considine (2006).
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To understand the strategy for reform that is being currently pursued it is use-
ful to make a distinction between framework and architecture. Framework is the 
sum of standards, conventions, regulations and laws whose inconsistencies are the 
causes of the barriers to cross-border C&S. Architecture is the structure of the 
C&S industry: how many suppliers in each segment, how much specialization 
there is, how large are suppliers relative to the market. The strategy chosen by the 
EU Commission, in close consultation with users and suppliers, has been to con-
centrate on framework, and leave architecture aside for the time being.
There are three, partly related reasons for this choice:
1  Without an appropriate framework, post-trading would be inefficient, no 
matter the architecture, and even with the maximum degree of consolida-
tion. The reason is that inappropriate framework is the deep cause of costs 
in post-trading. These costs would not be eliminated by consolidation.
2  Even if all barriers were eliminated, that is if the framework was fully op-
timized, there is not a universally preferred architecture for C&S. In par-
ticular, there are several institutions that consider themselves candidate to 
provide the pan-EU post-trading services.
3  There is a preference in the EU Commission of letting markets choose the 
preferred architecture once the barriers are completely eliminated.
In theory, it is possible to describe the fundamental drivers in the industry 
after the elimination of the cross-border barriers. As I have mentioned above, 
one of the key technological features of C&S is that they are services performed 
at nearly zero marginal cost. An additional fundamental characteristic is that 
such services cannot be differentiated: they are standard processes, which are 
getting more and more uniform internationally. Suppose there are a number of 
national monopolies providing post-trading services, and that the EU market, 
previously burdened by almost-prohibitive costs of cross-border C&S gets com-
pletely liberalized (all 15 barriers are completely eliminated). What will be the 
likely outcome on the structure of the industry? Krugman (2004) shows that, if 
technology is identical, the larger supplier will have the lower cost. Thus it will 
be able to gain market share at the expense of the smaller, higher cost suppliers. 
In doing so, it will be able to further decrease costs. At the end of the process, 
the larger supplier will become the monopolistic, EU-wide supplier. Alterna-
tively, and more efficiently, a series of cross-border mergers of national suppli-
ers, aimed at eliminating wasteful technological duplication, would achieve the 
same result. 
Of course, the choice of concentrating on framework is a choice about logical 
precedence, not time sequence. Nothing prevents the various actors, private or 
public, to organize themselves in the expectations of progress in the elimination 
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of cross-border C&S barriers.  In particular, it is also possible that cross-border 
consolidation ahead of framework reform could help put pressure on the various 
interested parties to accelerate framework reform. 
As I have recalled above, reform is carried out by a multiplicity of actors, pub-
lic and private, in a multiplicity of countries. It is not a centrally-directed effort, 
and there is no “Deus ex machina”. The EU Commission has so far played the role 
of stimulating analysis and initiatives, and of coordinating action. Coordination is 
managed through management of information flows. The instrument for this work 
is CESAME, the Clearing and Settlement Advisory and Monitoring Expert Group, 
a group setup and presided by the Commission (DG Markt), that meets periodi-
cally (about twice yearly). CESAME monitors progress in the initiatives that have 
been associated with the 15 Giovannini barriers. It collects information about all 
the work, including analysis, carried out around the barriers. It makes available the 
information to all interested parties and, finally, it provides advice to all interested 
parties, including and especially the Commission. CESAME is also attended by the 
European Central Bank, CESR (the Committee of European Securities Regula-
tors), and the Group of Thirty. CESAME is flanked by two other groups: the Legal 
Certainty Group and the Fiscal Compliance Group. These two groups are formed 
by national legal and tax experts. They carry out the analysis that is needed in the 
effort to eliminate barriers due to inconsistent definitions of securities ownership 
across different countries, and those caused by tax compliance in the different EU 
member states. This analysis is expected to produce practical ideas that will allow a 
re-writing of national laws and regulations. The new national laws, defining securi-
ties ownership will achieve the dual objective of being more suited to the way secu-
rities are exchanged in modern markets, which rely heavily on information technol-
ogy, and at the same time of being consistent across EU member countries. The 
new regulations on tax compliance could be designed to remove artificial barriers 
on the holding of securities and therefore on cross-border clearing and settlement.
The philosophy of CESAME, of the Legal Certainty and the FISCO group is 
twofold. First of all, the groups are a conduit for consultation with all interested 
parties. In addition, however, these groups and the way they work ensure a more 
democratic reform process. By participating in this process interested parties not 
only will consult with authorities but also with other (potentially opposed) inter-
ested parties. All of these exchanges are made available to the public, through time-
ly publication on dedicated websites. As a result, the risk of capture is minimized.
There are important asymmetries in the way standards and conventions are re-
formed and the way rules regulations and laws are reformed. In the case of stand-
ards and conventions – the private-sector rules of the game – the process by which 
they are designed is relatively straightforward, and has not, in the experience so 
far, shown any particular difficulty, even in the cases where lengthy and elaborated 
procedures have been used, like for example for new SWIFT messaging standards. 
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However, once new standards and conventions are established, there is no mecha-
nism ensuring their adoption. Adoption is voluntary, and is evidently subject to a 
coordination externality: the more users will want to adopt them, the faster they 
will be adopted, viceversa, if adoption is slow, it could easily fail6. 
Consider now the case of laws and regulations. Once they are promulgated, 
they are automatically abided to. Because by their nature they come immediate-
ly into force, rules and laws have a much more elaborate gestation period. This 
asymmetry between the process by which standards and conventions come into 
force and the process by which rules and laws come into force makes the work in 
venues like CESAME more difficult. The kind of effort required to ensure adop-
tion of new standards and conventions is very different from that required to sup-
port a proper decision process by authorities. This is the case even though there 
are substantial synergies across the different activities, and it is such synergies that 
the CESAME is meant to maximize.
5 The practice and the challenges of reform
To put the challenges of the reform of Clearing and Settlement in Europe in 
perspective it is useful to think about an abstract case. In this exercise I will high-
light the key assumptions.
Consider the case of separate national financial markets. In each national mar-
ket there is a securities market infrastructure service provider (for simplicity I do 
away with the distinction between clearing and settlement, without in any ways 
advocating the integration between the two). The securities market infrastructure 
service provider is a computer system (more properly, an IT department) with an 
administration department. Let us assume that it is a private company. This com-
pany’s business is to process large volumes of information in the most efficient 
possible way. I assume that the company does not take counterparty risk: whatev-
er counterparty risk it cannot perfectly diversify away is easily sold to an insurer. 
The biggest business risk of the securities market infrastructure service provider 
is technology risk: periodically the company has to make important technology 
investments to upgrade its systems and keep up with the pace of information and 
communication technology progress (which will be dictated by its customers, as 
well). The investments are lumpy. Their efficiency is uncertain. The earlier adop-
tion allows faster cost reduction and service enhancement, but at the same time it 
is subject to higher implementation risk.
6 Sometimes there are catalysts available, which help avoiding coordination failures. For example, the 
introduction of Target 2 by the European Central Bank represents a deadline for the harmonization of open-
ing hours and settlement deadlines.  
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These assumptions help identify the two key features in the business of securi-
ties market infrastructure. The first, static, feature are economies of scale. Process-
ing information does not require any active decision on each individual piece of 
information (transaction) processed: all transactions are processed passively. Hence, 
the marginal cost of each transaction processed is, for all intents and purposes, 
zero. It is in the interest of the provider and, indirectly, of its customer, that the 
infrastructure serves the entire market: this business is a natural monopoly. 
The second feature of this business is dynamic and stems from the fast rate of 
progress of the information and communication industry. The correct manage-
ment of the investment cycle is the most important determinant of the cost and 
quality of service of the securities market infrastructure provider.
It is apparent that the two key features of the infrastructure service provider busi-
ness can interact to produce outcomes that are less than optimal. If economies of 
scale make the business a monopoly, the managers of the monopoly may invest in 
technology at a rate that is less than the optimal one7. In addition, managers will 
also likely have an incentive to bundle the essential infrastructural services with oth-
er services, exposed to competition, in order to maximize the value of the former by 
(at least partially) shielding the latter from competition. Finally, the monopolistic 
service provider will have the incentive to extract the consumer rents by charging 
different prices to different users. These incentives would manifest themselves in the 
standard case where the infrastructural service provider is run as a private company, 
and the task of the managers is to maximize the value of the company.
What happens, in this abstract model, when the national markets, hitherto sep-
arated by non-tariff barriers, get integrated, or are expected to get integrated over a 
foreseeable period of time? The biggest opportunity is represented by the cost gains 
achievable in the larger, integrated market. As we already pointed out, other things 
equal the larger player would eventually get the entire market, by being able to 
charge the lowest prices (and it could also afford more than the other to engage in 
predatory pricing). Alternatively, scale could be gained by progressive integration 
of all the service providers in the new, integrated, market. This integration could 
start in the expectation of the removal of the barriers. At the end of the competi-
tive game, or integration process, the new monopolist will face the same incentives 
of the monopolists in the smaller, non-integrated, national markets.
It is evident that the elimination of the barriers to clearing and settlement in 
Europe is going to leave open a number of important questions regarding the ef-
7 Lower cost technologies will be adopted if their impact on profits justifies the investment.  In the case 
of a monopoly and in the presence of technology risk, it is plausible that new processes are adopted when un-
certainty on their productivity is low.  This may cause a less than optimal rate of technological progress.  In 
the case of more than one market actor, technology is adopted as a way to gain market shares, or as a defensive 
device.  Hence technology investments would be faster as we move away from monopoly.
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ficiency of the infrastructure. The EU Commission has, since its Communica-
tion on Clearing and Settlement (2004), pointed out that the likely, and desir-
able, consolidation of the industry to be expected as a result of the removal of 
the barriers, opens up questions regarding the governance of the service provid-
ers. The Commission has mentioned governance as an ex-ante mechanism that 
may help minimize the distortions associated with monopolistic profit maximi-
zation.
Most infrastructure service providers are private companies, whose objective is 
the maximization of profits. This relatively new market structure follows a wave 
of privatization and demutualization of these companies8. While it is difficult to 
verify whether the rate of technological investment by service providers is the op-
timal one, it is easy to verify that bundling and price differentiation are strategies 
almost universally followed. These facts are consistent with the model I laid out 
above. 
How has the joint problem of barrier removal and creation of an efficient con-
solidated EU infrastructure been dealt with so far? As mentioned above, the re-
form process entails a number of actions to be carried out by the private sector 
and a number of initiatives from public authorities. At the time of the writing of 
this essay (September 2006) the parties that have been charged with initiatives 
in different areas have generally responded constructively and energetically, and 
have brought about new standards and conventions. Yet, as I pointed out in the 
previous section, the critical juncture is the adoption phase. By its very nature, 
adoption is a lumpy process: thus it is too early to pass judgement on whether 
private sector reform is progressing at a satisfactory pace.
A similar difficulty characterizes the assessment of progress in public authori-
ties initiatives. Table 2, reproduced from the EU Commission, contains an analy-
sis of the overall reform effort, and highlights the authorities’ potential initiatives. 
Since the publication of that study, Commissioner McCreevy has made a 
move. He has distributed a code of practice to industry participants, asking 
them to put measures in place that address a number of items in Table 2. The 
measures are:
1  Price transparency: a number of measures designed to minimize price 
discrimination and make it easy to estimate the effective cost of essential 
post-trading services, including the publication of all pricing schedules, the 
disclosure of rebates and other reduction schemes and transparent billing;
8 Many have hailed demutualization as the cause of greater efficiency and profitability of many infra-
structure companies (this is observed especially with reference to stock exchanges).  I suspect that greater ef-
ficiency and profitability, a boom of transactions, have occurred because of a number of concurring factors, 
including, for example, the birth and growth of retail internet trading.
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2  Interoperability/remote access: an interoperability protocol to be adopted 
with the elimination of the rest of the Giovannini Barriers, full rights of 
remote access across all industry participants: central counterparties, central 
security depositories, and exchanges;
3  Unbundling/accounting separation: an incomplete list of standards has been 
distributed, highlighting which of the functions of a CSD should be un-
bundled from others, and for which accounting separation will be required.
The code of practice touches upon only one issue that is related to the cross-
border C&S barriers: the very important problem of remote access. The two other 
items in the code of practice are about mitigating distortions associated with mo-
nopolistic behaviour by service providers. However, what is prominently absent in 
this initiative is the legislative part.  Legislation will be needed for:
–  Eliminate restrictions on the location of securities
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In addition, legislation may be needed to draft safety standards to allow enti-
ties to access remotely clearing and settlement services, and to remove barriers 
related to tax compliance. 
The absence of legislation is due to an often-declared aversion of Commissioner 
McCreevy to new laws and regulations. His views are inspired by the belief that 
the structural lack of knowledge of lawmakers and regulators more often than not 
misguide their actions. It is hard not to sympathize with these opinions, although, 
as I argue below, sometimes the costs of no legislative action may be significant. 
The Commissioner’s preferences probably best explain the outcome that we cur-
rently observe. Many other parties have also expressed scepticism towards legislative 
initiatives by the Commission. This scepticism is largely due to a defensive attitude 
on the part of those entities that presumably would be most negatively impacted by 
legislation. However, and more seriously, it is also the result of a generalized scepti-
cism about the EU political process: many experts of EU affairs9 have mentioned 
the risk that a directive could be badly distorted from the time it is delivered by the 
technical offices of the Commission to the time it becomes effective10.  
Thus, the main challenge to the reform of post trading in the EU is one of 
coordination of the public sector with the private sector. The first initiatives of 
the public sector reflect, as I pointed out, scepticism towards legislation. But, as 
a result, the reform process is started in a somewhat lopsided way. This may have 
sent the wrong message to private market participants – those in charge of push-
ing reform of standards and conventions, and of adopting those reform. It can be 
argued that the timid approach of authorities may lead to a timid response of the 
private sector, and to a general slowdown of the reform process.
On the other hand, this relatively slow start may be just that, only a start. Noth-
ing prevents more decisive and incisive action in the future. Acceleration of public 
and private initiatives could occur at any time, and could feed on each other.
6 Concluding Remarks
The financial system performs functions that use intensively information and com-
munication technology. Through the mechanics of competition, the financial system 
strives to achieve ever lower-cost ways to deliver its functions to the marketplace. 
The basic framework of the financial system is a set of conventions and stand-
ards (private rules of the game) and regulations and laws (public rules) which 
9 Including, disturbingly, Members of the European Parliament!
10 This difficult problem, which the Lamfalussy process was designed to address, is beyond the scope 
of this paper, and orders of magnitude more important than the problem of building efficient post-trading 
infrastructure for the EU securities market.
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underlie the web of private contractual transactions that make the financial system 
work.  Thus, in order to evolve in the direction of providing ever lower-cost servic-
es or, ceteris paribus, more efficient services, the financial system needs every once 
in a while to adapt its basic framework to changing circumstances and opportuni-
ties. When we use the term “financial system reform” we implicitly refer to reform 
of laws and regulation, to a process which involves active participation from public 
authorities. Hence, financial system reform and the evolution of the financial sys-
tem are very close phenomena. It is apparent that, because of the importance of 
public rules (laws and regulation), an efficient evolution of the financial system 
needs a pro-active attitude by authorities.
In this paper, I have described and discussed the challenges facing the C&S 
services in the EU financial system. These challenges arise from the complicated 
interactions of private market participants and authorities. The choices of the 
former have to be consistent with the actions of the latter, but the special features 
of the EU political process (by which I mean the decision making process of EU 
authorities) make ensuring that consistency a complicated affair.
Prima facie, there are two kinds of market failures that deserve attention by au-
thorities. The first kind is, trivially, associated with the country segmentation of 
clearing and settlement services. This phenomenon, by now well understood, pre-
vents generalized, low cost access to securities markets throughout the EU. The 
segmentation could be easily dealt with through the removal of the 15 clearing 
and settlement barriers described above. The second kind of market failure has to 
do with the behaviour of (quasi) monopolistic providers of post-trading services. 
Monopolistic providers have incentives to charge excessively high prices through 
opaque pricing policies, they have incentives to bundle the service protected by 
the monopolistic market structure with other, competitive, services, in order to 
maximize the value of the overall business, and they have incentives to upgrade 
their technology at a rate that is less than optimal.
What has been the progress so far? EU authorities have led a novel and efficient 
process of exchange of information, aimed at sharing the broad objectives and the 
method of analysis. A number of practical initiatives have been undertaken by the 
private sector and by the EU Commission. Based on the record, one is tempted to 
conclude that the progress towards the “ideal” post trading infrastructure in Europe 
is so far slow, to the point that forecasting its completion appears an impossible task. 
Yet, progress is discontinuous for two reasons. The adoption of new and more ef-
ficient market standards and conventions is, as explained above, a nonlinear process 
due to coordination externalities: small progress so far does not mean that a dramatic 
acceleration cannot occur in the near future. Similarly, the fact that public authori-
ties have not so far displayed the boldness that some were hoping for or expecting 
does not imply an acceleration of initiatives, including those required to provide the 
appropriate legal and regulatory framework for European post trading.
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It is a great pleasure for me to be here in Madrid to share with you some thoughts about recent developments and policy challenges affecting payment 
systems in Europe. 
Indeed structural changes are underway in Europe that should have a signifi-
cant and positive bearing on the efficiency and safety of the payment infrastruc-
tures, notably in the wake of the implementation of the TARGET2 and the SEPA 
projects. Both projects are part of the overall process of the Lisbon agenda which 
aims at making the European Union “the most competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge-driven economy by 2010”. 
However, for Europe to reach that objective in the field of payment systems, a 
number of collective challenges have to be addressed, both by private actors and 
public authorities. Those challenges range from the redefinition by private actors 
of the boundaries between cooperation and competition, to the adjustment by 
public authorities of the legal and regulatory environment in which payment sys-
tems operate. 
In that context, the Eurosystem’s central banks have a key role to play, given 
their statutory task of promoting the smooth functioning of payment systems in 
euro. 
I will first review the key issues we are facing in Europe in the field of payment 
infrastructures. Then, I will discuss the current and possible future roles that the 
Eurosystem’s central banks can play in that field. 
1 Key issues in the field of payment
infrastructures today 
The three main issues I see as regards payment infrastructures today in Europe 
could be summarised as follows: 
Recent developments and policy
challenges affecting large-value
and retail payment systems in Europe
Christian Noyer
Banque de France
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1  Which role for payment infrastructures to support the European financial 
integration? 
2  Which place to give to technological progress in the field of payment sys-
tems? 
3  How to ensure business continuity of payment systems? 
1.1 Supporting the European financial integration 
The share of payment systems in money transfers between financial interme-
diaries is nearly 80%, versus 20% for the traditional correspondent banking ar-
rangements. So, payment systems are essential for the financial sector as a whole 
and, therefore, can be considered as a key enabler in the process of the European 
financial integration. 
Such contribution of payment systems to the financial integration is embodied in 
the TARGET2 and SEPA projects. Both projects aim at the harmonisation and consol-
idation of the European “network” of payment infrastructures. While large-value pay-
ment systems have already attained a high level of integration and will further progress 
with the launch of TARGET2, retail payment systems are still very fragmented. 
In the segment of large-value payment systems, the degree of integration has 
increased very quickly. The rationale for setting up the two European-wide pay-
ment systems that currently exist, i.e. TARGET and EURO 1, was clearly to face 
the challenge of the EMU. TARGET2, which is due to go live at the end of 2007, 
will further improve the degree of integration of wholesale payment infrastructures 
and will represent a major step forward in their consolidation. It will provide to its 
users fully harmonised settlement services and prices across Europe, supported by 
a single shared platform. 
An important issue which is now under consideration is how TARGET2, as 
“backbone” of the euro market infrastructure of the euro, can best contribute to 
the integration and consolidation of the securities settlement systems with which 
it is going to interact. Should TARGET2, as announced by the Eurosystem and 
implemented in the system’s specifications, support a wide range of interaction 
modes in order to foster competition between systems and let market forces select 
the most efficient one (i.e. the so-called no prohibition no compulsion principle)? 
Or should TARGET2 influence that selection process by limiting the interaction 
modes to only one in a long-term perspective? It goes without saying that in the 
latter case the Eurosystem, given its statutory responsibilities, can only select the 
most efficient interaction model, namely a model of settlement of cash and securi-
ties, which is in real time as it is the case in the US for instance, and which is inte-
grated in a single platform. 
In the segment of retail payment systems, the situation is quite different. Retail 
infrastructures are still separated by national borders and characterized by a high 




degree of diversity. A number of local payment systems concentrate the clearing 
and settlement of all retail national transactions. In addition, the execution of 
cross-border payments go through several dedicated arrangements such as inter-
national card schemes, banking “clubs” or the EBA’s STEP 2 system. 
The SEPA project aims to put an end to such fragmentation by introducing, 
as from 2008, European payment instruments which are going to replace nation-
al ones by end-2010. The vision is that by end-2010 all retail payments in euro 
are carried out as easily, efficiently and safely across Europe as within national 
borders. For this vision to become a reality, a key enabler is that retail payment 
infrastructures become interoperable and consolidate. 
The outcome of theses changes on retail payment systems is uncertain. It may 
lead to various structures, ranging from a natural monopoly exercised by one 
infrastructure that would encompass most national and cross-border payment 
flows, to the competition between several systems. However, whatever the struc-
ture, the challenge will be to find the right balance between two objectives: 
1  Reaping economies of scale and scope and 
2  Fostering competitive market conditions and behaviours. 
1.2 Keeping pace with technological progress 
The second issue for payment infrastructures consists in keeping pace with 
technological progress. Payment systems are made up of IT networks, hardware 
and software. As a consequence, technological progress is a key driver for enhanc-
ing the way payment systems are designed, operated and used. I will highlight a 
few significant examples of recent technological developments. 
The first half of the nineties experienced a major transformation in the design 
of large-value payment systems with the widespread introduction of real-time 
gross settlement (RTGS) systems. In a second step, further advances in informa-
tion technologies have made possible new designs like the so called “hybrid sys-
tems”, i.e. systems that settle in real-time but, at the same time, minimise liquid-
ity needs thanks to highly sophisticated optimisation mechanisms.
In short, advances in information technology allowed large-value payment sys-
tems to settle faster, with a lower amount of liquidity and at a lower cost. 
On the retail payments side, technological progress should also allow safety and 
efficiency gains beyond those which have resulted, for instance, from the imple-
mentation of cheque truncation or those that are expected from introduction of 
the EMV (Europay Mastercard Visa) technology for card payments. Innovation has 
definitely an important role to play in in order to keep the SEPA project future-
oriented and promote the use of new delivery channels for retail payments like the 
internet and mobile devices, or new types of services like electronic invoicing. 
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However, this flow of innovations come together with the entry in the pay-
ments market of new actors which do not always offer the same level of security 
as the traditional suppliers of those services, namely credit institutions. There is 
obviously a trade-off between, on the one hand, encouraging innovation by facili-
tating access to the payments market and, on the other hand, ensuring the safety 
of payments provided by setting prudential requirements on their suppliers. This 
challenge is at the heart of the current discussions on the “proposal for a directive 
on payment services in the internal market”. 
1.3 Ensuring business continuity 
The third key issue I see is related to business continuity. Business continuity 
can be defined as a set of measures aimed at ensuring the continuity of service in 
various incident scenarios such as the failure of an infrastructure component, or 
the unavailability of the staff in charge of operating systems. 
Business continuity has progressively emerged as a key issue to be considered for 
the design of payment infrastructures. In addition, several factors have recently led 
to overhaul our approach of operational risk : the spreading of real-time processing 
within payment systems, the growing complexity of technologies, the increasing 
interdependence between payment systems and the materialisation of risks such as 
terrorism or power breakdowns. All stakeholders – public authorities in charge of 
regulation and oversight, operators and users of infrastructures – have identified 
weaknesses as regards current practices. For example, incident scenarios impacting 
wide geographic areas have been overlooked.
In Europe, there is a broad consensus on the need to strengthen business con-
tinuity requirements. The ultimate objective is clear: business continuity should 
contribute to enhance the soundness of the financial system as a whole. But it is 
not obvious to renew business continuity procedures. Among the challenges to be 
taken up, I see two major ones: 
1  How far to go without putting at stake the cost efficiency of the systems? 
2  How to ensure the necessary coherence of the efforts undertaken by stake-
holders of different importance, submitted to different types of regulations, 
across the different financial centres that compose the financial system of 
the euro? 
2 What roles for the Eurosystem 
The Eurosystem has been quite active in the field of payment systems and is 
likely to develop further its involvement under its three roles of: 




1  Service provider, 
2  Facilitator of market and regulatory evolution, and 
3  Overseer. 
2.1 Providing payment services 
As a service provider, the Eurosystem has put priority on enhancing the ef-
ficiency and safety of its TARGET system, with the launch of the TARGET2 
project. 
TARGET2 will provide harmonised services and prices, efficient liquid-
ity management and settlement mechanisms, while setting a new benchmark in 
terms of business continuity. The Eurosystems objective is to promote the use of 
real-time settlement services in central bank money, given their expected social 
benefits in terms of risk reduction in the payment process. 
In the field of retail payments, the degree of the Eurosystem’s central banks’ 
operational involvement varies across countries. Most central banks provide pay-
ment services to public institutions. Some central banks also offer processing fa-
cilities to commercial banks by participating in private retail payment systems 
and/or operating an own retail payment system. The completion of the SEPA 
project calls for a specific effort of those central banks that are significantly in-
volved in retail payment operations. They should lead by example, notably by 
supplying the new European payment instruments to their clients and by ensur-
ing that the retail payment system they operate complies with the interoperability 
principle enshrined in the SEPA project. 
2.2 Acting as a facilitator of market and regulatory evolutions 
Turning to the involvement of the Eurosystem in payment systems issues as a 
facilitator of market and regulatory evolutions, it is fair to say that this mode of 
action has been mainly used in the field of retail payments to support the SEPA 
project. 
The SEPA project was launched in 2002 by the European banking commu-
nity under the aegis of the Eurosystem and the European Commission. The 
banking industry has taken on the responsibility of delivering the SEPA prod-
ucts, in particular the specifications of the new European instruments. The Eu-
ropean Commission, which grants a great importance to the SEPA project in so 
far as the latter contributes to the achievement of the common market and the 
completion of the Lisbon agenda, has elaborated a legal framework for payment 
services in the European Union. It made public, in December 2005, a directive 
proposal that should be adopted at the European level before being transposed 
in national laws by 2008. 
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Since 1999, the Eurosystem’s central banks have been actively promoting, at 
European and national levels, the establishment of a SEPA. They proposed a vi-
sion which is now shared by all stakeholders, contributed to a constructive review 
of the banking community’s deliverables and cooperated with the European Com-
mission to address legal and regulatory impediments. 
While the design phase of the SEPA project is almost completed, the next chal-
lenge is to ensure that migration towards the SEPA is well-organised and deliv-
ered. Because the starting point in each country is different, migration plans to the 
SEPA will primarily have to be organised locally. This should naturally lead to a 
further involvement of the Eurosystem’s central banks at national level, at least to 
help co-ordinating the efforts of the wide range of stakeholders. 
For example, the Banque de France and the French banking federation have 
created a national committee dedicated to the implementation of the SEPA. This 
committee gathers representatives of banks, different categories of users – public 
administration, corporates, retail business and citizens – as well as members of the 
French Parliament. It is in charge of coordinating works relating to the migration 
towards the SEPA. Having held its first meeting in April 2006, the committee 
foresees to adopt the French migration plan by October. 
2.3 Overseeing payment systems 
As overseers, the central banks of the Eurosystem have also contributed to the 
objectives of European financial integration, technological progress and higher re-
silience of the financial system. 
So far, this contribution has consisted in developing and applying an oversight 
framework for retail payment systems, which contributes to establish safety and 
efficiency guidelines for the expected integration and consolidation of retail pay-
ment systems in the context of the SEPA project. 
The need that the payment systems’ regulatory framework keeps pace with the 
structural changes underway in Europe is likely to lead the Eurosystem’s central 
banks to develop further their involvement as overseers, at least in two directions. 
The first direction is the updating of the existing oversight requirements to new 
market realities. Work has already started in that respect. For instance, the Eurosys-
tem is currently revising the oversight standard for systemically important payment 
systems relating to operational risk. This is because discussions and initiatives in 
order to strengthen business continuity management have taken place mostly at 
national level and have not systematically considered that the financial system of 
the euro operates as a euro area-wide network of interrelated markets, market in-
frastructures and participants. Therefore, the Eurosystem is preparing a revised 
version of its business continuity expectations for systemically important payment 
systems that should be integrated soon into its oversight policy framework.  




The transformation of the payment infrastructures landscape in Europe should 
also logically lead to an updating of the oversight framework for retail payment 
systems. In particular, retail payment systems are about to become interoperable 
and face a consolidation process, which is likely to lead to the establishment of 
links between systems. Such links may potentially imply a spill over of risks from 
one system to another. Central banks will have to make their oversight function 
evolve accordingly. Oversight standards will certainly have to include the links 
between systems, as it is already the case for securities settlement systems. 
The second direction for an evolution of the oversight activities of the Eu-
rosystem is the extension of the scope of its oversight framework to the European 
payment instruments currently in the making and their associated clearing and 
settlement systems. Investigations are currently underway to elaborate an over-
sight framework for card payments. 
Concluding remarks 
Payment systems, which are significant contributors to the broader effective-
ness and stability of the financial system, are currently exposed in Europe to spe-
cific structural changes notably as a result of pressures and progress towards fi-
nancial integration in the euro area. 
Integration and consolidation of payment systems have made progress, while 
remaining in line with expectations in terms of safety. However, further progress 
need to be made, notably in the field of retail payment services and infrastruc-
tures. In that perspective, the Eurosystem’s central banks will continue to signifi-
cantly contribute to these evolutions, but I believe that market forces should be 
and are likely to be the primary engine for such progress.

Introduction
It is a great honor to be here on the occasion of the celebration of the 150th anniversary of the Bank of Spain. I thank you for the invitation and the op-
portunity to share my perspective on payments evolution with you today. When 
preparing my remarks for this session, I concluded that I could best contribute 
to the event by offering you my commentary – as a career academic and recently 
retired U.S. central banker – on some changes taking place in the payments arena 
of the U.S. financial services industry. 
I believe you will find the changes occurring there interesting in their own 
right and an interesting point of comparison and contrast with what is happen-
ing in Europe. As anyone who knows the financial sector would readily admit, 
the origins and evolution of payments structures on our two continents could not 
be more different. Yet, it is my view that, while our two systems started out quite 
differently, they are now converging to a similar future system. 
For retail payments, we are both moving toward more electronic payments 
processed through a growing number of somewhat distinct but converging vehi-
cles. On the U.S. side, the pattern of payments is indeed evolving – some might 
say it is experiencing a radical change. America’s paper-based payments system is 
giving way to a new realm of electronic payments vehicles – a transition that has 
already occurred in Europe. 
For wholesale payments, change has been most apparent in the globalization 
of large dollar-based payments and the continued rapid increase in transactions 
across both borders and currencies. This volume acceleration and accompany-
ing institutional changes have been palpable forces of change in the international 
payments arena. As a result, I believe we are beginning to see signs that our two 
systems are starting to converge here too. 
A United States perspective
on the changing pattern of payments
Anthony M. Santomero
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
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Traditionally, when compared to Continental Europe, there has been consider-
able diversity in the forms of retail payments used in the U.S. The U.S. wholesale 
structure, however, has been relatively simple and fairly stable. Now, wholesale and 
retail payments structures are evolving rapidly. To be sure, their evolution is affect-
ed by our distinct financial history and shaped by our legacy systems, but changes 
are in fact occurring in the U.S. market. 
The rapid evolution of U.S. payments systems presents our central bank with 
many challenges. This is because, unlike most central banks in Europe, the Federal 
Reserve is a primary service provider as well as a regulator. Therefore, in this world 
of changing payments the challenges facing the U.S. central bank may be greater 
than those facing its counterparts across the European Union. 
The Federal Reserve has been a vital part of the retail payments system since 
our founding over 90 years ago. From its inception, the Federal Reserve has had a 
dual role as the central bank charged with ensuring the integrity of the payments 
system and as a participant in its evolution. As a result, the changes in the U.S. 
payments system are affecting not just the industry that the Fed supervises but 
also its own operations. Over time, the Fed’s role in payments will change and is 
likely to converge to one more similar to the one presently occupied by European 
central banks. The Fed’s role in paper processing will diminish over time as checks 
recede in both absolute volume and relative importance in our retail payments sys-
tem, and our large dollar payments system is likely to evolve into one that operates 
more like the ones employed in Continental Europe. As this occurs, it will further 
increase the Fed’s resemblance to the central banks of Europe. 
I am quite certain that, over time, both the Fed and European central banks 
will concentrate more of their efforts on their provision of large value gross settle-
ment services. Here, the U.S. has already changed quite a bit, and the same is true 
for continental Europe. However, we have had different reasons for the changes we 
have seen thus far in our central banks. For the U.S., our geography and the needs 
of commerce have led to significant increases in volumes as well as increasing con-
centration of clearing and settlement activities in the few major banks that partici-
pate in all of our key clearing systems. These changes, in turn, have raised concerns 
over daylight credit risk and the impact of increased concentration on the opera-
tions of our wholesale payments structure. For the EuroZone, the changed curren-
cy environment offered you a chance to institute a new, more efficient wholesale 
payment structure, which you are embracing under the title of TARGET 2. De-
spite their different starting points, I can see TARGET 2 evolving into a counter-
part of Fedwire even as Fedwire adopts some of the features of TARGET 2. 
With that prologue, I would like first to share my thoughts on retail payments 
issues, namely, the current status of the U.S. retail payments infrastructure as com-
pared to Europe’s, how the roots and evolution of the U.S. payment system differ 
from your own, as well as the likely future path of the U.S. payment system and 




the Fed’s role in it. I will next offer some thoughts on wholesale payments and 
trends there as well. In each case I will spotlight the forces of change and how 
they are leading to convergence and integration of our two systems. 
The current state of retail payments
technology in the U.S.
Historically, Americans and Europeans have long relied on an entirely different 
mix of retail payments vehicles. For example, Europeans use cash roughly twice as 
much as Americans.
However, looking at our noncash transactions gives evidence of where our dif-
ferences truly lie. When I last looked at the data, more than half of all noncash 
retail payments in Europe are made through a Giro system and only about 15 
percent are made by check. By contrast, it is almost exactly the reverse in the 
United States; half of all U.S. noncash retail payments are made by paper check 
and less than 10 percent are made through our ACH, which is the American ver-
sion of a Giro system.
The dominance of the Giro in Europe and of the check in the United States are 
long-standing features of our respective payment systems. The history of how this 
dominance evolved is interesting and instructive, as I will elaborate in just a minute. 
Payment cards account for the remainder of retail payments. Here, there are 
similarities and differences between Europe and the United States. The similari-
ties are in our use of debit cards. Debit cards, a relatively recent innovation, have 
caught on quickly both Europe and the U.S., now accounting for about a quarter 
of noncash retail payments in both places. The differences are in our use of credit 
cards. Credit cards have long been an important payment vehicle in the U.S. and 
at present account for about a quarter of noncash retail payments. In Europe, 
credit cards are used less frequently – in about 10 percent of transactions, though 
I would note that Europeans’ use of credit cards has picked up in recent years. 
The long-standing success of the credit card in the U.S., and the rapid rise of 
the debit card in both Europe and the U.S. are also interesting and instructive 
stories, which I will touch on as well. But first, let me expand on our distinct his-
tories in the differential use of the Giro and the check. 
The European structure
To understand the dominance of the Giro in Europe and the check in the U.S. 
we have to go back about 100 years to the late 19th and early 20th century. At that 
time, European banks did not provide routine payment services. They served pri-
marily as merchant banks and as private banks for wealthy individuals.  
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In the late 1800s, local post offices began establishing postal Giro systems as a 
convenient way for common people to deposit savings; later, these systems evolved 
to allow depositors to remit and receive payments. The system was successful in 
that it allowed every post office savings account holder to make and receive pay-
ments both locally and nationally. This revolutionary achievement rendered non-
cash payment transactions accessible to large sectors of the population. Later, in 
the 1950s and 1960s, European banks sought to broaden their business lines to 
encompass the mass market as a way to expand their deposit base to fund loans. 
This meant providing routine payments services to customers, and so bank Giro 
systems were created to handle the volume. 
This evolution occurred relatively smoothly and rapidly as a result of Europe’s 
concentrated banking industry – a few banks operating nationwide, cooperating 
closely with each other. 
At the same time, European governments wanted to establish payment systems 
that minimized costs and maximized access. When technology made it economi-
cal to replace paper Giros with electronic Giros, European governments pushed 
for the transition. The concentration of the payments system in the hands of the 
postal service and a few national banks made it relatively easy to accomplish. Be-
cause of its Giro system, Europe had, or could easily set up, centralized accounts 
for credit transfers. In short, European central banks encouraged – and in some 
cases, mandated – the use of electronic Giro systems. 
The U.S. structure
In contrast, the U.S. payments system evolved quite differently from Europe’s. 
Historically, U.S. banks tended to provide services – including payments services – 
to the broad spectrum of people and businesses. On the loan side, commercial banks 
focused on commercial and industrial lending, but they took deposit balances from 
all economic strata.  
In early America, the geographical expanse of the country and the relatively 
weak federal government encouraged a fragmented banking system. Entry into the 
banking business was relatively easy, but bank branching was very restricted. Banks 
were prohibited from branching outside their home state, and in many states, 
branching was restricted still further. As a consequence, a region would be served 
by a relatively large number of banks, but there were no banks operating nation-
wide. For many years, banks issued their own banknotes. To effect transactions, 
people paid one another with paper checks drawn on their bank or paper currency 
notes issued by their bank. The banks would then clear these checks and notes 
among themselves.
With many small banks spread out across such a big country and with banks 
clearing paper instruments among themselves, effecting transactions outside the 




local area was cumbersome. This was a payment system inimical to the growth of 
national commerce. 
By the turn of the 20th century, it was clear that the U.S. needed a more well-
integrated national payment system. Indeed, one of the main reasons Congress 
established the Federal Reserve System back in 1913 was to create a national 
clearing system in which checks could exchange at par value even among geo-
graphically distant banks. To achieve this goal, the Federal Reserve offered check 
clearing services free of charge to banks that joined the Fed System. The Federal 
Reserve also provided a national paper currency.
However, the Fed did not become the sole provider of check clearing services, 
despite offering its services for free. Especially in large urban areas, banks found it 
preferable to continue clearing checks directly. Nonetheless, the Fed established a 
large market presence, providing a baseline level of national check clearing serv-
ices accessible to all banks, large and small, anywhere in the country. Thus, the 
Fed contributed to the viability of both the paper check and the small commu-
nity bank. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. banks and the Fed applied advances in comput-
ing technology to check processing, increasing the efficiency of their operations. 
Banks found the paper check payments business to be profitable, and consumers 
were quite comfortable and confident in the use of checks. 
In short, checks were the dominant form of noncash payment, and there was 
little momentum for change in the U.S. payments system. One might argue that 
bank Giro systems, which were arising in Europe at the time, would have in-
creased the efficiency of the payments system even more. Yet with so many banks 
in the U.S. – all serving local markets – developing the legal framework, industry 
standards, and institutional arrangements necessary to establish such a payments 
network nationally would have been a daunting task. And in any case, American 
banks are forbidden under antitrust law to work together. Therefore the Fed was, 
almost out of necessity, a prime mover in the payments system of the U.S. 
In the early 1970s, the Federal Reserve itself introduced the first U.S. version 
of an electronic Giro system, known as the Automated Clearing House, or Fed 
ACH. Fed ACH has met with some success. However, unlike the European Giro, 
ACH did not and has not developed into the dominant form of electronic pay-
ment. In part this is because for many years only banks – not individuals – could 
initiate ACH payments. Therefore, banks initiated ACH payments for compa-
nies engaged in batch-processing a large number of payments, such as payroll dis-
bursement, but the cost of initiating and processing ACH payments was too high 
to make originating single payments for individuals worthwhile. However as costs 
have declined, banks have expanded ACH services to enable large organizations 
to collect regular payments from individuals using the ACH. A typical transac-
tion of this nature would involve individual customers’ authorizing their bank 
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to make payments from their accounts directly to a firm on a recurring basis. The 
individuals no longer write checks to pay those bills; instead, their banks initiate 
the ACH transactions. ACH is now also being used to process one-time payments 
initiated via the Internet. The result has been a rather rapid increase in volumes 
within an environment where the resultant ACH is almost invisible to both the 
retail customer and the corporate client of cash management services. 
Going forward, the speed of the transition to electronic bill paying will depend, 
in part, on the evolution of our payments system. Financial institutions are finding 
innovative new uses for ACH, spanning a broad range of retail transactions and 
shifting substantial volumes to this system, primarily at the expense of check vol-
ume. While our ACH has not been as successful as your Giro systems, this trans-
action vehicle continues to gain market share. The most important of these inno-
vations is known by the acronym ARC for Automated Check Conversion. ARC is 
helping to streamline payments initiated by check by converting these payments to 
ACH transactions, even when the paper check would follow. Moreover, as ACH 
continues to gain acceptance as a payment vehicle, its products and marketing will 
evolve making it more attractive and accessible to individuals and businesses.
Cards drive changes in U.S. payments
While Fed ACH saw some success as a means to effect electronic payments, it 
was the credit card that proved most instrumental in moving U.S. payments from 
paper to electronics. The credit card actually was the first electronic payments in-
strument to emerge in the U.S. Credit cards were introduced in the 1950s, and 
their use grew rapidly over the next three decades. 
Credit cards
Not coincidently, the U.S. credit card infrastructure looks a lot like the Euro-
pean banking system. There are relatively few major card associations. They oper-
ate nationwide. And they are not subject to the anti-trust laws that prohibited col-
laboration among U.S. banks. In fact, the credit card associations benefited from 
some early antitrust rulings against banks. 
In the 1990s, when the tech boom made information processing and telecom-
munications more powerful and less expensive, the credit card associations were 
well-positioned to take full advantage of these developments. Low-cost telecom has 
made real-time, point-of-service verification of cardholders and their credit status 
widespread, speeding transactions and curtailing fraud. Of significance for the fu-
ture, this technology also has made the credit card a viable means of payment for 
e-commerce. 





After the credit card, the debit card is the second most popular electronic in-
strument for making retail payments in the U.S. today. The debit card arrived on 
the scene relatively recently – during the 1980s – in both the United States and 
Europe. But since its arrival, growth in usage has been dramatic – much faster 
than growth in credit card payments.
In Europe, the debit card emerged as an evolution of banks’ automated teller 
machine (ATM) systems. Instead of using their card to withdraw cash from an 
ATM to pay merchants, bank customers simply present their card to the mer-
chants and their bank account is debited directly. 
This same progression occurred in the U.S., too. But in the U.S., the credit 
card networks responded with debit card products of their own. Visa and Mas-
terCard already had an infrastructure in place for processing credit card transac-
tions at the point of sale. They leveraged this infrastructure to establish offline 
debit card networks. Indeed, in the U.S., these so-called “signature” debit cards 
are proving at least as popular as ATM, or “PIN-based,” debit cards. 
Signature debit cards now account for about two thirds of the total of debit 
transactions in the U.S., so it could be said that they are even more popular than 
their PIN counterparts. However, PIN-based debits are growing a bit faster than 
signature. In any case, debit cards in general seem to be leading the migration 
away from cash and checks and toward electronic payments in the U.S. 
This trend is substantiated by the Survey of Consumer Finances, sponsored by 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The survey indicates that fewer than 18 
percent of households used debit cards in 1995. By the new millennium, nearly 
half of all households were using them. Not coincidentally, the survey also docu-
mented a substantial reduction in the use of cash. 
The growing popularity of debit cards in the U.S. seems to be part of a broad-
er phenomenon. As I mentioned earlier, debit cards have caught on just as quick-
ly in Europe. In fact, for the first time ever, Visa’s global debit sales volume sur-
passed its credit sales volume in 2004. 
The future of the U.S. retail payments system
Looking ahead, retail payments in the U.S. will continue moving away from 
cash and paper checks toward electronic instruments, including credit cards, 
debit cards, ACH, and emerging vehicles such as prepaid cards. Though roughly 
half of our noncash payments are still being made by paper check, the tide has 
turned. In fact, recent research by the Federal Reserve shows check usage peaked 
in the mid-1990s and has been declining steadily ever since. So paper checks are 
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not only losing market share, they are actually declining in volume and have been 
for about a decade. Therefore, it is easy to predict that the share of retail transac-
tions handled by cards will continue to grow in the U.S., particularly at the point 
of sale. 
More recently, the leading debit card issuers have been working hard to make 
inroads in the realm of “micropayments” – purchases under $20. According to a 
survey by MasterCard International, debit cards now account for about 1/3 of all 
micropayments, a 61 percent increase over 2001. Here, debit transactions are re-
placing cash with the survey indicating a substantial drop in cash micropayments. 
As cards are supplanting checks and cash, the players in the payments business 
are changing. Organizations other than banks, especially retailers themselves, are 
now playing an expanded role in the payments system. As a result of recent legal 
action brought by WalMart against U.S. card companies, retailers now appreciate 
the costs and benefits associated with alternative payment processing arrangements 
and are weighing in to protect their interests. 
As you may know, WalMart, the largest retailer in the U.S., along with other 
merchants, balked at the idea of accepting signature debit cards – and their associ-
ated fees, which are higher than fees for PIN-based cards – without the right to ne-
gotiate. They sued U.S. bank credit card associations, prevailing in a good portion 
of their efforts. Their settlement eliminated the “honor all cards” rule, effectively 
allowing merchants to decline signature debit products without jeopardizing their 
ability to accept credit products or PIN debit cards.
The resulting keen competition among card providers, and aggressive marketing 
by both card providers and merchants, are increasing the speed with which cards 
replace paper for point-of-sale transactions in the U.S. How rapidly U.S. consum-
ers will continue their move from paper to electronic transactions is an interesting 
question. The speed is uncertain but the direction is not in doubt. 
Managing the transition
So, the private sector is shifting retail payments in the U.S. away from paper-
based instruments and toward electronic ones. But history tells us that people’s 
payment habits change only gradually. When people are comfortable with and 
confident in a payment structure, they are reluctant to give it up. As a result, the 
paper check is likely to be with us for some time. 
In the meantime, the Fed has been trying to take full advantage of the efficien-
cies afforded by electronic processing of payments initiated by paper check in the 
interest of maximizing the efficiency of the payment system. Thus, the Fed is do-
ing what it can to foster check truncation and electronification as early as possible 
in the payment process.




The Fed is now well positioned to pursue this objective. Two pieces of legislation 
have set the stage. One is a law that has been on the books for nearly 25 years now: 
the Monetary Control Act of 1980. The second was passed just two years ago: The 
Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act, commonly called Check 21. Let me ex-
plain the significance of each.
Recall that when the Fed began its check processing operations in 1914, it 
provided the service at no charge, but only to its member banks. The Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 changed all that. It required the Fed to offer its payments 
services to all banks at prices fully reflecting the Fed’s costs of production plus 
a mark-up equal to profit margins earned by the Fed’s private-sector competi-
tors. This change established a marketplace incentive for the Fed and its private-
sector competitors in check processing to maximize the efficiency of their check 
processing operations. 
The second piece of legislation, Check 21, adds an important new dimension 
to the competitive drive for greater efficiency in check processing. The essence of 
the new law is that it makes the facsimile of a check created from an electronic 
image serve as the legal equivalent of the check itself. In doing so, it eliminates a 
significant legal barrier to check truncation and electronification of check process-
ing. A collecting bank can now create an electronic image of a check, transmit it 
to a location near the paying bank, and then present the paying bank with a pa-
per reproduction or with the electronic image. The hope and expectation is that 
over time paying banks will prefer to receive the electronic image.  Accepting im-
ages for both deposit and presentment eliminates back office capture of the check 
as well as the inconvenience of physical transportation. 
As a provider of financial services, the Fed has been actively engaged in bring-
ing a whole array of image products to market to take advantage of the capability 
of image clearing. The Fed has established an image archive for electronic items; 
it has enhanced their ability to produce facsimile checks; and it has extended 
clearing times to encourage the use of the image technology that the act allows. 
In short, the Fed is introducing new services that will enable banks to take full 
advantage of Check 21. 
How fast will the transition occur? The industry has been slow to embrace 
the new capabilities that the law permits, but recently volumes have begun to 
increase rapidly.  This rapid growth has caused some serious strains on the Fed 
infrastructure. With the evolution of the payments system in the U.S. accelerat-
ing, the Federal Reserve has had to make major adjustments to its payments in-
frastructure. 
The Fed has been working to cut costs and improve the reliability and effi-
ciency of the current generation of payments vehicles, even as it works to foster 
innovation and to support the next generation of payments vehicles. The Fed has 
begun implementing a strategy that includes key elements to help us successfully 
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meet both commitments. The Fed recently announced a program of “aggressive 
electronification” of retail payments in the U.S. This push toward electronics will 
help facilitate Check 21 and quicken the transition to an all-electronic world. The 
Fed also has been investing heavily in technologies that enable electronification. 
The resulting decline in paper check volumes has placed strong pressure on the 
Fed to find new processing efficiencies and reduce both fixed and variable costs. As 
a result, the Fed has embarked upon a downsizing strategy that includes the con-
solidation of operations and closing of processing sites where appropriate. As the 
Fed has downsized its check clearing operations, it has attempted to maintain rea-
sonable service levels nationally by re-routing checks to processing sites near those 
that are closed. 
To give you a sense of the scale and speed of this effort, I will note that when I 
joined the Fed in 2000, it had 45 check processing sites. By the end of this year they 
will be down to 22. In fact, by year’s end the New York Fed’s main check clearing fa-
cility will close and be folded into Philadelphia’s facility. This is a sign of the times.  
Such a radical transformation within the Fed’s financial services division is 
made necessary by law. As I mentioned earlier, the Monetary Control Act man-
dates that the Fed set prices on services to fully recover costs. At the same time, 
the law requires the Fed to adjust its portfolio of clearing and payment services to 
correspond to the needs of the economy and banking industry. As a result of these 
requirements, the aggregate decline in volume in this volume-based service creates 
a substantial challenge to the System. And achieving full cost recovery will become 
more challenging as the volume of check usage continues to decline. 
Nonetheless, by setting prices that reflect the low cost of electronic check 
processing relative to paper, the Fed will allow, indeed encourage, the market to 
drive checks toward electronics. In addition, the Fed will continue to develop its 
capabilities and expand its electronics capacity to respond to the market’s evolu-
tion and consumers’ needs. The impact of these changes and those that follow will 
ultimately transform the U.S. payments system and enable a complete restructur-
ing of the U.S. retail payments system.
Turning to wholesale payments 
But enough about retail payments. Let me turn next to wholesale payments 
in the U.S. In addition to its role of supporting retail payments and small-dollar 
transactions systems, the Fed has long had a role in facilitating wholesale or large 
dollar transactions. As most of you know, Fedwire is the Fed’s wholesale, real-time, 
gross payments operation. It is used to transfer both funds and securities. 
Fedwire transactions typically involve large-value, time-critical payments, such as 
payments for the settlement of interbank purchases and sales of federal funds, and 




securities or real estate transactions. To give some indication of scale, currently Fed-
wire processes approximately 500,000 payments per day, totaling nearly $2 trillion.
Fedwire has a long and rich history. It first went into operation back in 1918, 
just four years after the Federal Reserve System was established. At the time, it 
used leased wires and relied on Morse code. Over the years its operations have 
evolved with advances in technology and the integration of financial markets. 
From the telex, to dedicated computer systems, to the emergence of the Internet, 
the evolution of technology has put pressure on our central bank to evolve its 
wholesale clearing system to the needs of commerce in America. 
In the U.S., the pressures for change in wholesale payments occurred in an 
environment that made change somewhat easier than in other parts of the world. 
The U.S. has had one currency for more than 200 years, and the twelve inde-
pendent Reserve Banks have increasingly operated as a single system offering na-
tional products. Moreover, designing and implementing uniform operating poli-
cies at a national level to respond to the demands of the financial sector has been 
easier to accomplish in wholesale payments than was the case for retail payments. 
Geography is irrelevant for Fedwire payments but crucial for retail payments, as I 
have already noted.  
It is my impression that European wholesale payments systems recently have 
been evolving toward a wholesale payments model that is not dissimilar to the 
Fedwire system found in the U.S. I presume that this is at least in part because 
of the emergence of the Euro. If the US is any guide, your system, TARGET 2, 
will likely consolidate European central banks’ wire transfer operations much as 
Fedwire has done in the U.S. This standardization of the processing platform will 
likely reduce costs through economies of scale and improve flexibility of whole-
sale payments.
However, Fedwire is not alone in providing interbank clearing services to the 
U.S. financial system. We have a number of other networks that facilitate transac-
tions between our banks and their customers, including credit card networks and, 
of course, the payments activity of the Clearing House Interbank Payments Sys-
tem (CHIPS). Importantly, the Fed’s National Settlement Service allows partici-
pating clearing and settlement systems to settle transactions among their mem-
bers on a net basis via Fedwire. At last report, the US has approximately seventy 
such systems functioning in this manner. Of this group, the most important and 
most relevant is CHIPS; so, let me make a few comments about it and how it has 
been affecting the Fed. 
Payments platforms on our two continents have long been bound by the in-
ternational wholesale payments system, CHIPS. Yet, changes and advances in 
CHIPS have affected us perhaps more so than Europe, due to CHIPS dollar-
based settlement process and its reliance on Fedwire for net settlement among 
CHIPS participants. As a result, I would speculate that the lack of finality, a hall-
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mark of the CHIPS system of yesteryear, occupied, indeed worried our central 
bank more than others. But, with CHIPS now providing clearing finality, there is 
a meaningful private-sector linkage between the U.S. and European currency areas 
and between the wholesale clearing systems of the developed world. 
The more recent addition of the Continuous Linked Settlement structure, 
known by its acronym, CLS, has only added to our interconnections. This foreign 
exchange clearing system, although still handling a modest volume of the world’s 
foreign exchange trades, has proved to be another beneficial structure that has re-
duced intraday exposure and added needed liquidity to wholesale payments. 
This liquidity is indeed needed. In the US, wholesale dollar based transactions 
volume has increased steadily and dramatically over the past twenty or thirty years. 
And, during this same time our banking industry has been consolidating, resulting 
in the volume of transactions at our largest institutions rising even more rapidly. 
Data from 2000, which is almost ancient history now, tell this story. The top 50 
banks accounted for 80 percent of value across the system. The concentration is 
even greater today.
The result is that the volume of wholesale payments processed by Reserve Banks 
has been rising at the same time the payments flows have become more concen-
trated. This trend was first recognized in the 1970s and 1980s; it led the Fed to 
take steps to address the growing settlement risk generated by the combination of 
rapidly rising volumes and increasing concentration. 
As a matter of practice, any institution that maintains an account at the Fed 
is allowed to be a Fedwire participant. And in a similar manner, intraday central 
bank credit, in the form of daylight overdrafts, is generally available to all Fedwire 
participants in sound financial condition. Overall, aggregate average daylight over-
drafts averaged about $30 billion per day since 2000, with peak aggregate daylight 
overdrafts averaging $90 billion each day. In 2000, 10 institutions accounted for 
nearly 75 percent of total average overdrafts. 
Working with the industry, the Federal Reserve has addressed the daylight over-
draft issue through the systematic development of caps and self-regulation. The 
result of this effort was a slowing of the growth of daylight average overdrafts even 
as volumes continued to climb.
Interestingly, the Fed’s emphasis has been on limiting daylight overdrafts 
through self-policing, and internal payments queuing. The Fed’s rules require all 
institutions incurring intraday overdrafts to establish a daily limit (“net debit cap”) 
equal to a multiple of the institution’s risk-based capital. As you might expect, 
non-zero net debit caps are granted at the discretion of the Federal Reserve Banks 
and are subject to review by the Board as part of its overall oversight of payment 
system risk. 
This contrasts with the approach taken in Europe, where banks either are not al-
lowed to incur overdrafts in their accounts at their national central bank, or are re-




quired to fully collateralize them. In the U.S., the focus has not been on driving day-
light overdrafts to zero, or to collateralizing them as a way to reduce payments risk. 
In fact it was not until 2001 that banks were allowed to obtain additional daylight 
credit, that is to say, an amount beyond their net debit caps, by pledging collateral. 
Collateral has never been a mainstay of Federal Reserve payments risk policy. 
As a result, large institutions have responded to this regulatory framework by 
managing the timing of payments within the day to best live within the daily cap 
at their local Federal Reserve Bank. One effect of this queuing is that payments 
are increasingly becoming bunched at the beginning and end of the day. This has 
led some to express concern about the potential of “gridlock” in the payments 
system at certain times of the day, or when a large bank suffers computer prob-
lems and is unable to originate payments. Fortunately, such events are rare. In 
the past, when they have occurred, the Fed has extended Fedwire’s closing time 
and supplied additional liquidity to prevent shocks or technical difficulties from 
spreading and causing large disruptions in the payments system. But the system 
is not as robust as it might be.
As I noted earlier, the American approach of relying on central bank intra-
day credit is quite different than the path the Europeans have followed. European 
central banks have relied on collateral and virtually eliminated unsecured daylight 
overdrafts. 
While the U.S. has been slow to embrace this approach, its time may be near. 
Collateral already exists in the international systems that I referred to above. With 
the DTC same-day credit facility a reality and continuous time pricing of credit 
becoming more common in the global financial markets, my view is that it is 
just a matter of time before the US wholesale payments system relies more heav-
ily on collateral as a source of liquidity. When that happens, the wholesale pay-
ments system in the U.S. will likely evolve to one that more closely resembles 
TARGET2 in structure. 
In wholesale as in retail payments, we are seeing systems that were founded 
quite differently now evolving to a common approach. In short, here too we are 
seeing some convergence. 
Conclusion
By way of summary, let me indicate that my discussion today had several goals. 
First among them was to review and explain the state of the payments structure 
in the U.S. to colleagues who come from a different tradition and institutional 
structure. There is a reason for most things, and the roots of our different pay-
ment systems are found in our different banking structure and different percep-
tions of appropriate regulation. 
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Yours is a system of few large banks that can easily be regulated into a central-
ized world – first with near-universal Giro accounts and soon with an electronic 
world of more centralized clearing. In the U.S., markets and consumers led us to a 
multiplicity of banks and a retail payments system that has been paper intensive. 
My second goal was to explain how the U.S. retail payments structure is chang-
ing, as cards are replacing checks, and electronic clearing is truncating the maze 
of paper that fills our post offices. Our progress, while promising, occurs largely 
in fits and starts in response to market forces, reflecting the fact that the U.S. is a 
large nation with many providers, much complexity, and a philosophy of market-
based solutions. Nonetheless, it seems the U.S. retail payments system is moving 
toward convergence with the European model. 
The rapid transition from checks to electronic payments has presented chal-
lenges for the Federal Reserve as a provider of financial services. It has necessitated 
restructurings, plant closings, and difficult decisions that most central banks in 
Europe have been spared.  
On the wholesale level, change has been less dramatic. Fedwire continues to be 
a resilient and dependable payments mechanism, as it has been since its emergence 
nearly ninety years ago. Fedwire continues to be a critical locus of net settlement 
services for the myriad of networks from CHIPS to credit card systems that have 
come to depend on its integrity and reliability. Yet, here too, change is occurring, 
and is likely to continue. 
My third goal was to indicate that the likely outcome will be, I believe, a system 
not dissimilar to the one that the EuroZone is building for your new currency and 
integrated clearing system.
In conclusion, I want to note that the process of change will never subside. In 
both the retail and wholesale arenas, as payments technology moves forward, our 
payments system will continue to change as evolutionary forces generate new in-
novations in payments and new ways to deliver them. As we go down this path, 
however, I believe that in some important ways we in the U.S. will be operating 
with a payment system that looks more like the European system than ever before. 





I t is a great pleasure for me to open this round table on “Central Banks and Global Imbalances” at the invitation of the Banco de España. I would like 
first to thank the organisers for giving me the opportunity to speak in front of 
such a distinguished audience. 
The issue of global imbalances is indeed high on the agenda of every inter-
national economic policy and academic meeting. The facts are well known. In 
2005 the current account deficit of the United States was estimated to have 
reached 6.4% of GDP, a level roughly matched by the combined current ac-
count surpluses of Japan, China, other Asian economies and the oil-producing 
nations. It is this diverging pattern that is generally referred to as the “global 
imbalances”. 
These facts are recognised, but that’s as far as it goes. There is no consen-
sus on the other elements surrounding the discussion on global imbalances. In 
particular, the factors behind the imbalances, their sustainability and the risk 
of disruptive adjustments are being closely examined by both academics and 
policy-makers, and frequently their conclusions diverge. Indeed, our panel-
lists today hold contrasting views. Professor Axel Weber in a recent speech ob-
served: “With regard to measures to reduce the current global imbalances the 
most urgent policy steps have to be taken by the US authorities”. David Folk-
erts-Landau and his co-authors suggest, however, the possibility that no landing 
is necessary, that the current global imbalances reflect a conscious and stable 
arrangement between surplus and deficit countries, the so-called New Bretton 
Woods (NBW) system. 
To start off the panel discussion, I will base my remarks on four questions that 
get to the heart of the issue. The four questions are: What are the factors behind 
global imbalances? Are global imbalances sustainable? Is there a need for policy 
adjustment? And, what role could central banks eventually play in the resolution 
of global imbalances? 
Central banks 
and global imbalances
José Manuel González-Páramo 
European Central Bank 
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1 What are the factors behind global imbalances?
Declining savings in the United States 
A natural place to start to answer this question is obviously the US, where the 
increasing current account deficits seem to be due to a combination of factors. 
While rising investment was the driving force of this increase in the 1990s, falling 
savings have become the main contributor to the deficit since the early years of 
this decade. Indeed, the US national net saving rate is currently at around 1% of 
GDP, the lowest level since World War II. Both private and public savings seem to 
have contributed to this decrease.
As regards private saving, its decline has been mainly due to a drop in net house-
hold savings that in the course of 2005 – for the first time since the 1930s – fell into 
negative territory. Declining household saving could be the result of different fac-
tors, among which the economic literature has emphasised the role played by, first, 
the higher levels of productivity growth in the United States compared with its 
trading partners, implying larger returns on investment. Second, there is also some 
evidence that the lower US interest rates may have contributed to the decline in 
private savings, although in this case it is in practice difficult to identify the pre-
cise pattern of causality. Third, and related to this latter point, substantial positive 
wealth effects – triggered by the asset price bubble in the second half of the 1990s 
and soaring real estate prices since 2000 – may have helped to push down the low 
private savings rate in recent years. Finally, population ageing and distortionary tax 
incentives could have also played a role.
Turning to public savings, it is indeed a fact that the US general government 
fiscal balance swung from a surplus of more than 1% of GDP in 2000 to a deficit 
of around 4% of GDP in 2005. There is, however, an intense debate, ranging from 
academia to policy-making circles, on the extent to which a fiscal deficit translates 
into the current account. The consensus view is that there is a significant, albeit 
partial, statistical relationship between fiscal balances and current account posi-
tions, confirming partial Ricardian behaviour by the private sector. The aforemen-
tioned view implies that the US fiscal position matters as far as the current account 
deficit is concerned. 
Saving glut: Asia and the role of oil exporters
Falling net saving in the US must have a counterpart somewhere in the world 
in the form of higher net saving rates. This high saving rate was referred to as a 
“saving glut” by Ben Bernanke (2005) and originates mostly from Asian countries 
and oil exporters. To better understand the determinants behind this behaviour, it 
is necessary to look at the different regions separately. 





Starting with East Asian countries, excluding China, saving rates continue to 
be high in this region, but the switch into higher current account surpluses from 
the late 1990s onwards can be explained by a drop in investment around the time 
of the Asian crisis. In this case, it is therefore more accurate to speak of an “in-
vestment drought” rather than a “saving glut”.
In China, by contrast, the high and increasing current account surplus cannot 
be explained by a fall in investment – investment is in fact remarkably robust, ac-
counting for more than 45% of GDP – but by a very significant rise in national 
saving, which now amounts to more than 50% of GDP. The high level of house-
hold saving seems to be mainly due to adverse demographic developments (the 
ageing of the population), the lack of a social safety net and limited access to finan-
cial markets that do not allow savings to be channelled to productive investment. 
An additional important factor influencing the current account surplus of 
Asian economies concerns exchange rate policies. The policy followed by some 
of these countries of fixing the exchange rate at very competitive levels has fa-
voured the widening of trade surpluses in these countries and deficits elsewhere, 
but it has also forced Asian central banks to intervene to stabilise the undervalued 
exchange rates, leading to a massive accumulation of international reserves, with 
much of these reserves being invested in US dollar-denominated assets. Through 
these interventions, Asian countries have enabled the United States to finance a 
large and increasing current account deficit at relatively low interest rates. 
Finally, let me refer to oil exporters. They constitute a group of countries 
where net saving is also high by historical standards. In their case, saving rates 
have increased following the higher oil income revenues since the late 1990s. 
Faced with this positive terms-of-trade shock, oil exporters have opted for a rise 
in saving and invested abroad; domestic investment has not reacted so far. 
Related to this latter issue, I should add that in fact the rising oil bill has be-
come an additional hurdle to the adjustment of the US current account deficit, 
partially explaining its worsening over the past few years: the oil bill (net imports) 
of the United States rose from 0.7% of GDP per year from the mid-1980s until 
the end of the 1990s, to 1.8% of GDP or around one-quarter of the US trade 
deficit in 2005. 
Home bias
Let me finally refer to an additional factor that has been cited as contributing 
to the widening of the US current account deficit: the decline in home bias. By 
definition, rising current account deficits in a given country are possible if, and 
only if, foreign residents are willing to increase the value of the assets they have 
invested in that country. What prompts them to do so? One would think that 
return differentials are the main driving force but, as the recent experience of the 
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US shows, other factors play a role. In particular, the notion of home bias is a key 
element in explaining cross-border investments. 
The concept of home bias refers to the fact that investors worldwide seem to 
be excessively investing in their home country. To quote Alan Greenspan (2005): 
“Home bias implies that lower risk compensation is required for geographically 
proximate investment opportunities”. In an attempt to measure this phenomenon, 
one could say that having no home bias would imply that a country holds the 
same proportion of its financial assets abroad as the rest of the world market capi-
talisation is in the world. 
Ongoing empirical research at the ECB indeed shows a significant decline in 
home bias for equity and bond financial flows in the mature economies since the 
late 1990s, which would help to explain why the US has found it particularly easy 
to fund its rising current account deficit. The fall in home bias was larger for euro 
area economies than for the US, and the level of home bias is lower in euro area 
countries (now around 65%) than in the US (above 70% for equities and above 
90% for bonds). An important final point to be stressed is that the level of home 
bias is still very high in emerging countries, and therefore leaves scope for a future 
decline if one assumes convergence across countries. 
Having finished this quick overview of some of the key factors behind global 
imbalances, I’ll turn to the second question: 
2 Are global imbalances sustainable? 
This is of course not a trivial question. After all, we haven’t yet seen any signs of 
an incoming disorderly adjustment of the imbalances and, as I mentioned earlier, 
there are some analysts who say that the current path can actually be sustained for 
a fairly protracted period of time. 
This being said, there seems to be a broad consensus that the present constella-
tion of current account positions cannot be maintained indefinitely. The US cur-
rent account has led to a steady deterioration of the net US international invest-
ment position. 
Back in 1980, the United States was a net creditor to the rest of the world to 
the tune of USD 360 billion, whereas at the end of 2004 it owed foreigners USD 
2.5 trillion or around 22% of GDP. Between 2002 and 2004, this latter ratio re-
mained stable in spite of large current account deficits, mainly because of large 
valuation gains, which were prompted by the depreciation of the US dollar, which 
in turn boosted the dollar value of foreign currency-denominated assets. However, 
it is unlikely that a permanent net debt devaluation strategy is sustainable, since it 
is reasonable to expect that international investors would end up asking for higher 
interest rates on US debt. 





The previous dynamics point, in my view, to a need for a lower current ac-
count deficit in the United States. Let me illustrate this with the results from a sim-
ple arithmetic calculation. If the current account deficit of the United States contin-
ues to run at around 6% of GDP and nominal GDP grows at 5.5% a year – which is 
more or less the long-term consensus forecast for growth in the US – the ratio of 
US net foreign debt to GDP would increase to above 100% in the long run (if 
one excludes possible valuation effects). 
In this context, the ability of the US economy to attract sufficiently large finan-
cial flows becomes crucial for the sustainability of the external deficit. Until 2000 
the US current account deficit was financed by inflows into the domestic produc-
tive sector, taking the form of equity or direct investment. Recently, investors seem 
to have reassessed the longer-term profitability of US firms relative to earlier ex-
pectations and, as a result, net equity and foreign direct investment in the US have 
dried up and even gone into reverse, being replaced by large net inflows into the 
US bond market. In the last two years, virtually all of the net foreign inflows into 
the US have been debt-creating. The accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by 
Asian central banks and other reserve accumulators such as Russia, which mainly 
buy US government securities, have played an important role in shaping this trend. 
From a flow perspective, the growing stock of debt interacts with the current 
account dynamics. In fact, the US is expected to face higher costs for servicing 
its rising debt. Over the past twenty years, the US income balance has consist-
ently recorded surpluses ranging between 0.1% and 0.5% of GDP, although in 
2005 this surplus shrank to a mere USD 1 billion (preliminary estimate), on the 
back of rising debt service obligations. Looking ahead, the income balance could 
turn negative as US interest rates continue to rise. A growing negative investment 
income would in turn imply a smaller sustainable trade deficit over the long run 
and complicate the current account adjustment.
Therefore, the relevant question is not whether, but when and how, the adjust-
ment will take place, and this leads us to my third question: 
3 Is there a need for policy adjustment?
At least two different arguments can be used to give a positive answer to this 
question. First, as indicated previously, several policies seem to underlie, at least 
partially, the existence of global imbalances. Second, even if policy is not the 
cause of imbalances, there is a great risk that a purely market-determined adjust-
ment may be abrupt, with serious adverse effects on global economic growth and 
financial stability. Thus, policy may have an important role to play in preventing 
the market from overshooting, or should at least smooth the adjustment process 
and ensure that it does not disrupt the global economy. 
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In my own view, the most likely scenario will be one of a gradual and orderly 
adjustment of these imbalances over the medium term. Yet, I should add that such 
a “benign” scenario requires policy-corrective action to be taken, and I would like 
to quote President Kennedy’s sound advice to policy-makers worldwide: “The best 
time to fix the roof is when the sun is shining”.
The orderly unwinding of global imbalances requires global policy efforts, 
meaning that all major economies will have to make domestic adjustments. This 
is the bottom line of the G7 approach to the adjustment of global imbalances. In 
the United States, savings should increase – both through further fiscal consolida-
tion and through an increase in private savings, which could be achieved through 
reforms of the US tax system, the elimination of distortionary tax incentives, and 
a shift towards higher energy efficiency. Emerging Asian countries are also expected 
to play a role in contributing to a smooth resolution of the global imbalances. Ex-
change rate flexibility is an essential element to ensure that necessary adjustments 
take place, together with reforms aiming at improving and deepening the financial 
sector. This would facilitate the resolution of both internal and external imbalanc-
es – insofar as high savings rates stem from low rates of return on financial assets. 
Oil producers could also contribute by fostering higher domestic investment – in 
particular, investment to enhance their oil extraction and refining capacities, to 
develop their infrastructures and to diversify their domestic production capacities 
away from oil. Finally, I will of course not forget the euro area. Our external posi-
tion, with a roughly balanced current account, is very much in line with the struc-
ture of our economy and is consistent with demographic developments in the euro 
area, which require net savings over the longer term. Thus, the best contribution 
that the euro area can make towards resolving the global imbalances should come 
from further structural reforms aimed at increasing our growth potential. A similar 
line of argumentation to that of the euro area applies to Japan. 
4  What role can central banks play in the resolution 
of global imbalances? 
Let me now tackle the last part of my presentation, returning to the general 
issue raised by the organisers, on the link between global imbalances and central 
banks. I would like in particular to ask: what role can central banks play in the 
resolution of global imbalances? In other words, should monetary policy help fos-
ter the adjustment process and how? 
It seems to me that an answer to this question encompasses three different is-
sues: the role of monetary policy in achieving price stability, the way central banks 
should consider exchange rate changes and the question of whether and how cen-
tral banks should react to an inflating asset market. 





As I am sure that the other participants in this round-table discussion have 
their own views on the subject, I would just like to say a few words, taking 
mostly a euro area perspective, before I give them the floor. You will not be 
surprised if I start with price stability, our primary objective. In pursuing price 
stability, monetary policy makes its own contribution to economic growth in 
the euro area over the medium term. As such, this is an integral part of what 
the euro area can do to address the issue of current account imbalances. There 
is a large consensus today in Europe in respect of the continent’s low growth 
over the last decade, namely that it is, to a great extent, structural in nature. 
The enhancement of potential output in the euro area should therefore be 
mainly based on structural reforms. 
Regarding exchange rates, they are for us an indicator monitored under the 
economic pillar in our strategy. This means that the ECB does not react in any 
mechanical way to exchange rate changes; this is only one of the variables affecting 
economic developments and therefore influencing our decision-making. We will 
continue to take into account relevant developments, including the international 
environment, within a consistent framework aimed at ensuring price stability. 
As mentioned earlier, when we consider other regions whose currencies are not 
fully market-determined, such as parts of emerging Asia, including China, there 
are, however, some indications that exchange rate policies have contributed to an 
unbalanced pattern of growth, with an excessive reliance upon external demand, 
leading to rising current account surpluses and investment activity in the trad-
able sector. Moving to a more flexible exchange rate regime is also in this case an 
effective way of avoiding an accumulation of excessive levels of reserves, and it is 
only one of the advantages of such a strategy. Indeed, a second consequence of 
the choice of a fixed exchange rate in China and other emerging economies in 
Asia concerns the domestic repercussions. With the external constraint of a fixed 
exchange rate, it is more difficult for a central bank to achieve domestic objec-
tives, such as effectively controlling credit growth. There are some signs that tend 
to support this argument, notably the fact that money growth is growing above 
its target in China and that money growth volatility has increased with rising for-
eign exchange interventions. 
At the current juncture, and for the long-term development of China, it seems 
therefore essential to gradually gain more flexibility regarding the exchange rate 
arrangement and to focus monetary policy on domestic objectives. This would 
imply a gradual and orderly adjustment of the currencies of countries with large 
external surpluses, in consistency with a rebalancing of the growth pattern of 
emerging countries in Asia. By strengthening in particular the domestic financial 
sector, this additional flexibility would further contribute to a smooth resolution 
of global imbalances. In this respect, I am only reiterating the recommendations 
outlined in the last G7 communiqué. 
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Finally, it has been argued that asset price bubbles have contributed to the 
growing current account deficits since the late 1990s (see, for instance, Kraay and 
Ventura, 2005). In this respect, a distinction could be made between asset price 
developments in the context of the “new economy” bubble and potential misalign-
ments of asset prices observed in the recent period as global liquidity conditions 
remained generous for an extended period of time. While the mechanism behind a 
possible relation between asset prices and external positions may be analysed in the 
context of lower home bias and increased capital flows, the question of whether 
and how monetary policy-makers should and could react to such developments 
is much harder to answer. All the same, let me submit this question as a possible 
subject for debate in our panel discussion. 
To sum up, I have presented what are, in my view, some of the main factors 
behind global imbalances, as well as the policy measures that can be implemented 
to ensure an orderly correction of these imbalances. I have also raised a few issues 
for discussion, focusing on the role that central banks can play in the resolution of 
global imbalances. 
I now would like to give the floor to the other panel participants. We are hon-
oured to have here today Vittorio Corbo, President of the Banco Central de Chile; 
David Folkerts-Landau, Managing Director and Head of Global Markets Research 
at Deutsche Bank; Vincent Reinhart from the Federal Reserve Board as well as 
Axel Weber, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 





BERNANKE, BEN S. (2005), “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account 
Deficit”, 10 March 2005, remarks at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Eco-
nomics, Richmond, Virginia. 
FIDORA, M., M. FRATZSCHER and C. THIMANN (2006), “Home bias in global bond 
and equity markets: the role of real exchange rate volatility”, ECB mimeo, May 2006.
GREENSPAN, ALAN (2005), “International imbalances”, 2 December 2005, remarks be-
fore the Advancing Enterprise Conference, London, England.
KRAAY, ART and JAUME VENTURA 2005), “The Dot-Com Bubble, the Bush Deficits 
and the US Current Account”, NBER Working Paper 11543, August 2005.
WEBER, A. (2005), “Challenges to the global economy”, speech at the European Banking 
Congress in Frankfurt, 18 November 2005. 
References

Despite some ups and downs, world economic growth is soon to complete its best three years in the past three decades, with annual growth rates more 
than one third higher than the 1970-2000 average. Furthermore, for the first time 
in many years, this strong dynamism has been driven by a more balanced regional 
composition. World growth, induced by a single player – the US – in 2004-2005, 
today brings several other protagonists together. Worth underscoring are the Euro 
Zone definitely leaving behind its former lethargy, Japan’s continued growth, and 
China and India, whose combined share in world GDP at PPP reaches that of the 
United States and whose economies are growing at amazing rates that are not ex-
pected to end any time soon, given their enormous unexploited potential. Thus, 
this stronger growth scenario is also more balanced, which speaks of increased sus-
tainability.
This favorable global scenario faces short-term risks together with a rather 
structural and longer-term risk. In the near horizon, there is concern about the 
high oil prices persisting longer than previously forecasted and rising even higher. 
Accordingly, there is the associated risk of developed countries being unable to 
curb inflation or even to stop it from rising, putting an end to the days when 
second-round effects of oil hikes were not passed through to other prices, and 
beginning a cycle where the economies without idle capacity begin to lose their 
ability to absorb inflationary pressures from oil, which, with new price shocks 
would only make things worse. If this scenario unfolds, monetary policy interest 
rates will need to rise further with secondary effects on financial markets and in 
emerging markets.
Over a longer horizon, the main concern is how global imbalances will be ac-
commodated and what will be their repercussions. In other words, how global 
imbalances will be resolved. The US has seen its current-account deficit increase 
considerably for the past thirteen years, and it is expected to account for 6.5% 
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ing deficit has been financed primarily by oil-producing economies, emerging Asia 
– especially China – , and Japan. Latin America’s contribution has been negligi-
ble. In 2005, the region had a surplus equivalent to less than 1% of the US’s cur-
rent-account deficit. However, although the region is not helping to aggravate the 
imbalances, it can suffer the severe consequences of sudden changes in financial 
prices caused by this situation, which is believed by some to be unsustainable.
The earlier views on how the adjustment could occur were tainted by the Asian 
and Mexican crises, so the imbalance was expected to be solved abruptly when for-
eign investors lost interest in holding in their portfolios additional American assets 
at the existing interest rates and exchange rates. In such case a sudden stop would 
occur, thus causing a sharp breakdown to financing of the massive American con-
sumption. US interest rates would rise and the dollar would overshoot. Consump-
tion would slow down without compensating increases in surplus countries, caus-
ing major distress on world economic growth. 
I believe this scenario, so popular until recently, is unlikely. The present flexibil-
ity and deepness of financial markets and portfolio choices in the rest of the world, 
suggest that the adjustment will be gradual and will take place through rather 
smooth changes in financial prices. In such case, demand can be expected to move 
steadily from deficit-ridden to surplus-running economies, while asset prices and 
consumption converge gradually to sustainable paths, as is already beginning to 
happen. Thus, larger savings in the US and increased consumption and/or invest-
ment in the rest of the world configure a more benign scenario for world growth, 
where the slowdown in US demand is partly offset by stronger demand elsewhere. 
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This gradual pace would be favored if Asia, especially China, would make its ex-
change rates more flexible to produce the necessary reallocation of expenditures. 
More flexible exchange rates would also help countries to regain control over 
their monetary policies. Still, this benign adjustment, if materialized, would be 
coupled with a moderate deceleration of world growth.
An alternative to this gradual adjustment is a proposal under economist Ricar-
do Caballero’s line of research, which claims that these imbalances are an equilib-
rium solution in a world where very dynamic emerging countries have not devel-
oped sufficiently their financial markets or any attractive investment securities, 
whereas the US has done so with remarkable efficiency. In this case, the adjust-
ment would also be gradual and would occur to the extent that financial markets 
could be developed further in emerging economies and part of capital flows re-
turned to their countries of origin where they would meet with profitable invest-
ment options. 
Recent news of increased demand in Japan and the EU, and of a slowdown in 
private consumption and the real estate market in the US increase the probability 
of gradual adjustment. However, while unlikely, the risks of a sudden adjustment 
are still present and policymakers cannot sit and wait for global imbalances to re-
solve themselves. On the contrary, they must promote steady and cooperative ad-
justment and take actions to reduce the negative impact such adjustment might 
have in their countries.
To promote gradual, cooperative adjustment, saving must be encouraged in 
the US through fiscal efforts and incentives to private saving; stimulate private 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT BALANCEFIGURE 2
SOURCE: Moody's Financial Handbook, November 2005. Ministry of Finance of Chile.
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consumption in China – that saves over half its GDP – through financial reforms 
improving household access to credit and extending social protection networks 
in order to reduce precautionary saving, as the ones proposed in the latest Com-
munist Party Committee. Also increase investment in emerging Asia – which col-
lapsed in 1997 and has been unable to recover fully – through incentives to quality 
investment with structural reforms aimed at boosting expected returns, improving 
the ease to do business, increasing labor flexibility and promoting efficient resource 
allocation in financial markets. 
Asian economies have addressed their crises through heavy hoarding of inter-
national reserves, that come quite inexpensive – or even profitable – to them at 
current interest rates and parities, in the hope that by so doing they will ward off 
a new crisis like that of 1997. The bad news is that they have let credit swell (es-
pecially China) and have neglected the reforms to the financial system that could 
protect them better from a shock. Finally, the adjustment could benefit from a re-
duction in the relative price of the US dollar in terms of other currencies, particu-
larly the Chinese yuan/rembimbi.  
Ex-post reactions intended to minimize the costs of an abrupt adjustment de-
pend on the prevailing monetary and exchange policy framework. Countries with 
inflation expectations well-anchored in low levels and with limited currency mis-
matches should let the exchange rate adjust, thus driving the changes in relative 
prices. “Leaning against the wind” can only result in a capital flight, financial in-
stability and a credit crunch. Countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies coupled 
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with a solid domestic financial system will help to address potential international 
financial crises with a reversal of capital flows, with a reduced need for interna-
tional reserves accumulation.
Countries with de-anchored inflation expectations face a more complex sce-
nario. Real depreciation will be shadowed by higher inflation or, if currency mis-
matches between assets and liabilities are large, depreciation will turn out to be 
contractionary because of important balance-sheet effects. To avoid a major fi-
nancial crisis in these economies, the only tool they will have available will be fis-
cal policy, which would be recessionary.
Uncertainty regarding the way imbalances will be corrected has repercussions 
on economic policy decision-making. In emerging countries, monetary policy has 
limited or no impact on how adjustment happens. But regardless of its form, it 
undoubtedly affects monetary policy decisions, implementation and effectiveness. 
Increased uncertainty is something to take into account when projecting output 
and prices. The global scenario also makes it difficult to interpret the impact of 
monetary policy on demand and inflation.
The sound and stable macroeconomic environment that Latin-American 
countries have steadily built over the years has reduced their vulnerability to ad-
justments of global imbalances that might turn out to be more abrupt than ex-
pected. During the past two decades, and especially in the last five years, sub-
stantial advances have been achieved in economic policies and results. The fiscal 
discipline attained by these countries was unheard of before. Although Chile 
stands out, major improvements have been made in most countries. Annual infla-
tion has been reduced from three-digit annual levels less than fifteen years back, 
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to one-digit annual levels more recently. Current accounts have in most cases shift-
ed to surplus positions, and sovereign spreads are down to historic lows, with the 
resulting reduction in the costs of foreign financing. This has boosted the coun-
tries’ solvency, which in turn has permitted them to refinance their credits in much 
better terms. Finally, great advances in the development, supervision and regula-
tion of the financial system have also helped to improve Latin America’s resilience 
to shocks. But despite these advances, there is still a long way to go in terms of 
market liberalization, promoting competition and improving the efficiency of the 
state apparatus.
However, while Latin America is more resilient now than it was in the past, it 
is not fully protected and is sensitive to the way imbalances are ultimately correct-
ed. An abrupt adjustment would increase sovereign spreads, enlarging the finan-
cial burden of the most indebted countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay, and 
might hurt the largest providers of goods to the US, whose demand would not be 
absorbed by others. Despite growing diversification, NAFTA members buy 34% 
of total Latin-American exports (excluding Mexico). Within the region, the most 
exposed are Mexico and Central America, because of their extensive commercial 
relations with the United States.
In conclusion, the world economy presents an exceptionally favorable scenario, 
where the big surprise has been the dynamism of China and India. However, this 
good environment is not free of risks. The most immediate threats are larger and 
longer-lasting rises in oil prices, and possible inflation increases in developed coun-
tries. Over a longer horizon, the biggest uncertainty lies in how global imbalanc-
PUBLIC DEBT (a) IN LATIN AMERICAFIGURE 4
SOURCE: ECLAC (2005).
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es will finally unwind. This, however, looks less urgent now with some signs of 
gradual adjustments already beginning to occur. Furthermore, countries are rec-
ognizing that the solution will involve many players that will need coordination. 
In fact, as was discussed in the last IMFC meetings, demand is appearing for co-
operative adjustment that can help correct the global imbalances at the lowest 
possible cost in terms of world economy deceleration. Last, but not least, coun-
tries have managed to implement sound macroeconomic policies that will help 
smooth the adjustment and cushion the impact. However, they must continue 
to strive to strengthen their policies to create more favorable conditions for long 
term growth and to face a world with growing uncertainty. 














I appreciate this opportunity to participate in in this distinguished con-ference on 150th the anniversary of the renaming of the Bank of Spain. The 
topic of this panel – global imbalances – is a particularly apt subject to talk 
about in the center of the empire that experienced the first and probably largest 
capital inflow problem in the last millennium. Absorbing the inflows of gold 
and silver in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries created difficult sectoral 
adjustments and had even more complicated consequences for the political 
economy. Global adjustments – whether species flows, reparation payments, or 
the unwinding of prior imbalances – involve the transfer of real resources across 
national borders that has implications for relative prices, incomes, and wealth 
over time.
By the way, the views I just expressed about the Golden Age of Spanish Explo-
ration are my own and are not necessarily shared by anyone else in the Federal 
Reserve System. This also holds true for everything else said today.
Some Background
It does not take many numbers for the enormity of the challenge confront-
ing the global economy to become evident as our moderator clearly expressed. 
According to projections in the most recent World Economic Outlook, the 
U.S. current account deficit will extend its slide of the past decade and is 
poised to run at around $900 billion dollars next year, or 6½ percent of nomi-
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There have been many sophisticated attempts to put these imbalances into per-
spective, seen for example in the models of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) and Blan-
chard, Giavazzi and Sa (2005) in a recent Brookings volume. But at the risk of 
simplifying to the point of simplemindedness, I believe that the key points for un-
derstanding the current pattern of global imbalances are clear in the simple frame-
work by which most of us were first exposed to the notion of external surpluses 
US CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCEFIGURE 1
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and deficits. Emboldened by Alan Blinder’s ability to find sixteen questions per-
tinent to monetary policy, I will make six observations informed by this simple 
framework about the adjustment of global imbalances (Blinder, this volume). I 
will close by focusing in a bit more on some policy implications.
Although I do not have the yellowed document to prove it, in my first exposure 
to trade theory, I was taught that a country ran a trade deficit because relative prices 
encouraged the greater import of goods and services and discouraged their export 
(as in Figure 3). The horizontal difference between the demand curves for exports 
and imports represents the need to borrow to fund the relative excess. The analysis 
was somewhat more subtle by identifying five key margins relevant to understand-
ing how any particular excess could evolve over time (Table 1).
The first margin is what I put along the vertical axis of the diagram – the rela-
tive price of traded goods produced domestically versus internationally – which is 




The relative price of traded goods and services produced at home versus those produce abroad; 
The relative price of traded goods and services produced at home versus nontraded ones; 
Home versus foreign income; 
Home versus foreign wealth; and 
The dollar share of the foreign portfolio.
KEY MARGINS INFLUENCING THE DETERMINATION OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS TABLE 1 
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captured by movements along both curves. But the positions of these two curves 
may also depend on the prices of traded goods and services versus those that are 
not traded. For example, if nontraded services became particularly expensive, de-
mand may shift some toward imports and import competing goods. Third and 
fourth, respectively, are the scale variables influencing demand at home and abroad 
– home versus foreign income and home versus foreign wealth – that also affect 
the position of the curves. The fifth margin does not directly affect the position of 
either curve but is critical to determining how those other four margins are set at 
a point in time and evolve over time. Namely, what is the appetite of global inves-
tors to add further to their dollar portfolios to fund the distance between those 
two curves at a given relative price?
We’ve heard one set of reasons from David Folkerts-Landau why that appetite 
might be large and growing so as not to force adjustment in those two curves any 
time soon. But another, related explanation has also been popular. The dollar share of 
the global portfolio may expand because either global economic growth has tilted to a 
region under diversified in dollar-denominated assets (as suggested by Michael Doo-
ley, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber, 2005) or because financial globaliza-
tion has been reducing home bias over time (as suggested by Alan Greenspan, 2005).
Six Observations
This leads to two observations on the expansion of the global portfolio. First, 
we should remember that Bretton Woods I was much less stable than commonly 
believed. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) show that there was a wide array of multi-
ple currency regimes, as well as black-market trading, that put the exchange rates 
that mattered for trade and asset holding at values quite different from any official 
peg. And the differences were changeable. Moreover, inflation performance was di-
verse, implying large divergences in real effective exchange rates. To the extent that 
those mechanisms are less available today (in part because of the leveling effects of 
the globalization of financial markets), more pressure may be exerted directly on 
the spot exchange rate, making the maintenance of a peg more difficult. Hence, I 
wouldn’t bet that Bretton Woods II lasts as long as Bretton Woods I.
My second observation is that it is the relative change in home bias that mat-
ters for the change in the net dollar share in the global portfolio. But why would 
financial globalization act unequally on U.S. versus foreign investors? One possible 
answer sounds like a form of American triumphalism, in that our markets were in-
tegrated first and now others are catching up. But that seems inconsistent with the 
observation that the extent of home bias in U.S. portfolios still seems large. Anoth-
er possible answer is that we’ve got the wrong model of portfolio determination. 
Rather than the outcome of investors smoothing  consumption, we may be seeing 
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an increased demand for collateral that is both protected by a well-established 
rule of law and that performs well at a time of financial stress. Creating those in-
struments is something that the United States is very good at, as witnessed by the 
widespread acceptance of our currency and government securities.
Recognize how this argument turns the usual concerns about a disorderly ad-
justment on their head. In this world, elevated volatility and financial market 
strains associated with a potential downdraft in the foreign exchange value of the 
dollar would actually strengthen the demand for the dollar assets that serve as 
good collateral at a time of stress. I’m not suggesting that such flight-to-safety 
demands would roll back all the expectational effects that might push up yields 
were the exchange rate to slide sharply, but they would seem to be a blunting 
force not captured in traditional models, and ones that would work on different 
asset classes differently.
While on the subject of the role of assets, I believe, as my third observation, 
that an important role for assets in shaping behavior may have an ambiguous effect 
on the nature of the adjustment of imbalances. We’ve seen one side of that: There 
has been a recent recognition on the effect of exchange rate changes on the value 
of the gross portfolio (as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004, and Gournichas and 
Rey, 2006). Both U.S. and foreign investors hold dollar-denominated obligations, 
so that dollar depreciation lowers net U.S. debt. However, U.S. net debt is also a 
part of foreign wealth. Thus, dollar depreciation raises U.S. net wealth and lowers 
foreign net wealth. If wealth and income effects are important in determining ex-
port and import demands, there is an offsetting drag to any direct benefit of lower 
indebtedness (as in the shifts depicted in Figure 4). The pressure of this offset is 
THE EFFECTS OF OFFSETTING CHANGES IN RELATIVE PRICES 
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probably why researchers who include the gross balance sheet in their analyses find 
that the consequences for exchange rate adjustment need not be large.
Co-movements among the other margins shaping the external imbalance should 
importantly influence your view on the nature of the adjustment process. One 
source of concern, as in observation 4, is that in the United States the two key rel-
ative price margins may be related. A signal feature of U.S. economic performance 
has been the step-up in the growth of manufacturing productivity over the past 
decade (Figure 5). The good news is that faster productivity growth in manufac-
turing works to keep U.S. traded goods competitive with those from abroad. The 
bad news is that it also makes nontraded goods and services potentially relatively 
more expensive at home, encouraging demand for imports and import-competing 
goods. For example, an increase in the growth of productivity manufacturing at 
an unchanged exchange rate might shift the import demand curve as in Figure 6. 
(This general equilibrium effect might be one reason we saw those two remarkable 
features of the U.S. economic experience over the past ten years – the pickup in 
productivity growth and the steepening slide of the current account deficit).
My fifth observation is that two key external margins may be related. In particu-
lar, a depreciation of the dollar that lowers the relative price of U.S. to foreign goods 
should encourage our exports and discourage our imports. But, from the perspective 
of our trading partners, this represents an adverse aggregate demand shock. If policy-
makers abroad are not prepared to offset this drag, their relative income growth will 
suffer to the detriment of global demand for U.S. goods. Under that scenario, the 
United States will get a larger relative slice of the pie of global demand, but the pie 
may have shrunken (which produces shifts in the two curves similar to Figure 4).
PRODUCTIVITY IN MANUFACTURINGFIGURE 5
SOURCE: IMF, World Economic Outlook.
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This leads to my sixth observation: Meaningful progress in reducing the U.S. 
imbalance cannot rely on change at a single margin. Some combination of rela-
tively faster growth of income and wealth abroad and technical progress at home 
biased toward nontraded goods would likely set the market backdrop associated 
with a decline in the price of traded goods and services produced in the United 
States relative to those produced abroad. If this process were gradual, resources 
could shift efficiently to take the fullest advantage of these changed circumstanc-
es, lessening the magnitude of the necessary adjustment.
Monetary Policy Implications
What does all this mean for monetary policy? I’d like to address three ques-
tions: How should policy respond to a gradual adjustment process? Can mon-
etary policy initiate the adjustment process? And how should policy respond to a 
sharp adjustment process and potential associated market strains?
From the perspective of the central bank, changes in the various margins dur-
ing a phase of gradual adjustment can be taken for just what they are – relative 
shifts in prices, income, and wealth. As long as inflation expectations remain con-
tained, relatively faster growth of the prices of imported goods for a time would 
be associated with a temporary bulge in overall inflation but would leave no sig-
nificant imprint on core inflation. In that case, maintaining the full utilization 
of resources will both facilitate the movement of inputs of production needed 
to meet new, relatively higher foreign demands and foster price stability. To the 
extent that inflation expectations and core inflation were not impervious to more 
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rapid import price inflation, policymakers would be confronted with the more dif-
ficult challenge of weighing the threats to their dual objectives – but in the United 
States that is the role the Congress assigned to them. Not to prejudge that balanc-
ing, the experience of the past few decades suggests that it is important to draw a 
firm line at preventing inflation from picking up on a permanent basis.
If this seems familiar, it should. I was reading from the playbook page headed, 
“Asset prices and monetary policy”.2 The price of an asset, x, matters for policy-
makers to the extent that it influences the outlook for aggregate demand and infla-
tion. Policymakers should respond systematically to that extent. To respond be-
yond that presumes a better understanding of asset prices than the market, risks 
the pursuit of the macroeconomic objectives, and could fail because the link be-
tween asset prices and the policy instrument is indistinct. Policymakers concerned 
about systemic strains should tackle the problem directly by strengthening finan-
cial regulation. 
If the process of gradual adjustment looks attractive, should monetary policy-
makers do something to initiate the adjustment? Here it is pretty clear that you’d 
be looking to the wrong set of policymakers. The conventional recommendation 
is that easier policy at home and tighter policy abroad will depreciate the home 
currency and make home-produced goods more attractive. But remember Alan 
Blinder’s admonition that we know the least about exchange rate determination 
and the observation that pass-through seems to have declined around the world.3 
Against that backdrop, it is in no way obvious that a central bank can be confident 
that it could get the adjustment process started in a meaningful way.
But even if the central bank could change the relevant relative price, would it 
necessarily improve the nation’s trade position? In fact, the effects on the scale vari-
ables determining the position of the import and export demand curves may offset 
the effects of the relative price change. Looser policy at home and tighter policy 
abroad should lead to wealth and income changes that encourage imports and dis-
courage exports, making the net effect ambiguous (which will be similar to the 
shifts already shown in Figure 4). The correct set of policies are those our modera-
tor opened with: consolidation of the balance sheets of households and the govern-
ment in the U.S. and structural reforms abroad.
Alan Blinder also asked us to re-think coordinated sterilized intervention yester-
day. Suppose it was, indeed, employed to try to get the process of weakening the 
currency started. There are two possibilities. On the one hand, if it were success-
ful, then subsequent monetary policy actions to stabilize the domestic economy 
would have to reverse some of those effects so as to keep inflation contained and 
2 See, for instance, Reinhart (2003).
3 Evidence on the decline of pass-through is given in Ihrig, Marazzi and Rothenberg (2006).
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resources at full employment, calling into question the credibility and consistency 
of policymakers. On the other hand, if market participants understand that some 
of the effects of a successful intervention would be rolled back by subsequent do-
mestic policy actions, the odds that the policy works to begin with would seem 
to be lowered.
Lastly, I got the sense that the organizers wanted me to address how monetary 
policy should respond to a sharp adjustment of imbalances and potential associ-
ated market strains. I’m not going there. It is unhelpful to speculate in public 
about low-probability events, in part because each episode is different. Despite 
that request, I do appreciate participating in this panel.
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1 Introductory remarks
T he debate on global imbalances is due mainly to the large and growing US current account deficit. In 2005 it amounted to an unprecedented USD 
805 billion (6½% of US GDP). Estimates by the IMF for this year and next 
do not indicate marked changes in the US current account position. The Unit-
ed States accounts for around ¾ of the global aggregate current account deficit. 
Not surprisingly, the corresponding current account surpluses are more broadly 
spread. Among the major surplus regions, Asian economies like Japan and China 
and oil-exporting countries play the most important roles. By contrast, the euro-
area’s current account position is roughly balanced, although significant heteroge-
neities can be detected at the national level. 
The current account positions of developed and emerging economies underwent 
marked shifts during the past few years. In 1998, the developed economies still had 
an aggregate current account surplus of USD 24 billion. In 2005, however, a current 
account deficit of USD 475 billion had emerged – predominantly caused by a wors-
ening US balance. In 1998, the emerging economies and developing countries still 
had an aggregate deficit of USD 116 billion; in 2005, they had a surplus of USD 406 
billion. Moreover, accumulation of currency reserves in emerging economies remains 
at a high level despite some slowdown in 2005. Total official currency reserves have 
more than tripled in the past ten years and almost doubled in the past four years.
2 The debate on sustainability
Given the global distribution of current account balances, developments at the glo-
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sustainability of the current configuration. This is consistent with the G7 statement we 
issued at the Washington meeting in April. So, let’s “Google Earth” the US economy.
The current account deficit in the US mirrors the low level of national saving. Net 
saving fell to a low-point of less than 1% of gross national income; a figure not reached 
since the Great Depression in the 1930s. By contrast, in 1998 the private saving rate 
was still as high as 6.5%. Household and public saving are both contributing to this 
development. In net terms, households’ personal savings were negative in 2005 for the 
first time since the 1930s. Net government savings fell from a surplus of USD 240 bil-
lion in 2000 to a deficit of USD 323 billion in 2005. National savings have been sup-
ported by a steep increase in corporate savings owing to undistributed profits. 
The large overall gap between national saving and investment of more than 6% 
of GDP corresponds, by definition, to the ballooning US current account deficit.
“Google Earthing” the global economy tells us that, up to now, funds have happily 
been supplied by the rest of the world. Will this continue? Or is it unsustainable? I 
tend towards the second camp. This immediately leads to the next question: If the US 
current account deficit unwinds, will it happen in an orderly or disorderly fashion?
2.1 Intertemporal considerations
A fruitful discussion of sustainability needs to be formulated in terms of intertem-
poral considerations. Simple intertemporal mechanics suggest that the trajectory of 
US current account dynamics is not sustainable. A net external debtor cannot carry 
on accumulating trade deficits indefinitely in any intertemporal model. Continua-
tion of current trends would likewise lead to a further massive increase in the USA’s 
net debtor position. As an example, a 6.5% current account deficit and 5% nominal 
GDP growth leads to a negative net external position of 130% of US GDP, neglect-
ing valuation effects. It would also imply an ever larger part of the US capital stock 
being in foreign ownership. This may also raise questions about political acceptance.
Given this background, it is justified to assume that adjustment will come, as 
what cannot go on forever will not go on forever and will eventually have to stop. 
The only question is “when and how?”. At this point, the relevance of differing 
positions becomes apparent and explanations of the causes of the US current ac-
count deficit become important. Moreover, these explanations are crucial for pos-
sible policy measures as the remedy applied depends on the particular ailment.
2.2  Explanations for the longer-term persistence
of the current imbalances
Several theories postulate that the accumulation of foreign debt by the US can 
go on for longer than commonly assumed. The explanations can be grouped un-
der the following headings:




—  Strength of the US economy
—  Bretton Woods II
—  Dark matter
These explanations each emphasise a different aspect of the fundamental de-
terminants of the current account. They can be pedagogically separated into at 
least three fields, which are, of course, highly interdependent and not mutually 
exclusive since the current account is an endogenous variable which mirrors de-
velopments on nearly all relevant markets. These fields are the trade view, product 
market view and capital market view.
The core of the globalisation argument is as follows: integrated global financial 
markets reduce home bias and allow financing of higher current account deficits 
than hitherto. This is undoubtedly correct in part, but not an argument for the sus-
tainability of the current configuration. Moreover, owing to possibility of herding, 
integrated capital markets may also complicate necessary processes of adjustment.
Proponents emphasising the inherent strength of the US economy argue that 
the attractiveness of US capital markets for global savings – due to high returns 
on capital owing to high productivity growth of the US economy – will continue 
to allow financing of deficits on the present scale. There is some truth in this 
argument, too, but it, likewise, is no argument against the simple intertemporal 
arithmetic. For example, even if US productivity growth were to permit nominal 
growth of 7%, the US net external debt position would show a massive increase 
before reaching a new steady state (over 90% of GDP in this case, compared to 
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130% were nominal growth only 5% on average, again neglecting valuation ef-
fects).
The Bretton Woods II argument postulates that the growing US savings gap can be 
financed without difficulty as long as the Asian (or other) central banks are willing 
to accumulate reserve assets denominated in US dollars. They will have an incen-
tive to do so as part of an export-based and exchange rate-driven growth strategy. In 
my view, drawing a parallel between BW I and BW II, however, overlooks some rel-
evant facts. Firstly, in the original Bretton Woods agreement, the United States was 
posting current account surpluses. Secondly, there are inherent high risks and costs 
of reserves accumulation that should be taken into account. Sterilisation gives rise to 
costs if interest rates at home are higher than abroad, non-sterilisation implies liquid-
ity risks and threat of inflation. Moreover, the accumulation of reserves is linked to 
high valuation risks in the event of depreciation. This may constitute a first mover 
problem, although, it has to be said that asset management considerations are not 
the primary motivation for central banks’ reserve holdings.
There is one last difference between BW I and BW II: in the euro, the current 
global financial system has a potential alternative reserve currency.
Last but not least, the dark matter hypothesis states that the US net asset posi-
tion is not being captured accurately in the statistics and that, if these supposedly 
unrecorded assets – called “dark matter” – are taken into consideration, the current 
account deficit all but disappears. As their starting point, proponents of the dark 
matter camp take the somewhat surprising fact that despite a recorded negative 
US external position of USD 2.5 trillion, US cross-border income flows have been 
positive, amounting to USD 36 billion in 2004. The favoured explanation is this: 
US financial assets are recorded inaccurately – the discrepancy vis-à-vis official fig-
ures being called dark matter – due to the US enterprises’ export of intangible as-
sets, such as brand names and expertise.
One immediate criticism of this explanation is that the a priori assumption
– that current account figures and net position are wrong, while the figures on cross-
border income are correct – is more than questionable. For example, the possible 
role of tax-induced profit-shifting by multinational groups can distort cross-border 
income figures. Moreover, it is probable that the positive sign of the net invest-
ment income is due to differentials in the average returns between US investments 
abroad and foreign investment in the USA as the IMF pointed out some time ago. 
This has been recently confirmed empirically by research of Lane and Milesi-Fer-
retti. Reasons for this can be found in structural differences between the portfolio 
of US assets abroad and US liabilities – with more equity instruments on the asset 
side and more debt instruments on the liability side – and valuation effects due to 
exchange rate movements and asset price developments. Finally, US cross-border 
income is highly volatile; last year, it amounted to no more than USD 1.6 billion 
making dark matter itself an extremely volatile concept.
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Summing up, in the final analysis, none of the theories put forward makes a 
convincing argument against the contention that there is a lack of sustainability 
in current global imbalances.
2.3 Empirical findings on effects of current account adjustments
Going back to my key hypothesis that what cannot go on forever will not go 
on forever leaves one point unanswered: will the unwinding of the current unsus-
tainable configuration be abrupt and disorderly and, if it is, what will the macr-
oeconomic consequences be?” 
Empirical studies of historical cases of sharp declines in current account defi-
cits do not provide us with clear cut answers. For example. while Croke, Kamin 
and Leduc, in a study by the Federal Reserve, discovered little evidence that past 
sharp current account adjustments in industrial countries resulted in cumulated 
economic stress, Sebastian Edwards found that sharp falls in the current account 
deficit do indeed tend to have a negative impact on growth. An inherent prob-
lem in studies of this kind, however, is that there is no historical precedent for 
the current situation with large and increasing deficits over a long period in the 
world’s most important economy.
3 What role can policy play?
In view of the risks, the existing uncertainties about the when and how of 
eventual adjustment are by no means justification for inaction. Especially in the 
current favourable international setting, prudent policy demands a gradual im-
plementation of adjustment mechanisms. This will be primarily a market process. 
However, policy can play a supporting role.
The unwinding of global imbalances is a joint task, as was also emphasised 
in the G7 statement in April 2006. This is all the more appropriate as empirical 
studies show that an adjustment through isolated channels is not very likely and 
would call for dramatic changes in the relevant variables and prices that are nei-
ther realistic nor desirable. Thus, the familiar three-pronged approach we reiter-
ated at the G7 meeting in Washington remains valid.
Adjustment measures in the US aiming to increase national savings are key. In 
that respect, despite a somewhat loose general relationship between fiscal deficits 
and the current account in empirical studies, budgetary consolidation in the US 
remains of paramount importance. According to a Fed study, a 1 pp reduction in 
the government deficit would lower the current account deficit by up to 0.2 pp. 
According to an IMF study, it would actually be reduced by as much as 0.5 pp. If 
the IMF is right, medium-term balancing of the budget would therefore reduce 
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the current account deficit by 2 pp. Furthermore, households’ savings in the US 
should perhaps be encouraged, although steering the private savings rate through 
political measures might prove difficult. Promoting energy saving could also play 
a part in bringing down the deficit considering that 2 pp of the US trade deficit 
alone (~1/3) is due to net imports of oil.
The Asian emerging economies and China, in particular, should likewise be aware 
of their responsibility in the unwinding of the global imbalances. Greater exchange 
rate flexibility will be needed as allowing appreciations would somewhat redirect 
growth strategy away from export orientation towards domestic demand. The recent 
Yuan revaluations are a welcome first step in the right direction.
There is an increasingly pressing need for a contribution by oil exporters. Oil-
exporting countries should think to increase domestic absorption by strengthening 
investment in their countries.
For Japan and Europe (especially Germany), there are mainly structural reforms 
on the agenda. The central focus should be on enhancing the long-term growth 
potential, while short-term measures do not promise lasting success.
3.1 Role of European monetary policy
Generally, although global imbalances call for multilateral solutions, Europe’s 
role is less important than that of USA, oil exporters and Asia/China.
Europe’s contribution consists of achieving greater absorption capacity. Crucial 
in this respect, however, are sustainable measures (structural reforms), not short-
term demand policy.
This has immediate consequences for the role of European monetary policy: it 
should provide the appropriate conditions to foster sustainable growth in the euro 
area. At the current juncture, that entails safeguarding price stability by anchoring 
long-term inflation expectations. As a matter of principle, there is no room for 
subordinating monetary policy to exchange rate objectives. Finally, monetary poli-
cy should speak out clearly about the need for structural reforms in the euro area.
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Getting the financial system to work well is critical to the success of an economy and is a key element in economic development. The financial sys-
tem is a coordinating mechanism that allocates capital to productive investment 
opportunities. If capital goes to the wrong uses or does not flow at all, the econo-
my will operate inefficiently and economic growth will be very low. 
Financial globalization, the liberalization of the financial system to open it up 
to inflows of foreign capital, has several important benefits in emerging market 
economies. First, it lowers the cost of capital, thereby encouraging investment 
which promotes growth. Second , when foreign capital and financial institutions 
are allowed to enter a country, they improve the allocation of capital. Third, glo-
balization of the financial system helps promote the development of better prop-
erty rights and institutions that make the domestic financial sector work better in 
getting capital to productive uses.2 
However, financial globalization is not necessarily always a force for good: it 
can go very wrong. Opening up the financial system to foreign capital flows can 
and has led to financial instability and disastrous financial crises, which have re-
sulted in great pain, suffering and even violence. (There was widespread ethnic 
1 An earlier version of this paper was entitled “Getting Financial Globalization Right”. This paper 
draws heavily on material in chapters 8-12 of my forthcoming book, The Next Great Globalization: How 
Disadvantaged Nations Can Harness Their Financial Systems to Get Rich.
I want to thank for their helpful comments, David Archer, Christian Broda, Jerry Caprio, Bill Easterly, 
Barry Eichengreen, Bob Flood, Ross Levine, Sergio Schmukler, Jane Tufts and participants in the World 
Bank Conference, Globalization and Financial Services in Emerging Market Countries. I also thank Emilia 
Simeonova for helpful research assistance.
Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author only and not those of Columbia University or 
the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
2 Recent surveys of the impact of financial globalization on growth include World Bank (2001), Levine 
(2004) and Schmukler (2004) and Mishkin (2005a, 2006). 
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violence in Indonesia after its crisis and in the wake of Albania’s financial crisis 
there were around 2500 casualties.) This is why financial globalization is so con-
troversial. Thus, the issue is not whether financial globalization is inherently good 
or bad, but whether it can be done right. 
This paper discusses policies to achieve successful financial globalization. It 
starts by discussing policies which are needed to end financial repression in emerg-
ing market countries, then discusses policies which can help promote financial sta-
bility and make financial crises less likely. It ends by outlining how the interna-
tional community can help encourage financial reform so that the full benefits of 
financial globalization in emerging market countries can be achieved. 
Promoting financial development 
In order to get a financial system that channels funds to those with the most 
productive investments, an emerging market country must end financial repres-
sion and promote financial deepening, that is increase the scale and development 
of the financial sector. But how can emerging market countries do this? They first 
need to develop an institutional infrastructure that enables the financial system to 
allocate capital efficiently. 
The basic principles for developing the institutional infrastructure that fosters 
financial development have been discussed extensively in the literature and I out-
line them briefly.3 
1  Develop strong property rights. Investments will not be undertaken if the 
fruits of the investment are likely to be taken away by the government or 
others, and so strong property rights are needed to encourage productive in-
vestment. Strong property rights are also necessary to create collateral which 
gives lenders confidence that they can cope with asymmetric information 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard they encounter when pro-
viding funds to borrowers. 
Property rights need to evolve over time to suit local conditions. De Soto 
(2000) describes how British property rights for land, which were based 
on a long-established title system, had to be modified to apply to the new 
lands in North America in the 18th and 19th centuries, illustrating that a 
system for defining property rights in one country may not work effectively 
in another. Rodrick (2003) has emphasized this point in discussing China’s 
recent approach to defining property rights. The Chinese government de-
cided to allocate property rights in a couple of nonstandard ways. First by 
3 Chapter 2 of Mishkin (2006) discusses these principles in far more detail. 
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developing the Household Responsibility System (HRS), in which local 
officials assigned land to individual households according to their size. Un-
der this plan, farmers could develop their land, produce food and sell it for 
their own profit, thus giving them the incentive to increase production. To 
increase manufacturing output, the Chinese government allowed the es-
tablishment of Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs), in which the owner-
ship rights to business were given to the local government of the township 
or village and not to individuals. Because the TVEs could keep the profits 
and use them to provide goods and services to the community, they now 
had an incentive to make good investments and be efficient. 
Although the TVEs and Household Responsibility System did not con-
fer private property right as we know them, they probably worked far bet-
ter in China at its early stage of development than more standard private 
property rights – standard private property rights would not have been en-
forceable because a legal system to enforce them was not in place. Indeed, 
having local governments own enterprises gave the local governments an 
incentive to make sure that the profits from these enterprises would not be 
appropriated by the central government or by officials of the central gov-
ernment. 
The experience in China raises an important theme in this paper. 
Institutions that work well in advanced countries may not always work 
well in developing countries; they may have to be adapted to the local 
environment. Even in China, what has worked in the past is less likely 
to work in the future. Their system of property rights needs to undergo 
changes because entities like the TVEs are often too small to be the en-
gine of economic growth. If China is to be successful in its next stage of 
development, it needs to establish a modern financial system to allocate 
funds to larger enterprises. The Chinese government must now create 
property rights based on the rule of law if it is to develop a modern fi-
nancial system. 
2  Strengthen the Legal System. An essential step in supporting strong property 
rights is a legal system that enforces contracts quickly and fairly. Such a 
legal system reduces moral hazard problems and encourages lending. For 
example, lenders write restrictive covenants into loan contracts to prevent 
borrowers from taking on too much risk, but such covenants only have 
value if they can be legally enforced. An inefficient legal system in which 
loan contracts cannot be enforced will prevent productive lending from 
taking place. If is too expensive to set up legal businesses or to get legal 
title to property, the poor will never get access to the legal system and so 
will be cut off from lending that could help them open up small businesses 
and escape poverty. 
218   Central banks in the 21st century
3  Reduce Corruption. Eliminating corruption is also essential to strengthen-
ing property rights and the legal system. When a corrupt official demands a 
bribe she reduces the incentives for entrepreneurs to make investments. The 
ability to buy off judges weakens enforcement of legal contracts that enable 
the financial system to function smoothly. 
4  Improve the quality of financial information. High quality financial informa-
tion is essential to well-functioning financial markets. If lenders cannot fig-
ure out what is going on in a firm, they will be unable to screen out good 
from bad credit risks or monitor the firm to ensure that it does not take on 
too much risk at the lender’s expense. In other words, if information is too 
asymmetric, the adverse selection and moral hazard problems will prevent 
profitable lending, and productive investment will not take place. To make 
information easier to get accounting standards must be high enough so that 
prospective lenders can make sense of what is in a business’s books. Also 
setting up standards for credit reporting to encourage the establishment of 
credit registries (also called credit bureaus), which share information about 
the credit history of prospective borrowers can be especially beneficial in 
increasing lending to households and small business borrowers.4 Rules also 
have to be enforced that require businesses to disclose information, so that 
prospective investors can make sensible decisions as to whether the business 
deserves to get their hard-earned money. 
5  Improve corporate governance. In order for people to be willing to buy stocks, 
which is another way of channeling funds to business, there must also be 
rules that make sure that the managers of corporations act in the stock 
holders’ interest. If managers find it easy to steal from the corporation, or to 
use funds for their own personal use rather than for the benefit of the com-
pany, no one will want to invest in the company. 
6  Get the government out of the business of directing credit. Too much gov-
ernment involvement in allocating credit also hinders the flow of funds 
to productive uses. State-owned financial institutions do not have incen-
tives to make profits and so are often willing to make loans to those who 
are politically connected rather than those whose investment will increase 
productivity. Similarly when governments allocate credit directly, it is 
likely to go to the politicians’ cronies or to business interests that support 
their campaigns. 
4 See World Bank (2001) Tullio Japelli and Marco Pagano (2001, 2003), Inter-American Development 
Bank (2005), for discussions of the benefits of credit registries. The empirical evidence finds that countries 
with credit registries have on average nearly nine percentage points greater financial development than coun-
tries that don’t. 
Financial stability and globalization: getting it right 219
Frederic S. M
ishkin
How financial globalization promotes
financial development 
If developing the institutions that make the financial system work well is so 
important to poorer countries’ well being, why doesn’t it happen? Setting up 
the infrastructure for an efficient financial system is by no means easy. In addi-
tion, powerful elites in countries often oppose the necessary reforms because it 
will weaken their power or allow other people to cut into their profits. How can 
poorer countries overcome these obstacles? 
Liberalizing the domestic financial system through financial globalization is 
one key way. Opening up to foreign financial institutions increases competition 
in the financial system. As domestic financial institutions start to lose business 
to better run and more trustworthy foreign institutions, they realize the need for 
a better legal and accounting infrastructure that will make it easier for them to 
minimize adverse selection and moral hazard problems as they seek out new cus-
tomers. Domestic financial institutions will be far more likely to advocate and 
support the reforms to make this happen. 
Allowing foreign financial institutions to operate in an emerging market coun-
try brings in expertise developed abroad. Bringing in best practices from other 
nations in areas such as how to screen good from bad credit risks and how to 
monitor borrower activities to reduce the amount of risk they take directly im-
proves the functioning of financial markets.5 Because of their familiarity with 
more advanced financial systems, foreign financial firms also are likely to increase 
the pressure on the domestic government to make reforms that will make the fi-
nancial system work more effectively. Opening up to foreign capital also has the 
benefit of directly increasing liquidity and lowering the cost of capital for those 
with productive investments to make.6 
The dark side of financial globalization:
financial instability 
Although financial globalization can generate huge benefits for emerging market 
countries by encouraging development of the financial system, it has a dark side: it 
can lead to financial instability and crises which have a devastating impact on the 
economy. In a now famous, but initially ignored, paper published in 1985, “Good-
5 This argument is made in World Bank (2001) and Goldberg (2004). 
6 When stock markets in emerging market countries are opened to foreign capital, dividend yields fall, 
there is an increase in average stock prices and liquidity goes up (Levine and Zervosm 1998, Bekaert, Harvey, 
and Lumsdaine (1998) and Henry, 2000a,b.) 
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bye Financial Repression: Hello Financial Crisis,” Chilean economist, Carlos Diaz 
Alejandro (1985), was way ahead of his time in warning of the dangers of financial 
globalization. Given a government safety net for financial institutions, particularly 
banks, liberalization and globalization of the financial system often encourages a 
lending boom which is fueled by capital inflows. Because of weak prudential super-
vision by bank regulators and a lack of expertise in screening and monitoring bor-
rowers, losses at banking institutions begin to mount. With a weak banking sector, 
the government can no longer raise interest rates to defend the domestic currency 
because doing so would cause even more distress in the banking sector and precipi-
tate a bank panic. Once market participants realize that the government no longer 
can defend the currency, they engage in a speculative attack, leading to a currency 
crisis and a large devaluation. Because so many firms in emerging market countries 
have their debt denominated in foreign currencies such as dollars, the currency col-
lapse produces a sharp increase in their indebtedness in domestic currency terms, 
while the value of their assets usually remains unchanged. The resulting destruction 
of firms’ balance sheets then makes it more difficult for the financial system to solve 
asymmetric information problems and lending to firms contracts sharply, leading to 
a seizing up of the financial system and often a devastating economic contraction.7 
Financial instability which follows financial liberalization and globalization cre-
ate two problems. The most obvious one is the economic hardship following the 
resulting crisis, which particularly hurts the poor (Halec and Schmukler, 2003). 
Second, is that the resulting financial instability gives financial globalization a bad 
name and can provoke a backlash against both financial globalization and liberali-
zation which retards financial development. 
Prudential regulation and supervision 
Since financial institutions like banks are at the core of what can go wrong 
and trigger financial instability, promoting financial stability to prevent financial 
crises must start with governments’ providing effective prudential supervision and 
regulation of the financial system. To do so requires implementation of several 
types of reforms.8 To understand what form these reforms might take, we need to 
7 The above dynamics of financial crises in emerging market countries is discussed in Mishkin (1996) and 
Chapter 4 of Mishkin (2006), while case studies of these crises are found in chapters 5-7 of Mishkin (2006). 
8 One area of prudential regulation and supervision that I do not discuss here is capital controls. Capital 
controls are highly controversial and would require an extensive discussion that I do have space for in this pa-
per. I do discuss them in Chapter 9 of Mishkin (2006). The conclusion that I reach is that in general capital 
controls are not to be recommended, although a form of prudential controls that would restrict how fast 
banks could expand their foreign borrowings could be beneficial. 
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draw on the experience that many countries have had with prudential supervi-
sion, which requires discussion of a fair amount of detail. We must not forget, 
however, that reforms in one country do not always work well in another. The 
details of the reforms may require substantial modification in particular circum-
stances, and so the reforms discussed below should not be viewed as a check-
list that every country has to follow exactly. Instead, they point to the direction 
where emerging market countries need to head in order to make financial glo-
balization work for them. 
1 Limit currency mismatch
Emerging market countries almost always suffer from currency mismatch, that 
is many firms have debt denominated in a foreign currency like the U.S. dollar 
(liability dollarization), while the value of their production and assets is denomi-
nated in their domestic currency. As we have seen in countries with currency mis-
match, currency crises and devaluations will trigger full-fledged financial crises 
by decimating the balance sheets of nonfinancial and financial firms.9 (This does 
not usually happen in industrialized countries because their debt is generally de-
nominated in domestic currency.) 
The economy would be far less prone to financial crises if the issuance of foreign-
denominated debt was discouraged, especially for firms that have their production 
sold in domestic markets.10 Although reducing foreign-denominated debt is not an 
unmixed blessing because it might prevent some firms from borrowing,11 there are 
strong reasons to believe that excessive liability dollarization is detrimental to the 
health of developing economies. Governments are more apt to bail out firms and 
banks when they all fail together and this is exactly what happens when firms have 
borrowed heavily in foreign currencies and the currency depreciates. Thus the gov-
ernment safety net encourages financial and nonfinancial firms to borrow in foreign 
currencies, even though this leaves the economy more vulnerable to financial crises.12 
9 Allen, Rosenberg, Keller, Setser and Roubini (2002), argue that “almost all recent crisis episodes were 
marked by currency mismatch exposures.” 
10 This is consistent with evidence in Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004) who find that more liability 
dollarization is associated with a higher probability of financial crises and more severe crises. 
11 De la Torre and Schmukler (2003) suggest that liability dollarization and currency mismatch may be 
a sensible way for firms to reduce risk. Thus limiting liability dollarization may have costs as well as benefits, 
implying that doing this right may be more complex than many advocates for restricting the use of foreign-
denominated debt recognize. 
12 See Levy-Yeyati (2003), Broda and Levy-Yeyati (2003), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) pro-
vide an additional reason for why liability dollarization may be excessive because firms that can borrow 
abroad in foreign currencies do not recognize the social value in providing insurance to domestic firms that 
do not have access to foreign borrowing. 
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Because so much of foreign-denominated debt is intermediated through the 
banking system, regulation and supervision to force banks to acknowledge and re-
duce the risk posed by currency mismatches could greatly limit liability dollariza-
tion and enhance financial stability.13 
Similarly, restrictions on corporate borrowing in foreign currency or tax poli-
cies to discourage foreign-currency borrowing could help make the economy bet-
ter able to withstand a currency depreciation without undergoing a financial crisis. 
Anne Krueger (2000), now the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, has 
even suggested that emerging market countries should make foreign-currency debt 
incurred by domestic firms unenforceable in domestic courts and that restrictions 
should be placed on financial institutions in industrialized countries to limit lend-
ing to emerging market countries using industrialized country currencies. Howev-
er, blanket restrictions or tax policies to discourage borrowing in foreign currencies 
may be too draconian because firms that have their production priced in foreign 
currency should be borrowing in foreign currency in order to limit their exchange 
rate risk.14 A more nuanced approach that focuses on systemic risk to the economy 
from currency mismatch, rather than just the amount of liabilities denominated in 
foreign currency, makes more sense. 
Another reason domestic residents in emerging market economies use foreign 
currencies from industrialized countries to denominate debt is because these cur-
rencies have more stable purchasing power and therefore less inflation risk than 
domestic currencies. If domestic residents have access to debt indexed to inflation, 
they would have an alternative way to lower their inflation risk and liability dollar-
ization would be less likely to occur.15 However, domestic residents can be provid-
ed with an alternative way to lower their inflation risk if they have access to debt 
indexed to inflation. With indexation, debt contracts would be denominated in an 
index unit tied to a price level index like the Consumer Price Index (CPI) so that 
when the price level rises, the nominal value of debt would rise one-for-one. With 
indexation, the real value of the debt in terms of goods and services would remain 
unchanged. In the 1960s, Chile developed an indexing unit (the Unidad de Fo-
13 Goldstein and Turner (2004) has an excelent survey of the literature on currency mismatches and pro-
vides additional recommendations to deal with currency mismatches. 
14 Goldstein and Turner (2004), for example, disagree with the Krueger proposal as being too draconian 
because the concern should be with currency mismatches rather than liability dollarization per se. In addition, 
restricting dollarization may lead to a reduction of financial deepening, both directly and because financial in-
termediation would move offshore (De Nicolo, Honohan and Ize (2003) and Inter-American Development 
Bank (2005), chapter 4). 
15 The argument here is for the indexation of financial contracts only. The indexation of other contracts, 
especially labor contracts, may have negative consequences as seen in Latin America in the 1980s. Indexed la-
bor contracts, which are typically indexed to past inflation, have the undesirable consequence of putting sub-
stantial inertia into the wage-setting process, thereby making it harder to wring inflation out of an economy. 
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mento, UF), and indexation of debt and other contracts became widespread. As a 
result Chile was able to avoid liability dollarization, despite having high and vari-
able inflation rates similar to other countries in Latin America that had very high 
liability dollarization.16 17 
2  Without proper institutional backup, do not adopt
deposit insurance
Deposit insurance, which protects depositors from losses when banks fail, orig-
inated in the United States. In 1960 only six countries had emulated the United 
States and adopted deposit insurance, but this began to change in the late 1960s, 
with the trend accelerating in the 1990s, when the number of countries adopting 
deposit insurance doubled to over 70. Despite its popularity, deposit insurance 
is mixed blessing. By decreasing the incentive for depositors to withdraw their 
money if the bank gets into trouble, it can prevent bank panics because deposi-
tors will no longer run on the bank. 
On the other hand, deposit insurance increases moral-hazard incentives for 
banks to take on excessive risk. Without adequate prudential regulation and 
supervision to reduce banks’ incentives to take on too much risk, deposit insur-
ance can increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of a banking crisis and 
this is exactly what has occurred in many emerging market countries. Research 
done primarily at the World Bank (Kunt and Enrica Detragiache, 2002, Kunt 
and Kane, 2002, Cull, Senbet, and Sorge, 2001, World Bank, 2001) has found 
that, on average, the adoption of explicit government deposit insurance is as-
sociated with more instability in the banking sector and a higher incidence of 
banking crises. Furthermore, it seems to retard financial development. How-
ever, these negative effects occur only in countries with weak institutional en-
vironments: an absence of rule of law, ineffective regulation and supervision of 
the financial sector, and rampant corruption. Again, this illustrates the point 
that policies that work in advanced countries may not work in developing 
countries. 
16 Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) find that dollarization is significantly lower in countries where indexa-
tion of contracts is prevalent. 
17 Private markets are rarely able to develop indexed debt contracts on their own, and so active govern-
ment involvement to encourage indexation seems to be required to develop indexed-debt markets. E.g., see 
Shiller (1997). (This has been true in the United States where markets in indexed debt did not start to de-
velop until the U.S. Treasury began to issue TIPS [Treasury Inflation Protection Securities] in January 1997). 
As has been carefully documented by researchers at the Central Bank of Chile (Herrera and Valdes, 2003), 
avoiding dollarization and the development of indexed debt markets in Chile was not easy: it was a long, 
slow process, which required both implementing regulations to encourage indexation and substantial issu-
ance of indexed debt by the Chilean authorities. 
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3  Restrict connected lending and prevent commercial
enterprises from owning financial institutions 
The financial sectors of many developing countries are rife with connected lend-
ing, loans made by financial institutions to their owners or managers, or to the 
business associates (and friends and family) of the owners or managers of the insti-
tution.18 This characteristic was instrumental in the 1994-95 collapse of Mexico’s 
financial system. Financial institutions have less incentive to monitor loans to their 
owners or managers, a situation that increases the moral hazard incentive for the 
borrowers to take on excessive risk. These risky loans expose the institution to po-
tential loan losses. In addition, connected lending in which large loans are made to 
one party can result in a lack of diversification for the institution, further increas-
ing the risk exposure of the bank. 
Restrictions on connected lending can take several forms.19 Most countries 
have regulations limiting connected lending and many developing countries 
have limits on the books that are stricter than those in industrialized countries, 
but these limits are often not enforced effectively. An IMF study published in 
1995 before the East Asian crisis (Folkerts-Landau, et al. 1995), found out that 
bank examiners in Asia were often unable to assess the amount of connected 
lending because they lacked the authority to trace to whom loans were made 
and because the banks hid the loans in dummy accounts. Strong efforts to in-
crease disclosure of connected lending and to increase authority for bank ex-
aminers to verify the accuracy of loan information is crucial to controlling this 
moral hazard. 
Having commercial businesses own large shares of financial institutions also 
increases the incentives for connected lending. The Korean financial crisis of 
1997 was caused in part by chaebols (large commercial conglomerates) owner-
ship of merchant banks, which were virtually unsupervised (Hahm and Mishkin, 
2000). The merchant banks supplied the chaebols with large amounts of money 
by borrowing abroad and lending the proceeds to them. As a result of the exces-
18 As documented in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Zamarippa (2003), 20% of all large loans outstand-
ing from 1995 to 1998 in Mexico had gone to bank directors, while these insider loans had interest rates that 
were 4 percentage point lower than those on other loans, a 33% higher default rate and a 30% lower recovery 
rate for collateral. 
19 Barry Eichengreen (2002), argues that restrictions on connected lending can hinder financial transac-
tions in emerging market countries because it may be the only effective way of structuring and enforcing fi-
nancial contracts in countries where the information and contracting environments are weak. There are infor-
mational and enforcement benefits that can accrue from family and other connections, and this is why it often 
makes sense to have interfamily lending and family control of businesses in poorer countries. However, con-
nected lending by banking institutions which have access to a government safety net leads to huge moral haz-
ard and excessive risk-taking that is very destructive, and this is why it needs to be restricted. 
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sive risk taking by the merchant banks, who were making risky loans to the 
chaebols, most of them became insolvent, and their insolvency was a key fac-
tor in the Korean financial crisis. Preventing commercial enterprises from own-
ing financial institutions is crucial for promoting financial stability in emerging 
market countries. 
4 Ensure that banks have plenty of capital
Requiring that banks have sufficient equity capital is another way to change 
the bank’s incentives to take on less risk. When a bank is forced to hold a large 
amount of equity capital, the bank has more to lose if it fails and is thus more 
likely to pursue less risky activities.20 
Bank capital requirements can take on two forms. The simplest type, the lev-
erage ratio, is based on the amount of capital divided by the bank’s total assets, 
while more complicated type of risk-based capital requirement, codified under 
the Basel Accord, requires banks to hold a certain amount of capital depending 
on the type of assets the bank holds and an assessment of how risky they are. 
Although the Basel Accord does encourage banks to reduce risk by making them 
hold more capital when they hold higher risk assets, it was designed for advanced 
countries’ banking systems and is not as effective for emerging market economies. 
For example, the Accord classifies government bonds as having the least risk of 
all bank assets. This may make sense in advanced countries where government 
bonds are extremely unlikely to ever experience a default, but this is certainly not 
true for government bonds issued by emerging market countries. In fact, a major 
factor in the banking crisis in Argentina was that the value of banks’ holdings of 
Argentine government bonds fell sharply when these bonds went into default. In 
addition, emerging market economies are subjected to much larger shocks than 
are advanced economies, and thus the increased risk that banks in these coun-
tries face indicates that the amount of capital they hold should be even larger. 
Thus bank capital requirements in emerging market economies need to be even 
more stringent than the international standards adopted by bank supervisors in 
advanced countries.21 
20 Bank regulations that restrict banks from holding particular risky assets such as common stocks or 
real estate are another means of ensuring that banks to not take on too much risk. Risk can also be reduced 
by regulations that promote diversification and prevent banks from concentrating loans to one large borrow-
er or to a particular class of borrowers. 
21 A counter to the view here is provided by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2005). The find little evidence 
that capital regulations improve bank stability, although they are cautious in interpreting this result. They, 
however, do take a stronger stance that regulatory restrictions have negative consequences for bank efficiency 
and stability in countries where property rights and political institutions are weak. Their evidence suggests 
that going too far in adopting regulatory restrictions in developing countries may be counterproductive. 
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5 Focus on risk management
The traditional approach to bank supervision has focused on the quality of the 
bank’s balance sheet at a point in time and on whether the bank complies with 
capital requirements. Although the traditional focus is important in reducing ex-
cessive risk-taking by banks, it alone may no longer be adequate. Financial inno-
vation has produced new markets and instruments that make it easy for financial 
institutions and their employees to quickly take on huge amounts of risk. In this 
new financial environment, an institution that is healthy today can be driven into 
insolvency extremely rapidly from trading losses. This point was forcefully demon-
strated by the failure of Barings Bank in 1995 which, although initially well capi-
talized, was brought down in a matter of months by the losses incurred by a rogue 
trader. An examination that focuses only on a financial institution’s balance-sheet 
position at a point in time may not be an effective indicator of whether a bank will 
be taking on excessive risk in the near future. 
Bank examiners in developing countries can help promote a safer and sounder finan-
cial sector by assessing how banks manage risk by evaluating: 1) the quality of the risk 
measurement and monitoring systems, 2) the adequacy of policies to limit activities that 
present significant risks, 3) the adequacy of internal controls to prevent fraud or unau-
thorized activities on the part of employees, and 4) the quality of oversight of risk man-
agement procedures provided by the board of directors and senior management. Once 
this assessment is completed, the bank supervisory agency should make sure that this 
information is disclosed to the public. By giving poor rankings to banks that are not up 
to speed on risk management, banking supervisors can make sure that best practice for 
risk management would spread throughout the banking industry in their country.22 
6 Encourage disclosure and market-based discipline
There are two problems with relying solely on supervisors to control risk-taking 
by financial institutions. First, financial institutions have incentives to keep infor-
mation away from bank examiners so these institutions are not restricted in their 
activities. Even if supervisors are conscientious, they may not be able to stop fi-
nancial institutions from engaging in risky activities. Second, supervisors may give 
into political pressure or be corrupt and not do their jobs properly. 
To eliminate these problems it would be better to have the impartial market 
discipline financial institutions if they are taking on too much risk. Disclosure 
22 More controversial is whether bank supervisors should recommend approaches to risk management. 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2005) suggest that the answer is no because giving increased discretionary powers 
to supervisors has not led to safer and sounder banks for the reasons discussed in the subsection on strong dis-
cretionary supervisory powers. 
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from financial institutions about the state of their balance sheet and the riskiness 
of their activities allows individual depositors or other creditors to monitor these 
institutions and withdraw their money if the financial institution takes on too 
much risk.
Disclosure requirements have one important advantage over capital require-
ments. If bank capital requirements are set too low, they will have little impact. 
If set too high, banks may try to evade them. Disclosure of a bank’s true balance-
sheet position can help the market discipline banks by not providing the bank with 
funds if it does not hold an adequate amount of capital. Similarly, disclosure of the 
extent of bank lending denominated in foreign currency can help limit the degree 
of currency mismatch. Depositors and other creditors will be more wary of putting 
their money in a bank if it is has lent extensively in dollars to firms that have their 
products denominated in the domestic currency so that a currency depreciation will 
result in a surge in bad loans. In addition, disclosure about the riskiness of banks’ 
other activities allows individual depositors or other creditors to monitor these in-
stitutions and withdraw their money if the financial institution takes on too much 
risk. 
Because financial institutions are able to take on more risk than many con-
ventional businesses and because they are typically provided with a government 
safety net, disclosure requirements need to go beyond the simple public issuance 
of conventional balance sheet and income statements. Governments need to hold 
bank directors and managers responsible for timely and accurate disclosure of a 
wide range of information on the quality of their assets, the amount of risk they 
are exposed to, and the procedures they use to manage risk. Recent evidence in 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2005) indicates that disclosures of this type are the 
most effective tool in promoting a safe and sound banking system. 
Two additional steps may also help increase market discipline. One would re-
quire that financial institutions have credit ratings. Part of the supervisory system 
implemented in Argentina in December 1996 was the requirement that every 
bank have an annual rating provided by a rating agency registered with the cen-
tral bank.23 Institutions with more than $50 million in assets were required to 
have ratings from two rating agencies. As part of this scheme, the Argentinean 
central bank was responsible for performing an after-the-fact review of the credit 
ratings to check if the rating agencies were doing a reasonable job. In addition, 
after January 1998, it was required that these credit ratings be placed on bill-
boards in the banks as well as appear on all deposit certificates and all other pub-
lications related to obtaining funds from the public. The lack of a credit rating or 
a poor credit rating would make depositors and other creditors reluctant to put 
23 See Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (1997) and Calomiris (1998) for detailed descriptions 
of the Argentine regulatory system. 
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their funds in a bank, thus giving the bank incentives to reduce its risk taking and 
boost its credit rating.24 The Argentine regulatory system worked extremely well 
in promoting a healthy banking system, until Argentina’s fiscal difficulties led to 
destruction of the banking system.25 
7 Allow entry of foreign banks 
Many developing countries have laws that prevent foreign banks from estab-
lishing branches or affiliates in their country. Instead of seeing foreign banks 
as a threat, their entry should be seen as an opportunity to increase the stabil-
ity of the financial system in general and the efficiency of the banking system 
in particular.26 
Foreign banks have more diversified portfolios and also usually have access to 
sources of funds from all over the world through their parent companies. This di-
versification means that these foreign banks are exposed to less risk and are less af-
fected by negative shocks to the home country’s economy. Because many emerging 
market and transition economies are more volatile than industrialized countries, 
having a large foreign component to the banking sector is especially valuable be-
cause it can help insulate the banking system from domestic shocks. Encouraging 
entry of foreign banks is thus likely to lead to a banking and financial system that 
is substantially less fragile and far less prone to crisis. In fact, data show that coun-
tries that allow foreign bank entry have more stable financial systems and fewer 
24 For a favorable assessment of the Argentine bank regulatory system before the crisis, see Calomiris 
and Powell (2001). 
25 Another way to impose market discipline on banks is to require that they issue subordinated debt (unin-
sured debt that is junior to insured deposits, but senior to equity). Subordinated debt, particularly if it has a ceil-
ing on its the spread between its interest rate and that on government securities, can be an effective disciplining 
device. If the bank is exposed to too much risk, it is unlikely to be able to sell its subordinated debt. Thus, com-
pliance with the subordinated debt requirement will be a direct way for the market to force banks to limit their 
risk exposure. Alternatively, deposit insurance premiums could be charged according to the interest rate on the 
subordinated debt. Not only would the issuance of subordinated debt directly help reduce incentives for banks to 
engage in risky activities, but it can also provide supplemental information to bank examiners that can help them 
in their supervisory activities. In addition, information about whether banks are successful in issuing subordinat-
ed debt and the interest rate on this debt can help the public evaluate whether supervisors are being sufficiently 
tough on a particular banking institution, thus reducing the scope of the principal-agent problem. A subordinat-
ed debt requirement does require that an emerging market country have sophisticated capital markets. However, 
Argentina did implement a subordinated debt requirement in its BASIC program, although without an interest 
rate cap, which took effect on January 1998. As reported in Calomiris (1998), initially about half of the banks 
were able to comply with this requirement. Interestingly, as expected, it was the weakest banks that had trouble 
issuing subordinated debt. Furthermore, banks that complied with the requirement had lower deposit rates and 
larger growth in deposits. Thus, the subordinated debt requirement looks like it has had the intended effect of 
promoting discipline on the banks (Calomiris and Powell, 2000). Calomiris (1998). 
26 See Levine (1996) and World Bank (2001) for a general discussion of the benefits of foreign bank entry. 
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episodes of financial crisis (Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Min (1999) and Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2005). 
Another reason to encourage entry of foreign banks is that this can encourage 
adoption of best management and prudential supervisory practices in the bank-
ing industry. Foreign banks come with expertise in areas like risk management 
and are typically more efficient than domestic banks.27 When bank examiners 
in a country see better practices in risk management, for instance, they can en-
courage the spread these practices throughout their country’s banking system 
by downgrading banks who do not adopt these practices. Having foreign banks 
demonstrate the latest risk management techniques can thus lead to improved 
control of risk in the home country’s banking system (Ross Levine (1996) Caprio 
and Honohan, (1999), and Mishkin, (2003).28 
Encouraging the entry of foreign banks makes it more likely that a failed 
bank’s uninsured depositors and creditors will not be bailed out.29 Govern-
ments are far less likely to bail out the banking sector when it gets into trou-
ble if many banks are foreign-owned because such a move will be politically 
unpopular (Kane, 2000). Thus uninsured depositors and other creditors will 
have greater incentives to monitor a bank’s practices and performance and will 
withdraw their funds if it takes on too much risk. The resulting increase in 
market discipline is likely to encourage more prudent behavior by banking 
institutions: foreign banks provide higher provisions for potential loan losses 
and have higher recovery rates for loans that go into default (Crystal, Dages 
and Goldberg, 2001).30 
27 Foreign banks have lower overhead costs than domestic banks than domestic banks and are thus able 
to operate with lower net interest margins (net interest income relative to assets) and still earn similar returns 
on assets. See Figure 10.5, page 133 in Inter-American Development Bank (2004). 
28 Levine (1996) and Caprio and Honohan (1999) point out that there are also benefits from the in-
creased competition that foreign bank entry brings to the banking industry in the home country.because it 
leads to improved management techniques and a more efficient banking system. 
29 In addition, because foreign banks do not have the same political connections as domestic banks, 
foreign bank entry seems to reduce political influence peddling in the financial sector (Kroszner (1998) and 
Calomiris, Klingebiel and Laeven, (2003)).
30 There are two concerns about the entry of foreign banks that seem unfounded. The first concern is 
that the entry of foreign banks might hurt small customers because it may cause the demise of small domes-
tic banks that specialize in lending to small businesses and individuals. However, although when domestic 
banks in Argentina were first acquired by foreign banks, they did not initially focus on consumer, mortgage, 
or property lending, over time they did begin to enter these businesses aggressively, thereby lowering interest 
rates for consumers (Clarke, Cull, D’Amato and Molinari (2000)). A second concern is that foreign banks 
may be more likely to cut and run during a crisis and thus could exacerbate financial crises. However, the 
opposite seems to be the case in emerging market countries like Argentina and Mexico, where the presence 
of foreign banks has stabilized credit flows during crises (Goldberg, Dages and Kinney, 2000, and Clarke, 
Cull and Martinez Peria, 2001). 
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Making prudential supervision work 
We would like to think that politicians and government official (the agents) work 
on behalf of the public (the principals), but this doesn’t take into account human 
nature. The principal-agent problem occurs because agents (politician or govern-
ment officials) have incentives to act in their own interest rather than in the pub-
lic (principal’s) interest. To act in the public’s interest, prudential supervisors (and 
regulators) have to limit currency mismatch, restrict connected lending, ensure that 
banks have enough capital, make sure that banks don’t take on too much risk and 
encourage disclosure. They also must not engage in regulatory forbearance, that is, 
allow financial institutions that are broke to continue to operate because it creates 
enormous incentives for banks to take on even more risk because they have almost 
nothing to lose. However, because of the principal-agent problem, prudential super-
visors have incentives to do the opposite. Bankers in developing countries may bribe 
these government officials to allow banks to skirt prudential regulations, or get poli-
ticians to lean on the supervisors to weaken regulations or look the other way when 
banks are not complying with them. The principal-agent problem, which has led to 
inadequate prudential supervision, has not only been at the source of financial insta-
bility in emerging market countries, but also has led to banking crises in most of the 
advanced countries, including the United States. 
What reforms can limit the principal-agent problem and ensure that prudential 
supervision will work? 
1 Implement prompt corrective action 
Quick action by prudential supervisors to stop undesirable activities by finan-
cial institutions and, even more importantly, to forgo regulatory forbearance and 
close down institutions that do not have sufficient capital, is critical if financial 
instability is to be avoided. An important way to ensure that bank supervisors do 
not engage in regulatory forbearance is implementing prompt corrective action 
provisions (first implemented in the United States in the 1991 FDICIA legisla-
tion) which require supervisors to intervene earlier and more vigorously to force fi-
nancial institutions to either clean up their act or close them down if they are close 
to insolvency. Prompt corrective action is crucial to preventing problems in the 
financial sector because it creates incentives for institutions to take on less risk in 
the first place: they know that if they take on more risk, they will be closed down 
quickly when they get into trouble. 
One key element in making corrective action effective is that supervisors must 
have an accurate assessment of the condition of the bank. Such accuracy is achieved 
by examining banks frequently and ensuring that they recognize their bad loans so 
that they are subtracted from the amount of capital on hand. It is particularly impor-
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tant that banks be prohibited from “evergreening”, a common practice in develop-
ing countries in which banks extend new loans to troubled borrowers who then pay 
back the old loan plus its interest with the new loan. In this way, the bank takes the 
old loan, which would otherwise be classified as non-performing, off its books and 
so does not have to record the loss and lower the value of its capital. 
Not only must weak institutions be closed down, but closure must be done in 
the right way: Funds must not be supplied to weak or insolvent banking institu-
tions to keep them afloat. The way to recapitalize the banking system is to close 
down all insolvent and weak institutions, and sell off their assets to healthy insti-
tutions. If getting healthy institutions to buy these assets is not possible, a public 
corporation, like the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) in the United States 
or KAMCO in Korea, can be created which will have the responsibility to sell off 
the assets of these closed banks. However, in order to put these assets quickly into 
productive use by the private sector, and so limit the losses, they need to be sold 
off as promptly as possible, as occurred in both Korea and the United States. 
It is also imperative that the government make clear and then make sure that 
stockholders, managers and large creditors will suffer large financial losses when 
financial institutions are closed and public funds are injected into the financial 
system. If managers, stockholders, and large uninsured creditors expect to be 
bailed out by the government (often the case in developing countries) they will 
have tremendous moral hazard incentives to take on risk. If their bets pay off, 
they win big, and if the bets fail, the government will cover (at least partially) 
their losses. 
Punishing the managers and owners of insolvent financial institutions is neces-
sary to generate public support for committing sufficient funds to clean up the fi-
nancial sector. In the United States, for example, owners of insolvent banking in-
stitutions such as savings and loans did incur substantial financial losses when they 
failed and sometimes were even thrown into jail aferwards. Such actions helped 
provide political support for the full clean up of the savings and loan and banking 
industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This rarely happens in developing coun-
tries, and even in advanced countries like Japan. The result has been that the public 
is often unwilling to support the injection of public funds into the banking system 
to get it fully back on its feet. In Japan, the public was outraged that owners of 
failed banking institutions (some of whom were criminal figures) got off scot free. 
The lack of political support for cleaning up the banking mess has been disastrous 
for Japan and is an important source of Japan’s economic stagnation. 
2 Limit Too-Big-To-Fail
Because the failure of a very large financial institution makes it more likely 
that a major, systemic financial disruption will occur, banking supervisors are 
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naturally reluctant to allow a big financial institution to fail and cause losses to de-
positors. The result is that most countries either explicitly or implicitly have a too-
big-to-fail policy in which all depositors at a big bank, both insured and uninsured 
are fully protected if the bank fails.31 The problem with a too-big-to-fail policy 
is that it increases the moral hazard incentives for big banks to take on excessive 
risk. Once large depositors know that a financial institution is too big to fail, they 
have no incentive to monitor the bank or pull out their deposits when it takes on 
too much risk. No matter what the bank does, large depositors will not suffer any 
losses. Because bank monitoring by depositors declines, banks are more likely to 
take on even bigger risks, making failures more likely.32 
This problem is even more severe in emerging market countries because their fi-
nancial systems are typically smaller than those in developed countries and so tend 
to be dominated by fewer institutions which are even larger relative to the size of 
the economy, increasing the likelihood that they will be considered too big to fail. 
Furthermore, the government connections and political power of large financial 
institutions is often much greater in emerging market countries, making it more 
likely that they will be bailed out if they experience difficulties. Indeed, other cred-
itors and stockholders, as well as uninsured depositors, in many emerging market 
countries have been protected in many emerging market countries when large in-
stitutions have been subject to failure. 
Limiting moral hazard that arises when financial institutions are too-big or too-
politically-connected to fail is a critical part of prudential supervision in emerging 
market countries. To discourage large institutions from taking on excessive risk, 
prudential supervisors need to scrutinize them even more rigorously than smaller 
ones and, at a minimum, must allow shareholders and managers to suffer losses 
when these institutions are insolvent. 
The same incentives clearly apply to non-financial companies if they are con-
sidered to be too-big-to- or too-politically-influential-to fail) by the government. 
Lenders, knowing that they are unlikely to be subjected to losses if a company gets 
into trouble, will not monitor the company and call in its loan if it is taking on 
excessive risk. In many emerging market countries, governments have propped up 
large and politically-connected companies when they suffer financial distress and 
this has been a source of increased risk taking by these companies, especially when 
they face difficult times. Indeed, the too-big-to-fail policy for the chaebols (con-
glomerates) was a key factor generating the financial crisis in Korea. 
31 For an excellent discussion of the too-big-to-fail problem, see Stern, and Feldman (2004). Mishkin 
(2005b) indicates, however, that although the too-big-to-fail problem is important, it is not the dominant 
problem for bank supervisors, as the Stern and Feldman book seems to suggest. 
32 See Boyd and Gertler (1993), for evidence, that even in advanced countries like the United States, 
large banks take on riskier loans than smaller banks. 
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To eliminate incentives for the corporate sector to take on too much risk, too-
big-to-fail policies must be eliminated for this as well as the financial sector. This 
implies a greater separation between the corporate sector and the government, 
something that requires a change in the business culture of many emerging mar-
ket countries. 
3  Give adequate resources and statutory authority
for prudential regulators/supervisors 
In many emerging market countries, prudential supervisors are not given suf-
ficient resources or statutory authority (the legal ability to issue cease and desist 
orders and to close down insolvent banks) to do their jobs effectively. In close to 
40% of developing countries, supervisors can be held personally liable for their 
actions.33 In addition, their salaries are generally very low relative to those paid 
in the private sector. In India, for example, bank supervisors in the late 1990s 
typically had a salary of $3000 (plus some additional housing benefits), while a 
comparable position at the assistant vice president level in a private sector bank 
was paying $75,000.34 While the problem of low public sector pay relative to the 
private sector exists in rich countries, it is far less severe. When I was an execu-
tive at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, I worried that its employees could 
often double or triple their salaries by moving to the private sector, not increase 
their income by a factor of twenty-five! 
Without sufficient resources and incentives, supervisors will not adequately 
monitor the activities of banks and their managers. Indeed, absence of sufficient 
monitoring of banking institutions has occurred in many emerging market coun-
tries, and in industrialized countries. For example, the U.S. Congress’s resistance 
to providing the savings and loan supervisory agencies with the resources to hire 
an adequate number of bank examiners was a key factor in making the S&L crisis 
in the 1980s much worse. 
Giving supervisors sufficient resources and statutory authority to do their jobs 
is thus critical to promoting a safe and sound financial system that is resistant to 
financial crises. Ruth Krivoy (2000), who was the president of Venezuela’s central 
bank during its banking crisis in 1994 and saw the supervisory process in Venezue-
la from the inside has put it nicely by saying that supervisors in emerging market 
countries must be given “respect”. If they are paid poorly, they will be more easily 
33 Barth, Caprio and Levine (2005) indicate that in their sample supervisors in one-third of all the 
countries are subject to lawsuits for doing their jobs and that the percentage is higher for developing coun-
tries. In private correspondence, Gerard Caprio informed me that 50 of 105 developing countries have their 
supervisors subject to lawsuits (38%) while this is true for only 15 of 45 industrialized countries (33%). 
34 These figures come from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2005), Chapter 2. 
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bribed either directly or through promises of high paying jobs by the institutions 
they supervise. Making supervisors personally liable for taking supervisory actions 
also makes it less likely that they will take the appropriate actions. Furthermore, if 
they do not have sufficient resources to monitor financial institutions, particularly in 
information technology, then they will be unable to spot excessive risk taking. 
Adequate government funds for supervisors to close down insolvent institutions 
is also needed to make prompt corrective action work. Politicians and regulatory 
authorities often engage in wishful thinking when the banking system is in trouble 
and hope to avoid a large injection of public funds to save the banking system. 
Such regulatory forbearance allows insolvent institutions to keep operating with 
disastrous consequences. 
4 Give independence to regulatory/supervisory agencies 
Because politicians often lean on prudential supervisors to not do their jobs, the 
bank regulatory/supervisory agency must be sufficiently independent from the po-
litical process so that it will not be encouraged to sweep problems under the rug and 
engage in regulatory forbearance. Providing supervisory agencies with adequate re-
sources also will help promote their independence. If supervisory agencies have to 
come hat in hand to the government for the funds to close down insolvent institu-
tions, they will be more subject to political pressure to engage in regulatory for-
bearance. Supervisors must have adequate financial resources at their finger tips to 
prevent this from occurring. 
5 Make supervisors accountable 
Giving independence to prudential supervisors is not an unmixed blessing. The 
principal-agent problem indicates that supervisors will not always act in the pub-
lic’s interest. They not only have incentives to do the bidding of bankers and poli-
ticians and not enforce regulations to restrain bank risk-taking, but also have in-
centives to engage in regulatory forbearance and hide problems of insolvent banks 
and hope that the situation will improve, a behavior that Edward Kane (1989) has 
characterized as “bureaucratic gambling”. 
To improve incentives for them to do their job properly, supervisors must 
be held accountable if they engage in regulatory forbearance.35 Opening up 
35 For example, as pointed out in Mishkin (1997), an important but very often overlooked part of the 
U.S.’s FDICIA legislation which has helped make it effective is that there is a mandatory report that the su-
pervisory agencies must produce if the bank failure imposes costs on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC). The resulting report is made available to any member of Congress and to the general public 
upon request, and the General Accounting Office must do an annual review of these reports. 
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the actions of bank supervisors to public scrutiny makes regulatory forbear-
ance less attractive to them, thereby reducing the principal-agent problem. 
In addition, politicians will be less likely to lean on supervisors to relax their 
supervision of banks when the reasons for supervisory actions are visible to 
the public. To get supervisors to do their jobs properly, supervisors must also 
be subject to criminal prosecution if they are caught taking bribes and must 
also be subject to censure and penalties if they take jobs with institutions that 
they have supervised recently. In many emerging market countries, supervi-
sors are allowed to get too close to the institutions they supervise and go to 
work for the institutions they have been supervising almost immediately after 
leaving the supervisory agency. 
6 Strong discretionary supervisory powers may backfire 
The new Basel Accord for bank supervision (known as Basel II) has strength-
ening of official supervision as one of its three major pillars. (The other two are 
minimum capital requirements and strengthening market discipline.) Giving su-
pervisors stronger discretionary powers (such as forcing a bank to change its in-
ternal organizational structure, suspend dividends, stop bonuses, decrease man-
agement fees, remove and replace managers and directors, and so on) provide 
supervisors with a stick to force banks to comply with regulations and to con-
strain them from engaging in risky behavior. 
However, giving supervisors these powers is beneficial only if they are acting 
in the public interest (that is, the principal-agent problem is small). In countries 
with a strong rule of law, an active free press that holds supervisors accountable 
for their actions, and relatively high wages for supervisors, supervisory powers 
are far more likely to be used in the public interest. What works well in rich 
countries with strong institutional environments, however, may not work in the 
weaker institutional environment found in developing countries. Instead of act-
ing in the public interest and being a “helping hand”, supervisors may instead 
act in their own interest and be a “grabbing hand”. An important new book by 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2005) uses a unique data base on bank supervisory 
practices throughout the world compiled by the World Bank to see whether su-
pervisors act as a helping hand or a grabbing hand. In rich countries, supervi-
sors generally help; in developing countries they generally grab. The statistical 
evidence suggests that in developing countries, strengthening the discretionary 
powers of supervisors has led to lower levels of bank development, greater cor-
ruption in lending, and banks that are less safe and sound. Following the Ba-
sel II recommendation of strengthening supervisory powers, then, may do more 
harm than good in developing countries, unless it is accompanied by substantial 
progress in institutional development. 
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Should we just throw up our hands and give up on prudential supervision in 
developing countries with weak institutional environments? Clearly not. Measures 
to make prudential supervision effective need to be high on policymakers agenda. 
But since instituting effective and accountable prudential supervision takes time, 
giving strong statutory powers to supervisors may have to be sequenced. For coun-
tries with weak institutional development, prudential supervision may need to fo-
cus less on telling banks what to do and more on encouraging market discipline by 
making sure banks comply with disclosure requirements: that is, make sure that 
information provided by financial institutions is both accurate and sufficient. Only 
when the institutional environment improves so that supervisors are accountable 
for doing their jobs properly, should supervisors be given discretionary statutory 
powers. 
7 Get the government out of the banking business
We have already seen that because state-owned banks do not have the incentives 
to allocate credit to productive uses, a banking sector dominated by state-owned 
banks results in less efficient investment and slower growth. State-owned banks 
also weaken the banking system. The absence of a profit motive means that they 
are less likely to manage risk properly and be efficient. State-owned banks typical-
ly have larger loan losses than private institutions, and countries with the highest 
share of state-owned banks, on average, are also the ones with a higher percentage 
of non-performing loans and higher operating costs.36 
The inefficiency of state-owned banks and their higher loan losses strongly 
argue for privatization of the banking sector. However, even privatization must 
be managed properly or it can lead to disaster. If purchasers of banks are those 
who are likely to engage in excessive risk taking or even fraud, the possibility 
that banking problems will arise in the future are high. Also if purchasers of 
banks are allowed to put in very little of their own capital into the bank (as 
happened in Mexico), then they may also have strong incentives to engage in 
risky activities at the depositors’ and taxpayers’ expense. If corporations are al-
lowed to purchase banking institutions (as occurred in South Korea), they are 
more likely to make connected loans which in turn are more likely to end in 
default. The potential downsides of privatization do not indicate that privati-
zation be avoided, but rather that the chartering or licensing process be suf-
ficiently stringent to screen out bad owners and ensure that bank ownership 
goes to individuals who will improve bank performance over the previous gov-
ernment managers. 
36 For additional reasons why the government should get out of the banking business, see Goldstein and 
Turner (1996), World Bank (2001) and Barth, Caprio and Levine (2005). 
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Managing the overall economy 
So far I have outlined reforms which focus on the details of how to develop a 
financial system that is less prone to crises. But there is a bigger picture of how 
the overall economy needs to be managed to prevent financial instability. 
1 Financial liberalization should be sequenced 
Although deregulation and liberalization are highly desirable objectives, if 
this process is not managed properly, it can be disastrous. If the proper bank 
regulatory/supervisory structure, accounting and disclosure requirements, re-
strictions on connected lending, and well-functioning legal and judicial systems 
are not in place when liberalization comes, the appropriate constraints on risk-
taking behavior will be far too weak. The result will be that bad loans are likely, 
with potentially disastrous consequences for bank balance sheets at some point 
in the future. 
In addition, before liberalization occurs, banks may not have the expertise to 
make loans wisely, and so opening them up to new lending opportunities may 
also lead to loan portfolios of poor quality. Opening up to foreign capital inflows 
often leads to a lending boom, because of increased resources for bank lending 
and because it promotes financial deepening in which more funds flow into the 
banking system. Although financial deepening is a positive development for an 
economy in the long run, in the short run the lending boom may outstrip the 
available information resources available in the financial system and promote a 
financial collapse in the future. 
The dangers in financial deregulation and liberalization do not imply that 
countries would be better off by rejecting a liberalization strategy. To the contrary, 
financial liberalization and globalization are critical to the efficient functioning 
of financial markets so that they can channel funds to those with the most pro-
ductive investment opportunities. Getting funds to those with the most produc-
tive investment opportunities is especially critical to emerging market countries 
because these investments can have especially high returns, thereby stimulating 
rapid economic growth. 
To avoid financial instability, policymakers need to put in place elements of a 
proper institutional structure before fully liberalizing their financial systems, es-
pecially if there are no restrictions on financial institutions seeking funds abroad 
or issuing foreign-denominated debt.37 Crucial to avoiding financial crises are the 
precepts outlined above: limits on currency mismatch, restrictions on connect-
ed lending, requirements for adequate bank capital, an appropriate focus on risk 
37 Goldstein (1998) provides a strong argument for sequencing.
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management, adequate disclosure and encouragement of market-based discipline, 
adoption of prompt corrective action, limits on too big to fail, provision of ade-
quate resources and statutory authority to bank supervisors, independence of bank 
regulators/supervisors from short-run political pressure, increased accountability of 
bank supervisors, elimination of stateowned banks, and encouragement of entry of 
foreign banks. 
There is an important counterargument to the view that the above reform 
measures need to be fully put in place before financial liberalization takes place. 
Because, as we have seen, powerful elites in emerging market countries often op-
pose reforms to improve the working of the financial system, many countries do 
not pursue reforms before they undertake financial liberalization. A staged ap-
proach may provide policymakers with an excuse for prolonging bad policy (Ir-
win, Gilbert and Vines, 2004). Politicians who benefit from status quo are willing 
to agree in principle to reforms, but emphasize practical difficulties. Sequencing 
arguments then may be little more than a ploy for attracting assistance without 
implementing difficult policies. Instead it is the opening up of the financial sys-
tem that provides the impetus behind reform. In a study of financial liberaliza-
tions, Kaminsky and Schmukler, (2003) find that in only 18% of countries does 
the rule of law improve before financial liberalization, while it improves in 64% 
after the liberalization. This same study also found that financial liberalization is 
followed by more volatility in business cycles, but leads to more stability in the 
long run.38 
Because financial liberalization may still be worth pursuing even if the necessary 
reforms are not already in place or because they take time to install and because of 
the stresses that rapid expansion of the financial sector puts on both managerial 
and supervisory resources, restricting the growth of credit when financial liberali-
zation is put into place makes a lot of sense. Such restrictions can take the form of 
putting upper limits on loan-to-value ratios, or for consumer credit, setting maxi-
mum repayment periods and minimum downpayment percentages. Banks could 
also be restricted in how fast certain types of loans in their portfolios are allowed 
to grow. In addition, at the beginning of the liberalization process, restrictions on 
foreign-denominated debt and prudential controls that might limit capital inflows 
may be necessary to reduce the vulnerability of the newly-liberalized financial sys-
tem. As the appropriate infrastructure is put into place, these restrictions then can 
be reduced. 
The bottom line is that, although eventually a full financial liberalization is a 
worthy goal, to avoid financial instability financial liberalization may have to be 
phased in over time, with some restrictions imposed along the way. 
38 A similar result is also found in Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann, (2005).
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2  Fiscal policy should be reformed to prevent excessive 
budget deficits
Although most of the financial crises in recent years have been triggered by de-
ficiencies in the financial system, the Argentine crisis of 2001-2002 demonstrates 
that even a prudential regulatory and supervisory system that effectively restricts 
risk taking may not be enough to prevent devastating crises if fiscal policy spins 
out of control.39 Fiscal reform to ensure that this doesn’t happen is thus anoth-
er key to preventing financial crises in emerging market countries. Fiscal reform 
takes several forms. 
First, provincial or state governments must not be bailed out by the cen-
tral government when they can’t pay their bills. Knowing that the central gov-
ernment will come to the rescue, the provinces (states) then have every incen-
tive to overspend because they can put the burden onto the taxpayers in other 
provinces. This is just another manifestation of moral hazard and the free-rider 
problem at work, but in this case it applies to governments and not the pri-
vate sectors. When provinces spend far more than their revenue and then go to 
the central government to fund their deficits, the central government will print 
money to pay the bills of the provinces (leading to hyperinflation), or it can 
lead to a default on the government debt which triggers a financial crisis. Both 
outcomes have occurred in Argentina. 
Having a no-bail-out rule for state and local governments is therefore a critical 
reform for emerging market countries in which the consequences of high govern-
ment fiscal imbalances can trigger a financial crisis. Alternatively, budget rules 
can be set up for state and local governments, preventing them from running 
large deficits. Indeed, this is exactly what the members of the European Mone-
tary Union have done with their Growth and Stability Pact which limits member 
states to maximum budget deficits of 3% of GDP. However, as has become clear 
in Europe recently with France and Germany violating this limit, enforcement of 
budget rules of this type may not be easy. 
Another necessary reform to keep fiscal imbalances from triggering crises is 
budget rules that increase transparency. Fiscal policy gets out of control in emerg-
ing market countries because the government’s fiscal accounts are nontransparent. 
If the public has no idea what the government is spending – a clear cut informa-
tion asymmetry – then it is hard for them to constrain politicians who can spend 
money on projects that reward their family, friends or constituents who will fill 
the politicians campaign coffers. Such “pork barrel” spending is not restricted just 
39 E.g., see Mussa (2002), Jonas (2002), De la Torre, Eduardo Yeyati, and Schmukler, (2003) and Chap-
ter 7 of Mishkin (2006). 
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to emerging market countries, but occurs in advanced countries as well. There is 
typically far less transparency in emerging market countries, however, and this is 
why their fiscal problems are generally far worse.
Increasing transparency by eliminating numerous special accounts and consoli-
dating all fiscal activities under one bottom-line measure that summarizes the total 
government budget situation is one step in this direction. In addition, fiscal rules, 
like balanced budget amendments, can be put in place to ensure fiscal responsibil-
ity. However, rules of this type can be manipulated and thus require a high degree 
of budget transparency to work. Also giving more power to chief executives or fi-
nance ministers to control spending can help to constrain the tendencies of differ-
ent parts of the government to push their pet spending projects,40 which otherwise 
would lead to large budget deficits.41 
3  The monetary policy framework should promote
price stability 
It is important to recognize that monetary policy can play an important role 
in promoting financial stability. Price stability which entails a low inflation rate is 
a worthy goal in its own right. Not only do public opinion surveys indicate that 
the public is very hostile to inflation, but there is also strong evidence that infla-
tion is harmful to the economy. Inflation, particularly at high levels, is found to be 
negatively associated with growth, while at lower levels, inflation is found to lower 
the level of economic activity, although not necessarily the growth rate.42 Empiri-
cal evidence also indicates that price stability helps promote financial deepening, 
with all the benefits it brings, such as a lower cost of capital, higher economic 
growth and a reduction of poverty (Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001) and Kamil 
and Izquierdo (2004). 
Our understanding of the causes of financial crises provides additional reasons 
why price stability is so important. When countries have a past history of high 
inflation, debt contracts are often denominated in foreign currencies (De Nicolo, 
Honohan and Ize, 2003, and Inter-American Development Bank, 2005, and Ho-
nig, 2003), a factor that makes the financial system more fragile because currency 
depreciation can trigger a financial crisis. Achieving price stability is a necessary 
condition for having a sound currency, and with a sound currency, it is far easier 
for banks, nonfinancial firms and the government to raise capital with debt de-
40 Evidence that giving more power to chief executives or finance ministers to control spending produces 
better fiscal outcomes can be found in Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes, and Stein (1996) and von Hagen and 
Harden (1994). 
41 For further discussion of fiscal reforms, see Poterba and von Hagen (1999). 
42 See the survey in Anderson and Gruen (1995) and Fischer (1993), one of the most cited papers in this 
literature. 
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nominated in domestic currency. Israel, for example, went from above 50% dol-
larization of its bank deposits in the mid 1980s to less than 10% by the mid 
1990s after a decade of achieving low and stable inflation and fiscal consolidation 
(Galindo and Leiderman, 2003). Thus another method for reducing an econo-
my’s dependence on foreign-denominated debt and thereby reducing currency 
mismatches and enhancing financial stability is the successful pursuit of price sta-
bility. 
What reforms can help emerging market countries achieve price stability? The 
fiscal reforms mentioned above are key because if fiscal imbalances get too large, 
governments resort to printing money to finance their deficits, and inflation will 
take off. Indeed, the primary reason that emerging market countries often have 
such a bad historical experience with inflation is because they have so often pur-
sued irresponsible fiscal policy. Central banks also need to be insulated from the 
political process because politicians typically focus on the short-run creation of 
jobs and often push central banks to pursue expansionary policy to create them. 
The result is that inflation rises, which harms the economy in the long-run and 
thus eventually hurts workers rather than helping them. Granting the central 
bank independence so that it can set monetary policy instruments without politi-
cal interference can help it to focus on the longer-run goal of containing infla-
tion. In addition, giving the central bank a mandate to pursue price stability as 
its overriding, long-run goal can provide more political support for the central 
bank to control inflation. Also, as I have advocated in a large body of my research 
(Mishkin, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, forthcoming, Mishkin and Miguel Savas-
tano, 2001, Schmidt-Hebbel and Mishkin, 2002, Jonas and Mishkin, 2005, and 
Bernanke et al., 1999), having the government and the central bank commit to 
achieving an explicit numerical goal for inflation (an inflation target) can help an-
chor inflation expectations and increase the probability that the central bank will 
pursue the price stability goal seriously. The improved control of inflation and 
the resulting reduction of liability dollarization promotes financial stability. 
4 Pegging the exchange rate can be dangerous 
Pegged exchange rate regimes, in which the domestic currency is pegged to a 
foreign currency like the U.S. dollar, have often been used by emerging market 
countries to promote price stability. Although often successful in bring inflation 
down, pegged exchange rate regimes have been a common element in emerging 
market countries that have experienced financial crises. A pegged exchange rate 
regime appears to encourage liability dollarization, which makes the economy 
highly vulnerable to harmful effects from depreciation of the domestic currency. 
By providing a more stable value of the currency, an exchange-rate peg can lower 
the perceived risk for foreign investors and thus encourage capital inflows. Al-
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though these capital inflows might be channeled into productive investments and 
stimulate growth, the presence of a government safety net and weak bank supervi-
sion can lead instead to excessive lending. An outcome of the capital inflow is then 
likely to be a lending boom, an explosion of non-performing loans and an even-
tual financial crisis. 
A pegged exchange rate regime also can also make it easier for countries to 
tap foreign markets for credit and so make it easier for the government to en-
gage in irresponsible fiscal policy because it is easier for it to sell its debt. Ar-
gentina again provides a graphic example of this problem: when its fiscal policy 
became unsustainable, it provoked a disastrous crisis that pushed it into a great 
depression. 
Pegged exchange-rate regimes are subject to speculative attacks and if these at-
tacks are successful, the collapse of the domestic currency is usually much larger, 
more rapid and more unanticipated than when a depreciation occurs under a float-
ing exchange-rate regime. The pegged regime makes an emerging market economy 
especially vulnerable to twin crises, in which the currency collapse, destroys firms’ 
and households’ balance sheets, which then provokes a financial crisis and a sharp 
economic contraction. Countries exiting from pegged exchange rate regimes are 
more prone to higher-cost financial crises and large declines in output the longer 
the exchange rate peg has been in place (Aizenman and Glick, 2005, Eichengreen, 
1999, and Eichengreen and Masson, 1998). 
The dangers of pegged exchange rate regimes are so clear that most emerging 
market countries would be far better off avoiding exchange rate pegs and instead 
adopting a flexible exchange rate regime, in which the exchange rate is allowed to 
fluctuate on a daily basis. As the former First Deputy Managing Director of the 
IMF, Stan Fischer (2003), put it: “The adoption of flexible exchange rate systems 
by most emerging market countries is by far the most important emerging mar-
ket crisis prevention measure ...” A flexible exchange rate regime has the advantage 
that movements in the exchange rate are much less nonlinear than in a pegged ex-
change rate regime. Indeed, the daily fluctuations in the exchange rate in a flexible 
exchange rate regime have the advantage of making clear to private firms, banks, 
and governments that there is substantial risk involved in issuing liabilities denom-
inated in foreign currencies. Furthermore, a depreciation of the exchange rate may 
provide an early warning signal to policymakers that their policies may have to be 
adjusted to limit the potential for a financial crisis.43 
Flexible exchange rate regimes do not prevent negative consequences of ex-
change rate volatility, because liability dollarization does not disappear entirely 
and a currency depreciation can still damage balance sheets and harm the econ-
43 For additional criticisms of pegged exchange rate regimes, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Eichen-
green (1996), and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). 
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omy. Nevertheless, lightly burned fingers are better than death from conflagra-
tions.44 
The conclusion is that a pegged exchange rate regime, which is only backed 
up by a government announcement of the peg and not by a firmer institutional 
commitment is likely to increase financial instability in emerging market coun-
tries. This is why I have advocated in my academic writings the adoption of a 
flexible exchange rate regime for most emerging market countries, but with a 
strong commitment to controlling inflation with an inflation target.45 
Pegged exchange rates are not always inappropriate, however, and advocacy of 
flexible exchange rate regimes can be taken too far. As Paul Volcker (1998), a 
former Chairman of the Federal Reserve has put it, “We still hear the siren song 
that somehow floating exchange rates will solve the problem. That seems to me a 
strange and sad refrain.” 
In emerging market countries whose political and monetary institutions are 
particularly weak and who therefore have a history of continual bouts of very 
high inflation, fixing the exchange rate relative to a sound currency may be the 
only way to break inflationary psychology and stabilize the economy. This con-
sideration has driven some economists to suggests that there might be times when 
a strong commitment to a fixed exchange rate (either through a currency board 
or through full dollarization in which the country abandons its currency and 
adopts a foreign currency like the dollar as its money) might be necessary (Calvo 
and Reinhart, 2000, Mishkin and Savastano (2003) and McKinnon and Schnabl, 
2004). 
However, as I have argued above and in Mishkin and Calvo (2003), the choice 
of exchange rate regime, whether a fixed or flexible one, is likely to be of second-
ary importance to the development of good financial, fiscal, and monetary in-
stitutions in producing economic success in emerging market countries.46 When 
countries have placed their hopes for institutional development on adoption of 
a particular exchange rate regime, as the Argentineans did when they adopted 
the Convertibility Plan, they have been sorely disappointed. Placing too much 
emphasis on a particular choice of exchange rate regime can actually be harmful 
because it may reduce the focus on pursuit of institutional reforms that are so 
critical to successful financial globalization, reforms such as improved bank and 
financial sector regulation, fiscal restraint, building consensus for a sustainable 
and predictable monetary policy, and increasing openness to trade. 
44 This phrase was suggested to me by David Archer. 
45 See for example, Mishkin (1998, 2000a). I lean to the position taken by Goldstein (2002) who ad-
vocates flexible exchange rates, inflation targeting and prudential measures to limit currency mismatch. 
46 For a similar view that more focus needs to be on improving fundamental institutions rather than 
on exchange rate regimes, see de la Torre, Levy-Yeyati and Schmukler (2002).
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5 Open up to international trade
Opening up to foreign trade is another measure that can not only make finan-
cial crises less likely, but also less severe. When a country experiences a sudden stop 
of capital inflows, it can no longer finance its net purchase of foreign goods and 
services and so must increase its net exports (the difference between its exports and 
imports). The value of the currency must then fall to increase the demand for ex-
ports by making them cheaper and decrease the domestic demand for imports by 
making them more expensive. In this way, net exports increase. When a country is 
more open to trade, exports and imports are a larger percentage of GDP, and net 
exports can more easily adjust for a given change in the exchange rate. When there 
is a sudden stop of capital flows, a country that is more open to international trade 
will have less downward pressure on its currency and will be more likely to avoid 
a currency crisis. In addition, an economy open to trade has more firms exporting 
goods and services that are priced in foreign currency. When a depreciation occurs, 
even if firms have debt denominated in foreign currency, the prices of the goods 
and services they produce rises in terms of domestic currency. When the domestic 
currency depreciates, the resulting rise in the domestic-currency value of firms’ as-
sets then offsets the increase in the foreign-currency denominated value of their 
debt so a depreciation has less impact on the balance sheets of domestic firms. 
Trade openness, therefore, not only reduces the likelihood of a currency crisis, 
but also makes it less likely that a currency crisis will trigger a severe financial cri-
sis. Empirical research bears this out. Countries that are more open to trade are 
less likely to experience currency crises and when they experience sudden stops of 
capital flows, the size of the output contraction is smaller (Calvo, Izquierdo and 
Talvi, 2003, Frankel and Cavallo, 2004, Frankel, 2005, Edwards, 2004a, 2005, 
and Desai, Foley and Hines, 2005). Trade openness has the desirable feature that 
it promotes financial development, which is so necessary for economic growth.47 
The fact that trade openness also makes financial crises less likely and less severe 
should make trade openness a top priority for developing countries. 
 How can the international community
encourage emerging market countries
to adopt necessary reforms 
To harness the power of financial globalization, emerging market countries have 
a difficult task. We have seen that they have to adopt a number of reforms to get 
their financial systems to work properly. First steps involve developing strong prop-
47 This is discussed more extensively in Chapter 3 of Mishkin (2006).
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erty rights by strengthening the legal system and rule of law, reducing corruption, 
and improving the quality of financial information and corporate governance. 
But this is not enough. They further need to develop a prudential regulatory and 
supervisory system for their financial institutions that prevents financial instabili-
ty. The list of reforms to accomplish this is long: limit currency mismatch; restrict 
connected lending, ensure that banks have plenty of capital and have good risk 
management; encourage disclosure and market discipline of financial institutions; 
implement prompt corrective action; limit too big to fail; give adequate resources 
and statutory authority for prudential regulators/supervisors, but make them ac-
countable; get the government out of directing credit and the banking business; 
allow entry of foreign banks, reform fiscal policy to prevent excessive budget defi-
cits; and adopt a monetary policy framework that promotes price stability. 
Implementing these reforms in emerging market countries is a long hard path 
and there are powerful forces that work to block reform. Business elites in emerg-
ing market countries benefit from such practices as connected lending, which 
provides their businesses with cheap sources of finance. They also want weak pru-
dential regulation and supervision of banks they own. Again, globalization can 
help. As pointed out by Rajan and Zingales (2003), globalization increases com-
petition, which weakens domestic elites who often block reforms and regulations 
that make the financial system safer and work better. Globalization also promotes 
domestic industries that require more capital, who have an interest in reforming 
the financial sector so that financial crises become less likely. Globalization thus 
needs to be seen in emerging market countries as an important driver of needed 
institutional reforms. 
But how can the international community help? This is a complex topic that 
I discuss extensively in Mishkin (2006),48 but I will touch on it briefly here. The 
key is to provide the right incentives to encourage institutional development in 
emerging market countries. 
Currently, the IMF and the World Bank typically find it hard to deny loans to 
governments in the less-developed world that misallocate the funds or refuse to 
develop the institutions that are needed to make the nation’s economy successful. 
The inability to “just say no” creates exactly the wrong kind of incentives for ill-
run nations. Money should be used as a carrot to help poorer countries develop 
good institutions. If a government in one of these countries is unwilling to do 
this, it must be cut off. The IMF and the World Bank must learn to just say “no”. 
This sounds harsh, but it is better to engage in “tough love” rather than to en-
courage countries to go down the wrong path. 
The international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank and 
other governmental organizations in the rich countries (like the G7) have also 
48 Especially in chapters 11 and 12.
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had a tendency to impose institutions on less-developed countries patterned af-
ter those that have worked well in advanced countries. Furthermore, the interna-
tional financial institutions and governments in the advanced countries have often 
pushed standard “one size fits all” prescriptions for lessdeveloped countries such as 
complete abolition of capital controls. The IMF is greatly resented in the less-de-
veloped world, because the standard prescriptions often do not work and also have 
a strong element of hypocrisy because many of the prescriptions imposed on the 
less-developed countries are not followed by the rich countries. 
The international financial institutions can help in several ways. Although less-
developed countries need to develop their own institutional frameworks to make 
globalization work, there is a lot of expertise in institutions like the IMF and 
the World Bank that these countries could draw on. Technical assistance from 
these organizations can thus be of great value and indeed has been, as occurred in 
South Korea after their financial crisis. The right incentives from the internation-
al financial institutions can also help encourage elements in the less-developed 
countries overcome special interest who may block good institutional develop-
ment. 
But what can advanced countries do to help promote institutional develop-
ment? The answer is opening up our markets to goods and services from emerging 
market countries. By so doing, rich countries can provide exactly the right incen-
tives to promote institutional reforms that will improve the functioning of finan-
cial markets. If firms in emerging market countries have access to foreign markets, 
their increased need for capital means that they will demand that the legal system 
be better at enforcing property rights and financial contracts that will enable them 
to borrow. Similarly these growing, exporting firms will want to see improvements 
in the availability and quality of information because fewer asymmetric informa-
tion problems will make it easier for them to get loans. They will also be more 
supportive of improvements in prudential supervision since a more efficient bank-
ing system can be a source of credit. Thus opening up the markets in the advanced 
countries to emerging market countries is the single most valuable thing the devel-
oped world can do to promote the financial reforms. In turn, financial reforms can 
increase financial deepening and help allocate capital to its most productive uses. 
More open trade with emerging market firms can also help promote financial 
stability and reduce the likelihood and severity of financial crises in emerging mar-
ket countries by increasing the size of the export sector in these countries (Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Mejia, 2004, Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2003, Calvo and Talvi 
(2005), Edwards, 2004a,b, Frankel and Cavallo, 2004). Having debt denominated 
in foreign currency makes firms more vulnerable to currency depreciations when 
the goods they produce are sold primarily in domestic markets and so are priced 
in the local currency. Under these circumstances, a domestic currency deprecia-
tion increases the value of their foreign-currency denominated debt in terms of 
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the local currency, while the domestic currency value of their output remains un-
changed. The discrepancy between the increase in what they have to pay on their 
debt (liabilities) and what their product sales will bring in (assets) is what destroys 
their balance sheets. However, if the firm is selling its goods abroad, when there 
is a depreciation, the demand for the goods they produce rises in terms of local 
currency, so that the value of their production goes up, thus compensating for the 
increased value of the debt. When an emerging market country’s export sector is 
larger, it is less vulnerable to a financial crisis because a currency depreciation will 
do less damage to the balance sheets of firms. Indeed, one of the reasons why 
Argentina was so hard hit by the collapse of its currency in 2001 was that it had 
such a small export sector. 
Concluding remarks 
Is making financial globalization work for emerging market countries without 
causing financial instability easy to accomplish? Far from it. It is extremely diffi-
cult because it requires development of institutions that took advanced countries 
a long time to develop. Furthermore it requires getting the political process in 
poor countries to support institutional reform. 
This paper does not come up with easy answers to getting globalization right 
and promoting financial stability. Globalization and promoting financial stability 
requires hard work on the part of emerging market countries. All that we can do 
in the advanced countries is to provide incentives to encourage businesses, policy 
makers, politicians and ordinary citizens to support the kind of institutional de-
velopment that will promote economic growth in poor countries. Opening up 
our markets to emerging market countries is the single most valuable way that 
the international community can help emerging market economies become suc-
cessful. Although providing more aid to poor countries seems like a good way to 
stimulate growth an eradicate poverty, it rarely works. It usually does not create 
the right incentives to promote economic growth (Easterly, 2001). International 
financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank can also help by provid-
ing technical assistance and incentives to pursue financial reforms by providing 
funds to countries that are serious about developing and supervising their finan-
cial systems, while denying funds to those countries that are not. 
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On the paper
Mishkin provides a very insightful and comprehensive paper on potential pitfalls in financial liberalization and globalization, and discusses policy 
responses to well-manage such a transition – both macro (monetary, fiscal and 
trade policies) and microeconomic (legal system, corporate governance, informa-
tion disclosure, financial supervision). On these policies, there is both a balanced 
account of the literature and some recommendations in the paper (and one can 
agree with most of them). The paper mostly deals with developing countries.
While liberalization and globalization are needed for supporting financial 
deepening (ending repression due to intrusive regulations and capital controls), 
an almost immediate consequence in several countries was a period of severe fi-
nancial instability or a full-blown financial crisis. The high cost of these crises 
makes their prevention and effective resolution a policy priority.
Such a development from liberalization to a crisis is in the backdrop of the pa-
per – obviously – but the paper does not really describe the events so far. (Such a 
systematic description could make the paper more complete and pointed).
“Anatomy” of crises since early 1980s
There is striking amount similarity in the past crises, even though details 
of the crises may differ. Most of the financial crises experienced since the early 
1980s followed a fairly standard (while not necessarily predictable) pattern of de-
regulation, lending boom, asset price booms (foremost real estate or share prices), 
business cycle and asset price shocks, and large-scale bank failures (due to credit risk 
– i.e. bad debts) and – eventually – a financial crisis. Crisis was usually triggered by 
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an external shock (e.g. unforeseen recession or exchange rate collapse). Crisis resolu-
tion was often similar as well. Insolvent banks were either temporarily nationalized 
or forcibly merged, after separating “bad loans” in a state agency. In some cases, a 
blanket government guarantee was also given that all financial institutions would 
meet their obligations. 
Examples of similar crises include the crises in Latin America (Argentina, Mex-
ico in early 1980s), the US Savings and loans institutions’ crisis (early 1980s), and 
the three Scandinavian banking crises (Norway, Finland, Sweden in early 1990s). 
The crises in emerging market economies in late 1990s (Korea, Philippines etc.) 
also reflected the same pattern, by and large.
The Finnish crisis fits well with the major source of instability highlighted in 
the paper: the danger of accumulating indebtedness in foreign currencies and the 
resulting currency mismatches in the closed sectors of the economy (while not 
necessarily on banks’ books). Once the Finnish currency depreciated heavily after 
its flotation, many firms could no longer repay their debt and banks’ accrued vast 
amount of credit losses. 
Four viewpoints for discussion
The points below are suggested as complements to the paper – not necessarily 
as points of disagreement (even though these elements are missing or hidden in 
the paper):
1  Financial globalization raises difficult issues related to supervision and crisis 
management of cross-border and cross-sector financial institutions;
2  Focus also on the quality of supervision by developing risk-based approaches (not 
only on the institutional framework);
3  Avoid rigid policy solutions (one-size-fits-all) for all countries with different cir-
cumstances;
4  The next crisis could result from different risks and require different preventive 
or resolution measures. We should be prepared to prevent and handle future 
crises not the past ones.
1  Financial globalization raises difficult issues related to 
supervision and crisis management of cross-border and 
cross-sector financial institutions
The paper argues, rightly, that opening up the domestic markets to foreign fi-
nancial institutions may promote higher-quality domestic regulation and supervi-
sion by, inter alia, putting pressure on the domestic government to make reforms 
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that will make the financial system work more efficiently. However, as is well-
known, big market shares of foreign-owned banks in many small countries create 
potential problems for both prudential financial supervision and the maintenance 
of financial stability in those countries.
One of the key issues in the international regulatory debate is how to divide 
the tasks, powers, and responsibility between different countries in supervising 
cross-border financial institutions and dealing with these institutions in financial 
distress. In the EU, the division of tasks, powers, and responsibilities is currently 
based on home-country control. The home country is responsible for supervis-
ing financial institutions that are headquartered in that country and its foreign 
branches. Foreign subsidiaries, on the other hand, are supervised by the host 
country supervisor. The home country supervisor, in addition, is responsible for 
the consolidated supervision of the financial group. 
It seems likely that when the home-country responsibility principle applied in 
EU for supervising cross-border activity was drawn up, the expectation was that 
financial institutions´ cross-border and cross-sector activity would be small and 
that multi-country institutions would operate in other markets through subsidi-
aries. In that kind of world, the current regulatory design was sufficient. 
Today, the reality is very different. Financial institutions cross-border and 
cross-sector activities are increasing at fast speed. Currently, for example, there are 
at least over 40 banks and banking groups that are active in more than three EU 
countries. In addition, financial institutions increasingly work along global busi-
ness lines and less along national borders. For financial groups which are expand-
ing cross-border a part of synergies is derived from centralizing functions along 
business lines, not necessarily along country borders. Concerning the legal form 
of banks´ foreign operations, the relative importance of banks´ foreign branches 
(as opposed to that of foreign subsidiaries) is likely to increase substantially as 
banks start to take advantage of the European Company Statute and operate as 
a single entity. As illustrated by these changes, the current and future European 
banking market is very different from that in which role of banks´ cross-border 
and cross-sector operations and banks´ foreign branches was negligible.
The problem of the current set-up is the gap, on the other hand, between the 
legal powers and mandates and, on the other hand, the abilities and responsibili-
ties of the home and host supervisors. This gap becomes a problem once there is 
a financial institution that is systemically relevant in a host country. There are 
many kinds of potential conflicts of interest and coordination problems between 
home and host countries in dealing with the supervision, crisis management and 
crisis resolution of such institutions. The problems are starkest in the event of 
a crisis in the banking group, as all national authorities have a clear mandate to 
protect only their depositors and systems. In particular, if the institution´s pres-
ence in the host country is a branch, it is the home country supervisor who is 
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responsible for managing a crisis. Although the branch can systemically important 
in the host country, all its authorities can, to put it bluntly, do is to hope that 
the home country authorities take the interests of host country into account when 
dealing with the crisis. 
It is clear that because of integration, the EU´s current regulatory set-up will be 
under increasing pressure in the future. Therefore, it is not a surprise that various 
alternative models to the current home-host set-up have been presented. The alter-
natives range from considerably strengthening the role of the home supervisor (lead 
supervisor model) to creating a European Financial Supervisor with full supervisory 
powers over branches and subsidiaries of cross-border banks. However, despite the 
pressures, the EU is likely for the time being to stick to the current European super-
visory principles and structures and try to improve the functioning of the current 
regime by, inter alia, increasing supervisory cooperation and convergence of super-
visory methods. Time will tell whether the current set-up will be sufficient. 
A thorough discussion of the European supervisory arrangements would require 
a separate presentation. In this context, it might be sufficient to say that the finan-
cial globalization raises very challenging issues related to the supervision of cross-
border and cross-sector financial institutions. These issues, in addition to those pre-
sented in Mishkin´s paper, should be addressed in any regulatory reform agendas.  
2  Focus also on the quality of supervision by developing
risk-based approaches
An appropriate institutional framework (deposit insurance, disclosure regime, 
property rights, independence and accountability of supervisors etc.) is clearly a 
prerequisite for well-managing liberalization and preventing crises. However, one of 
the biggest lessons from the crises (also from the Finnish one) is that banks’ risk manage-
ment and supervisory practices were not yet developed enough to address the risks in the 
new environment. This resulted in uncontrolled risk taking by banks as such risk 
taking was made possible by the liberalization. Mishkin discusses as a central issue 
the need to put in place proper institutional setting (foremost supervision) before 
liberalization, but does not spend space on the issue of the quality of supervision.
Before the crises, supervision was (and can still sometimes be) mostly legalistic 
checking of compliance with current regulations, rather than focused on risks. But 
risk-based supervision is at the core of having preventive (i.e. forward-looking) su-
pervision rather than responding to problems when it is already too late. This is an 
issue of both supervisory culture and resources (a large enough number of qualified 
risk analysts working as supervisors). 
What is needed is a systematic plan to develop risk-based supervision, which – one 
should acknowledge – takes many years to institute in a supervisory authority. 
Even developed countries have further efforts to make in this area.
Commentary on “Financial stability and globalization: getting it right” 259
Erkki Liikanen
A key element of such a plan is to put emphasis on institutions’ own risk man-
agement, as risks are getting so complex and fast moving that they cannot be ob-
served real-time by supervisors, or prevented through simple supervisory limits. 
However, this needs to be coupled by adequate capacity of supervisors to form their 
own judgment of the supervised entity’s internal risk controls and major risk po-
sitions. Independent supervisory assessment is needed to prevent moral hazard 
and to avoid problem institutions from shifting risk to the government. Basel II 
reform supports this development by instituting a regular supervisory risk review 
(which is the second Pillar of the Basel package).
3 Avoid rigid solutions (one-size-fits-all) for all countries 
Policy measures need to be adjusted to individual countries’ circumstances 
(economic structures and development stage, financial system structure, political 
systems etc). While lessons on policy mistakes from the crises can be (reasonably) 
clear, this does not mean that a simple recipe can prevent future crises, or repre-
sent otherwise suitable policy options in all circumstances. 
The paper does not advocate uniform solutions very strongly; in general it is 
quite balanced. It only has this flavor at instances. Some examples are below. (In-
ternational institutions (IMF, World Bank) can have a stronger tendency for one-
size-fits- all recommendations).
—  Floating exchange rates (recommended with caveats in the paper) can 
be more stabilizing than fixed and allow using monetary policy to cool 
down fast credit growth. However, a currency board (such as in Estonia 
for example) could be a good option for “importing” monetary policy 
and bringing down inflation.
—  Deposit insurance is often recommended (by World Bank, IMF and in the 
paper) to be avoided, at least by less institutionally developed countries 
because of moral hazard and increased risk taking by banks. However, 
deposit insurance can be a commitment device for governments to res-
cue only depositors and not other creditors of banks, and thus to support 
market discipline1. Without deposit insurance the true policy adopted 
in a crisis can be a blanket guarantee for all bank creditors. Market dis-
cipline is only possible when some creditors have their money at stake 
(with some positive ex ante probability) in a crisis. Disclosure of informa-
tion is needed, but it does not generate market discipline unless the previ-
ous condition is met. Hence, explicit and limited deposit insurance – ex-
1 See Gropp, R. and J. Vesala (2005) “Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring”, Eu-
ropean Review of Finance. 
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plicitly protecting depositors only and leaving out other creditors – could 
be a step forward especially in a country (like Scandinavian countries in 
late 1980s/early 90s) with a history of blanked guarantees and weak mar-
ket discipline. Explicit deposit insurance also needs to be coupled with ef-
fective supervision to cub any moral hazard effects.
—  Stringent (and simple?) regulatory capital requirements are recommended (in 
the paper) for banks in less developed countries. However, a large and sim-
ple requirement (such as a leverage ratio) would not support the develop-
ment of banks’ own risk management – and ability to function in a liber-
alized environment – as it is not risk-based. On the other hand, advanced 
aspects of the highly risk-based Basel II may not be feasible due to lack of 
expertise and data in banks, but nothing prevents from gradually moving 
towards a more flexible and risk-based approach in less developed countries 
(where Basel II is not obligatory and its timing is not pre-specified like in 
Europe). One could implement e.g. the standard Basel II model for sov-
ereign and bank counterparties based on external ratings and thus avoid 
the present low risk weight on government bonds under Basel I. Advanced 
methods for calculating capital charges for firms and households could and 
should be adopted only over time with more experience in banks and the 
supervisory authority.
—  Limiting currency mismatches (recommended in the paper) in closed sectors 
of the economy would only be feasible by limiting foreign currency-de-
nominated borrowing. This would be canceling liberalization, actually, so 
other indirect measures should probably be considered. What those meas-
ures could be will depend on the local tax system (possibility to use taxes 
to curb lending growth), monetary policy etc. This is an actual issue for 
many New Members States of the EU with high credit growth, often in 
foreign currencies.
4  The next crisis could result from different risks and require 
different preventive or resolution measures
The past crises were mainly due to credit risk and were national in scope. While 
credit risk often still is the most important risk for banks, the structure of the fi-
nancial system has been changing in a profound way and the next crisis could 
come from a different source.
First, a rapid increase in banks’ and other financial institutions’ (e.g. insurance 
companies and pension funds) financial market-related activities has heightened 
their exposure to financial markets (and counterparty risks to other market play-
ers) and earnings sensitivity, suggesting that financial instability may increasingly 
result from market instability. This refers to equity, bond and derivative markets as 
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distinguished from more traditional exposures of banks to real estate price and 
exchange rate movements. Market activities also often entail a greater degree of 
operational risk (Barings’ case for instance).
Second, the past separation between financial institutions and markets has 
been replaced by an increasing integration of markets and banks, as well as be-
tween banks and other financial institutions. Hence, systemic risks could result from 
non-bank financial institutions (such as hedge funds, private equity funds etc.), at 
least to the extent that major financial institutions are exposed to them. 
Third, liquidity conditions and contagion risks play an increasingly important 
role due to the rapid increase in financial markets’ activities and banks’ increased 
reliance on market sources of funds.
Fourth, internationalization of the financial system has spread rapidly. Capital 
controls and restrictions on cross-border bank operations have largely been elimi-
nated. National markets can no longer be viewed as isolated entities, but tend to 
be embedded in a complex system of interlinks. This holds true especially for EU 
countries due to the Single Market and spreading of cross-border banking, but also 
globally and for many developing countries as well, because in their financial sys-
tems international banking groups can play an important role. In New EU Mem-
bers States the ownership of foreign banks in the local banking system is 70-100%.
Policies and measures taken to foster financial stability must take into account these 
developments in case of both developed and developing economies. Failure to upgrade 
policies to mach financial system developments can be very costly as the previous 
lessons show. 
Rightly so, many relevant new issues are increasingly debated internationally. 
Listing a few of them (without analyzing them here) shows that the list of rel-
evant issues goes much beyond those that can be easily handled in a single paper:
—  Is there too much concentration risk in international financial markets 
(e.g. in may derivatives) causing clusters of counterparty risks? How 
should these risks be addressed by regulators?
—  Should currently unregulated non-bank financial firms, such as hedge 
funds, be regulated, or is it enough to focus on banks’ counterparty risks?
—  How to analyze and reduce contagion risks effectively? 
—  Is the role of central banks heightened in financial crises resolution due 
to the increased importance of liquidity? 
—  How to manage crises in cross-border financial institutions? 
—  How to supervise effectively cross-border institutions, of financial con-
glomerates that span many financial activities? 

The first years of the twenty-first century resemble closely those of the twentieth. We are living through the second wave of economic globalisation, 
and we have been enjoying an era of remarkable growth in productivity and in-
come levels in many countries. But despite the promise of eternal prosperity that 
seemed to be offered by the previous era of globalisation, it did eventually end, 
first interrupted by World War I and later in the throes of the global Great De-
pression that followed the “roaring twenties”.
That long ago experience should continue to keep us alert and humble. Alert, 
so that we do not take this current period of prosperity for granted, but instead 
work actively to safeguard it. Humble, so that we do not fall into the trap of 
thinking that we have finally found the answers to the fundamental economic 
questions with which the world confronts us. Globalisation is a market-driven 
process boosted by technological advances and the “animal instincts” of entre-
preneurs. But, unlike technological change, globalisation is not unidirectional or 
inevitable; ultimately it hinges also on political decisions. And those decisions in 
turn are shaped, to a considerable degree, by the extent to which we can use them 
to harness the forces of globalisation so as to increase their benefits and reduce 
their costs.
In fact, the present wave of globalisation exhibits all the dynamism, but also 
some of the excesses, that were found in the process of capitalist transformation 
at the turn of the twentieth century and in the 1920s. Seen in this light, Frederick 
Mishkin’s paper is a very useful compendium of all the things an emerging mar-
ket country needs to do to embrace globalisation – to catch this wave, if you like, 
without being drowned by it.
In my remarks, taking my cue from Mishkin’s paper, I would first like to stress 
some of the dilemmas that countries face when seeking to embrace globalisation. 
Then I will provide some reflections on the challenges ahead for central banks, 
focusing on the relationship between monetary stability and financial stability. 
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And – I have to say in the spirit of humility – I will be raising more questions than 
providing answers.
1  Globalisation and institutional reform: 
lessons learned
Let me first highlight, without much elaboration, three crucial points on which 
I agree entirely with Mishkin.
1  Embracing globalisation is a highly desirable goal. The enormous benefits 
it brings in terms of resource allocation and long-term growth potential are 
well known. I also agree with Mishkin that a key under appreciated benefit 
is the fact that globalisation is a vital catalyst for implementing domestic 
structural reforms that are desirable in their own right. In a nutshell, being 
able to sustain the challenges of globalisation is an unmistakable “signal” of 
institutional maturity.
2  Being able to enjoy the benefits of open financial borders does require the 
presence of broad-ranging institutional underpinnings: putting them in 
place is a major challenge that cannot be achieved overnight. Mishkin’s pa-
per lists them in detail. They range from property rights and legal systems, 
through adequate prudential regulation and supervision, to sound macr-
oeconomic policies, monetary and fiscal. 
3  Institutions that work well in particular countries at a particular stage in 
their development need not always be well suited to other countries or oth-
er times. This reflects, in part, different legal, cultural and historical tradi-
tions, and, in part, sequencing issues. The proper sequencing of the move to 
globalisation is idiosyncratic; it is country specific. Mishkin again provides 
several examples. I would highlight, for instance, that the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision has for some time emphasised, in its Core Princi-
ples for Effective Banking Supervision, the legal and institutional precondi-
tions that need to be in place in order for regulation and supervision, and 
hence instruments such as commercial bank capital adequacy standards, to 
be effective.
From these three points, however, several dilemmas follow, which I think could 
have been highlighted more in Rick Mishkin’s paper. They result in challenging 
trade-offs.
1  There is a ‘‘Catch 22’’ regarding the link between institutional reform and 
globalisation – and I am thinking particularly of financial globalisation 





here, but not necessarily only of emerging market economies, as the expe-
rience in some industrialised countries has shown in the past. Waiting for 
all the preconditions to be in place obviously slows the pace of their adop-
tion, given that openness is a catalyst for change. But not waiting until all 
preconditions are in place is quite likely to lead to costly episodes of finan-
cial stress. 
The implication is that, particularly for emerging market economies, the 
process of embracing globalisation is bound to be either very long or quite 
painful. Since the early 1990s, we have been fortunate – so far – that the 
financial crises that have occurred have been used by a large number of 
countries to strengthen their institutional and policy frameworks rather 
than to retreat into isolationism. Just think of the macroeconomic and 
structural reforms that emerging market economies in East Asia undertook 
following the Asian financial crisis, as reflected in the widespread improve-
ments in their credit ratings since the crisis broke out in 1997. Indeed, his-
tory seems to show that it took a crisis at the core of the global economy 
– in the United States and in the other industrial countries – rather than 
just at the periphery, to throttle and then reverse the previous globalisation 
wave of the early twentieth century.
This consideration puts a premium on efforts by the international com-
munity to enhance the process of structural change to embrace globalisa-
tion. Ultimately, progress can only be based on enlightened self interest 
and a sense of ownership of the reforms.
2  There is a clear tension between the call for uniformity demanded by the 
global capital marketplace and country-specific circumstances: this is a 
hard call to make. Think, for instance, of the nuances between principles-
based accounting and rules-based accounting, or of the delicate balancing 
act in developing generally applicable best practices for corporate govern-
ance. Or recall the obvious difficulties major banks face in many countries 
in adopting the more advanced variants of Basel II.
To my mind, all this puts a premium on soundness over uniformity per se, 
and on patience over haste. I therefore fully endorse the view taken by the 
Basel Committee and the international financial institutions, for instance, 
that countries should adopt Basel II only when ready, even though this 
naturally complicates cross-border issues.
3  Judging the state of readiness of a country to liberalise and open up its 
markets has proved extremely difficult. How many times have countries 
thought they were ready to liberalise and open up, only to be proved 
wrong? Crises have often appeared inevitable only ex post. If memory 
serves me right, Mexico had been upgraded by the rating agencies just 
before its 1994 financial crisis broke out. And in Asia by the mid-1990s 
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fiscal probity, high investment levels and low inflation had been thought 
to insulate the region from difficulties. We should not, therefore, be lulled 
into a false sense of security; rather we should redouble efforts to strengthen 
institutional underpinnings.
2  Central banks: some certainties and one open 
question
I have not yet said anything about central banks. However, they clearly have 
a key role to play in strengthening the institutional set up. They are guardians of 
payment and settlement systems, repositories of financial know-how, responsible 
for monetary policy and, where relevant, in charge of financial supervision. Here, 
let me just highlight two certainties and one open question.
First certainty
Financial stability is a very complex task: central banks are an important, but 
by no means the only, player. Moreover, in a number of countries certain key fi-
nancial stability responsibilities have been transferred to other agencies, notably 
in the prudential area. This makes it all the more important for central banks to 
retain influence, based on their know-how and competence, and to intensify their 
cooperation with other authorities nationally and internationally. This would help 
strengthen to further the macro-prudential, as opposed to micro-prudential, ori-
entation of current efforts to secure financial stability. The establishment of in-
ternational fora like the Financial Stability Forum, in which central banks play a 
prominent role alongside prudential regulators and ministries of finance, has been 
a step in the right direction. At the BIS we have been working hard to support 
such analytical and operational cooperation. The fact that the Basel Committee 
now reports to a joint group of central bank Governors and Heads of Supervision 
is one concrete such example.
Second certainty
Even more important, over the longer term and from a macroeconomic per-
spective, securing sustainable price stability is the best contribution that central 
banks can make to financial stability and to successfully embracing a globalised 
world. Countries have learned the hard way the enormous economic and social costs 
of inflation during the historically anomalous ‘Great Inflation’ era of the 1970s and 
early 1980s. Conversely, looking further back, the Great Depression was marked by 
a very painful, if historically equally anomalous, precipitous price deflation.






However, is whether we have indeed fully learned the lessons from the past. 
To be intentionally provocative, a stylised lesson that I draw from the past is that 
focusing exclusively on short-term inflation control, over a one-to-two year horizon, 
and paying only limited or no attention to monetary and credit aggregates, is not 
sufficient to ensure monetary and financial stability over the longer term. The po-
litical economy of a number of inflation targeting regimes, in which short hori-
zons help to strengthen accountability, has favoured such a shift. Rick’s paper dis-
cusses this issue in the context of financial liberalisation in individual emerging 
market economies, but not the risks in the dynamics of globalisation as a whole.
Why do I say this?
First, history indicates that short-term inflation control is not sufficient to pre-
vent the emergence of macroeconomic instability. Inflation, for instance, did not 
rise to any significant degree during the run-up to the Great Depression in the 
1920s or of Japan’s ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s. Nor was it a problem in the run-up 
to the Asian crisis of 1997–98. And, indeed, looking back to the late nineteenth 
century Gold Standard period, financial crises were typically not preceded by ris-
ing inflation.
Second, some of the most serious mistakes in the history of monetary policy 
implementation were the result of not paying sufficient attention to money and 
credit expansion. The episodes I have just highlighted were indeed preceded by 
unusually strong cumulative expansions in “liquidity”, broadly defined, typically 
alongside equally unusual increases in asset prices, not least those of real estate. 
The same is true for the Great Inflation. And on the downside, failure to focus 
sufficiently on the contraction in such aggregates certainly contributed to the 
depth of the Great Depression in 1931-33.
Third, recent formal empirical evidence, including research carried out at the 
BIS,1 has confirmed this observation. In particular, it has found that unusually 
strong cumulative expansions in credit aggregates alongside similar increases of 
asset prices herald serious financial stress, economic weakness, and disinflation 
beyond the one-to-two year horizons common in monetary policymaking.
My final observation is that all of this acquires greater significance at the 
current juncture. The world economy has been experiencing, and may now be 
emerging from, an unusually long period of historically low inflation-adjusted 
policy interest rates, unusually strong expansion in global liquidity, exceptionally 
buoyant asset prices, and strong global growth. And this has occurred at a time 
1 See “Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus”, BIS Working Paper 114 by 
Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe and “Securing sustainable price stability: should credit come back from the 
wilderness?”, BIS Working Paper 157 by Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe.
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when globalisation should, if anything, have raised the world’s natural interest rate, 
by boosting global growth potential while helping to keep a lid on inflation. But 
just because inflation has remained remarkably quiescent so far, should we assume 
that all is fine?
I say this in that spirit of humility which should underpin all policies. We must 
always remain alert and avoid complacency. The major policy mistakes in history 
that I highlighted earlier were made precisely when policymakers felt they had fi-
nally come to master the secrets of the economy. Preserving macroeconomic and 
with it, financial stability, is essential. We should not forget that it was financial 
stress at the core of the global economy, and its international ramifications, that 
proved fatal to the first wave of globalisation. I certainly do not have the answers. 
But these questions are worth asking.
Introduction
I would like to make comments along two lines. First, I will briefly describe the financial and economic reforms that have taken place during the last dec-
ade in Mexico, and which have succeeded in delivering macroeconomic stability.
Second, I would like to make some remarks on the challenges that financial 
globalization poses to host-country authorities. Almost everyone agrees on the 
gains derived from globalization and the benefits that foreign investment brings 
to recipient countries. The benefits are well described in Mishkin’s paper, along 
with a series of recommendations for success in the process of financial globaliza-
tion. What not everyone recognizes, however, including Frederick in his paper, 
are some of the challenges that come along with the globalization of financial 
markets and institutions. Hence, I would like to briefly describe the challenges 
on five counts: 
1 Competition in host-country financial markets
2 The soundness of local banks
3 Market discipline
4 The impacts of foreign regulations on domestic financial markets
5 The resolution of troubled global banks
Mexico’s reform effort 
The depth of the Mexican 1995 banking crisis made it clear that the incentives 
faced by financial-system participants were not correctly aligned. The combination 
of financial deregulation, the unprecedented availability of resources for lending to 
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the private sector, the absence of a risk management culture combined with a lack 
of experienced bankers after years of government-run banks and a weak supervi-
sory framework, resulted in severe problems in the banking system. The current 
account imbalances, fixed-exchange rate regime, and the instability that charac-
terized the Mexican political scenario during 1994 became unsustainable at the end 
of that year. A sharp depreciation of the peso, high interest rates, and the fall in 
real disposable income sharply deteriorated borrowers’ capacity to service their bank 
debts. Banks suffered on both sides of their balance sheets: Many debtors defaulted 
on their obligations, and depositors demanded higher interest rates to compensate 
for inflation risk. The consequence was the bankruptcy of many banks and a severe 
economic crisis. 
As a result, in the last ten years, Mexico has undertaken a series of reforms along 
the lines suggested by Mishkin’s paper. Strict fiscal and monetary discipline, the 
adoption of a freely floating exchange rate, and an inflation targeting framework 
have gradually brought a degree of macroeconomic stability not seen in Mexico in 
the last 30 years. 
The public-sector deficit dropped to 0.3% of GDP in 2005. The strategies used 
to reduce inflation have succeeded in anchoring expectations towards the central 
bank target and in reducing annual inflation from 52% in 1995 to 3.2% in April 
2006. Strict fiscal policies and the development of domestic capital and derivative 
markets has allowed the government the substitution of domestic for foreign debt 
which has reduced its foreign indebtedness from 19.3% of GDP in 1998 to 9.4% in 
2005. Private banks are now offering fixed-rate mortgages with 10 and 20 years ma-
turities, and the market for mortgage securitization is growing rapidly; all of this was 
unheard of in our financial system a little over a decade ago. These strong macroeco-
nomic fundamentals have facilitated the Mexican economy´s ability to absorb for-
eign shocks and the current de-leveraging process taking place in emerging markets.
The importance of undertaking reforms aimed at improving legal and institu-
tional infrastructure and aligning the incentives of the various participants is well 
described in Mishkin’s paper. In this respect, we have improved lender property 
rights by enacting a new bankruptcy law and initiating legal reforms that help to 
expedite foreclosure on credit guarantees.
The institutional framework has been further enhanced by the enactment of 
new regulation on credit bureaus that helps reduce information asymmetries. The 
blanket guarantee of deposits, which helped to prevent a large run on deposits dur-
ing the banking crisis but increased the costs of its resolution, has been gradually 
rolled back. Stricter rules on connected lending were established, and accounting 
and auditing standards have been aligned to international guidelines. Banks´ bal-
ance sheets were gradually improved, and the entry of foreign banks – which started 
with the signing of a trade agreement with the United States and Canada – fully 
materialized, contributing greatly to the recapitalization of the banking system.   





We have also moved gradually to a more risk-based kind of regulation, in which 
the central bank has played an important role by requiring banks wishing to operate 
in derivatives markets to comply with modern risk measurement and management 
techniques. Supervisory practices have improved radically, and legislation on prompt 
corrective actions and bank resolution procedures has been introduced recently.
In 2002, the Mexican Congress enacted a payment system law in line with 
the BIS “Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems.” This law 
ensures finality in all systemically important payment systems and gives legal cer-
tainty to the guarantees submitted. The law also grants power to Banco de Méx-
ico to regulate and supervise financial entities managing systemically important 
payment systems. In addition, Banco de México developed and now manages a 
large-value payment system which allows a bank’s customers to transfer resources, 
in almost real time, between bank accounts established at different banks.
Early this year, we asked the IMF and World Bank to conduct an update of 
the FSAP carried out in 2001. The FSAP has helped to identify some pending 
issues, such as a special bankruptcy chapter for banks in our general law, and the 
need to provide financial authorities with a sufficient level of autonomy and legal 
protection. In emerging market countries, where powerful elites can have undue 
influence in shaping policy and the regulatory agenda to their own benefit, strong 
and politically independent public agencies are much needed. 
Let me now turn to the challenges that host-country authorities have to face 
with the globalization of financial markets and institutions, which I consider a 
necessary complement to Frederick’s agenda. 
Competition
In order to acquire local depositors’ bases and gain access to profitable house-
hold sectors abroad, the main vehicle of expansion of cross-border global banks is 
through the acquisition of existing financial entities in target countries. This strat-
egy allows global banks to offer credit cards, mortgage loans, and insurance prod-
ucts where profits are high. However, the acquisition of existing entities rather than 
the establishment of new ones leaves market structures largely unchanged. While 
improvements are tangible in the derivatives and money markets, efficiency gains in 
other sectors often result in higher profits to the exclusion of consumer benefits. 
Banks´ efficiency improved notably in Mexico after the entry of foreign banks. 
Just to mention a figure, bank efficiency, measured as the ratio of operational 
costs to total income, decreased from 70% in 2000 to 53% in 2005. We are also 
witnessing lower prices and better conditions for mortgages. However, in other 
segments, such as credit cards and basic banking services, where banks face less 
competition, efficiency gains have translated only into higher profits. Interest 
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margins on a consumer loan are three times higher than on a corporate loan. Inter-
est rates on credit cards are as high as 70% when annual inflation is close to 3%. 
Banks´ interest margins are much higher in Mexico than in the countries of origin 
the Mexican banks’ shareholders, despite the fact that Mexican inflation, market 
volatility, and taxes are at levels very similar to those of the home-countries.
Benefits from globalization are not automatic, and in order to access them, meas-
ures should be taken to improve competition at the local market level. As in other 
areas, central banks can play the role of catalyst in improving competition in many 
emerging market economies. 
The soundness of local banks
Subsidiaries are entities that are legally independent from parent banks and sub-
ject to different laws, regulations, and courts. However, global banks manage their 
subsidiaries as branches but keep their responsibilities limited to the invested capital. 
The way in which global banks are managed could lead to many decisions that are 
good for the global bank but not necessarily positive for the subsidiary or host country.
1  There is a growing tendency to register transactions where funding and regula-
tory costs are lower. Although this makes sense from the global banks´ perspec-
tive, it shifts revenues away from the local bank where the business is originated. 
2  Global banks also establish individual limits to credit exposure in each for-
eign country, according to the sensitivity of the overall portfolio. Thus, sub-
sidiaries sometimes have to reduce their local exposures, even though these 
exposures are also financed locally. 
3  Likewise, subsidiary banks invest in host-country sovereign debt according 
to capital risk weights which, having been set by parent banks and home-
country authorities, are usually higher than those of the host country. 
4  Global banks are also inclined to adopt matrix reporting arrangements by 
which local treasurers, comptrollers, and risk managers report directly to 
their parent bank’s counterparts rather than to the local CEOs. Bank di-
rectors and managers usually are long-career employees of the parent bank. 
Holding them more responsible is not going to be enough. 
These asymmetries between decision-making powers and economic rewards ver-
sus legal responsibilities are a matter of concern for host-country authorities when 
large local retail banks are involved. 
One potential way to get local managers to look first to the subsidiaries’ best 
interest could be to widen the ownership structure of large subsidiaries. Requiring 
minority shareholders to sit on subsidiaries’ boards would encourage decision tak-





ing in the subsidiaries’ best interest. It would benefit corporate governance and 
give meaning to the role of independent board members. 
Why are widely held ownership structures considered to be highly important 
for global banks and not for systemically important local subsidiaries? The idea 
that subsidiaries automatically reap the benefits of belonging to a widely held 
parent bank ignores the legal separation between them. 
Market discipline
The need to encourage market discipline to supplement the work of super-
visors is widely recognized at the international level. Mishkin acknowledges that 
banks’ disclosure requirements need to go beyond the simple publication of balance 
sheets and income statements. As he correctly states, this is because: 
‘‘... financial institutions are able to take on more risk than many conven-
tional businesses and because they are typically provided with a government 
safety net, ...”
Mishkin also proposes to hold bank directors and managers responsible for 
timely and accurate disclosure of a wide range of information. He also suggests 
requiring financial institutions to be rated and even mentions the possibility of 
requiring the issuance of subordinated debt. These suggestions are very positive. 
For market discipline to work, market participants need signals – in the form 
of prices – which reflect market perceptions, as well as instruments to enforce 
discipline and research carried out by independent analysts. The latter play an 
important role in markets, since financial information is not always easy for the 
common investor to come by or understand. 
The presence of minority shareholders would facilitate the listing on local 
stock exchanges of systemically important subsidiaries. A public listing would 
provide market participants with price signals and instruments to exercise disci-
pline. It would also provide independent bank analysts with a customer base and 
give meaning to the third pillar of the Basel II regulations. As it stands, the third 
pillar is simply one of disclosure, not of market discipline. 
Impacts of foreign regulations on domestic 
financial markets
Regulatory differences among home countries could have adverse impacts on 
host-country markets. All banks incorporated in a jurisdiction have to comply 
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with its laws and regulations. However, when a local bank is a subsidiary of a for-
eign bank, it also has to observe the guidelines put forth by its controlling share-
holder and the regulations of the jurisdiction where its parent bank is incorporated. 
In general, we would expect the stricter regulation to prevail. Nevertheless, sub-
sidiaries have to consolidate their books with those of their parent banks. In fact, 
parent bank shareholders follow the consolidated balances, not the local ones. This 
means that the subsidiaries’ business and trading decisions are taken with close re-
gard toward their impacts on the parent banks’ balance sheets. This situation can 
have important adverse effects on host-country markets. 
For example, capital adequacy rules usually establish a zero risk weight on local 
sovereign claims denominated and funded in domestic currency. Nevertheless, the 
New Capital Accord establishes risk weights on sovereign claims based on ratings 
provided by external credit assessment institutions or by internal rating methodol-
ogies. Although the Accord gives national supervisors discretion to apply lower risk 
weights to their domestic banks, it is very likely that subsidiaries of foreign banks 
will apply the capital weights established by their parent banks and by their home 
countries. Should this happen, it will increase the financing cost of host countries’ 
sovereign debt denominated and funded in domestic currency.
The resolution of a troubled global bank 
Finally, I would like to talk about the conflicts of interest that may arise when 
a global bank runs into trouble. Global banks are comprised of a constellation of 
entities incorporated in different jurisdictions. The failure of a global bank could 
easily lead to conflicts among the various parties involved, as their interests will 
diverge considerably. 
The conflicts between home and host-country authorities could be particularly 
significant if the relative sizes of the parent bank and its subsidiaries are substan-
tially different. Home-country authorities will not be very keen on supporting 
subsidiaries overseas, even if they are relatively important for a host country. On 
the other hand, host-country authorities could find it politically impossible to use 
public resources to support a foreign-owned bank. 
There is no common understanding on how to deal with or resolve the failure of 
global banks. The absence of a common jurisdiction and supranational legal courts 
complicates the potential attainment of reasonable and fair solutions. Therefore, it 
is very important to devote more efforts to devising ways to improve existing frame-
works so that cooperation among supervisors and central banks is encouraged. 
These frameworks should include full and equal access to relevant and timely 
information on both a subsidiary’s and a parent bank’s global position as well as 
each one’s risks. Home-country authorities should not have informational advan-





tages over host regulators unless they are willing to accept more responsibilities in 
terms of the resolution processes. 
We welcome the recent changes introduced to the Basel Core Principles with re-
gard to information-sharing arrangements between home and host-country supervi-
sors. A major step forward is the recognition of the need of host-country authori-
ties to have prompt access to all relevant information about their subsidiaries’ parent 
banks. However, home-country supervisors still retain some discretion as to which 
information is to be shared with host-country authorities, and also can decide 
when it is appropriate to inform their counterparts. Further progress should be 
made in this area in order to ensure that during a crisis, host-country supervisors´ 
access to all relevant information will not be limited by home-country supervi-
sors´ criteria. 
Final remarks
The relevant question is not whether globalization is good or bad, but how to 
benefit from it. In this respect, we cannot ignore the challenges that host-country 
authorities have to face, especially in places where systemically important banks 
are owned by foreign global banks. There are no simple solutions to these chal-
lenges. I firmly believe the best way to accommodate the conflicting interests that 
may arise when banks operate across different jurisdictions is to have in place the 





Mr. Vice-President of the Government and Minister of Economy and Finance, ladies and gentlemen,
It is my pleasure to participate in this concluding session of the conference and 
to be accompanied at this table by Pedro Solbes. I hope you found the presenta-
tions and discussions inspiring and motivating. I certainly did. We are now wit-
nessing some profound changes in the way our societies organise their economic 
relationships, and these naturally pose new challenges to central banks, regarding 
both their role of monetary policymakers and their responsibility to preserve and 
foster safer and more efficient financial systems.
Over the last two days we have discussed some of the underlying forces of 
change and their implications for the design of sound monetary policy and finan-
cial architecture, including the question of how best to arrange payment and secu-
rity settlement systems. Let me briefly elaborate on some of the issues raised at the 
conference which I found particularly interesting. I will first reflect on the difficult 
question of how monetary and financial stability relate to each other and then move 
to some particular issues of special interest for a currency area, such as EMU.
Monetary and financial stability
The global financial system has developed at an unprecedented pace in the 
last two or three decades. During this time, many countries have undergone sig-
nificant processes of financial liberalisation that have contributed to deeper and 
wider markets, in terms of both the number of participants and the assets traded 
on them. In the international sphere, financial liberalisation has led to a grow-
ing number of countries gaining access to global capital markets and to a step-
ping up of the economic and financial links among different regions. Technologi-
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to obtain and process vast amounts of information almost instantaneously and to 
conduct complex transactions at low cost has grown enormously. 
In short, all these changes have significantly increased the possibilities for risk-
sharing among economic agents. And, as such, there is ample consensus that this 
process of financial deepening brings tangible benefits for businesses, households 
and governments alike. There is little doubt either that this phenomenon will con-
tinue its course over the foreseeable future. 
In parallel to the changes on the financial landscape, we have also witnessed a 
remarkable performance by our monetary policy frameworks in terms of attain-
ing and maintaining low and stable inflation, with noticeable effects on economic 
welfare. I believe that those achievements are largely permanent. I further consider 
that, as stressed by Alan Blinder in the introduction to his insightful paper, the 
debate over some of the core principles for sound monetary policy practice seems 
to be resolved for now. For example, there is currently substantial agreement, both 
among academics and monetary authorities, on the need to provide central banks 
with sufficient formal and effective institutional independence, the superiority of 
interest-rate operational targets over quantitative instruments, and the pursuit of 
low inflation as the main objective for monetary policy.
Both trends – towards deeper and more integrated financial markets, at one 
end, and towards monetary policies clearly determined to deliver price stability, at 
the other – are important factors behind the sound macroeconomic performance 
recorded practically worldwide over the last decade. 
Notwithstanding this positive view on the recent past, central banks must de-
ploy their best efforts – improving their monetary policy and regulatory and su-
pervisory arrangements – to preserve and consolidate the attainments I mentioned, 
since various significant risks and challenges lie ahead. As stressed by Frederic 
Mishkin, the final success of the processes of financial liberalisation and globalisa-
tion in developing economies hinges crucially on the ability of both policymakers 
and the private sector to properly respond to a rapidly changing environment. No 
doubt, the spirit of this proposition applies likewise to developed countries. 
An increasingly liberalised and globalised financial system necessitates a re-
consideration of some key inputs in our current monetary strategies. The greater 
relevance of markets and their evolving nature requires an ongoing assessment of 
the different monetary policy transmission mechanisms. This area, while critical 
to successful monetary policy decision-making, still remains shrouded in consider-
able uncertainty. Undoubtedly, the emergence of new financial assets and financial 
intermediaries poses fresh questions here.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the financial funds flowing across different 
countries at the present time and the uncertainty surrounding the sustainability 
and the possible effects of an eventual correction of the so-called global imbalances 





of indicators into consideration when formulating their policies. Moreover, we 
are probably at a juncture that can be best described as one of “Knightian uncer-
tainty”, in that some of the risks we are facing, and the hypothetical consequenc-
es following their realisation, are essentially immeasurable. Consequently, good 
monetary policymaking requires not only a continuous reassessment of market 
conditions and expectations, but also forecasts and projections flexible enough to 
encompass a wide set of scenarios. 
I share the view set out yesterday by Jean-Claude Trichet that a sound commu-
nication strategy takes on special importance in the current environment, as well. 
Anchoring expectations about future inflation is a valuable asset, and especially 
at times of financial and real turbulence. Fluent communication with market 
participants and the general public is also of great help in preserving credibility, 
especially when circumstances lead to relatively persistent temporary departures 
from what is sometimes called a “neutral” monetary policy stance, as some of our 
central banks have faced in recent times, or when specific factors push inflation 
rates above what the monetary authorities normally consider as satisfactory.
Moreover, alignment of market expectations with the central bank’s own tar-
gets, through fluent and transparent communication, allows monetary policy to 
exert a stronger influence along the entire yield curve. Yet notice that this lat-
ter channel becomes most relevant if central bankers approach markets from the 
sort of leadership position emphasised by Professor Blinder. I agree with him on 
this important point: central bankers should continuously monitor markets and 
should extract from them as much information as possible. But they must not 
put themselves under the thumb of what is sometimes erratic market sentiment.
In any event, one of the most robust lessons we can extract from the recent pe-
riod of global monetary and output growth stability is that low inflation may well 
be consistent with episodes of high financial volatility. Cases of financial stress 
have been recorded both in industrialised and in emerging market economies 
over the last few years without noticeable inflationary pressure. Even in countries 
whose financial system has proved more resilient, financial cycles have become 
wider and more volatile.
Indeed, a long period of monetary stability coupled with low interest rates, 
as has been the case for some years now, may arguably be conducive to certain 
types of imbalances in asset markets. In such an environment the poor returns on 
low-risk investments and the softening of lending standards may lead investors 
to take on increasingly riskier projects. As economic agents underestimate the to-
tal risks of their positions, the volume of investment in financial – and, in some 
cases, also real estate – markets rises at a strong pace, and with it, asset prices and 
the overall level of credit, perhaps, with both being further fuelled through the 
feedback mechanism operating between collateral value and credit capacity. In 
that situation, there is a risk that a sharp asset price reversal might have a size-
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able impact on the stability of the whole system. Therefore, an otherwise beneficial 
context of price stability and low financing costs might sometimes sow the seeds 
for the emergence of financial imbalances.
This latter, somewhat ironic conclusion has spurred a recent debate on the role 
to be assigned to monetary policy as an instrument of use in correcting financial 
and real estate market excesses. Should central banks react to asset prices over and 
above their direct effects on purely monetary goals, such as inflation? The answers 
vary depending mainly on the confidence that one places in the ability of central 
banks to detect price misalignments early and to undo them without causing ma-
jor damage to the economy.
I tend to think that while in normal conditions monetary policy should react 
only to changes in economic variables insofar as they bear some influence on 
inflation dynamics, there are exceptional circumstances in which policymakers 
have enough signals to conclude that the economy, as a whole, is facing signifi-
cant risks, thus warranting a more pre-emptive policy approach. This pragmatic 
view is consistent with the idea that monetary policy decisions should be based 
not only on the most likely scenarios but also on other, less probable ones which, 
however, may have far-reaching implications for the entire system should they 
materialise. Certainly, an abrupt asset price correction pertains to this class of 
low-probability event that may ultimately entail significant costs for a country’s 
welfare.
More importantly, to place this approach to monetary policy in its right place, 
it is critical to recognise that some of the risks inherent in the financial sphere 
should first be the subject of an appropriate prudential framework. It is no ex-
aggeration to say that any concern about unbalanced market developments is, at 
core, a concern about a problem of inappropriate risk management. This state-
ment applies to the case in which, due to over-optimism or short-sighted behav-
iour, market participants fail to appreciate the true risk of their investment or 
lending strategies. Yet even if their behaviour can be thought as being fully rational 
from an individual perspective, nothing ensures that the final outcome will not 
convey important risks at a systemic level that are not properly internalised by sin-
gle agents. As a result, a portion of the marked volatility and procyclicality of some 
key financial variables, like asset prices and credit, may be understood as a reflec-
tion of individual and collective risk misjudgement. 
Hence, there is much to be gained in terms of greater resilience and efficiency 
of the financial system through the design of regulatory and supervisory frame-
works aimed at combating the factors that underlie a poor assessment of risks at 
their root. In this sense, a sound prudential framework should provide financial in-
stitutions with the right incentives to properly assess and monitor the risks of their 
investment and lending policies, incorporating them accordingly into their pricing 





cycle, favours earlier reactions to changing conditions and smoother adjustments 
in the flow of credit, thus reducing the likelihood of episodes of abrupt liquidity 
and credit contraction. 
The New Capital Accord, known as Basel II, is an example of a prudential 
framework that makes the foregoing principles I have outlined its centrepiece, 
since it seeks to strengthen the stability of the international banking system by 
promoting the implementation of more robust and comprehensive risk manage-
ment practices. It does so mainly by establishing a more precise and sensitive sys-
tem to link banks’ real risks and the minimum regulatory capital requirements, 
and by imposing higher levels of transparency in banks’ financial reporting, hence 
fostering closer scrutiny by market participants. 
A more risk-sensitive capital framework tends to make banks more watchful 
of the actual risks of lending policies focused on short-run targets, such as market 
share or portfolio size, which presumably are important ingredients in periods of 
credit booms sustaining speculative activities. Furthermore, greater transparency 
in the information provided by banks on their balance-sheet and risk position 
must help alleviate the informational asymmetries among shareholders, lenders 
and borrowers that arguably lie behind most episodes of financial distress.
Yet despite the recent advances in the design of a banking supranational pru-
dential framework, much remains to be done, especially with regard to other 
financial institutions and markets. From my personal experience as governor 
of a central bank with supervisory and regulatory responsibilities, member of 
the Governing Council of the ECB and member of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, I strongly believe that there is much merit in central banks 
playing an active role in the pursuit of prudential policies that rightly respond 
to the challenges posed by the current process of intense financial deepening. I 
would agree that one specific institutional model is unlikely to fit all. Moreover, 
the operational separation between prudential and monetary policies should in 
any event be preserved. However, it is in the general interest of societies to take 
advantage of the institutional strength and the valuable information and analyti-
cal expertise held by most central banks in order to safeguard the soundness of 
financial systems. 
Reflections on challenges in EMU
The challenges faced by a central bank are certainly not smaller if it has to 
conduct a single monetary policy for a multinational currency area.
We have seen that in the new economic and financial landscape, central banks 
should explore ways to fully internalise the close links between financial and mac-
roeconomic stability. The Eurosystem is well suited to take into account the ex-
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isting synergies. The Treaty itself establishes price stability as a primary objective 
while at the same time calling on the ESCB to contribute to the smooth conduct 
of prudential policies and the proper operation of payment systems.
Nonetheless, central bank policies must deal with a heterogeneous economic 
scenario where national economies retain distinctive features both in terms of ex-
posure to specific shocks and as a consequence of the different functioning of domes-
tic policies and allocation mechanisms. Moreover, while markets are increasingly 
integrated there are still frictions impeding sufficiently flexible flows of products, 
capital and labour. Even in the financial services area, and although progress in de-
veloping the single market is already evident, some transactions involving agents in 
several euro zone countries are still penalised in comparison with purely domestic 
operations.
Against this background, the Eurosystem has had to face the challenges 
posed by economic heterogeneity and imperfect integration in two ways. First-
ly, by complementing the monitoring of euro-wide aggregate variables with the 
analysis of relevant national developments in order to identify the policy that 
best helps ensure price stability in the euro area as a whole. Secondly, by pro-
moting a better integration of markets, particularly financial markets, in the 
euro area. 
Regarding this latter issue, the role of payment systems is crucial. As we have 
heard this morning, the Eurosystem is making a significant contribution by devel-
oping a wholesale payment system, known as TARGET2, which will provide for 
safer and more efficient large-value payment flows within the euro area. I would 
agree that more has to be done by the competent authorities to achieve higher in-
tegration for retail payments and securities transactions. However, the Eurosystem, 
together with the European Commission, is actively supporting the Single Euro 
Payments Area initiative and has devoted much effort to promoting more efficient 
and safer securities settlement systems and to facilitating the cross-border use of 
collateral.
In any event, I have the impression that in years to come the Eurosystem will 
have to strengthen further both aspects of its policy approach. As EMU is not like-
ly to become a much more homogenous area in the foreseeable future, the need 
might be felt to pay more attention to key national economic developments on 
the basis of the contribution by NCBs, therefore making more intensive use of the 
federal organisation of the European monetary authority. My feeling is that coun-
try-specific analysis is proving increasingly informative for fully understanding the 
situation, prospects and policy needs of the euro area as a whole. 
Similarly, I would not be surprised if the ECB were to find it appropriate in the 
future to raise its profile somewhat in defending a more integrated and liberalised 






In sum, our economies are now experiencing some important changes, both 
with regard to how goods and services are produced and traded, and the possi-
bilities that agents face to organise their economic decisions over time. Most of 
the underlying forces causing these changes must be judged as largely beneficial 
per se. Yet as occurs with any new situation, we face much uncertainty that re-
quires a comprehensive learning effort. As central bankers, we have learnt that 
price stability should be deemed as a highly valuable but insufficient achievement 
to promote financial stability. We have also gained some understanding as to why 
this is so, and, hence, on the need to take some steps towards making the goals 
of monetary and financial stability compatible and sustainable. Admittedly, our 
knowledge is still scarce in some important areas. However, as the interaction be-
tween the two objectives is becoming more pronounced, the role of central banks 
is probably more complex but also more relevant.

Good afternoon, governor, members of the Governing council, ladies and gentlemen,
Let me first of all thank the Bank of Spain for its kind invitation to be here 
with you today. It is always a pleasure for our country to host the meeting of the 
European Central Bank Governing Council. It is a particular pleasure if it is cou-
pled with a symposium with such qualified attendance. 
You have been discussing very interesting topics throughout the day. My com-
ments today in closing this conference will deal with some of them, specifically 
those of the last two sessions: financial stability and macroprudential issues, and 
global imbalances. In both cases, I will discuss them briefly while trying to con-
vey how these issues are viewed from outside the realm of central banking.
I will purposefully leave out the session on settlement systems, which as you 
know is a, shall we say, difficult topic for non-central bankers. 
Macroprudential concerns have been high on the agenda of central banks and 
other supervising entities in the last few years. The interest of supervisors has 
gradually shifted from what intrinsic features make a bank vulnerable, to which 
macroeconomic traits might portend a general economic correction that could 
render some apparently sound banks vulnerable. This represents a remarkable 
change of emphasis from a decade or so ago. Let me offer two reasons which 
might partly explain this trend:
First, the supervision of banks at the micro level is now on a very sound foot-
ing. This is due to several factors: the microeconomic literature on bank solvency 
and bank runs has come a long way in the past decade and a half, while supervi-
sors have displayed a high degree of competence in the execution of their tasks; 
in our country, we have the outstanding example of this in the Bank of Spain. 
Supervision as such has improved markedly, but equally important in disciplin-
ing bank behaviour have been the strict enforcement of rules governing the ad-
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equacy of bank management teams and the prudent but vigorous exercise of moral 
suasion by supervisors. The progress in constraining individual bank behaviour to 
forestall future problems has been remarkable, even if some important challenges 
remain.
Second, behavioural finance has shown us the importance of the herd instinct 
in all financial issues. There are reasons to believe this instinct to be somewhat 
less prevalent in banking than in financial markets, for a variety of reasons; but of 
course banks are more fragile than investment vehicles, for reasons well known, so 
that inadequate behaviour among banks is much more worrying to all of us, not 
least to Governments who guarantee deposits. Therefore, inasmuch as excessively 
expansive macro developments could be due to herd-like imprudent lending by 
banks, macroprudential concerns and responses would be warranted.
In any case, we have to exercise care so as not to apply these concerns indis-
criminately. A rapid buildup of debt may sometimes be a sign of rational adapta-
tion to a new economic environment; increases in asset prices could be reflecting 
improved economic circumstances and not collectively irrational behaviour on the 
part of investors.
The creation of the euro area is certainly a case in point. For countries such as 
Spain, membership of the Monetary Union has entailed a dramatic break with our 
past of macroeconomic instability and high interest rates. This accounts for high-
er asset prices, since the existing capital stock becomes more productive, and hence 
more valuable, by virtue of this new macroeconomic environment; and lower interest 
rates lead to those higher future returns having more present value. The increase in 
investment and debt is also to be expected, with the inevitable lags, due among other 
factors to adjustment costs associated with changes in the physical capital stock.
We can debate the timing and size of these effects, and both issues are very 
much part of the economic discussion in our country, but the effects undoubtedly 
exist and are significant. We should therefore be wary of simplistic analyses which 
deem increases in asset prices and debt accumulation to be imbalances by defini-
tion, therefore requiring automatic corrections from the economic policy side.
If the creation of a monetary union seems too unique to be a general qualifi-
cation to the macroprudential baseline case, there are other examples: in fact, any 
positive exogenous shock to the supply side of the economy would lead to an in-
crease in the prices of assets and probably induce a faster rate of debt accumulation, 
as economic agents adjust their intertemporal consumption desires. This would be 
fully rational and would not require any economic policy response. Of course, one 
could qualify the applicability of this argument by pointing out that a main source 
of such shocks is structural reform, and that the euro area is not seeing much of it.
The rationality of the asset price escalation-buildup of debt is a very important 
part of the macroprudential discussion, and has justifiably been one of its main 
focal points. But another key element is often lost in this debate: the role of am-
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plifying factors. I am thinking in particular of two: budgetary behaviour on the 
Government side, and labour market issues.
The fiscal response on the Government side is important, inasmuch as it can 
temper the expansive impulses that private demand is experiencing. If fiscal restraint 
from the public side compensates the higher propensity to spend on the private side, 
aggregate saving can remain stable, offering an important anchor for the economy; 
among other things, this would normally ensure that private investment accounts 
for most demand growth, so that we would have prima facie reason to believe that 
the new capital stock will generate enough returns to service the incurred debt.
Meanwhile, developments in the labour market also matter. Depending on la-
bour market institutions, the expansion of demand attendant upon higher asset 
prices might lead to excessive wage growth and therefore create greater inflation-
ary tensions. This would mean that the push from the demand side would end up 
dissipating in inflation, while investment would be deterred by adverse wage de-
velopments. As a result, the society’s productive capacity, and hence its ability to 
service debt, would not increase at the same rate as its debt and problems would 
ensue, first of a macroeconomic nature and then, possibly, bank solvency prob-
lems. Conversely, smoothly-functioning labour markets would properly process 
labour demand pressures, turning them mainly into employment gains.
Of course, the budgetary behaviour on the Government side and the evolution 
of the labour market are factors that would only be adding to pressures arising 
elsewhere, in the credit market; they might thus be thought of as secondary. But 
their role may actually be key in two ways: they may precipitate the correction of 
asset prices and the ensuing weakening of the economy, giving policymakers less 
time to react; and, more importantly, they may generate macroeconomic problems 
even if the initial asset price increase was perfectly rational. Indeed, the economic 
difficulties of some eurozone countries since 1999 may be attributable to the inad-
equate response to the financial effervescence induced by monetary union, rather 
than to the inadequacy of such financial developments in themselves.
Global imbalances have also been touched upon in these meetings, and they 
are certainly a worrying part of our economic landscape. In thinking about them, 
we should focus on three questions: to which extent might they have a rational 
economic explanation? What risks do they pose? And, what is the optimal eco-
nomic policy response from an aggregate point of view?
I will deal with these questions, leaving out the political economy part of the 
issue, which may well be the most important one: how to convince the main 
incumbent countries to participate in this optimal policy response by ensuring 
them a reasonable participation in the benefits.
In dealing with current account surpluses, it is helpful to differentiate between 
those incurred by oil exporters and surpluses run by developing countries which 
are not relevant exporters of crude.
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Current account surpluses by oil-exporting countries, and the corresponding 
deficits in oil-importing countries, may be rational to a large extent, in an inter-
temporal sense. After all, the price of oil might not remain as high as it is now in 
the long term, and, if it does, oil-consuming countries will end up adapting by im-
porting less of this raw material. One way or another, oil-exporting countries are 
unlikely to obtain as much real oil revenue in the long term as they are enjoying 
now. Hence, the imbalances due to high oil prices may be considered a rational 
intertemporal response by oil-purchasing countries, in the form of consumption-
smoothing: borrowing from nations which benefit from high crude oil prices to 
tide them over while the adjustment to more expensive oil takes place.
In the case of developing countries with current account surpluses, the situation is 
different. First, these nations are exporting capital while they still have pressing invest-
ment needs of various kinds, not least in the environmental area. One might deem 
this a secondary concern, given the high rates of investment that many of them are 
nonetheless sustaining, but there is also the issue of consumption: at present, poor de-
veloping country families are foregoing consumption on a large scale to finance much 
richer consumers in developed countries (as well as government deficits in some of 
them). Whether this makes any sense is at least debatable. There is reason to believe, 
furthermore, that some of these imbalances may be caused by exchange rate policy.
But, as we know, one country’s surplus is another country’s deficit. And it is also 
apparent that fiscal indiscipline in some developed countries, particularly the US, 
is unduly eroding its national saving rate and therefore contributing to its current 
account deficit.
We all know the risks that excessive current account imbalances entail. Mainly, 
the risk of a disorderly correction in exchange rates, with currency disruptions and 
damage to the world trade system. The fact that part of the imbalances can be 
considered logical from an economic standpoint offers some consolation, but only 
some; after all, oil-exporting countries are also accumulating assets vis-à-vis deficit 
countries. If a currency crisis arose, there is no obvious reason to believe that these 
assets would not be part of the selling trend just as other assets that surplus coun-
tries have accumulated in recent years.
It is therefore heartening to see that incumbent countries have finally started to 
take action in dealing with these imbalances, from a cooperative standpoint. More 
important than the specific actions that have been adopted up to now is the fact 
that these countries recognize that imbalances pose problems and that joint action 
can be beneficial to the world as a whole. After all, currency stability is a world 
public good, the preservation of which is in the interest of all countries.
What specific recipes should be applied to deal with our present imbalances? 
Classic demand-shifting policies are undoubtedly part of the answer, and consti-
tute the backbone of the coordination efforts that are now underway. But let me 
also offer some qualifications.
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First of all, there is always the temptation to focus all the debate on exchange 
rates, and that is not desirable, for several reasons. Estimating equilibrium ex-
change rates is a subjective task, and exchange rate policy is perceived, rightly or 
wrongly, as a zero-sum game by all the main agents in this discussion; therefore, 
it is a variable that lends itself to shallow political discussions rather than to so-
ber economic debates. The excessive public discussion of this topic could thus 
encourage protectionism and serve as a distraction from serious efforts on other 
economic policy fronts.
Second, it is also important to realize that there are limits to what macroeco-
nomic policy, even if perfectly coordinated, can do or should do to address glo-
bal imbalances. One reason is that some of the imbalances are due to structural 
factors: for example, in some countries with “insufficient consumption” from a 
world economy point of view, population aging, an underdeveloped financial sys-
tem, or the scant availability of consumer goods may be more important causes 
than interest rates or disposable income. A lack of investment safeguards or a lim-
ited regard for the rule of law in a country could also inhibit investment flows to 
it and lead to capital outflows from this country to richer ones, contrary to what 
standard economic theory would predict. These structural variables cannot easily 
be influenced by macroeconomic policy.
We should also bear in mind that adjustment policies are not symmetric in 
their effects. Restrictive policies are almost always successful, while expansive pol-
icies, for reasons well known, are ineffective relatively often. Therefore, recom-
mendations to maintain contractive economic policies in some countries and ex-
pansive policies in others might, if applied, end up reducing world demand and 
hence world GDP. One need not fully accept the “savings glut” theory in order 
to have some reservations about restraining demand in the countries that are now 
pushing the world economy forward.
These are some of the reflections I wanted to share with you today, by way of 
closing this symposium. Let me add one last comment, at the risk of stating the 
obvious: these are very important issues. There is often the tendency to dismiss 
them as topics of interest only to central bankers and G-8 ministers, but they 
have a substantial impact on the long-term welfare of our societies. We all ben-
efit from an economic growth which is balanced among the different regions and 
hence less vulnerable to corrections. Equally beneficial, as we know very well in 
Spain, is having a robust, high-quality banking system, resistant to shocks and ef-
ficient at channelling savings towards investment.
I hope this conference has served to advance the state of knowledge in all these 
questions.
Thank you all for your attendance,
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Bank of Portugal) in 2000, and is now in his second term after reappointment 
in May 2006. He also served in this same post from 1985 to 1986, after several 
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mandates as Vice-Governor (1977-1979 and 1981-1984). In addition, he was ex-
ecutive Director of the Banco Português de Investimento (1995), non-executive 
Director of Electricidade de Portugal, the Portuguese national power utility (1998-
2000), member of the Conselho de Estado, an advisory body to the President of 
the Republic (1996-2006), Secretary of State for Budget and Planning (1974-1975 
and 1976), and Member of Parliament (1976, 1980-1981, and 1987-1988). He 
graduated in Economics from the Universidade Técnica de Lisboa.
Vittorio Corbo
Mr. Corbo has been serving as Governor of the Banco Central de Chile (Cen-
tral Bank of Chile) since May 2003. Prior to this he was Head of the Macro-
economic Development and Growth Division of the World Bank (1984-1991), 
professor at Concordia University in Canada (1972-1981), professorial lecturer 
at Georgetown University (1986-1991) and Vice-President of the International 
Economic Association (1998-2002). Since 1981 he has also held the position of 
professor of the Economics School of the Catholic University of Chile. In recent 
years he has been an adviser to the World Bank, the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank and the IMF. Mr. Corbo received a Ph.D. in Economics from the 
MIT in 1971.
David Folkerts-Landau
Mr. Folkerts-Landau is the Global Head of Research (Equities and Fixed Income) 
at Deutsche Bank, based in London and New York.  He is also a member of the Glo-
bal Markets Executive Committee. Before joining Deutsche Bank in 1997, he was 
the division head of International Capital Markets surveillance and financial markets 
research at the IMF from 1992.  Prior to this, he was assistant professor of econom-
ics and finance at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. Mr. Folk-
erts-Landau holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Princeton University. 
Alberto Giovannini
Mr. Giovannini is Chief Executive Officer of the asset management compa-
nies Unifortune SGR SpA (Milan) and Unifortune Investment Management Ltd. 
(London). He is also Chairman of the Consultative Group on the Impact of the 
Euro on the European Capital Markets, also known as the Giovannini Group. In 
addition, he has been Deputy General Manager of Banca di Roma, a member of 
the board of Borsa Italiana SpA (the Italian Stock Exchange), Montetitoli SpA (the 
Italian central security depository) and the Vice-Chairman of MTS SpA (the pre-
mier government bond electronic platform in Europe). Mr. Giovannini gained his 
Ph.D. in Economics from the MIT in 1984 and joined the faculty of Columbia 




Mr. González-Páramo has been a Member of the Executive Board of the ECB 
since June 2004. Previously he held several posts at the Banco de España, where he 
was a member of the Executive Board (1998-2004), of the Governing Council (1994-
2004), and senior economic adviser (1989-1994). He has also acted regularly as ad-
viser to many public policy institutions, including the World Bank, the International 
Development Bank, the European Commission and several Spanish government 
agencies. Mr. González Páramo obtained a Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1986, 
and, since 1998, has been a professor of economics at Universidad Complutense. 
Malcolm D. Knight
Mr. Knight has been General Manager of the Bank for International Settle-
ments since April 2003. From 1999 to 2003, he served as the Senior Deputy 
Governor at the Bank of Canada, where he was also the Chief Operating Officer 
and a member of the Board of Directors. Prior to this, from 1975 to 1999, Mr. 
Knight was with the IMF, where he held senior positions in research and op-
erations. While at the IMF, he taught at the Johns Hopkins University School of 
Advanced International Studies and the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University. From 1971 to 1975, he taught at the University of Toronto and the 
London School of Economics, from where he holds a Ph.D. in Economics. 
Erkki Liikanen
Mr. Liikanen is the Chairman of the Board of the Suomen Pankki (Bank of 
Finland), and has been a Member of the Governing Council of the ECB since 
July 2004. Also, he is currently the Governor of the IMF for Finland. He ear-
lier held several posts at the European Commission, including Commissioner for 
Enterprise and Information Society (1999-2004), and Commissioner for Budg-
et, Personnel and Administration (1995-1999). Prior to this, he was elected as 
a Member of the Finnish Parliament (1972-1990), and served as Minister of Fi-
nance (1987-1990). From 1981 to 1987, he was Secretary-General of the Finnish 
Social Democratic Party. Mr. Liikanen holds a Masters degree in Political Science 
(Economics) from the University of Helsinki.
Frederic S. Mishkin
Mr. Mishkin is the Alfred Lerner Professor of Banking and Financial Institutions at 
the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University. He is also a research associate 
at the National Bureau of Economic Research, a senior fellow at the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Center for Banking Research, and is currently the President of 
the Eastern Economic Association. Since receiving his Ph.D. from the MIT in 1976, 
he has taught at the University of Chicago, Northwestern University, Princeton Uni-
versity and Columbia University. From 1994 to 1997 he was Executive Vice President 
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and Director of Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In September 2006 
he was appointed Governor of the Federal Reserve Board.
Christian Noyer 
Mr. Noyer is the Governor of the Banque de France and has been a Member of 
the Governing Council of the ECB since November 2003. Prior to this, from Oc-
tober 2002, he was Special Advisor to the French Ministry of Economy, Finance 
and Industry. In June 1998 he was appointed Vice-President of the ECB and occu-
pied this position until June 2002. Among other senior posts, he has been Director 
of the French Treasury, member of the European Monetary Committee, alternate 
Governor in the IMF and the World Bank, and Chairman of the Paris Club of 
Creditor Countries. Mr. Noyer graduated in Law at the universities of Rennes and 
Paris, and holds a diploma from the Paris Institute of Political Sciences. 
Guillermo Ortíz
Mr. Ortíz was appointed for his current position as Governor of the Banco de 
México in 1998. Previously, he served as Secretary of Communications and Trans-
portation in Mexico for a brief period, just before the economic crisis of 1994, 
when he was appointed as Secretary of Finance and Public Credit, where he served 
for three years. During that time he was also President of the Banking Privatiza-
tion Committee of the Ministry of Finance. From 1984 to 1988, Mr. Ortíz was 
Executive Director at the IMF. Prior to his long career in public service, he taught 
at several universities in Mexico and the United States. Mr. Ortíz gained his Ph.D. 
in Economics from Stanford University. 
Lucas D. Papademos
Mr. Papademos has been the Vice-President of the ECB since 2002, where he 
also sits on the Executive Board and the Governing Council. Before joining the 
ECB, he held a number of senior posts at the Bank of Greece, including Economic 
Counsellor (1985-1993), Deputy Governor (1993-1994), and Governor (1994-
2002). Mr. Papademos obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from the MIT (1977), and 
has taught at Columbia University (1975-1984) and Athens University, where he has 
held a professorship since 1988.
Raghuram G. Rajan
Mr. Rajan is the Economic Counsellor and Director of Research at the IMF. 
Prior to this position, he taught at the Graduate School of Business at the Univer-
sity of Chicago where he is the Joseph L. Gidwitz Professor of Finance. In 2003, 
Mr. Rajan was awarded the inaugural Fischer Black Prize by the American Finance 
Association for contributions to finance by an economist under 40. His research 
is broadly on the role of institutions, especially financial institutions, in fostering 
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economic development. He earned his M.B.A. from the Indian Institute of Man-
agement, Ahmedabad, and his Ph.D. in Economics at MIT. 
Vincent R. Reinhart
Mr. Reinhart assumed his current position as Director of the Division of Mon-
etary Affairs at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in 2001. 
Prior to this, he was Deputy Director of the Division of International Finance at 
the Board, with responsibility for the sections of international banking, financial 
markets, international financial transactions and trade, and quantitative studies. 
Mr. Reinhart has published extensively on policy issues in international finance 
and trade, macroeconomics and monetary policy. He earned a MPhil in Econom-
ics at Columbia University in 1982. 
Anthony M. Santomero
Mr. Santomero was the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia from July 2000 to April 2006. In that role, he was a voting member of the 
Federal Open Market Committee. During his career at the Federal Reserve, Mr. 
Santomero served as chair of the System’s Committee on Credit and Risk Man-
agement, and as a member of the Financial Services Policy Committee, and the 
Payments System Policy Advisory Committee. He was also Vice Chairman of the 
Conference of Reserve Bank Presidents. Mr. Santomero gained a Ph.D. in Eco-
nomics from Brown University in 1971, and was the Richard K. Mellon Profes-
sor of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School.
Pedro Solbes
Mr. Solbes has been Second Vice-President of the Spanish Government and 
Minister for Economy and Finance since 2004. From 1999 to 2004, he was the 
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs at the European Commission 
and, prior to this, he served as Secretary of State for Relations with the European 
Community (1985-1991), Minister of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (1991-
1993), and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Economy and Finance 
(1993-1996). Mr. Solbes graduated in European Economics from the Université 
Libre de Bruxelles and in Law from the Universidad Complutense, where he also 
gained his Doctorate in Political Science.
Jean-Claude Trichet
Mr. Trichet has been the President of the ECB since October 2003. A few 
months before that appointment, he was elected as Chairman of the G-10 Gover-
nors. Prior to this, he served two terms (1993, 1999) as Governor of the Banque 
de France. Mr. Trichet has also served in a variety of public policy roles, including 
a  position as adviser to the President of the Republic, head of International Af-
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fairs of the French Treasury and Chairman of the Paris Club from 1985 to 1993. 
In addition, he was Chairman of the European Monetary Committee and a mem-
ber of the Council of the European Monetary Institute and the Board of the Bank 
for International Settlements. 
Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell
Ms. Tumpel-Gugerell has been a member of the Executive Board of the ECB 
since 2003. Prior to joining the ECB, she held a number of key positions at the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian National Bank), including Director of 
Area Corporate Planning and Management (1992-1997), Executive Director of 
the Economics and Financial Markets Department (1997-2003), and Vice Gover-
nor (1998-2003). She also served as member of the Economic and Finance Com-
mittee of the European Union (1997-2003) and Chair of the Banking Advisory 
Committee of the European Union (2002-2003), and as a member of the Interna-
tional Relations and Banking Supervision Committees of the ECB (1999-2003). 
Ms. Tumpel-Gugerell also sits on the University Council of the University of Vi-
enna, where she gained a Ph.D. in Economics in 1981.
Axel A. Weber
Mr. Weber has been President of the Deutsche Bundesbank and Member of 
the Governing Council of the ECB since April 2004. Before starting his career in 
central banking, he taught and conducted research, mainly in the field of mon-
etary economics, at the University of Cologne (2001-2004), the Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main (1998-2001) and the Rheinische Frie-
drich Wilhelms University in Bonn (1994-1998). From 1998 to 2002, he was the 
Director of the Center for Financial Studies in Frankfurt am Main. Mr. Weber 
obtained his Doctorate in Economics from the University of Siegen.

